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In this dissertation, I argue for the need to examine the emergence 
of licensing and branding practices prior to media conglomeration. 
Through an in depth exploration of George Trendle’s licensing 
arrangements for the Lone Ranger and Green Hornet brands’, I trace how 
contemporary licensing practices took root while also arguing for the need 
to analyze licensors as cultural intermediaries with particular occupational 
identities, attitudes and values that shape their daily business practices. 
This project uses historical records archived at the Detroit Public Library 
and the American Heritage Center in Laramie Wyoming to re-write the 
history of trans-media relations between the years 1933-1966 through the 
lens of one of the most successful independent licensors of his era. 
Trendle not only shaped future licensing practices, but the degree of 
vii 
independent managerial authority he exercised over his brands also 
exceeded the norms of most intermediaries, leading to his eventual 
marginalization within the emerging media conglomerates of the late 
1960s.  
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Chapter One: Introduction  
On December 12, 2005, Dynamite Entertainment announced plans 
to publish a new Lone Ranger comic book debuting September 2006.i 
Dynamite engages almost exclusively in the practice of “license farming,” 
or leasing the rights to pre-sold commercial properties, for its publishing 
endeavors.ii The company’s other publications include comic books of 
Battlestar Galactica and Xena: Warrior Princess, both titles based on cult 
television series. Explaining Dynamite’s reasons for adapting the Lone 
Ranger, spokesperson J. Allen stated, "After all, The Lone Ranger is THE 
archetype of the modern superhero, he is THE definition of 'Americana,' a 
crusader for truth, justice and the American way.”iii  
What is striking about Allen’s statement is how it simultaneously 
situates the Lone Ranger as part of American popular culture while 
ignoring the brand’s value as an entertainment commodity. First created as 
a radio program by George Trendle in 1933, the Lone Ranger has had a 
long and established career as a licensed brand, having appeared in almost 
every media form imaginable, from radio (1933-1955) to television (1949-
1957), film serials (1937, 1938) to major motion pictures (1958, 1981), 
comic strips (1938-1971), comic books (1940 onwards), cartoons (1966-
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1969), video games (2003) and a long list of toys and other merchandise.  
The Lone Ranger brand was particularly successful from the 
1930s-1960s. This dissertation investigates how the licensing practices 
that developed between 1933-1966 have helped shape both the 
contemporary media climate as well as the continued recognition of the 
Lone Ranger as a cultural icon. It does so by analyzing the workings of 
George Trendle and his associates in developing, licensing, managing and 
marketing the Lone Ranger and Green Hornet brands – not only as popular 
heroes and American icons, but also as entertainment franchises and 
enduring name-brand commercial properties. The Green Hornet would not 
achieve the same financial or cultural acclaim as the Lone Ranger and 
serves as a useful counterexample in delineating the tensions and struggles 
involved in transforming licensed brands into cultural icons. 
How did the Lone Ranger become an American icon? Why did the 
Green Hornet fail to generate the same appeal? What might an 
investigation into the pre-conglomeration development of trans-media 
licensing practices reveal about the differing cultural and economic value 
of these two brands and about the intermediary role performed their owner 
and licensor in shaping them? How did Trendle establish authorship and 
ownership over intangible properties like the Lone Ranger, which 
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otherwise might have circulated “freely” across media and within popular 
culture? Finally, what roles have licensors played historically in both 
furthering brand recognition and exploitation amongst cultural producers 
(and, in turn, consumers) and how has their work shaped the ways in 
which these icons circulate within popular culture?  
As licensing and the negotiation of intellectual property rights have 
become globally recognizable business phenomena and have contributed 
to the growth of contemporary synergistic trans-media strategies, it is vital 
that the history of such practices be traced, their generative mechanisms 
identified, and their cultural logics unraveled. It is essential to investigate 
the historical roles played by licensors in establishing a business model 
and developing formulas that have allowed “American icons” like the 
Lone Ranger to persist across both time and space while remaining 
proprietary pieces of intellectual property. In order to understand how 
successful brand formulas and licensing practices were cultivated, it is 
also necessary to analyze failed attempts. The Lone Ranger’s fictional 
distant cousin, the Green Hornet (1936- ) provides such an example. Both 
followed a similar formula in which a masked hero accompanied by a 
racialized sidekick and equipped with unique weapons and modes of 
transportation battled criminals outside the law’s reach. Whereas The Lone 
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Ranger was set in the Old West (1850-1865), the Green Hornet fought 
urban contemporary criminals. Both brands also followed similar licensing 
and merchandising practices, in which a central text (first radio, and later 
television) was used to generate merchandising opportunities and promote 
the brand to sponsors and to other licensees. Yet, whereas the Lone 
Ranger was widely merchandized and has become a part of the American 
popular cultural lexicon, the Green Hornet has struggled to achieve the 
same economic success and cultural acclaim. Though both properties have 
appeared in multiple mediated forms, I argue that the Green Hornet’s 
failure to generate the same interest from sponsors and merchandisers is 
what makes it an unsuccessful brand. One of the central arguments of this 
project is that licensors saw media texts as means for further promoting 
brands to potential sponsors and licensees, that extending the brand’s 
merchandising reach was their primary goal.  
This project is an attempt to trace the historical development of the 
business of licensing by showing how it has developed over time and how 
licensing has shaped (and has  been shaped by) both shifting cultural 
values and economic practices. I argue that licensors initially positioned 
themselves as intermediaries who managed the articulation of brand 
formulas across multiple but separate media and manufacturing industries. 
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As the national television networks consolidated their power by the late 
1950s, they began operating in-house licensing and merchandising 
divisions that effectively adapted strategies introduced by independent 
licensors like Trendle, undercutting his autonomy and authority and 
eventually rendering him anachronistic by the mid-1960s. By the time 
conglomeration began to take hold by the late 1960s, which centralized 
licensing and merchandising even further, the era of the independent 
licensor was effectively over.    Yet, the brands formulated and managed 
by Trendle and other independent licensors would persist. Many 
(including the Lone Ranger) were bought up by larger more diversified 
companies, like the Wrather Corporation, which stockpiled multiple 
licenses and engaged in both licensing and production activities. Wrather 
purchased the Lone Ranger rights from George Trendle in 1956. Though 
these new licensing agents continued to extend brands into other media 
and merchandise arenas, they relied heavily on the tested strategies and 
established reputations that the independents had built for their brands. 
CMI acquired the Lone Ranger rights in 2001 when it bought out 
the Wrather library. Beyond the comic book deal with Dynamite, CMI has 
begun releasing DVDs of the 1950s TV series, licensed a Lone Ranger 
made-for-TV-movie that appeared on the WB in 2003, and  has announced 
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preliminary plans for a Lone Ranger major motion picture to be released 
in 2007. In 2004, CMI’s estimated income from licensing the Lone Ranger 
and other brands for commercial use was $3.5 million. CMI’s operations 
are part of the current trend within the conglomerated entertainment 
industries to generate trans-mediated commercial intertexts built around 
pre-sold brands rather than stand-alone projects. In such an environment, 
trademarked characters -- like Spiderman, for example -- are spun-off 
from their comic book origins into movie franchises, animated cartoons, 
television series, video games, theme park rides, toys, t-shirts, and other 
ephemera, which are in turn re-adapted back into comic book form.Each 
of these sites promotes the other as well as the brand that binds them 
together. Tellingly, Spiderman’s owner, Marvel Entertainment, Inc., no 
longer identifies itself as a comic book publisher, but as “one of the 
world's most prominent character-based entertainment companies.”iv  
While licensed brands that have been in circulation for up to seventy years 
are clearly  still central to contemporary media practices,  what is not 
altogether clear is what licensors actually do with these properties. CMI’s 
website explains that the company “owns and manages some of the 
world’s most recognizable family properties across all media including 
feature film, television, home video, and consumer products.”v Like 
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CMI’s management role, Marvel “facilitates the creation of entertainment 
projects.”vi  What precisely is involved in managing or facilitating the 
extension of intellectual properties into other media and merchandise 
arenas is not explained. To some extent, it is simply taken for granted that 
iconic heroes like Spiderman or the Lone Ranger sell themselves, while 
their owners simply keep an eye on their bank accounts or watch out for 
illegal, unlicensed reproductions of their property. In this dissertation I 
argue that dating back to the 1930s, a great deal of work has gone into 
constructing successful cultural brands; moreover, given their continued 
exploitation in an environment that presupposes their iconicity, there is a 
need to excavate and expose the historical practices that have facilitated 
these assumptions, as well as these brands’ continued profitability.  
This dissertation investigates what licensors actually “do” in order 
to make trade characters like the Lone Ranger into “American icons.” In 
its most basic form, licensing involves the “granting of rights in property 
without transferring ownership of it.”vii This definition, in and of itself, 
says very little about how licensors go about their business; how 
determinations are made over what properties get licensed in what form 
and to whom and how licensees come to appreciate certain brands over 
others. It also says nothing of what licensors do to ensure their rights to 
 8
property are not violated or challenged, either by so-called infringers or by 
misappropriations. A more encompassing, if anecdotal, definition of what 
licensor’s “do” is found in a 1966 True Magazine article about the 
“unprecedented” success of the Licensing Corporation of America in 
licensing the James Bond and Batman properties: 
A licensing agent takes a property - which can mean a 
person such as Jackie Gleason or Brigitte Bardot, a 
mythical character such as Batman or Sherlock Holmes, or 
even a magazine such as American Heritage - and acting as 
a broker, deals out permission to manufacturers to make 
products using the name of that property. The licensing 
agent acts as legal advisor, salesman, merchandising expert, 
package designer, promoter, advertising consultant, 
brusher-offer, whooper-upper and Dutch Uncle. For this he 
usually gets five percent of the wholesale price of the item, 
which he splits with his client, the owner of the property.viii 
 
While this definition suggests that licensors wear many hats and act in 
various intermediary capacities in assisting licensees to best exploit 
particular brands, it fails to address the role licensors play in shaping and 
managing the cultural meanings attached to the properties they broker. 
Nor does this definition address the relationships between licensees that 
must be attended to, as properties traverse merchandising and media lines. 
Because licensing practices are primarily invested in extending brand 
identification, they are deeply rooted in policing the boundaries and 
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managing the articulations of the necessarily malleable formulas employed 
to represent their intangible properties as they are adapted to meet shifting 
social and institutional contexts. How did licensors convince potential 
clients that it was their intangible properties that sold products, and not the 
other way around? How did licensors demonstrate that intangible 
properties had value? Where are the trouble spots and conflicts that 
emerge in licensing brands across multiple media and merchandising sites 
and how did licensors work to resolve these tensions? 
Licensing is often invisible; its origins are as murky as the actual 
work that is involved in making trans-media intersection fluid and brands 
prolific. As such, there is a growing need to make licensor work practices 
transparent and, more importantly for this project, to situate these tasks 
within their proper historical, institutional, and cultural context. This 
dissertation seeks to shine a light on these complex cultural and industrial 
processes as well as on the often invisible figures that, particularly during 
the era under investigation in this project (1933-1966), played important 
roles in spreading and shaping the meanings and values their properties 
promoted. Licensing practices have largely gone unnoticed in academic 
histories that focus on textual examples or macro-political economies of 
cultural industries. This project is interested in micro-political economics, 
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the practices and the attitudes and values that inform cultural production, 
that happen between industries, particularly prior to (and as a precursor 
for) the current era of conglomeration. What did Trendle did to make 
properties like the Lone Ranger successful (or failed to do in the case of 
the Green Hornet)?  What accounts for his particular work habits, 
strategies, and social ideals? What effects did Trendle’s own 
understanding of his role as licensing agent play in shaping how these 
brands circulated across media? Trendle’s licensing practices were 
intricately linked with his self-appointed role as "cultural intermediary" 
and "moral arbiter," who could simultaneously deliver consumers to 
corporations through established brand formulas and protect consumers 
from corporate tendencies to exploit them. This concern was especially 
acute for brands whose audiences were largely envisioned to be children.  
The cultural values and institutional practices of independent 
licensing agents like Trendle, acting as intermediaries between various 
media and merchandising outfits, shaped the transformation of licensed 
properties such as the Lone Ranger into American cultural icons. At the 
same time, Trendle’s managerial authority was repeatedly challenged by 
the constantly shifting institutional, legal, and social climates in which he 
operated. There is a need to complicate the relationships between licensors 
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and their clients in order to reveal not only how cultural concerns often 
conflicted with economic practices when it came to trans-mediated 
branding strategies (and often won out over immediate profits), but also 
how the arbitration of cultural values was integral to licensor justifications 
of their managerial authority/ownership of their brands and the formulas 
devised to exploit them. 
 
PERIODIZATION    
As a professional practice, licensing is intrinsically linked with the 
development of mass culture industries and advertising agencies at the 
turn of the 20th Century.ix In Comics and Consumer Culture, Ian Gordon 
argues that early efforts at licensing comic strip characters often pitted 
their creators against both the publishing syndicates that exploited their 
labor and claimed ownership over the strips and against the horde of 
unlicensed materials bearing the image of their creation. Richard 
Outcault’s experiences with his highly popular comic strip Hogan’s Alley 
and its star character, The Yellow Kid, epitomized these struggles.  As 
Gordon elaborates, created in 1900, “the Yellow Kid’s meaning and 
reception often slipped from his creator’s control... unauthorized Yellow 
Kid products, including songbooks, buttons, chewing gum, chocolate 
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figurines, cigars, and ladies’ fans” abounded. x Additionally, Outcault's 
employer, Hearst Publishing, saw the cartoon character as its property, and 
often sought to exploit the Kid's image for newspaper sales without 
compensating Outcault (or even employing him to do the art), prompting 
Outcault to add a warning to fans in his cartoon, which read  “Do Not Be 
Deceived. None Genuine Without This Signature.”  Still, Gordon surmises 
that the lack of clear creative ownership and the bevy of unlicensed 
products bearing the Yellow Kid's image quickly "diminished the value of 
the character as a commodity for both Outcault and the publisher.”xi 
Outcault’s next creation, Buster Brown (1902), was more carefully 
guarded against unapproved replications. Outcault copyrighted both 
Buster’s name and image, ensuring that only he had the rights to draw the 
character. Outcault also recognized the merchandizing potential for his 
comic strip character and earned a healthy second income from licensing 
Buster’s image to a bevy of products, including Buster Brown shoes. 
Though Outcault did not earn any royalties or receive a percentage of 
profits from any of these licenses, he was paid for his artistic work 
(Outcault typically drew all the advertisements and display materials that 
featured Buster Brown). While newspaper publishers and cartoonists 
licensed comic strip characters as far back as 1902 with Buster Brown, 
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these arrangements were merely secondary forms of income 
supplementing profits earned from either newspaper sales or salaries.  
Independent licensors first emerged in the 1930s, responding to 
both changes in copyright law and the nation-wide expansion of media 
and marketing outlets. Though they often continued to produce materials 
for a particular media site (for instance, either a comic strip or, in 
Trendle’s case, The Lone Ranger radio program), these independent 
licensors privileged extending their brands across media and merchandise 
sites over the production of any one text.  In other words, they saw their 
primary product as the brand and their first orders of business as extending 
its reach. The media texts in which a brand appeared became new ways of 
further publicizing the property’s value to other potential licensees. In fact, 
my use of the term “independent licensor” refers precisely to this 
inversion of the primary order of business. 
 Independent licensors emerged just as previous struggles over 
copyright ownership were being decided in the courts and by Congress in 
favor of granting greater control to registrants and higher penalties for 
infringers. Deriving from the Copyright Clause of the Constitution, 
copyright provides inventors with exclusive but limited-term rights to 
exploit their inventions commercially and encourages the “progress of 
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science and the useful arts” by securing rights and benefits for innovators. 
Copyright is intended to provide incentives for innovation, with profits 
seen as a mere byproduct. As such, copyright protection cannot supercede 
the social benefit derived from new scientific or artistic accomplishments. 
For example, copyright protection might provide an incentive for a 
scientist to develop a new vaccine, but the scientist could not then deny 
sick people access to it, especially if they were willing to pay. Similarly, 
artists might copyright particular paintings or sculptures in order to 
prevent their duplication, but they could not deny others the right to be 
inspired by their work.    
 Trademark protection dates back to the 1850s and common law 
rules against passing off property belonging to another as one’s own. It 
was not until 1918, however, that the Supreme Court considered the 
complexities of unfair competition as exceeding merely palming off 
products, as it encountered claims of stolen names and even stolen ideas. 
Trademark law offers weaker protection than copyright law but for a 
potentially unlimited duration, as long as the property remains in 
commercial use. Trademark legislation is intended to protect the public 
against confusion and deception that might be caused by competing 
businesses using similar marks/logos/slogans, etc. As such, it supposedly 
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promotes competition by facilitating comparison shopping and preserving 
the “goodwill” that trademark owners have invested in and generated from 
a recognizable brand. There has been considerable struggle historically, 
however, over defining what categories of business are actually in 
competition with one another so and, moreover, what defines “goodwill.”  
 According to McCarthy, early arguments over trademark 
infringement often centered around whether plaintiffs and defendants were 
in direct competition with one another and, if not, how use of similar 
trademarks could be considered unfair competition. As such, the first 
“modern” federal trademark act passed in 1905 offered only limited 
protections. Only technical common-law trademarks could be registered. 
Registered trademarked names and logos had to be fanciful and arbitrary, 
not suggestive or descriptive.  For example, on could trademark the name 
Sanka (fanciful), but not Fine Coffee (descriptive) The act was amended 
several times, including a major revision in 1920, but these changes 
remained inadequate to cope with the complexities of 20th Century 
commercial branding practices.xii  
 It was not until the 1930s that a concerted effort to modernize 
trademark law was undertaken.  The initial draft of the Lanham Act, still 
the basis for all modern-day intellectual property law, was first introduced 
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before Congress in 1938, though it did not pass until 1946. The act 
established secondary meaning justifications for ownership claims. 
Secondary meanings become attached to suggestive and descriptive 
properties by demonstrating that the public has come to associate the 
brand name exclusively with particular products. The test of secondary 
meaning comes from only the mere possibility of consumer confusion.  
Secondary meaning would have considerable implications for licensors. 
For example, if one were to add the “Lone Ranger” name to say, a piano 
or a garbage truck or a cleaning solution (or any product) without 
permission, and there was even the slightest possibility that the consumer 
might believe this product was now officially associated with the Lone 
Ranger brand or endorsed by the Lone Ranger character, even though 
none of these products bare any direct relation to the original Lone Ranger 
radio series, one would risk violating the trademark protection granted to 
the Lone Ranger’s owner.  Nonetheless, there have been many challenges 
to the Lanham Act that have tested the limits of secondary meaning 
protection and the act itself has been amended twenty times since 1946. 
Throughout this period, the legal actions and business practices 
established by licensing agents played crucial roles in shaping both 
copyright and trademark legislation, while also anxiously responding to 
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the delays in passing the Lanham Act and to its occasionally fuzzy 
interpretations.  
The height of independent licensor activity also coincides with an 
era characterized by intense pressures for social conformity and 
tremendous change in the organization and operation of the film, 
broadcasting, and publishing industries. These industrial shifts included, 
amongst other things, the transitions from local to national radio 
sponsorship, from radio to television, from single-sponsorship to 
magazine-format programming practices, and from independent TV 
producers to studio productions. Additionally, licensors felt the after-
effects of the 1948 Paramount Decree, which put an end to not only the 
film industry’s (and, in particular, the major Hollywood studios’) vertical 
integration strategies (control of the means of production, distribution and 
exhibition of motion pictures), but also to the centrality of B-movie 
westerns and film adventure serials to the classical mode of production. . 
Throughout the 1930s and 1940s, these had been the most prominent sites 
for translating licensed characters to the silver screen.  
Licensors also attempted to adapt their strategies to the increasing 
regulation and, in turn, juvenilization of the American comic book 
industry. The comic book industry came under fire in the early 1950s for 
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publishing materials deemed unsuitable for children like “true crime” and 
“horror” comics. Rather than risk government regulation, the comic book 
industry eliminated its more adult fare entirely and refocused its attention 
on much younger audiences. The comic book industry’s decision came at 
a time when its television and motion picture equivalents were beginning 
to recognize and target older adolescent and young adult consumers, 
which made comic books somewhat incongruous with these other media. 
Throughout, licensors continued to act as intermediaries between different 
media and merchandisers, negotiating separate yet intersecting licensing 
arrangements that responded to (and often were stymied by) changes in 
the organization of media production, distribution, and exhibition 
practices. Licensors’ need constantly to reinvent both their properties and 
how they were sold led to business strategies that stressed malleability on 
the one hand, and historical continuity on the other. These strategies 
continue to play an important role in the marketing of intellectual 
properties. 
 This period also was one of tremendous transformations in the 
ways Americans constituted themselves as both citizens and consumers. 
From the 1920s through the 1950s, social attitudes shifted from a 
potentially antagonistic relationship between corporations and consumers 
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during the Depression that resulted in calls for increased consumer 
advocacy, better rights and benefits for labor, and an ethos of restraint, to a 
postwar climate that conflated citizenship with consumption, and marked 
the latter as a vital means of demonstrating the former.xiii Licensors played 
important roles in helping industries to navigate these shifts, while 
themselves responding to changing cultural definitions of Americanism. 
Furthermore, licensors like Trendle lived through these tumultuous 
changes and thrived. These changes affected Trendle’s attitude both 
toward the value he assigned his work as a licensor and the values he 
incorporated into his brands. The Lone Ranger would, in part, become a 
champion for both corporate capitalism and the entrepreneurial spirit 
because these were values that Trendle not only profited from, but also 
wholeheartedly believed in. 
 From the mid-1960s onwards, conglomeration began to reintegrate 
licensing divisions into larger corporations. Intense cross-industry 
promotional strategies were already in place prior to these conglomeration 
trends; in fact, while more tenuous and contentious, these earlier 
intersections helped pave the way for the more overtly synergistic efforts 
that followed. As the practices that licensors had promoted became 
industry standards, the intermediary roles played by independents like 
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Trendle began to hinder the maximal cross-promotional potential that 
conglomerates sought to exploit. By the mid-1960s, independent licensors 
had either moved in-house as part of studio and network licensing and 
merchandising divisions or were pushed further and further to the margins  
Though cross-promotion and synergy have been identified with the 
practices of the New Hollywood, this dissertation will show how they 
were used by independent licensors pre-conglomeration and were 
gradually incorporated into the production logics of media corporations 
over a thirty-year period.. xiv  
 
GEORGE W. TRENDLE AND ASSOCIATES 
George Washington Trendle (1884-1972) began his career as an 
entertainment lawyer specializing in motion picture contracts and leases. 
In 1918, Trendle partnered with John Kunsky (later King) in the latter’s 
Detroit Kunsky Theaters, managing the distribution end of the business. 
By 1929, he was president of the United Detroit Theaters, which he and 
King sold to Paramount Studios for six million dollars (Trendle remained 
on as manager of the chain until 1935).  
It is unclear why King and Trendle decided to switch from film 
exhibition to broadcasting, but in 1930 they purchased station WGH, 
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CBS’s Detroit affiliate, re-christening it WXYZ. In 1932, CBS began 
offering its affiliate stations all of its programming free of charge so long 
as affiliates took the entire CBS programming package (previously, 
affiliates paid for the network programs they wanted, but had more choice 
over what shows and time spots they wanted to fill). Trendle and King 
(though King was, by now, a silent and uninvolved partner) saw greater 
profit potential in creating their own programming that would attract local 
sponsorship and cancelled their contract with CBS. Trendle’s ambitions 
were furthered by his purchase of six additional radio stations throughout 
the state of Michigan, forming a regional network that promised sponsors 
opportunities for more targeted state-wide coverage at a fraction of CBS’s 
charges.  
Trendle hired several freelance writers to create radio 
programming for his regional network, among them Fran Striker. Striker 
developed several programs for Trendle, in a number of genres, including 
crime, romance, and westerns. In 1933, he developed The Lone Ranger. 
While many Lone Ranger aficionados credit Striker with creating the 
series, both Trendle and Striker flatly denied this. Like other programs 
created for WXYZ, The Lone Ranger was collaboratively developed over 
a number of months with various parties involved in refining the 
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program’s formula. Though admitting that Striker wrote the majority of 
the scripts, Trendle insisted on distinguishing his role as creator from the 
development work done by others. xv  Between 1933-1940, Striker 
developed three radio programs that would attain varying degrees of 
national attention: The Lone Ranger (1933), The Green Hornet (1936) and 
Sergeant Preston of the Yukon (1940).xvi Striker served as lead writer and 
script supervisor on all three shows and was paid per script for his work 
throughout his employment with Trendle (which lasted well into the mid 
1950s).xvii 
While The Lone Ranger began as a radio program on WXYZ, by 
1938 the broadcasting rights were being leased to a large number of 
unaffiliated local and regional radio stations and sponsors via transcription 
services, which provided acetate recordings of individual episodes. By the 
end of 1938, The Lone Ranger could be heard over 108 stations on five 
different radio networks (the Michigan Radio Network, the Mutual 
Broadcasting System, the Don Lee Network, and the Colonial Network, as 
well on NBC affiliate stations in markets not reached by these other 
networks) and was under forty-two separate local or regional 
sponsorships, mostly bakeries.  
The Lone Ranger is often credited, anecdotally, with launching the 
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Mutual Broadcasting System. To be certain, it was one of the first radio 
programs to be shared between several of the flagship radio stations that 
would form Mutual - WXYZ in Detroit, WGN in Chicago, and WOR in 
New York. No definitive history of Mutual radio has been written, even 
though many of the radio series that linger in popular memory originated 
there (including The Shadow and Buck Rogers). Unlike CBS or NBC, the 
Mutual Broadcasting System was less a network than a loose relationship 
between independent radio stations that shared programming. Mutual’s 
aspirations were commercial, but not initially national. The recycling 
strategies Trendle would employ in initially selling The Lone Ranger radio 
program market-by-market resulted from this arrangement with Mutual 
and, I argue, contributed to the generalizability of the formula, which 
needed to be reproduced with every new sponsorship.  
Throughout the 1930s, the Lone Ranger brand was also licensed 
across a wide array of other media and merchandise, including comic 
books, comic strips, film serials, toys, clothing, and confectionary items. 
What distinguishes Trendle from other content producers, distributors, and 
exhibitors, however, was the primacy he granted the merchandising and 
licensing aspects of his business, with the actual program production 
serving mainly to further promote the Lone Ranger brand in order to 
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generate new licenses. By 1935, Trendle had registered the Lone Ranger, 
Inc., the official licensing company for the Lone Ranger brand, as a 
distinct corporate entity from the King-Trendle Radio Corporation, which 
continued to produce the radio series. In fact, Lone Ranger, Inc.’s first 
order of business was to license the radio production rights to The Lone 
Ranger to King-Trendle. The early Lone Ranger licensing arrangements 
will be discussed in greater detail in chapter 1. 
Though this project will often refer interchangeably to George 
Trendle and his corporate affiliations, the King-Trendle Radio Corporation 
(King-Trendle for short) and later, Trendle-Campbell-Meurer, Inc. (TCM), 
it is important to note that much as The Lone Ranger program was 
collaboratively developed, so was the licensing formula. Trendle’s 
primary collaborators on the business end were Alan H. Campbell and 
Raymond Meurer. Campbell began as head of sales at King-Trendle in 
1936, but quickly became Trendle’s right-hand man and eventual business 
partner. Meurer was Trendle’s chief legal counsel from the late 1930s 
onwards, and also became a co-partner in the mid-1940s. All three were 
also the primary shareholders in the Lone Ranger, Inc., the Green Hornet, 
Inc., and Sergeant Preston of the Yukon, Inc., with Trendle holding a 70 
percent stake, Campbell 20 percent,  and Meurer 10 percent.  
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At the company’s height, Trendle handled all aspects of inter-
textual supervision, script consultation, and brand continuity, with 
Campbell responsible for seeking out new markets and Meurer overseeing 
both the legal and merchandising ends of the business. Throughout the 
1930s and early 1940s, most of the promotion and marketing of Trendle’s 
brands was handled by Chas C. Hicks, though never without active 
supervision by all three partners, especially Trendle. Hicks was a salaried 
employee. From the early 1940s through the mid 1950s, Freddie Fralick, a 
talent agent, acted as Trendle’s Hollywood representative, primarily 
supervising the daily production of The Lone Ranger and Sergeant 
Preston television series. Trendle also closely monitored Fralick’s 
activities. Fralick’s salary was drawn from the production budget for each 
series.  
The Lone Ranger was first played on radio by Earle Graser (1933-
1941), who died in a car crash in 1941, and then by Brace Beemer (1941-
1955). Beemer, who  “looked the part,” also made most of the Lone 
Ranger’s public appearances until the early 1950s, when his television 
counterpart, Clayton Moore, replaced him. Beemer remained the radio 
voice of The Lone Ranger until the series was cancelled in 1955. On 
television, the Lone Ranger was played by Moore (1949-1952, 1954-1957, 
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with a brief stint by John Hart [1953-54] when Moore demanded a raise 
and temporarily fired). Al Hodge supplied the Green Hornet’s radio voice 
(1936-1951). The television Green Hornet was played by Van Williams 
(1966-67).  The radio voices for the Lone Ranger’s Indian sidekick, Tonto 
and the Green Hornet’s “Oriental” valet, Kato mostly belonged to white 
performers pretending to be Native American or Asian. Very little 
information is available as to their identities. On television Jay Silverheels 
played Tonto (1949-1957) and Bruce Lee played Kato (1966-67). 
The internal production shifts on both series are mirrored by the 
myriad external partnerships/licensees that the company worked with 
throughout the decades in question, each of whom exercised (or, at least, 
attempted to) varying degrees of influence over the articulation and 
execution of the Lone Ranger and Green Hornet brand formulas. While 
these arrangements led to tremendous profits and popularity for the Lone 
Ranger brand, particularly throughout the 1940s and early 1950s, the 
Green Hornet brand stagnated.  The external partners for the Lone Ranger 
and Green Hornet included: 
 
Lone Ranger Radio: 
 
Green Hornet Radio: 
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1933-1941: The Mutual Broadcasting System 
1942-1946: The National Broadcasting 
                    Company 
1946-1956: The American Broadcasting    
                   Company 
  
1936-1938: The Michigan Radio Network 
1938-1939: The Mutual Broadcasting System 
1939-1940: The National Broadcasting   
                    Company 
1941-1942: The Mutual Broadcasting System 
1942-1945: The National Broadcasting     
                    Company 
1945-1951: The American Broadcasting  
                    Company 
1952:          The Mutual Broadcasting System 
Lone Ranger Radio Sponsors: 
 
1933-1939: Gordon’s Bakeries (first sponsor   
                    over WXYZ); represented by  
                    Sehl Advertising Agency 
1939-1940: Bond Bread (Second sponsor  
                   over WXYZ) 
1933-1941: 40 additional separate local and    
                   regional radio sponsors 
1940-1956: American Bakeries/Merita  
                    Breads (Southeast sponsors) 
1941-1956: General Mills (national sponsors  
                    except in Southeast states);    
                    represented by Blackett- 
                    Sample-Hummert Advertising 
                    Agency 
Green Hornet Radio Sponsors: 
 
1936-1938: Detroit Ebling Creamery/Jersey  
                   Milk (first sponsor on WXYZ);    
                   represented by N.W. Ayer & Sons 
                   Advertising Agency 
1939-1943: Aired on a sustaining basis  
1944-1945: United Shirt Distributors 
1945-1946: Aired on a sustaining basis  
1947-1948: General Mills 
1948-1951: Aired on a sustaining basis  
1952:           Orange-Crush Company  
 
Lone Ranger Television: 
 
1949-1957: Produced by Jack Chertok/Apex  
                   Film Productions; broadcast    
                   Thursdays at 7:30-8:00PM on    
                   ABC-TV; sponsored by General 
                   Mills 
 
 
Green Hornet Television: 
 
1951:          Unaired pilot produced by Jack     
                    Chertok/Apex Film Productions 
1966-1967: Produced by William 
                    Dozier/Greenaway Productions  
                    and Twentieth-Century Fox  
                   Television; broadcast on ABC-  
                   TV 
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Lone Ranger Motion Picture Serials: 
 
1938: Republic Studios (The Lone Ranger,  
          15-part serial) 
1939: Republic Studios (The Lone Ranger    
          Rides Again 15-part serial) 
 
Green Hornet Motion Picture Serials: 
 
1939: Universal Studios (The Green 
           Hornet, 15-part serial) 
1941: Universal Studios (The Green Hornet 
           Strikes Again, 15-part serial) 
 
Lone Ranger Comic Books: 
 
1940-1956: Whitman Publishing (The Lone   
                     Ranger) 
1951-1954: Whitman Publishing (Tonto) 
1952-1954: Whitman Publishing (Hi-Yo    
                    Silver) 
 
Green Hornet Comic Books: 
 
1941-1950: Harvey Comics (Green Hornet)  
 
Lone Ranger Books: 
 
1935-1952: Whitman Publishing (15 Lone   
                     Ranger novelizations)  
Green Hornet novelizations did not emerge 
until the mid-1960s, were published by Dell 
Publishing and coordinated through ABC-TV 
in connection with the 1966-1967 Green 
Hornet television series 
Lone Ranger Comic Strip: 
 
1938-1954: King Features Syndicate (177 
                    daily newspapers) 
 





Lone Ranger Merchandise Licenses: 
 
1938-1954: 171 separate merchandise  
                    licenses for toys, clothing, food  
                    and beverage products,  
                    confections, and other items. [see 
                    reproduction of 1939 list of  
                    merchandise licenses 
 
Additionally, the Lone Ranger made dozens 
Green Hornet Merchandise Licenses: 
 
1965-1966: 65 separate merchandise licenses, 
                   mainly through ABC-TV xviii 
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of paid personal appearances at parades, 
circuses, and factories, as well as guest 
appearances on other radio programs.   
 
The above list reflects the extension of the Lone Ranger and Green 
Hornet brands while owned by Trendle.  In 1954, Trendle sold the Lone 
Ranger property to the Jack Wrather Corporation for $3,000,000. In 1957, 
he also sold Wrather the Sergeant Preston of the Yukon property for 
$1,500,000. By the late 1950s, Trendle had only one brand left, the Green 
Hornet, which he diligently promoted in an effort to land a television 
series and extend its merchandising possibilities. By the end of the 1950s, 
Campbell and Meurer were no longer actively involved in the business, 
though they remained shareholders in the Green Hornet, Inc.  
George Trendle’s turn toward extending the Lone Ranger and 
Green Hornet brands and managing their formulas across media and 
merchandising outlets was not unique, though Trendle’s particular 
position as both owner and creative authority for the brands afforded him a 
degree of control that few other licensor’s had in the early 1930s. Most 
licensed trade characters continued to be owned by newspaper syndicates 
who haphazardly sold these properties to various sponsors and 
merchandisers with little centralized control.  Little Orphan Annie and 
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Terry and The Pirates were radically different stories depending on 
whether one read the comic strip or listened to the radio series. While both 
were extensively merchandised throughout the 1930s, the lack of 
managerial authority over their respective formulas contributed to their 
decline in popularity in the postwar era. Additionally, Little Orphan 
Annie’s creator, Harold Gray, and Terry and the Pirates creator Milton 
Caniff rarely shared in the royalties generated by their respective 
syndicates through licensing their characters. Gray and Caniff did earn 
extra income however by drawing the promotional art and packaging 
design for these merchandised items. This often meant that they had little 
incentive to intervene in licensing decisions, since their profits were 
always earned from immediate extra art work and not long term royalties. 
Some brands that were developed during this period were proprietary 
properties of particular sponsors. For example, General Mills owned the 
Jack Armstrong, All-American Boy brand and while the company did 
license toys and clothing based on the brand and even commissioned a 
couple of film serials, Jack Armstrong’s exclusive association with 
Wheaties prevented the character from fully becoming a national icon.    
Trendle’s contemporaries in the field included John Dille, owner of 
the National Newspaper Service Syndicate and owner of the Buck Rogers 
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brand (1929), Frank Martinek, creator of Don Winslow of the Navy 
(1934), and Walt Disney, owner and creator of Mickey Mouse. Through 
the late 1940s, most licensed character brands emerged first from comic 
books, strips, pulp novels, B-westerns and cartoon animation. Buck 
Rogers began as a pulp novel written by Phillip Nowlan, but was quickly 
extended into a comic strip, a  radio program and several film serials. 
While Nowlan remained the author of the pulp novels and comic strips 
well into the late 1930s, Dille owned the property and recognized that its 
greatest profits lay in merchandising the many science fiction gadgets the 
hero used in his adventures. Buck Rogers ray guns were amongst the most 
successful toys sold throughout the 1930s, as were Buck Rogers space 
suits and toy spaceships. Dille also recognized the importance of cross-
promoting merchandise through media. In 1933-34, Dille had a special 
Buck Rogers short film screened at the World’s Fair and generated dozens 
of new licenses from promoting his futuristic brand at a venue celebrating 
the wonders of new technologies. In 1936, Dille had another Buck Rogers 
short film made and screened in several department store windows that 
sold Buck Rogers merchandise.  
Walt Disney initially licensed Mickey Mouse merchandise to fund 
his exorbitantly expensive animation projects, but the success of these 
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licensed products caused him to rethink his business model. In 1934, 
Disney hired Kay Kamen to head up his new merchandising division. 
Kamen not only extended the Mickey Mouse – and other Disney character 
– brands into non-toy licenses, but he carefully monitored how the 
characters were being depicted and promoted on the merchandise that bore 
their names. Disney also quickly learned to cross-promote merchandise 
and media, coordinating the release of new toys and other products into 
various markets with the exhibition of his films in local theaters. In 1935, 
Disney released Snow White and the Seven Dwarfs merchandise as 
advance promotion for the company’s first feature length motion picture.  
Trendle’s position as an independent regional radio network owner 
afforded him a degree of creative control that most newspaper syndicates, 
publishers and film studios did not possess. Whereas the syndicated Buck 
Rogers comic strip had to appeal to newspaper publishers across the US, 
the Lone Ranger radio program was initially created to attract only local 
sponsorship for station WXYZ. The Lone Ranger radio program would 
continue to be broadcast from WXYZ throughout its twenty-three year 
run. Moreover, as the Lone Ranger was initially sold primarily market-to-
market via transcription recordings, Trendle continued to be able to 
produce a finished product first for his own station and only then concern 
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himself with other non-competing markets. The lack of an immediate 
national spotlight allowed Trendle’s creative authority over the brand 
formula to become ingrained. Interestingly, it was likely also the need to 
recreate the marketing and promotional strategies for the Lone Ranger 
brand market-by-market that allowed the formula to become so 
entrenched.   
Radio’s emphasis on the performer rather than the author also 
likely contributed to Trendle’s insistent managerial authority over the 
Lone Ranger formula. Most comic strips clearly identified their creators – 
while obscuring the actual brand owners for the properties – and most of 
the iconic brand characters emerging out of B-westerns, like Gene Autry, 
Roy Rogers, Tom Mix, and William Boyd as Hopalong Cassidy were 
actually embodied by their performers, corporealizing their authorship 
over the brand. Radio, however, tended to downplay authorship in favor of 
performance (this was less true for prime time programming, but 
definitely the case with children’s radio), opening the Lone Ranger and 
Green Hornet brands  up to greater potential infringements and audience 
identifications with the actors who played these parts, rather than the 
company that owned and managed the properties.  
By the mid-1940s, Trendle, Dille and Disneys’s conflation of 
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brand ownership and authorship and their prioritizing of their brands over 
any of the texts that represented them would have tremendous influence 
on cowboy actors like Autry, Rogers, and Boyd, who purchased the rights 
to their back catalog of films and began using these recycled materials on 
early television as promotional vehicles that attracted new merchandising 
and sponsorship deals. Meanwhile, in the early 1950s, comic strip artists 
also began to negotiate new partnerships with their syndicates that allowed 
them to retain or share heavily in the merchandising of their creations. 
Caniff abandoned Terry and the Pirates and created Steve Canyon, which 
he owned the exclusive rights for. A new generation of comic strippers 
like Charles Schultz and Hank Ketchum respectively invented Peanuts 
and Dennis the Menace with merchandising firmly in mind. Much like 
Trendle, Dille, Disney, Autry, Rogers and Boyd, these cartoonists paid 
very close attention to the formula their brands followed and how these 
were translated across media and merchandise. As Trendle (and perhaps 
Dille) had the least direct involvement in the creative process (while 
Trendle supervised, he never actually wrote a single script), however, the 
licensor compensated by foregrounding both his managerial skills and 
moral arbitration over how sponsors, producers, and manufacturers 
exploited the Lone Ranger and Green Hornet brands. Trendle’s conflation 
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of ownership with creative – and moral – authority over a brand predated 
the shift from copyright to trademark protection in the early 1950s, which 
would guarantee corporations greater protection over brand properties as 
business logos regardless of their actual authors. Trendle’s assertion of his 
rights to financial reward and proprietary control over the exploitation of 
his brands due to his careful managerial authority – and not simply his 
creative vision – helped pave the way for this shift.  In this regard, I argue 
that Trendle’s licensing practices (along with several others’) both helped 
shape the field and were somewhat exceptional in terms of the degree of 
authority he exerted over the brand formulas he promoted.  
By most accounts, though his business model was typical of most 
early brand licensors, Trendle also exercised an inordinate amount of 
personal control over his brands, from script approval and production 
supervision in all media to consulting on all merchandise and publicity 
materials. This makes Trendle a significant figure worthy of study 
precisely because his investment in his brands exceeded the norm, 
allowing those parameters to be delineated, while also helping to explain 
his diminishing authority as the media industries became more centralized 
and consolidated by the late 1950s.    
It is also important to consider whether the radio origins of 
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Trendle’s brands affected their formulation and extension in different 
ways than brand properties emerging out of comic strips or other media. 
From the beginning, radio was subject to different regulatory structures 
and public scrutiny than film or newspapers were, due to its free and easy 
entry point into the private sphere. Whereas newspapers and movie tickets 
needed to be purchased, radio programming was freely broadcast into 
American homes. As such, its content was more closely monitored for fear 
that it might have a corrupting effect on naive listeners. This, in turn, 
likely shaped the ways brand formulas were constructed, particularly those 
aimed at children. Finally, Trendle’s starting point on radio privileged 
certain generic and narrative devices over others, since fantastical 
elements could and needed to be conveyed through oral cues. This allowed 
radio narratives to rely on listener imaginations about what the Lone 
Ranger or Green Hornet actually looked like without having to visually 
represent them. The more bizarre elements of each brand, such as the Lone 
Ranger’s mask or the Green Hornet’s gas gun, could be described in ways 
that made them sound plausible. Tensions would quickly emerge over how 
best to represent visually the Lone Ranger and Green Hornet as their 
brands made the leap to other media. In contrast, comic book and comic 
strip characters were always visible to their readers, and publishers rarely 
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placed the same emphasis on logical or realistic representations as did 
their radio producer counterparts. 
 
MATERIALS 
In reconstructing Trendle’s licensing career and the branding 
strategies in formulation of the Lone Ranger and Green Hornet properties, 
I rely upon archival materials found primarily in the George W. Trendle 
and Raymond Meurer collections housed at the Detroit Public Library. 
Both collections contain abundant materials relating to the licensing, 
marketing, merchandising, and production of copyrighted goods featuring 
these brands, as well as legal documents related to lawsuits and copyright 
infringements. I also use materials from the William Dozier collection 
housed at the American Heritage Center in Laramie, Wyoming pertaining 
to the production of The Green Hornet television series, 1966-67. 
While I use these materials in order to construct a historical 
narrative of how licensing operated and functioned, I also perform a 
discursive analysis on them, reading the materialsfor their rhetorical 
arguments,  for how they reveal Trendle’s assumptions about licensing 
practices,  and for  how they illustrate the cultural and economic values 
Trendleassigned to the Lone Ranger and Green Hornet properties. I also 
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read these materials symptomatically, for cultural and economic tensions 
and concerns that underlie many of the licensor’s efforts to promote, 
market, and protect these brands.  
 
LITERATURE REVIEW 
Quite a lot has already been written about licensed trade 
characters, intellectual property, and branding. Few, if any, of these 
accounts have examined the phenomenon in terms of the actual work 
practices and values of licensing agents or have explored licensor roles in 
extending and managing the trans-mediated commercial intertexts through 
which figures like the Lone Ranger circulate. What has been written 
largely has emerged in the field of legal studies.xix Such accounts 
generally review the key legal cases and legislation, but offer little insight 
into the cultural attitudes and business practices that inform intellectual 
property, copyright, and trademark law. Critical studies by scholars like 
Jane Gaines and Kembrew McLeod often focus their analysis on the 
infringement of individual artistic rights and the denial of public access to 
cultural goods that trademark legislation facilitates.xx Such work also tends 
to treat legislation as the basis for corporate practices, rather than the one 
mutually informingthe other. 
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There are also a bevy of books written about the history of 
successfully merchandised properties, including Mickey Mouse, the Lone 
Ranger, Little Orphan Annie, Superman, etc., but the majority of those 
have been popular, rather than scholarly accounts.xxi These works have 
tended to focus on the popularity of the properties, inferred through their 
successful licensing and merchandising, rather than the work of licensors 
in constructing properties that would appeal to business perceptions of 
what the public might find popular. There is a tendency in these books to 
render the properties’ success as inherent and the licensor as merely 
reaping the rewards of their popularity.  Further, such accounts tend to 
address the multiple adaptations and iterations of licensed properties 
moving between different culture industries and merchandising sites as 
unproblematic, ignoring the intermediary roles of licensors in massaging 
and managing an increasingly complex web of texts and products. Instead, 
popular histories treat adaptations as if they emerge out of the sheer 
popularity of the character or, in later years, as a result of obvious 
synergies effectively exploited through media conglomeration, rather than 
resulting from negotiations and struggles over authorship, marketing, 
management, and exploitation of particular brands. 
The historical literature with which my project best engages is, on 
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the one hand, work done on the emergence of media conglomerates from 
the late 1960s onwards, and on the other, work done on the complex and 
mutually constitutive relationship between different media industries prior 
to the 1960s. A third body of literature, on the significance of branding 
and its relationship to the development of consumer culture from the late 
nineteenth century onwards, is also essential to articulating licensing 
practices and the cultural and economic values that inform them. In turn, a 
history of licensing bridges historical accounts of early cross-media and 
contemporary conglomeration while also addressing cultural concerns that 




COMMERCIAL INTERTEXTS AND CROSS-MEDIA HISTORY 
Scholars Tom Schatz, Valerie Wee, and Eileen Meehan (amongst 
others) have all discussed the increased focus on synergy, cross-
promotion, branding, intertextuality, cross-media interaction, ancillary 
product extensions, and market segmentation (with a particular focus on 
youth markets) that has accompanied the rise of multi-media 
conglomeration.xxii Schatz asserts that the blockbuster films that have 
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dominated Hollywood production since the mid 1970s are “multi-purpose 
entertainment machines.”xxiii Wee seconds, “multimedia conglomeration 
and the interest in synergy encouraged the culture industries to exploit the 
promotional and marketing opportunities that accrued from blurring the 
boundaries of media texts rather than maintaining the integrity of a media 
figure as a commodity in a single medium.”xxiv Meehan has labeled this 
phenomenon the emergence of “commercial intertexts”, where “decisions 
about movies are increasingly focused on the potential profitability of a 
wide range of products. The film per se becomes only one component in a 
product line that extends beyond the theater, even beyond our contact with 
mass media, to penetrate the market for toys, bedding, trinkets, cups and 
other minutiae comprising one’s everyday life inside a commoditized, 
consumerized culture.”xxv  
In many ways, the phenomenon that Meehan identifies also 
accurately describes work done by independent licensors from the early 
1930s onwards. I seek to build on Meehan’s articulation of the commercial 
intertext by tracing how media corporations came to recognize their 
potential value.  Schatz suggests that the predominance of these 
contemporary practices is a result of transition (and trial-and-error), rather 
than representing a radical break from previous modes of production. He 
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explores the gradual changes in studio production and marketing strategies 
from the postwar to the present, tracing how the film industry responded 
to shifting economic and cultural climates, including the dissolution of 
vertical integration and the growth of network television as a key site of 
both production and consumption.xxvi  Unlike Schatz, I situate the 
centrality of these practices for independent licensors as beginning in the 
1930s and I trace their intersection with shifting media institution 
production models through the 1960s. I argue that the emerging 
conglomerates of the early 1970s appropriated many of their synergistic 
strategies from existing cultural production practices championed by 
independent licensors. In so doing, I will contextualize licensing’s shifting 
relationship to media production sites in ways that explain how and why 
these practices were first articulated.   
My project traces the development of many of these practices as 
they were employed by licensors in their efforts to extend their properties 
across multiple media and merchandising sites. As such, I also argue that 
cross-media relations are not a new phenomenon. Christopher Anderson 
and Michele Hilmes each have demonstrated that the histories of the film 
and broadcast industries cannot be considered in isolation from one 
another, nor that such relationships were necessarily wholly 
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complementary or antagonistic, but rather complex and mutually 
constitutive.xxvii Anderson claims that Hollywood and the broadcast 
network have existed in a “symbiotic relationship” with one another 
throughout most of the twentieth century and that, moreover, their mutual 
success was rooted in public perceptions of these industries as being 
“complimentary experiences in which stars and stories passed easily from 
one medium to another.”xxviii Behind the scenes, however, Anderson 
asserts that cross-media interactions involved much haggling between 
movie producers, television networks, and sponsors over “economic 
relations, creative control, and program forms.”xxix  
I seek to complement Anderson’s work by investigating the roles 
played by licensors as intermediary agents in negotiating the processes of 
cross-media interaction. The development of cross-mediated relations is 
best explained through genealogical approaches to media history rather 
than in terms of large-scale transformative processes brought about by 
institutional vision.xxx The early movements of texts, stars, characters, and 
brands between media industries often needed to be carefully managed 
and synergies were not always self-evident, requiring licensors to 
demonstrate repeatedly to radio stations, film exhibitors, and sponsors 
alike the value of cross-promoting licensed properties across media and to 
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address concerns about overexposure, misappropriation, and copyright 
infringement. I argue for the need to rewrite cross-media history through 
the prism of independent licensors, whose motivations and efforts to 
extend the visibility and profitability of their properties were as significant 
in the development of national media systems and cross-promotional 
strategies as those of either the networks or the studios, and whose practies 
often were mutually constitutivewith those of the media industries.  
The Lone Ranger did not become a national icon because General 
Mills sponsored him over the NBC Blue Network beginning in 1941.  
Trendle and his partners first had to establish a business model for 
extending the property’s reach before General Mills became convinced to 
sponsor the program nationally. Moreover, Trendle’s impetus for 
extending The Lone Ranger’s radio reach was partly motivated by 
Republic Studios refusal to release the 1937 Lone Ranger movie serial in 
cities where the radio series was unavailable. Trendle sold potential radio 
stations and local sponsors on the added exposure they would gain by 
tying the program to the impending film release.  What Trendle sold was a 
name brand personality around which both media could organize their 
products and promotion. As Paul du Gay and Michael Pryke contend, 
“techniques of ‘economic management’ do not come ready-made. They 
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have to be invented, stabilized, refined and reproduced; they have to be 
disseminated and implanted in practices of various kinds in a range of 
different locales.”xxxi Histories written from the perspective of 
“independent” media producers working within the larger “cultural 
industries” destabilize normative assumptions about how media works  by 
investigating how economic and cultural production practices are put into 
action and rehearsed by smaller entities before being adopted by 
institutions writ large. Various scholars, including Tom Schatz’s work on 
Desilu Productions and Michael Kackman’s on Ziv Productions, put these 
perspectives forward.xxxii 
 
TRANS-MEDIA BRANDS AND THE SELLING POWER OF 
PERSONALITY  
My dissertation also argues for the need to re-conceptualize the 
object that licensors helped broker across media and merchandising sites. 
While Wee, Meehan, Schatz, Anderson and Hilmes each, in varying 
degrees, privilege the text as the shared product, Michael Kackman’s work 
on the 1950s licensing and merchandising of Hopalong Cassidy by 
William Boyd astutely argues, “what was being sold was not a product, 
but a brand that was both broadly dispersed, even globalized, and 
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localized.”xxxiii Kackman asserts that the Hopalong Cassidy film or 
television texts were merely promotional vehicles for extending the brand 
across multiple consumer products: 
 
 
What makes Hopalong Cassidy so fascinating in this 
context is that the ultimate commodity being sold was not 
principally further adaptations, but the character’s 
continued viability as a promotional vehicle. We often 
think of merchandising as a profitable secondary market - a 
way to extract as much profit as possible from a popular 
media figure or text. But in the case of Hoppy, 
merchandising and sponsorship contracts were the primary 
site of industrial exchange, and may well have been the site 
of primary cultural encounter with the character. In other 
words, merchandise wasn’t used to extend the viability and 
popularity of the primary texts; instead, in both economic 
and cultural terms, it eventually became the primary text, 
supported by the films, television programs, and other 
adaptations.xxxiv 
 
Trendle also saw such merchandising opportunities as the first 
order of business, refocusing his business model for the Lone Ranger 
brand by the late 1930s. The texts that featured the Lone Ranger would 
now primarily serve to promote the brand, not only to consumers, but also 
more importantly to future sponsors and licensees. Thomas Doherty has 
coined the term“trans-media” to describe the 1950s promotion of rock 
music and teen idols to consumers across a wide array of media.xxxv 
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Building on Doherty’s work, Mary Celeste Kearney argues that trans-
media exploitation exceeded the adaptation of particular texts across 
media to the “promotion of such texts reputations as successful 
entertainment properties in the marketing of later versions produced in 
other media.”xxxvi For Kearney, it is the internal inter-industry promotion 
of a property’s success in one media in order to extend it into another that 
produces trans-mediated texts.  Kackman further extends this argument by 
shifting the focus to brands. I employ Kearney’s definition of trans-media 
exploitation and Kackman’s elevation of the brand as the primary object 
of exchange to describe the work that Trendle performed in recycling past 
successes while attempting to attract new sponsors and manufacturers to 
invest in both the Lone Ranger and Green Hornet brands. 
The significance of shifting the focus away from reproducing texts 
to extending brands is threefold.  First, brands were intended to 
supplement, not replace existing products.xxxvii Attaching the Lone 
Ranger’s name to a toy gun increased its value, but it did not alter the 
commodity itself. Second, and building on the first point, brands infused 
existing products with personality. Gary Cross has pointed to the toy 
industry’s early twentieth century recognition of the power of celebrity to 
elicit strong emotional reactions from children and their parents, which, in 
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turn sold toys. “Sales increased when buyers identified products with 
attractive ‘personalities,’ and these personalities in turn became the subject 
of toys.”xxxviii Ian Gordon has similarly argued with regard to early 
twentieth century manufacturers’ commercial exploitation of the popular 
comic strip character, Buster Brown, that “advertisers used Buster Brown 
as an eye-catching image and as a symbol of qualities to be associated 
with their product.”xxxix A Lone Ranger toy gun might still have been a toy 
gun, but it also embodied particular characteristics of the Lone Ranger’s 
personality and story that children could act out.  
Social historian Warren Susman has argued that the emergence of 
consumer society at the end of the nineteenth century saw a transitional 
struggle between the valuation of character versus personality, whereby 
the former “stressed moral qualities, [while] the newer culture insisted on 
‘personality,’ which emphasized being liked and admired.”xl Douglas Holt 
effectively situates Susman’s work on the character/personality conflict 
and its connection with anxieties over consumer culture within 
institutional settings, and demonstrates how branding strategies are 
devised, often unconsciously, to address these cultural concerns. Brand 
personalities worked to offset any negative implications associated with 
their commodity status by infusing popular personalities with moral 
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dimensions. In his work on cultural branding, Holt asserts that successful 
branding formulas “perform identity myths... that address cultural 
anxieties” or acute social contradictions at various historical moments.xli 
Thus, thirdly, the key to developing popular personalities and 
ensuring their economic viability is the enforcement of a generalizable and 
repeatable formula that ensured both consumer familiarity with the brand 
and with the particular cultural concerns it addressed.  Much as Kackman 
recognizes the significance of Hopalong’s “unimpeachable character and 
responsible civic leadership” to the brand’s sales appeal, I argue that 
Trendle carefully constructed the Lone Ranger’s personality in such a way 
as to emphasize the brand’s educational value in teaching children proper 
moral vales and acceptable codes of conduct. Whereas during the 
Depression, these lessons were often intended to offset the brand’s 
commodity status, by the postwar era, the Lone Ranger taught children to 
equate American values with consumption. Kackman similarly argues that 
Hopalong Cassidy’s personality explicitly linked  “normative discourses 
of citizenship... [that were] closely articulated with consumerism.”xlii  
These upstanding personality traits were carefully integrated into the Lone 
Ranger brand formula and articulated in all iterations of the property 
across media and merchandising sites. Adhering to the Lone Ranger 
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formula was a non-negotiable (though often contested) requirement 
Trendle made of licensees seeking to exploit the brand.  
The Lone Ranger formula reproduced essential components 
necessary for extending merchandising possibilities by emphasizing 
recognizable and repeatable character props (the Lone Ranger’s horse, 
Silver; the Lone Ranger’s mask; the Lone Ranger’s silver-handled guns 
and silver bullets) but also the character’s code of conduct. The Lone 
Ranger formula, as conveyed in the varied texts that promoted the brand, 
sutured a connection between promoting the hero’s code of conduct to the 
righteousness of commodity consumption.xliii The formulas that licensors 
adhered to were justified on both economic and cultural ground. By 
conceptualizing the object of exchange that licensors trafficked in as 
branded personalities instead of reproducible texts, the relationships they 
brokered between different cultural sites of production becomes infinitely 
more complex.  Promoting branded personalities involved the overlaying 
of a valuable and value-laden formula onto already existing products or 
production processes, whose institutional goals, constraints and practices 
were not always in line with said formula, resulting in a high degree of 




THE PRODUCTION OF CULTURE 
My dissertation is primarily focused on the practices, beliefs, and 
concerns of these independent licensors, as they struggled both to define 
the value of their work in relation to other, more tangible sites of cultural 
production and to maintain control over the abstract concepts they owned 
but that others concretized.  These practices included marketing and 
merchandising to different producers and sponsors, contractual 
negotiations, legal battles, and creative “consultation” (which, more often 
than not, came with final script and merchandise approval).  
My focus on the construction of culturally iconic brand formulas 
and the struggles to adapt them across media systems situates my work 
within a larger body of literature on the production of culture. Paul 
DiMaggio and Paul Hirsch have argued for the need to analyze cultural 
products through the contexts in which they were produced and to study 
the operational processes of cultural apparatuses in order to understand the 
artifacts they create.44 Similarly, Howard Becker has suggested that the 
study of cultural artifacts is necessarily the study of the social 
arrangements that brought them into being.45 Certainly, my own project 
seeks to understand how a brand such as the Lone Ranger became 
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culturally iconic, while the Green Hornet did not. In so doing, I am 
arguing for the need to trace the institutional, economic, and historical 
networks in which they circulated. As J. Dennis Bounds has argued in his 
work on the trans-media circulation of Perry Mason, “[The] production of 
culture perspective identifies commercial cultural products as the result of 
a complex arena of production practices and historical influences.”46 
While political economists tend to argue that its economic base 
wholly determines the cultural superstructure of society,47 such 
perspectives assume homogeneity within the culture industries that ignores 
the dynamic and conflicting roles played by creative and business 
personnel. Moreover, political economy de-emphasizes the roles that 
cultural and social beliefs play in shaping the ways cultural producers 
conceptualize the cultural products they create, which can, and often do, 
exceed simplistic profit motivations. Analyzing how cultural values 
inform the production of culture complicates political economic 
approaches in ways that allow tensions to emerge and takes the agency of 
individual actors into account, even as they operate within a structured set 
procedures and conventions.  
In studying the production of culture, it is important to both 
differentiate and understand the complex relationship between product 
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conventions and production conventions. Product conventions refer to 
generalizable formulaic aspects that come to be associated with a 
particular type of product. For instance, a 1950s Hollywood musical 
usually had actors break out into song and dance at key intervals within 
the narrative. The Lone Ranger formula always kept the hero’s true 
identity a secret by carefully avoiding plot elements that might lead to the 
character’s unmasking. Production conventions refer to the actual work 
practices that create a product. For example, 1950s Hollywood musicals 
were usually shot on a studio set ensuring tight coordination between 
choreography and camera movements. Alternately, Trendle insisted upon 
personally approving every Lone Ranger script in order to ensure 
continuity and limit deviations from the formula. Both product and 
production conventions may be sites for innovation, constraint, and 
conflict, and each might, in turn, conflict with one another. As I will argue 
throughout this project, Trendle’s articulation of the Lone Ranger and 
Green Hornet formulas are inseparable from his articulation of a formulaic 
production process and his role within it. As both brands circulated across 
and between media sites, the perceived necessity to instill product and 
production formulas that maintained their continuity (as well as Trendle’s 
continued control over them) became both a guiding focus for the licensor 
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and a source of conflict amongst his clients. 
The question of conflict is also central to analyses of the 
production of culture. As Janet Staiger has argued, “conflict exists among 
norms and among roles in the work process.”48 Staiger identifies three 
factors that produce conflictual tensions within the realm of film 
production, “the complexity of the product, the need for both 
standardization and differentiation in the manufacturing process, and the 
desire to create narratives satisfactory to consumers.”49 DiMaggio and 
Hirsch argue that much conflict centers on questions of innovation and 
control.50 By carefully policing the articulation of the Lone Ranger and 
Green Hornet formulas, Trendle often attempted to distinguish his brands 
from others in circulation, while also uniformly promoting them across 
multiple sites of mediation in order to ensure their continued recognition 
and established audience appeal. The licensor also devised production 
formulas that ensured his control over any possible changes to his 
profitable product in the face of shifting industrial, technological, 
regulatory, and cultural regimes that threatened (and promised) new 
modes of articulation. Thus, script and product approval were absolute 
requirements of any deal the licensor entered into, as was the persistent 
recycling of old radio scripts into comic strip and television plots. 
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Licensors were also required to juggle multiple sites of mediation 
with rapidly shifting work environments and practices, keeping the 
constructed audience in mind for each, and re-conceptualizing their 
properties accordingly. Efforts to maintain such business and ideological 
ties required licensors regularly to negotiate shifting cultures of 
production, not always successfully. Often, the conservative cultural 
attitudes of licensors interfered with their abilities to keep up with rapidly 
changing production practices and the desired formulaic reconstitutions of 
their properties that ensued. One of the fundamental contradictions that 
informed licensing practices was the malleability of the properties 
licensors sold in relation to their reluctance to embrace change, often 
creating tense production arrangements that constrained and (re)defined 
the cultural meanings assigned to licensed properties. Similarly, Negus 
argues concerning the British music industry, “occupational 
intermediaries… are constantly engaged in disputes with each other, with 
their corporate bosses and with recording artists. Such conflicts can have a 
direct impact on how popular music is produced and presented to the 
public.”51 
The careful attention Trendle paid to managing brand formulas 
mitigates somewhat against Becker’s claims that cultural producers 
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operate within a collaborative network in which shared production 
conventions provide a social framework for continued production and 
reproduction of art, or Joseph Turow’s assertion that control of production 
resources is limited to those with similar ideas and therefore determined 
by those cultural producers.52 While both are correct in identifying the 
importance of analyzing interactions between multiple yet finite sets of 
actors in the production of culture, the degree to which these actors share 
similar conventions or ideas about the brand is complicated by the lack of 
standardization of production processes and product creation across 
media.  
For example, in the 1950s, comic book writers were still being 
paid by the page and were often unaccredited for their work, while 
television writers were highly regarded. From a different vantage point, 
1950s comic books were under repeated attack for their inappropriate 
content assumed to be directed at the children’s market and eventually 
succumbed to pressure to abandon more adult-oriented materials in favor 
in juvenile fare. At the same time, television was moving toward 
producing “adult” versions of popular genres like the western and the 
crime drama. Therefore, their approaches to a brand like the Green Hornet 
would have been very different from, and were often incommensurate 
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with, the formula Trendle sought to adapt from radio. Trendle’s repeated 
efforts to police against formula violation not only responded to the fact 
that the exploitation of a brand required the work of multiple actors, who 
each threatened to take the property in a direction more suitable to their 
own institutional and historical needs, but also raises important questions 
about authorship in general. How might Trendle claim authorship over the 
Lone Ranger or Green Hornet brands if he did not write any of the scripts 
or direct any of the programs? 
The very malleability and intangibility of the brands on which 
licensors stake their livelihood contributed to practices that continuously 
attempted to police the working relationships they established with other 
media and merchandising outlets. Licensors foreground their own labor in 
order to established ownership over particular properties and distinguish 
such labor from other forms of work involving these characters (such as 
acting, writing, directing, etc.), a practice well in line with what Michel 
Foucault has described as the “author function” and its relation to “the 
juridical and institutional system that encompasses, determines, and 
articulates the universe of discourses” of ownership.53 Foucault further 
argues that authorship is never spontaneously attributed to 
writers/creators, but must instead repeatedly be demonstrated through a 
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series of complex operations that continuously reaffirm authorship as 
producing a “constant level of value, [having] conceptual or theoretical 
coherence, stylistic unity, [and the author as] a historical figure at the 
crossroads of a certain number of events.”54 As such, Trendle relied upon 
a particular set of strategies intended to demonstrate his authorial control 
over particular properties, especially at moments when such authority was 
challenged or the value of his property questioned. These strategies largely 
involved the invocation of a long and selective cultural and corporate 
memory as both a salesmanship tactic and a safeguard against efforts by 
others to claim ownership of his characters. 
While Clare Birchall has discussed the use of “nostalgic strategies” 
on contemporary prime-time television as “an emotional mediation of 
space and time,”55 I argue that Trendle invoked similar appeals to 
idealized memories of his properties as a means of asserting authority over 
intangible products spread across a wide array of cultural production sites 
and of managing shifting institutional practices by appealing to the 
historical continuity (and continuous profitability and popularity) of his 
properties. Trendle did so by keeping meticulous records of otherwise 
ephemeral events such as audience giveaways, phone surveys, and fan 
letters, which would continue to serve as contemporary justifications for 
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the appeals of his products and his own authority over them. Yet, it would 
be a mistake to think that the invocation of memory was simply a 
proactive strategy for Trendle, meant to increase business. Trendle’s 
reliance upon maintaining the sanctity and continuity of his formulas was 
often a defensive posture taken in response to shifting industry practices 
that sought to limit his authorial control, marginalize his properties, or 
both. Trendle also repeatedly invoked his authorial ownership through 
references to his skillful abilities to manage his brands’ complex inter-
textual movements across multiple mediated and merchandising sites.  
Tony Bennett and Janet Woollacott distinguish the concept of 
inter-textuality from Julia Kristeva’s notion of intertextuality. Whereas the 
latter refers to “the system of references to other texts which can be 
discerned within the internal composition of a specific individual text,” 
Bennett and Woollacott define inter-textuality as “the social organization 
of the relations between texts within specific conditions of reading.”56  In 
other words, even though a set of texts or products may not directly refer 
to one another, they still may be linked together through a shared 
character, a set of genre conventions, or a similar set of thematic pre-
occupations. The Lone Ranger comic book never referred to plot elements 
heard on the radio series (though the comic did occasionally promote the 
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radio series – and vice-versa – through advertisements), but someone 
consuming both texts would likely read them inter-textually, as bearing a 
relationship to one another.  Bennett and Woollacott focus their attention 
on the fictional figure of James Bond and the ways in which cultural 
understandings of the character are formed through the inter-textual 
relationships established between the different sites that represent him 
(including books and films, but also advertisements, interviews, and other 
ephemera and publicity materials). They argue that the meanings the 
“popular hero” takes on have eclipsed, and exist above and in between, the 
various texts that once contained him and moreover, that popular heroes 
are produced through “the constantly changing relations between a wide 
range of texts brought into association with one another via the 
functioning of [the hero] as the signifier which they have jointly 
constructed.”57  
Yet, they do not investigate the efforts to manage and police 
Bond’s inter-texts as coordinated by licensing agents – in Bond’s case, 
The Licensing Corporation of America – nor how such efforts, whether 
fully successful or not, impact both what sites Bond will appear in and the 
meanings attached to those sites.  Even unsanctioned representations are 
often a direct response to the dominant forms that popular heroes take. My 
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dissertation is concerned precisely with these managerial efforts and the 
ways that licensing practices set limits and imposed restrictions on how 
properties and their meanings could be circulated. More importantly, 
however, I am interested in the ways licensors discursively called attention 
to these managerial skills in order to perform their authorship over their 
properties as well as to assert a stabilizing inter-connectivity during an era 
of rapid social and industrial change. While Bennett and Woollacott assert 
that the meanings that Bond embodies at different historical moments are 
informed by shifting cultural concerns that the property’s malleability is 
able to absorb and negotiate,58 I contend that such processes are as active 
within institutional communities as they are in society at large, and that 
licensed properties often negotiated the cultural-economic concerns of 
licensors and licensees within a rapidly changing media landscape.  
Branding formulas were intended to assuage concerns felt by corporate 
sponsors and media producers – licensors’ primary clients, over the best 
ways to reach consumers without alienating them through excessive 
advertising or blatant commercial exploitation. Licensors often justified 
their authorial role in managing brand formulas as articulated through and 
across multiple media and merchandising sites by positioning themselves 
as intermediaries between sponsor and consumer. Licensors claimed to be 
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able to bring the consumer to licensees while assuring that sponsors and 
producers did not cross the line when it came to exploiting the public. 
 
CULTURES OF PRODUCTION 
So far, it might seem as though my project fits quite neatly with the 
production-of-culture literature -- and, in many ways, it does. Where I 
differ is in regards to the role economic gain plays in structuring 
production tensions. Staiger argues, “Built into capitalism is an economic 
tension that inhibits the cookie-cutter approach to making films. Although 
it is important that much of the work be routine, capitalism markets its 
products in ways that work against pure repetition of product... [because] 
product differentiation is valuable in re-creating demand. Thus, it is 
completely within the capitalist system to cultivate innovation in products, 
particularly if the novelty can be advertised.”59 Staiger also asserts that 
such innovations are motivated by historical changes that require actors in 
the cultural industries to adapt their product and production formulas to 
changing work conditions in order to remain profitable.60 Similarly, 
Becker argues, “A system of conventions gets embodied in equipment, 
materials, training, available facilities and sites, systems of notation and 
the like, all of which must be changed if any one segment is.”61 DiMaggio 
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and Hirsch suggest that the identification of and “simultaneous build-up 
and abandonment of stars” is an oddly rational byproduct of these tensions 
between innovation and control.62 Simply put, if one wants to stay in the 
game, one needs to learn how to play amidst and to adjust to changing 
rules. 
While I do not challenge these claims, I seek to complicate many 
of the underlying assumptions over what motivates conflict and to explore 
how divergent attitudes and ideas are resolved. I argue against economic 
justifications as the underlying conflicts over brand articulations, 
illustrating the centrality of cultural and moral values that are rationalized 
as economically necessary. For example, if the need to innovate product 
and production formulas is a simple by-product of capitalism and 
rationally justified in economic terms, why wouldn’t Trendle have 
abandoned his outmoded Green Hornet formula in the late 1950s in the 
face of mounting pressures to do so? While it might be easy to argue that 
Trendle was out of touch with changing production cultures, this 
explanation fails to recognize the degree to which many of Trendle’s own 
branding strategies had been integrated into the emerging network 
television hegemony. 
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Janet Wolff argues that when discussing the production of culture, 
it is imperative to remember that art is a social practice and that artists 
(loosely defined by Wolff and others to include media producers, and 
extended by me to include licensors) are real people engaged in real 
activities and beset by real problems that inform their ideological 
perspectives and cultural expressions.63 Richard Petersen similarly asserts, 
“the ways that creative people define their occupations and organize their 
careers can influence the nature of the work they produce.”64 These 
recognitions are add a significant degree of complexity to otherwise 
overly-rational explanations of production practices and product 
conventions as economically determined.  I argue that Trendle’s 
intransigence results precisely from the non-economic values he ascribed 
to his brands and to his role as an independent intermediary in promoting 
and managing them (though he justified these moral values in economic 
terms by claiming that these were what had made the brands profitable in 
the first place). 
DiMaggio and Hirsch identify a central structuring tension in 
cultural production as one of “control over substance,” which in 
commercial media systems has led to cautionary approaches to change and 
sensitivity to possible threats of boycott or objections from organized 
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pressure groups.65 Thus, it is not merely sustaining or increasing 
profitability that drives product and production innovations (or lack 
thereof), but anxieties over losing public support by crossing an ethical 
line in the exploitation of commercial properties. DiMaggio and Hirsch 
argue that such lines are almost always imaginary, since cultural producers 
“do remarkably little research on the taste preferences of their publics.”66 
Instead, cultural producers imagine the values their audiences demand 
from consumer products and the values that they would reject. DiMaggio 
and Hirsch define these as “imaginary feedback loops,” which 
preemptively intervene in production choices based on “expectations 
about what a market, middleman, or federal or state agency might do if a 
certain line is crossed, a certain taboo violated.”67 Though they do not 
make this claim, I argue that cultural producers write their own values 
onto those of the audiences they imagine -- values shaped by their 
particular class and occupational taste cultures. In an industry 
overpopulated by upper middle-class white men, the cultural values that 
licensors idealized as utopian and universal were often those that 
reinforced their own social positions. As Negus similarly argues regarding 
the music recording industry, “Social relations of race, gender, sexuality, 
and ethnicity mediate the creation and reception of art and entertainment 
 66
products... no music will ever simply ‘reflect’ a society or an individual 
performer’s life or psyche, but instead be caught within, arise out of and 
refer to a series of unequal social relations and power struggles.”68   
To this effect, DiMaggio and Hirsch describe the gate-keeping 
function of various occupational communities in translating cultural 
production for public consumption through attributing cultural or artistic 
value to particular works that, in turn, justify their market value.69 
Licensors were middle men, who sold themselves across media and to 
corporate interests as both having a finger on the pulse of audience desires 
and concerns and as first-rate managers of the increasingly complex web 
of brand movements and merchandising rights that exploded in the 1930s. 
For these reasons, I label them cultural intermediaries - as “belong[ing] to 
those intermediary occupations... involved in the provision of symbolic 
goods and services.”70 Paul du Gay describes cultural intermediaries as 
“play[ing] a pivotal role in articulating production with consumption by 
attempting to associate goods and services with particular cultural 
meanings and to address these values to prospective buyers.”71 In so 
doing, licensors sought to generate what du Gay terms “a discourse of the 
economy… the elaboration of a language for conceiving of and hence 
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constructing an object in a certain way so that the object can then be 
deliberated about and acted upon.”72 
  Building on Pierre Bourdieu, Sean Nixon and du Gay suggest that 
cultural intermediaries historically have had a certain degree of “cultural 
authority as shapers of taste and [as] inculcators of new consumerist 
dispositions.”73 As such, licensors often positioned themselves alongside 
advertising and pubic relations agents as able to bridge corporate and 
consumer interests. Yet, whereas cultural intermediaries are often 
envisioned as translating corporate goals into consumer fantasies, I argue 
that licensors saw media and merchandising personnel as their primary 
audience and tried to anticipate the shifting needs, attitudes and self-
images of these constituencies above and beyond those of the 
viewers/listeners/purchasers of the products that bore the names of their 
brands. The opinions and desires of the mass audience only functioned for 
licensors as a means of further selling their properties to a more elite 
corporate audience. Yet, I also assert that the “imaginary feedback loops” 
that licensors constructed about what would displease these larger 
audiences greatly effected the ways they developed, managed, and policed 
brand personalities and formulas and the ways they justified their roles as 
inter-textual managers and moral arbiters.  
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Roland Marchand has argued that advertising men in the 1920s and 
1930s saw themselves as arbiters of modernity who used the new art and 
science of advertising to persuade and educate the public on the social 
good brought about by new consumer products and technologies. 
Similarly, I suggest that licensors saw themselves, and the brands they 
owned and managed, as possessing the necessary qualities to convince 
Americans of the moral rightness of corporate capitalism.74 Bourdieu has 
referred to this disposition on the parts of cultural intermediaries, as their 
support for “ethical retooling” that promoted a “morality of pleasure [in 
spending] as duty.”75 While much of the literature on cultural 
intermediaries has been both sweeping in its attack and general in its 
assertions of the cultural roles played by all middle-men in society, Nixon 
and Du Gay argue that there remains a need for historical work that 
investigates the “formal expertise and broader intellectual and cultural 
formation” of discrete groups of intermediaries.76 This approach, they 
argue, will allow for more complex analysis of the cultural attitudes and 
beliefs that often drive - and justify - economic decisions. My dissertation 
is precisely such an attempt to engage with the attitudes and values of 
licensors as an intermediary occupational community and to better 
understand not only their work habits, but also their motivations. There is 
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no doubt that licensors stood to gain by supporting corporate capitalism, 
encouraging an environment conducive for consumption, and aligning 
their own interests with those of corporations.  It also important to 
recognize that these were not conspiratorial acts, but emerged out of 
genuine belief in the progressive power of private enterprise and licensors’ 
own abilities to sell the public on what was legitimately in its best interest. 
These beliefs had direct impact on the strategies and practices employed 
by licensors in promoting and selling both themselves and their properties. 
Trendle as licensor, however, did not simply fit into the category 
of cultural intermediary; he actively shaped its contours. Bearing in mind 
Liz McFall’s arguments for the need to properly historicize the 
development of intermediary occupations, my project will analyze 
Trendle’s particular construction of an identity for himself that was at 
once both inside and outside the sphere of cultural production.77 Whereas 
most discussions of cultural intermediaries position them as mediating 
between consumers and producers with little actual creative input, Trendle 
occupied a double position as both creator and radio producer for the Lone 
Ranger and Green Hornet brands as well as intermediary between the 
myriad manufacturers, sponsors and networks that employed them and the 
imaginary consumers that he simultaneously “delivered” and “protected”. 
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In this sense, I seek to complicate the ways in which the term “cultural 
intermediary” has been typically employed by exploring both how this 
occupational identity was shaped (and not just experienced) by the very 
people who would come to be identified with it and by repositioning 
intermediary agents like Trendle as both creator and mediator. In fact, I 
argue that as Trendle’s own creative authority over his brands diminished 
by the late 1950s, so too did his status as mediator.  
Du Gay offers the term “cultural economy” and explains that 
“‘economic’ processes and practices… depend on meaning for their 
effects and have particular cultural ‘conditions of existence’. Meaning is 
produced at ‘economic’ sites (at work, in shops) and circulated through 
economic processes and practices.”78 These cultural meanings often 
legitimize the economic practices they articulate, equating free enterprise 
with “freedom” or infusing business entrepreneurialism with a pioneering 
spirit. This legitimating of consumer capitalism in cultural terms reaches 
its zenith in postwar America, where consumerism and civic duty became 
synonymous under what Lizabeth Cohen has termed the Consumer’s 
Republic.79 Not coincidentally, this period was also the most successful 
for Trendle’s Lone Ranger licensing, with the 1949-1957 television series 
helping to generate multiple merchandising licenses, but also one of 
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decline for the Green Hornet. As I will argue, the former articulated 
consumerism’s cultural value more effectively than the latter because of 
the particular ways in which its western setting and brand formula aligned 
with the interests and needs of media industries and merchandisers, while 
the latter’s contemporary urban crime setting and vigilante hero did not. 
 
CHILD CONSUMERS 
Where cultural and economic values do not align, conflict ensues. 
In the case of licensors, these conflicts were multi-pronged. Licensors 
positioned themselves as intermediaries between consumer and 
corporation and between multiple media and merchandising interests. The 
latter required careful inter-textual managing to ensure brand continuity. 
The former required licensors to claim the mantle of moral arbiters, 
guarding against misuse of their brands that might elicit a deleterious 
public response (which, in turn, would hurt its financial value). As I 
argued above, successful brands often address and ease cultural anxieties 
over consumer culture. In the Lone Ranger’s and the Green Hornet’s cases 
(as well as those of many other brand personalities coming out of radio 
programs and comic strips in the 1930s), such anxieties often centered 
around the recognition of children as an emerging market.  
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As numerous scholars have argued, childhood is neither a static 
nor a natural state of being, but a culturally constructed, conflictual, and 
historically shifting set of discourses.  These discourses have served as the 
basis for much political, economic, and social struggle over the twentieth 
century, often in the service of larger concerns that have only a tangential 
relationship to children (but always with real implications for real 
children).80 Until the early 19th Century, children were seen as important 
contributors to the labor economy and children’s culture was understood 
as an important site for inculcating adult responsibilities. According to 
Karin Colvert and Viviana A. Zelizer, the period between 1830-1900 saw 
the transformation of how children were perceived, from adults-in-training 
to sacred innocents in need of protection, particularly from participation in 
the economic sphere either as laborers or consumers.81 As Jenkins 
surmises, “this new myth of childhood innocence served, in part, as the 
basis for criticism of modernity and the breakdown of traditional forms of 
family and community life82.” In this manner, the corruption of children 
by consumer culture became a rallying cry for the expression of much 
larger cultural anxieties about changing social and economic conditions.  
Even as pressures mounted to protect children from consumer 
society, they were quickly emerging as an important sales tool, sales force 
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and sales market in their own right. Advertisers and marketers sold 
consumer goods to adults through children, either by getting them to nag 
parents into making purchases, or by selling consumer goods that 
promised to extend children’s quality of life. Stephen Kline states, “the 
child became a central salesperson for mass-marketed goods,”83 while 
Nicholas Sammonds contends, “By the late 1910s the child was emerging 
as the distinct target of advertisers and marketers, a valuable commodity in 
its own right.”84 
I argue that licensors found themselves and their brands at the 
heart of this discursive struggle over childhood. On the one hand, their 
properties were designed to bring children to clients. Popular brand 
personalities often adorned inexpensive toys and promotional giveaways 
that children could either afford to purchase on their own or would 
encourage them to get their parents to purchase a sponsor’s product. 
Particularly during the Depression, many manufacturers sought out new 
markets and methods to sell both consumer goods and the ideals of 
consumption to a struggling population;  attractive brand personalities 
were amongst the strategies they embraced. On the other hand, there was a 
growing concern that children needed to be shielded from the blatant 
commercial appeal of these properties, as well as from any overt political 
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positions advocated by corporate America. Arguments for film regulation 
and reform during this period often centered on the need to protect 
susceptible populations, most notably children, from corrupting or 
questionable morals contained within these commodities. Similarly, the 
need to regulate of the American airwaves was partly conceived in relation 
to the dangers of having public life enter the domestic sphere where 
innocent children might hear it (as well as genteel women or naive 
immigrant populations).  
Fears of backlash, both imaginary and real, certainly informed 
Trendle’s brand management strategies, but also produced important 
economic opportunities for the licensor. Sammonds argues for the need to 
analyze “the productive aspects of regulation” that “open up market 
opportunities for savvy producers” by establishing “a set of guidelines by 
which the enterprising media producer could tailor its public relations 
address and its products in such a way that those products would appear to 
be beneficial to the child.”85  
Similarly, I contend that Trendle’s branding and marketing 
strategies, particularly with the Lone Ranger, were designed to promote 
the brand as beneficial for children. Alternately, the Green Hornet suffered 
from concerns that it was not promoting the right values for children, and 
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Trendle’s branding efforts, while contradictory, repeatedly responded to 
these concerns (either by tweaking the formula, or by arguing that it was 
not intended for children at all). In other words, I argue that children were 
not simply understood as either consumers or innocents to be protected 
from consumption by licensors and their clients, but as actual commodities 
of exchange in their own right, whose economic value could be leveraged 
in exchange for brands upholding normative cultural values. Sammonds 
states, “As the emerging generic child became the inevitably consuming 
child, regulating consumption became integral to regulating development. 
As mass consumer culture increasingly came into conflict with an ideal 
American culture, the child became a focal point in the struggle to 
preserve those American ideals and enforce their inclusion in mass-
mediated products.”86  
Since Trendle’s primary audience was not, in fact, children, but the 
sponsors and manufacturers who actively sought this market and 
simultaneously feared being accused of doing precisely this, I argue that 
Trendle claimed as part of his role as licensor the function of “moral 
arbiter.” His intermediary position between cultural producers and their 
target audiences brought child consumers to potential clients while 
protecting kids from corporate excesses. The Lone Ranger brand deflected 
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concerns about its commodity status by promising to help children 
embrace “normative” (read: white, middle-class, patriarchal, and 
heterosexual) moral values and build character. Since his economic 
livelihood was staked on his ability to mediate the tensions between 
selling to/through children and shielding them from the negative effects of 
consumerism, the moral values he built into his brand formulas regularly 
superceded the immediate financial reward that might come from altering 
the formula.    
As Jenkins reminds us, though, “childhood is not timeless, but 
subject to the same historical shifts and institutional factors that shape all 
human experience.”87 As such, it is important to recognize how changes in 
both cultural attitudes toward consumption and citizenship and within 
media industries from the 1930s-1960s intersect with the ways brands are 
marketed. I argue that, in part, Trendle’s intermediary role as moral arbiter 
became obsolete by the late 1950s and that his refusal to abandon this 
occupational identity contributed to his failures with the Green Hornet 
brand. Though many of the practices Trendle partook in, including an 
emphasis on the primacy of merchandising, inter-textual management, and 
branded personalities and formulas, were inevitably integrated into the 
production models that the emergent conglomerates would embrace, his 
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self-appointed role as public guardian interfered with the fluid and 
malleable relationship between product and production process that these 
new in-house licensing divisions could promote. 
 
CHAPTER BREAKDOWN 
Organized chronologically, I trace Trendle’s career as Lone 
Ranger and Green Hornet licensor beginning in 1932 and running through 
1970, with the primary focus on the period between 1933-1967. Chapter 2 
(1932-1937) traces the emergence and development of the Lone Ranger 
brand formula, including early marketing and merchandising efforts, on 
the regional Michigan Radio Network and its flagship station, WXYZ (all 
owned by Trendle)  as they directly responded to immediate programming 
and sponsorship needs. The initial growth of Lone Ranger licensing and 
merchandising adhered to a strict recycling strategy necessitated by 
WXYZ’s relationship throughout the 1930s with the burgeoning Mutual 
Broadcasting Network, a loosely-interconnected assembly of 
independently owned stations who shared programming resources which 
required Trendle to sell the program market by market. As such, the 
generalizability and reproducibility of the Lone Ranger formula became 
central to how the program was marketed. The chapter also traces 
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Trendle’s early efforts to promote and extend his brand across media, 
analyzing how early sales efforts worked to convince local stations, 
sponsors, film exhibitors and newspaper publishers to cross-promote the 
Lone Ranger brand in all its radio, film, and comic strip incarnations. 
These early efforts to convince local media outlets to work together often 
superceded the intense inter-textual managing strategies that would 
emerge once these relationships were concretized.  
Finally, the chapter analyzes how Trendle’s development of the 
Lone Ranger brand formula responded to and worked to contain anxieties 
related to the emerging children’s market throughout the Depression.   I 
examine how the brand formula negotiated broader concerns over the 
propagandistic potential of branded personalities, either for or against 
FDR’s New Deal. I argue that Trendle’s development of the Lone Ranger 
Safety Club became an important means of offsetting concerns over 
marketing either merchandise or politics directly to children. Cultivating a 
sales force, the Lone Ranger Safety Clubs also indirectly endorsed blandly 
civic (to borrow Michael Kackman’s term) and pro-corporate ideologies 
that could be easily reproduced by local Lone Ranger sponsors. 
Chapter 3 (1937-1941) analyzes the lures as and the perils of 
seeking a national audience and sponsor and becoming a national icon. I 
 79
argue that Trendle tried to replicate the Lone Ranger’s success with the 
Green Hornet brand formula, but sought to forego the market-by-market 
approach by partnering with NBC as the latter began to position itself as a 
national network. Due in part to the public spotlight NBC found itself 
under and the network’s reliance on commercial backing to fulfill its 
public service mission, the Green Hornet brand formula repeatedly ran 
into difficulties both over its generic appropriateness for children and in 
how it was marketed to potential sponsors. This, in turn, hurt its cross-
promotional effectiveness at a crucial moment where the potential for 
building a national brand was at hand. The national potential that Trendle 
sought to exploit yielded increased concerns over representation, 
particularly of Kato, the Green Hornet’s “oriental” valet, which intersected 
with shifting racial ideologies about Asians as America headed toward a 
war in the Pacific. 
Trendle’s insistence on comparing the Lone Ranger and Green 
Hornet brands, without consideration for either generic compatibility or 
differing target audiences, also hurt the Green Hornet’s attractiveness to 
sponsors. Such strategies were motivated by increased pressures to 
simultaneously differentiate brands and assert authorial ownership over 
them, which accompanied legal challenges over questions of origination of 
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intellectual property. While the Green Hornet struggled to define its 
formula, the Lone Ranger had emerged successfully by the end of the 
decade as a national icon.  As such, Trendle faced an increasingly complex 
set of legal battles over who had the right to exploit the property. As these 
struggles attempted to assign ownership standards over intangible brands, 
Trendle cultivated his occupational identity as both inter-textual manager 
and moral arbiter, particularly when it came to children, in order to 
achieve recognition of his rights.  
Chapter 4 (1943-1954) covers the Lone Ranger’s career as a 
national icon during WWII and the post war boom (though most of the 
chapter focuses on the latter period). In this chapter, I investigate the 
paradox of how anxieties over losing control over his star brand at the 
very height of the Lone Ranger’s success drove Trendle’s inter-textual 
efforts to contain and constrain innovation to the formula. During this 
period, the Lone Ranger landed a powerful and profitable national sponsor 
in General Mills and made the transition from radio production in Detroit 
under Trendle’s direct control to television production in Hollywood, with 
Trendle’s supervision from afar.  
The Lone Ranger brand also became a full-fledged sales agent for 
an Americanism that conflated civic duties with consumer spending. 
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These transitions, while bringing new fortune and fame, also brought with 
them new economic concerns and managerial strategies that engaged and 
embraced the cultural containment logic of the era. Trendle’s efforts to 
maintain control over his property went hand-in-hand with corporate 
efforts to sustain consumer frenzy and reject those who questioned the 
market’s ultimate fairness. Consumption and conformity were patriotic 
(and were intrinsically linked together), while dissent and difference were 
labeled un-American. It is significant that it is not merely the Lone Ranger 
who is presented as embodying these particular aspects of Americanism, 
but the people responsible for his creation and success. Promotion of the 
Lone Ranger was also a celebration of American business ingenuity and 
entrepreneurship. Still, the very exaltation of the American corporation, 
and its increased centralization in the postwar era, actually threatened the 
independence that licensors sought to maintain and upon which Trendle 
had staked his occupational identity and intermediary function.  
In Chapter 5 (1951-1964), I analyze Trendle’s repeated failures to 
license the Green Hornet to television as the industry  transitioned to the 
classical network era.  Trendle’s attempts to adapt the Green Hornet 
formula to meet the postwar cultural climate would prove incongruous 
with industry standards and perceptions of the television audience. The 
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Green Hornet brand formula did not conform to the generic expectations 
of the crime dramas of this period, which relied on documentary realism.  
This aspect, coupled with the show’s historical distance from the adult 
western, was a key factor in the brand’s failure to branch out into 
television during this period, as was Trendle’s unwillingness to adapt his 
business practices to address shifts from a single-sponsorship to a 
magazine-format driven advertising system.  The eradication of first-run 
syndication markets also contributed to the failure of the Green Hornet on 
television. Trendle’s intransigence and unwillingness to rethink both his 
business model and his understanding of what the Green Hornet 
represented proved to be repeated sources of tension with potential 
producers. While other independent producers like Desilu and Ziv re-
invented themselves during this period, the loss of autonomy and direct 
managerial control over the Green Hornet brand that Trendle was 
presented with in this renewed regime of network and studio power were 
antithetical to the very cultural and economic values that had sustained the 
independent licensor since the 1930s. 
In Chapter 6 (1965-1967), I argue that the installation of licensing 
and merchandising divisions within network and studio operating systems 
at first re-activated interest in the Green Hornet brand as a potentially 
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lucrative franchise and eventually spelled the brand’s demise. The 
successful licensing of the Batman TV series and James Bond film 
franchise also contributed to corporate interests in formulas that could 
promote an array of gizmos, gadgets, and other merchandising props. 
Institutional memories of the Green Hornet’s value differed significantly 
from how Trendle defined the brand and would prove the series’ undoing. 
I analyze the highly contentious correspondence between Trendle and 
William Dozier, head of Greenaway Productions, and producer of the 
1966 Green Hornet TV series for Twentieth Century Fox and ABC 
television. Trendle’s insistence on thematic continuity with the original 
Green Hornet formula versus Dozier’s desire to play up its more 
fantastical elements serve as a central tension throughout the short-lived 
series. I argue that competing memories of the Green Hornet’s value 
played an integral part in the muddled production. This case study also 
serves as an analysis of the shifts in the TV industry by the mid-1960s that 
were paving the way for conglomeration and began to push the 
intermediary values of independent licensors further to the margins while 
integrating their brand exploitation strategies into larger corporate entities. 
Overall, in tracing the development and articulation of the Lone 
Ranger and Green Hornet brands across multiple media and over this 
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thirty-year span, I aim to underscore how cultural icons are constructed 
and managed, but also to analyze the complex and shifting web of 
institutional and cultural practices and values that licensors had to 
negotiate - and sometimes failed to address. As the Lone Ranger stands 
ready for yet another comeback, this time in comic book form, and then in 
a major motion picture scheduled for release sometime in 2007, it is 
amazing how well these brand formulas and the practices that sustain them 
have been preserved. While the degree of bloodshed in the forthcoming 
Lone Ranger comic book would probably not have met with Trendle’s 
approval, the fact that producers still see the commercial potential for this 
cultural brand speaks to the work its licensor put into developing its value. 
And, yet, while the Lone Ranger still resonates in both popular and 
institutional memories, and even the Green Hornet lingers as an unused 
but proprietary piece of intellectual property that might be exploited again, 
Trendle has largely been forgotten (if he was ever even really known 
outside of media production world to begin with). Even as licensing and 
merchandising have become increasingly central to cultural production, 
the independent licensors that championed these practices have been cast 
aside. To understand, however, how it is that the Lone Ranger became a 
cultural icon - and why the Green Hornet did not - it is essential to 
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investigate the work Trendle performed on these brands and the values 
that informed these practices.  
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Chapter Two: Introduction 
Every radio (and, later, television) episode of The Lone Ranger 
began the exact same way: with the sound of gunshots, the cry ‘Hi Yo 
Silver!’, and the William Tell overture. An announcer would then set the 
mood: “A cloud of dust, a galloping horse with the speed of light, a hearty 
Hi-Yo Silver! - The Lone Ranger!” That The Lone Ranger followed a 
formula cannot be refuted. Nor can it be refuted that The Lone Ranger’s 
formula was financially rewarding for its creator, George W. Trendle 
(President of King-Trendle Radio Corporation), whose gross receipts from 
the series in 1939 exceeded $1,000,000.1 However, the creation of the 
show’s formula and its characters’ emergence as American icons requires 
closer investigation. Popular heroes emerge out of, and are negotiated 
within, shifting industrial, legal, economic, and social contexts. They are 
not pure reflections of any given moment, but rather they are filtered 
constructions that are both shaped by and shaping of cultural industry 
perceptions of the consumer/ audience. Their meanings and movements 
may be multiple, but they are always subject to various forms of cultural 
and economic management. This is particularly true of a licensed brand 
like the Lone Ranger. 
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 The meanings accrued and markets accessed by the Lone Ranger 
during the 1930s were shaped by, on the one hand, the continued growth 
of radio as a sponsored, but still not fully national, medium, and on the 
other hand shifting conceptualizations of the consumer and emergent ways 
of selling to them that were necessitated by the economic downturn of the 
Great Depression. During the Depression, manufacturers sought new ways 
of selling and new markets to sell to. While radio would prove to be an 
expanding site for such endeavors, it was the recognition of children as 
consumers that would prove both particularly appealing and disconcerting 
to potential sponsors. King-Trendle worked not only to demonstrate the 
sales appeal of their properties to children, but also to reframe concerns 
over exploitation and manipulation of children’s innocence into 
discussions of the positive moral lessons and character building potential 
of their brands. In other words, it was not sufficient for licensors to prove 
to potential sponsors and radio stations that their properties had monetary 
value; they also had to imbue them with the right moral values.  
 Moreover, the King-Trendle Radio Corporation sought to align 
such moral values with corporate needs, an often tricky balancing act as 
sponsors struggled to overcome public mistrust and accusations of greed 
and apathy, while it simultaneously pursued a consumer group many 
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believed needed protection from precisely such interests. Under such 
conditions, the ability to deliver children and assuage their parents and 
guardians became enormously valuable within the cultural industries, as 
licensors positioned themselves as arbiters between corporate and public 
interests. King-Trendle argued that the Lone Ranger, when its formula was 
properly managed by its owners, was a powerful personality brand that 
inspired character building in children which, in turn, brought sponsors 
and licensees both financial reward and good public relations.  
 Of course, King-Trendle had to convince sponsors, manufacturers, 
and media outlets of this argument. Additionally, King-Trendle developed 
its own reasons for creating the Lone Ranger formula and business model 
as it did. Indeed, as this case illustrates, neither so-called normative 
business practices nor the logics that sustain them emerge overnight, but 
result from intense struggles to legitimate these practices as motivated by 
historically particular institutional conditions.  
 George Trendle’s pioneering efforts2 in licensing emerged out of 
the particularities of his status as, initially, an independent radio station 
owner in need of programming that would attract sponsorship and 
generate revenue and, soon after, by his long-time affiliation with the 
Mutual Broadcasting System (MBS), a loosely-networked group of 
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independent local and regional station clusters who shared programming, 
but operated until the late 1930s outside the national network model 
advocated by NBC and CBS. These working conditions necessitated the 
development of a formula that could be replicated exactly for each new 
market where King-Trendle sold The Lone Ranger program. The reusable 
nature of The Lone Ranger not only attracted like-sponsors in non-
competitive markets (42 bakeries throughout the decade), but the repeated 
recycling of publicity constructed the Lone Ranger brand as an important 
sales tool amongst manufacturers, ad agencies, radio networks, and other 
cultural producers and exhibitors. 
 King-Trendle’s early management efforts were largely 
concentrated on coordinating marketing and merchandising campaigns 
(both within and across local markets).  The need for pre-sold markets 
drove the development of cross-marketing strategies that taught local 
stations, sponsors, retailers and exhibitors how to interact with one 
another, while these strategies also promoted the Lone Ranger brand as a 
trans-mediated node that could link these different groups together. At the 
same time, King-Trendle positioned members of its licensing operation as 
management experts who could coordinate and integrate marketing 
efforts.  King-Trendle was also concerned with inserting the Lone Ranger 
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brand into local communities, the Lone Ranger himself signifying both a 
consumer advocate and a civic/moral inspirational leader for young 
children. In fact, these identities were not mutually exclusive, but intended 
to be embodied by the Lone Ranger brand as mutually constituting.  
 Marketing strategies developed by King-Trendle centered on the 
development of Lone Ranger Safety Clubs that would help train children 
to be good consumers as well as upstanding citizens. Simultaneously 
promoting traffic safety and sponsored products through the cultivation of 
Lone Ranger fandom, Lone Ranger safety clubs were key to King-
Trendle’s formula for extending the brand’s reach beyond any one 
particular text.  The Safety Clubs also alleviated tensions over the moral 
values that products marketed directly to children imparted, by positioning 
the Lone Ranger’s virtuous personality above and outside of any of the 
commodities he helped sell. King-Trendle succeeded at establishing a 
controlled yet seemingly all-inclusive fan community infrastructure that 
encompassed all brand iterations and encouraged interactions with the 
brand beyond merely consuming a particular text (and, in fact, where 
listening to the radio program was only a means of further promoting club 
activities). This accomplishment would have a tremendous impact on 
contemporary conglomerate strategies in developing commercial intertexts 
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(though his valuation of the civic and moral qualities of the Lone Ranger 
and Green Hornet brands, as well as his role as arbiter of these values, 
would eventually become anachronistic).  The licensing and marketing 
practices adopted by King-Trendle and other licensors, and the 
assumptions and conditions that motivated how they went about their 
work, are also significant not only for how they shaped the Lone Ranger’s 
cultural and consumer status during the 1930s, but also for how they 
rehearsed brand management strategies that would shape future branding 
and licensing endeavors as adopted by the media conglomerates of the late 
1960s and beyond.3  
 This chapter is organized as follows: first I will elaborate on The 
Lone Ranger formula’s development and the conditions that structured the 
way the brand was constructed. I also will explain how King-Trendle as 
licensor earned money from the business model it employed and will 
discuss what licensing the Lone Ranger brand actually entailed. I then will 
contextualize the factors that attracted licensees to the Lone Ranger brand, 
as well as some of the concerns that arose from selling to children through 
branded personalities.  This section will illustrate how King-Trendle’s 
management and marketing formulas were designed to alleviate and 
ameliorate these tensions. I will conclude with a detailed case study of the 
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Lone Ranger Safety Club as key to negotiating the various economic and 
cultural values the property had to embody. 
 
 
THE LONE RANGER FORMULA 
 On the surface, The Lone Ranger formula is fairly straightforward. 
Set in the Old West (1850-1865), the Lone Ranger is a masked rider who 
hunts down criminals with the help of his Indian companion, Tonto. The 
Lone Ranger rides a white steed named Silver and shoots silver bullets 
from his silver-handled revolvers. His true identity remains a mystery, 
though he is believed to be the lone Texas Ranger to survive an ambush by 
the Cavendish gang, who periodically appear in the adventures as the Lone 
Ranger’s arch nemeses. It was Tonto who found the wounded ranger and 
nursed him back to health. While these elements have become iconic, they 
in fact developed over multiple radio episodes and through trial and error. 
For instance, Tonto was not actually introduced until the fourth Lone 
Ranger episode. His introduction was motivated by the need to convey 
plot exposition without the hero talking to himself. In the first three 
episodes, the Lone Ranger usually disguised himself amongst a crowd of 
people to discuss plot points.4 The Cavendish gang origin, as well as the 
 
 98
story of Tonto and the Lone Ranger’s partnership were introduced nearly a 
year after the series first went on the air.  
 The generic plot for Lone Ranger adventures was also developed 
over many years, but was formally codified in 1950 in order to help King-
Trendle control the adaptation of its brand to television. The Lone Ranger 
formula followed the plot structures of many other western adventures. 
The Lone Ranger would ride into a town, uncover a nefarious plot, assist 
the kind but helpless/hapless town-folk capture the villain, and would ride 
off again. The majority of radio episodes ended with a rescued child 
asking their parents, “Who was that masked man?” Seeking to capitalize 
on the child consumer market by promoting a positive role model that 
parents and sponsors could rally behind, Lone Ranger plots were 
purposely devised to be straightforward and unambiguous. The audience 
for the series was always aware of the villain’s identity and his plans in 
advance of the Lone Ranger. There were very few mysteries or 
cliffhangers (with the notable exceptions of the 1937 and 1938 Republic 
film serials and the first four episodes of the 1949-1957 television series, 
which were conceived with the possibility of later releasing them as a 
feature film in mind).  Though technically operating outside the law, the 
Lone Ranger was a law-abiding hero who often partnered with local law-
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enforcement officers on his adventures.  Lone Ranger villains were always 
cowardly and evil, with no redeeming motivations for their actions other 
than greed. In order to avoid complaints from minorities, King-Trendle 
also insisted that all Lone Ranger villains be white – though the licensor 
regularly conflated “white” and “American.”  
 Assuming that children were uninterested in love stories, Lone 
Ranger plots were devoid of romance. The Lone Ranger also never shot to 
kill and if killing was absolutely necessary to a plot, Trendle insisted that 
Tonto do the deed -- and even then, without the Lone Ranger’s consent or 
knowledge. Seeking to maintain the property’s iconic status, King-Trendle 
insisted that under no circumstances were plots to place the Lone Ranger 
in a position where he might be unmasked. The only exception to this rule 
came in the 1937 Republic serial, The Lone Ranger, where the hero’s 
identity was revealed in the final episode.  King-Trendle tried to fight 
Republic on this, but failed. After this incident, King-Trendle 
contractually prohibited clients from unmasking the Lone Ranger.  
Though recent marketing efforts to relaunch the Lone Ranger franchise 
have labeled the character a “superhero,” one important distinction is that 
the Lone Ranger had no secret identity or private life (unlike 
Superman/Clark Kent or Batman/Bruce Wayne).  King-Trendle’s 
 
 100
insistence that the character’s true identity remain a mystery was intended 
to further promote its mythic quality. Similarly, the licensor insisted that 
Lone Ranger plots always have the hero fighting for a larger cause and not 
simply to help individuals in need. As the Lone Ranger’s value grew, the 
stakes were raised at both the textual and promotional level. Initially, the 
Lone Ranger aided entire communities and promoted traffic safety 
through his Safety Clubs, but as the property’s value grew, so did the 
causes the hero fought for. By the postwar era, the Lone Ranger fought to 
defend pioneering industries like the railroad and taught children to be 
good Americans.   
  As stated in the introductory chapter to this project, the 
development of the Lone Ranger brand was a collaborative effort. While 
George Trendle owned the copyright and claimed the title of creator, the 
formula actually originated with Fran Striker, the head writer and script 
supervisor for the radio series.5 Striker employed a “morphological 
approach to plotting”, which comprised “modular pieces, archetypal forms 
or everyday experiences arranged in columns according to whether they 
referred to character traits, objectives to be reached, obstacles to be 
overcome, or solutions to problems.”6 Alexander Russo argues that Striker 
generated plots by combining different elements in endless variations.7 
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Striker referred to his writing process in even more formulaic terms: 
“Drama consists of a character in conflict ‘A’ desiring ‘B’ is opposed by 
‘C’. This is conflict... DESIRE opposed by OBSTACLE equals 
EMOTION.”8 
 While this formula would serve as the basis for most Lone Ranger 
radio, comic book, comic strip, television stories and novelizations over 
the next twenty years, it is important to situate the brand’s development 
within the particular historical and institutional context that first 
determined the character traits, objectives, obstacles, and solutions from 
which the Lone Ranger’s identity would be forged. The formula served the 
particular needs of its creators, the King-Trendle Radio Corporation and 
its flagship station, WXYZ. From its inception, The Lone Ranger radio 
series formula was designed to attract sponsorship by appealing to 
children.  
 In 1930, George Washington Trendle and John Kunsky (later 
King) formed the Kunsky-Trendle Broadcasting Corporation (later King-
Trendle) and bought radio station WGH in Detroit, Michigan, re-
christening it WXYZ. At the time, WXYZ was Detroit’s CBS affiliate, but 
in 1932, Trendle cancelled the station’s contract with the national network, 
opting instead to create a regional network, The Michigan Radio Network 
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(MRN), with WXYZ as the flagship station. To this end, he bought up 
seven additional radio stations in the State.  While later self-aggrandizing 
publicity from the 1950s would label Trendle a “pioneer” and a “rebel” for 
these decisions, his choice to go independent was rooted in simple 
economics.9  In 1932, CBS implemented a new policy by which it would 
pay affiliates to take its programming, sponsored and sustaining, but this 
required that affiliates take all or nothing.10 Trendle saw greater profit 
margins in reserving evening hours for locally sponsored programming, 
but he now faced the double need to generate programming and convince 
sponsors that the MRN could attract listeners.  Without CBS’s steady 
influx of programming, WXYZ initially lost $4000 a week.11 In order to 
promote both the flagship station and the seven other stations that formed 
the MRN, Trendle needed programming that could compete with NBC 
and CBS, at a fraction of the cost, and attract audiences who, in turn, 
would lure sponsors.  
 Knowing that MRN could not afford the production budgets that 
NBC and CBS were investing in variety programming featuring celebrity 
hosts and Hollywood guest stars,12 King-Trendle opted to create dramas 
because they were cheap to produce and could employ an anonymous set 
of actors who would work on various programs.13 Trendle also decided to 
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target children since he believed that this group was less discerning than 
adult listeners and would forgive poor production values in exchange for 
action and adventure.14 The romanticization of the Lone Ranger’s origins 
asserts that Trendle settled on a western setting for the series instead of a 
crime drama because of his nostalgic childhood memories of reading dime 
store novels about the moral fortitude and bravery of cowboys.15  
However, the truth is that MRN created series in both genres, both also 
written by Striker. The Lone Ranger debuted on January 30, 1933, only a 
few weeks after Manhunter, a series about a crusading district attorney. 
The two series initially were alternated with one another. 16    
 While Striker may have formalized the plot structure, various 
members of Trendle’s broadcasting company played a part in developing 
the characteristics necessary to create a competitive series that would 
attract children, who in turn, would attract sponsorship. Letters between 
Striker and James Jewell, a director at WXYZ, between 1932-1933 outline 
some of the basic characteristics and elements of the Lone Ranger brand. 
Jewell would later claim to have been the Lone Ranger’s true creator, 
which Trendle hotly denied. Regardless, all King-Trendle employees were 
required to sign contracts that prohibited them from making any 
ownership claims on characters or stories that they might have helped 
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develop, so that copyright rested exclusively with the King-Trendle Radio 
Corporation. It is also worth noting that all of Jewell’s letters to Striker 
always convey suggestions and revisions from other members of the 
company, including Trendle, evidencing the collaborative creative 
process.  
 Many of the elements of the Lone Ranger’s appearance that would 
become iconic were introduced with the search for sponsors and the child 
audience in mind. The Lone Ranger’s mask was intended to add an 
element of mystery that would distinguish the series from other children’s 
adventure shows and the character from Hollywood matinee western 
heroes. Trendle described the Lone Ranger as a cross between Robin 
Hood and a Tom Mix type. Whereas Robin Hood had an established 
persona, but was a fictional character (conveniently located in the public 
domain, legally allowing for comparisons to be made between him and the 
Lone Ranger - see next chapter), Mix was a real actor (hence, the 
declaration that the Lone Ranger was a “Tom Mix type” and not inspired 
by Tom Mix) who commanded a high salary for his services.   
 Sponsors were demanding Hollywood stars and the networks 
promised to deliver the type of mass audience that justified the expense.17 
King-Trendle’s regional network needed another option. In the absence of 
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any real stars on the program, the character himself had to stand out, and 
the mask was intended to make the Lone Ranger an object of fascination 
in the same manner as other celebrities of the era, at a fraction of the cost. 
As Gary Cross has suggested about branded radio cowboy personalities 
(both real celebrities and fictional characters), “the cowboy star... offered 
boys a wide variety of fantasies based on courageous, powerful 
individualists who defended right against wrong.”18 
 The Lone Ranger’s use of silver bullets was settled upon because 
Trendle wanted the program to have identifiable signature premiums. 
Premiums were cheap mass-produced giveaway items that usually bore 
the brand’s insignia and were offered to radio listeners (or film goers and 
newspaper readers) in exchange for their writing in and, occasionally, 
providing proof of purchase of a sponsor’s item. Most premiums were 
directed at children, who were instructed to convince their parents to buy a 
particular product so that they could mail in the proof of purchase to 
receive their ”free” gift. “Radio advertisers used the heroes of their 
programs in premiums to increase sales. [Radio heroes like] Jack 
Armstrong, Tom Mix, Buck Rogers, Charlie McCarthy, and Little Orphan 
Annie won loyal audiences and sold malt drinks, breakfast foods, and 
coffee when children collected labels and box tops to “earn” compasses, 
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pedometers, decoder rings, and even pocket knives with their favorite 
hero’s picture on them.”19 Premiums were also an important way of 
measuring both the size and consumer-friendliness of a given program’s 
audience when seeking out a potential sponsor for a series. While Cross 
convincingly argues that science fiction programs like Buck Rogers 
offered the greatest opportunity for premiums because of their constant 
use of gadgets and gizmos integrated into their stories, Trendle believed 
that westerns offered more opportunities for premiums than other 
children’s programs.20 
 In June 1933, four months after The Lone Ranger series debuted, 
MRN put out a promotional pamphlet entitled “Radio’s Most Spectacular 
Incident − Five Minutes of Reading Time that Dispels Five Years of 
Doubt.” Upon unfolding the pamphlet, potential sponsors came to a two-
page spread with the headline “Twenty-Four Thousand Six Hundred 
Seven LETTERS RECEIVED From One Announcement Broadcast at 
9:30 p.m.”21 The announcement at the end of the program had promised 
“genuine Lone Ranger six-shooter[s]” to the first 300 people who wrote to 
the stations requesting one.22 The enormous number of requests received 




 Many licensed brands that would emerge in the 1930s initially 
resulted from circumstances intended largely to promote their parent 
company to potential investors (whether sponsors or consumers) and bring 
in additional sources of revenue during the Depression. For instance, the 
Radio Orphan Annie series that debuted on Chicago’s WGN on December 
8, 1930 helped publicize The Chicago Tribune.  Aside from publishing the 
comic strip and syndicating it nationwide to over 500 other newspapers, 
the Chicago Tribune also owned WGN precisely as a publicity vehicle for 
its columnists and comic strips in order to sell more newspapers.23 
Similarly, The Lone Ranger was initially created to promote WXYZ to 
regional sponsors.  
King-Trendle’s strategy paid off when the Gordon Bakery, makers of 
Silvercup Bread, became the program’s sponsor on November 27, 1933 (it 
would remain a major sponsor of the show until March 1939).24 Gordon 
reaped immediate success with the program - a promotional ad in Grocer’s 
Spotlight Newspaper stated “Our Best Salesman Rides a Horse.”25  
 One important distinction between the Lone Ranger and other 
brands like Little Orphan Annie, indeed between licensors in general and 
media companies that licensed characters primarily for extra income, like 
the Chicago Tribune Syndicate, was the degree of control licensors 
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exercised over the properties they marketed. The Lone Ranger, like all 
other radio productions created by King-Trendle was broadcast from the 
WXYZ studios in downtown Detroit. It was produced by King-Trendle 
throughout its 23-year radio career. As Russo suggests, though Trendle 
was not involved in the day-to-day production of the series, the relatively 
small scale of production (as opposed to NBC or CBS), placed ultimate 
control over the radio product in his hands.26 Trendle would insist on 
continued and active involvement in almost every facet of The Lone 
Ranger’s production; indeed, he sold himself (and the licensing profession 
in general) as a management expert who developed detailed integrated 
merchandising strategies that potential sponsors were required to buy 
along with the character rights. 
 Interestingly, many of the elements originally used in attracting 
local sponsorship for the radio program would be reconfigured to help 
expand the Lone Ranger brand to other radio stations and across media 
and merchandising outlets. As King-Trendle refocused its primary object 
of sale on the brand itself, the complex business model that would drive 
sales also began to take shape, becoming as integral part of the Lone 




THE BUSINESS MODEL 
 While the product was originally created to promote WXYZ and 
MRN to potential sponsors, within a couple of years King-Trendle 
recognized that greater profits lay in extending The Lone Ranger program 
beyond Michigan and the Lone Ranger brand beyond radio programming. 
The business model that evolved targeted independent radio stations in 
non-competitive markets and helped them to attract like-sponsors through 
marketing strategies that stressed the reusable qualities and recycled sales 
successes of past brand-sponsor interactions. In this sense, the formulaic 
aspects of the promotional capabilities were as important to its sales 
effectiveness as repetitive plot elements. Moreover, as the brand expanded 
into other media, King-Trendle’s profits, and thus its sales strategies, 
became tied to selling to local radio stations, film exhibitors, and 
newspaper publishers on the mutually beneficial possibilities of cross-
promotion. Finally, whereas premiums had initially been developed to call 
attention to the radio program, new merchandising schemes would use the 
radio program to promote the brand. 
 On January 31, 1935, Trendle incorporated The Lone Ranger. 
While Trendle would later explain this decision away as a means of 
protecting WXYZ from lawsuits, the incorporation also gave The Lone 
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Ranger Inc the right to lease the characters and stories featured under that 
title for any promotional or production purpose. Trendle’s first licensee 
was himself as he granted, for the cost of one dollar, the King-Trendle 
Radio Corporation the right to produce the radio series and required that 
any sponsor attached to the radio series use those broadcasts exclusively.  
The initial impetus to extend the market penetration of The Lone Ranger 
radio series actually came from Gordon’s Bakery. Gordon was a regional 
manufacturer with markets in Michigan, Illinois, New York and Ohio. As 
such, it quickly pressed for the series to be heard over other radio stations 
outside the Michigan Radio Network market. Sponsor pressures led to 
negotiations with other independent radio stations in those markets (WGN 
in Chicago, WLW in Cincinnati, and WOR in New York) to air the series. 
This informal exchange of programming would lead to the development of 
the Mutual Radio Network in 1934, with WXYZ as one its flagship 
stations.27 Since Mutual consisted of a loosely inter-connected group of 
independent radio stations that shared programming, most Lone Ranger 
episodes were distributed via mail on transcribed recordings to non-
networked stations.28 By 1937, WXYZ earned most of its revenue through 




 The Lone Ranger was sold market by market to independently 
owned and operated stations, most of which were loosely affiliated with 
regional independent networks, like the Don Lee Network in California 
and the Pacific Coast and the Colonial and Yankee Networks out of New 
England. King-Trendle contracted independent radio stations that 
purchased the transcribed radio program on a sustaining basis in 13, 26, or 
52-week blocks, while searching for a local sponsor. In exchange for a net 
payment usually equivalent to 30-50 percent of the highest priced half-
hour drama on a station’s schedule, depending on the size of the market 
King-Trendle not only supplied three 15-minute episodes per week, but 
also publicity and advertising materials, lists of preferred premium 
manufacturers (i.e., those that King-Trendle collected a healthy royalty 
on), and other merchandising management expertise.30  
 NBC generally thought very little of the series - an internal memo 
evaluating whether they should attempt to lure The Lone Ranger to the 
Blue Network described it as “a dime novel translated into radio. 
Overplayed and overwritten.” 31  But this did not prevent it from entering 
into a transcription arrangement with King-Trendle in 1938 that expanded 
The Lone Ranger’s reach even further. In addition to making the 
recordings, NBC was also sub-licensed to sell the series to its affiliates in 
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markets where Mutual did not have a presence. This history contributes to 
the confusion over when The Lone Ranger actually began airing on NBC. 
It aired as a transcription series on many local NBC affiliates several years 
before joining the NBC Blue Network in 1941 under General Mills’ 
national sponsorship. While King-Trendle paid $90 for every 30-minute 
transcription recording of the show NBC made, NBC paid King-Trendle 
50 percent of net receipts for any recordings they leased on its behalf.32 
King-Trendle would assist station salesmen in finding sponsors by 
providing stations with publicity materials and merchandising guides, but 
local stations also paid King-Trendle to take the series on a sustaining 
basis until they could procure a sponsor. Once a sponsor was found, King-
Trendle would convince them to pursue merchandising schemes like the 
Safety Club, requiring added licensing fees for premiums, display 
materials, etc. 
 Licensing market-by-market meant that sponsors generally were 
local or regional businesses. King-Trendle often targeted like-businesses 
in non-competitive markets, using the statistical evidence and 
merchandising success garnered by sponsors to further the reach of his 
property. By August 1938, The Lone Ranger’s success for Gordon’s 
Bakeries had translated into 42 different regional sponsors, mostly 
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bakeries in non-competitive territories, including Cobacko Bakeries, 
Weber Baking Co., Cramer Baking Co., and Kilpatrick’s Bakeries, but 
also companies like the 7-Up Bottling Co. in Baltimore.33 In September 
1938, Bond Bread became the regional sponsor in the Washington, DC 
market on station WOL.34 Bond eventually would take over from Gordon 
as the Lone Ranger’s WXYZ sponsor.35 As evidenced by a 1937 
merchandising exploitation publicity supplement assembled by King-
Trendle for potential sponsors, the very reproducibility of the Lone 
Ranger’s marketing formula was a key to its success. It contains a four-
page spread titled “Consumer Tie-In” that showcases the various sponsor 
tie-in materials used to promote and exploit The Lone Ranger Safety 
Club.36  
 First adapted on October 14, 1935 by The Sehl Advertising 
Agency for Gordon’s Bakeries (though it had been envisioned as far back 
as 1933 by Lone Ranger scribe Fran Striker), the Safety Club was 
marketed by King-Trendle as “a handy index to the popularity of the 
program.”37 The Lone Ranger incorporation guaranteed that any 
promotional materials or premium giveaways devised by sponsors of the 
series needed to be copyrighted in the name of The Lone Ranger Inc., 
granting Trendle not only ownership of said promotional materials, but the 
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right to reproduce and sell those ideas to other potential sponsors (usually 
outside of the primary markets of those sponsors who might have devised 
the promotion or after a certain amount of time had allotted on the 
contract). While sponsors paid the entire costs of developing, 
manufacturing, and promoting Lone Ranger premiums, the Lone Ranger 
Inc., owned the copyrights (even the registration costs of which were born 
by sponsors).  
 Throughout his career, Trendle would often cannibalize 
promotional materials developed by sponsors (and sponsors’ advertising 
agencies) as merchandising materials in his efforts to win new Lone 
Ranger sponsors or help existing ones expand their reach into new 
markets. Licensor contracts also stipulated that all promotional material 
devised by sponsors first required King-Trendle’s approval before being 
disseminated, since it was imperative that it convey the appropriate brand 
image and be reusable in other contexts by maintaining thematic and 
visual consistency. 
 King-Trendle maintained strict control over the production of 
premiums, licensing particular companies to produce them and restricting 
those manufacturers from selling premiums to anyone but radio sponsors. 
They also required that sponsors either purchase premiums directly from 
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these manufacturers or, if they sought a cheaper alternative, insisted that 
samples be given approval before another manufacturer could be 
employed. A percentage of every premium order by sponsors went back 
into King-Trendle’s coffers as a royalty paid to them by the manufacturer, 
exponentially increasing the licensor’s earnings. It is no wonder that King-
Trendle worked as hard as it did to convince sponsors to maximize their 
premium usage by tying the Lone Ranger brand into their products, since 
this not only provided increased exposure for the brand, but added revenue 
for the company. 
 The supplement brochure replicated various sponsor tie-in items 
for the Safety Club, including membership pledge cards, badges, secret 
decoder cards, and Safety Club newsletters. Each of these items appeared 
multiple times on the display page, which was organized like a collage, 
emphasizing the uniformity of the merchandising process [See image #1]. 
While each item was shown to be reusable in different markets, the 
merchandising supplement also revealed how minor variations were 
incorporated according to sponsor needs. For instance, the shapes of the 
badges differed, likely according to the price quoted by regional 
manufacturers licensed to produce this give-away for a given sponsor.  
The pledge cards, each containing ten promises made by members, also 
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varied, some placing almost exclusive emphasis on traffic safety while 
others extending the scope of the pledge to encompass larger civic duties 
and moral values.38 Licensing practices relied heavily on these recycling 
strategies to demonstrate the reusable qualities of their properties. 
Licensors also relied on obtaining constantly updated sales information 
from their clients. In the absence of tangible evidence of the sales appeal 
their properties possessed, recycling statistics culled from audience write-
ins for premiums and, more importantly, from sponsors, ad agencies and 
stations’ reporting on successful marketing campaigns became the primary 
mode through which licensors proved that their properties brought 
tangible economic results. 
 Trendle’s promotional files are filled with letters from radio 
stations, advertising agencies, and sponsors commenting on the success of 
various merchandising campaigns. These letters responded to King-
Trendle’s requests for statistical information (occasionally, such 
information was even contractually required). Letters from April 21-26, 
1938, for instance, responded to King-Trendle’s inquiries about the first 
60 days of Lone Ranger broadcasts across stations from Cincinnati to San 
Francisco. These letters reveal the types of information King-Trendle was 
interested in cultivating. Uniformly, these letters answered questions about 
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Safety Club membership, giveaway responses, and advertising tie-ins 
(especially with the recently released Lone Ranger motion picture serial). 
King-Trendle’s questions selectively produced responses that 
foregrounded the role of his property in selling sponsor goods, ignoring 
information such as previous customer bases, other promotional efforts, 
quality of merchandise, etc. Impressive statistical information was circled 
with the comment “the first 60 days” written beside it. Many of these 
statistical responses would find their way into promotional materials for 
the radio series or as merchandising strategies for maximizing sales. This 
oft-repeated strategy involved each new market’s premium and Safety 
Club membership statistics to be gathered and selectively incorporated 
into the campaign to sell sponsorship in the next market.39 
 While the practice of recycling statistics was largely motivated by 
the ever-expanding search for like-sponsors in non-competitive markets, it 
also had the added cumulative effect of discursively constructing (and 
repeatedly reconstructing) the Lone Ranger in the eyes of business leaders 
as an important sales agent for their products and King-Trendle as a 
dutiful product manager. This practice affected Lone Ranger’s rise to 
iconic stature in the US, as it was first necessary to convince producers 
and manufacturers of its ubiquity. Once on board, these producers and 
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manufacturers contributed to the wealth of consumer goods sold under the 
Lone Ranger moniker, but it was the persistent internal recycling of 
success stories, sales statistics, and premium requests that helped establish 
the perception that the character was already an American business icon. 
To this effect, the concluding page of a1939 sales packet designed to sell 
Lone Ranger transcriptions states, “Jack Benny, Fred Allen, Phil Baker 
and Phillip Morris programs mention ‘The Lone Ranger’ and play upon 
the words ‘Hi Yo Silver.’... National magazines such as NEW YORKER, 
JUDGE, LIFE and prominent radio journals quote in picture and in story 
of ‘The Lone Ranger’ and the cry, ‘Hi Yo Silver.’ No matter where you 
go, you’ll hear remarks referring to the great radio character.”40 
 Recycling publicity differed from the ways advertising agencies 
used premiums and other forms of audience measurement. While ad 
agencies certainly used giveaways to measure the audience and to promote 
the sponsor through licensed trade characters, they did not generally 
publicize their results, choosing to keep such information proprietary so 
that other competitive agencies and businesses could not copy successful 
strategies. Sehl Advertising, the first agency to create a Lone Ranger 
Safety Club, seemed perplexed when asked by King-Trendle for statistics 
on giveaways and club membership, stating “Don’t know just how you 
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expect to use this material... all radio and broadcast publications have been 
calling on us for a full and complete story of the Lone Ranger. We have 
refused to give out any information, the Gordon Baking Company taking 
the stand that this is all of a private nature, of no concern to anyone else... 
due to the fact that the editors haven’t access to exact figures, the articles 
never show up in our favor as strongly as they should. And this again 
bothers us very little, because these magazines are not read by the 
consumer.”41  
 King-Trendle, however, saw tremendous advantage in publicizing 
the success sponsors had using its brand, since its audience was not the 
consumer, but precisely those other manufacturers and advertising 
agencies that Sehl and Gordon’s wished to keep in the dark. Sponsors 
were attracted to the Lone Ranger brand because it helped foster closer 
relationships between manufacturers and retailers. As the Depression set 
in, manufacturers looked for any advantage they could muster to 
distinguish their products from those of their competitors. Retailers served 
as intermediaries in guiding consumers toward particular products. Due to 
increased competition for diminishing markets in the 1930s, retailer 
willingness to stock or prominently display one product over another took 
on added significance. From the start, the Lone Ranger’s radio appeal 
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mattered most to Gordon’s Bakery in terms of how this could be converted 
into grocers’ stocking Silvercup Bread. As one ad aimed at this 
occupational community asks, “Who’s asleep at the switch? Only the 
grocer who doesn’t take advantage of this amazing radio advertising by 
featuring SILVERCUP in his store.”42 Licensed properties like the Lone 
Ranger became important sales tools for manufacturers in cultivating 
productive relationships with retailers, since they promised extra 
consumer interest for retailers. 
 As Cross has argued regarding toy sales during the Depression, 
manufacturers had to first win access to sales shelves from retailers before 
they could reach children. Branded products provided an important 
intervention. “The media personality put a ‘child’s friend’ on an ordinary 
sand pail or pull toy. These toys stood out from the generic version and in 
effect sold themselves. Retailers then had an incentive to seek a specific 
line of goods... This gave manufacturers who used licensed characters 
leverage over store owners.”43 
 King-Trendle assembled numerous manuals on how effectively to 
exploit The Lone Ranger program for “maximum retail results” and sales 
kits included detailed suggestions on how to “build up” the importance of 
merchandising product to retailers.44 The procedures outlined in these 
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manuals reveal the extent to which licensors felt it necessary to train 
sponsors on how to properly utilize their properties. A section titled 
“Internal Propaganda” encouraged sponsors to meet with their employees 
and lecture them on securing new retailers and extra product orders to 
coincide with the radio series beginning in their market, or to announce of 
free giveaways. It also advised that sales staff should be taught how to 
secure prominent displays of goods in all retail outlets.45 Sponsors were 
even cautioned to answer every fan letter because “every letter represents 
a family. Every family represents potential consumption of product.”46 
Strategies for getting sales staff on board included playing a sample 
episode of the radio program “to give a definite idea of entertainment and 
use of commercials”. Sales staffs were also encouraged to don Lone 
Ranger cowboy hats and greet retailers with the cry “Hi Yo Silver” as 
ways to build sales.47 
 While such suggestions ranged from the obvious to the ridiculous, 
they were intended to boost morale and help sellers distinguish themselves 
and their products in the eyes of retailers during a decade in which 
consumption of non-essentials radically declined and convincing grocers 
to stock products was often challenging. A letter from Lloyd George 
Venard, Director of Sales for station WCKY in Cincinnati, reporting on 
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the sales campaign on behalf of the Schultze Baking Company (a later 
Lone Ranger sponsor) attests to this inspirational function. Venard 
recounts, “We furnished cowboy entertainment and then played a 
transcription of the program after which we held a sales meeting which 
lasted until 12 o’clock and which did not drag for one minute. It was the 
most remarkable sales meeting I had ever seen because the officials of the 
Schultze outfit kept firing inspiration to an extremely responsive group of 
100 salesmen.”48 
 Attracting retailer cooperation required sponsors to provide them 
with participation incentives. Not only were giveaways to be made 
available in local shops (with the explicit direction that items like The 
Lone Ranger Mask were “under no circumstances... to be given unless the 
product is bought”), but every retailer was also instructed that these free 
gifts were “his own give-away and not the sponsor’s.”49 This masked the 
overt sales function of such premiums, but it also built goodwill for 
retailers, particularly with children, that then transferred into increased 
orders of sponsors’ products. Of course, the insistence that every mask be 
accounted for - “make it forcefully plain... the number of unsold products 
must correspond with the number of masks on hand” - also suggests a 
certain degree of mistrust between manufacturers and retailers that 
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licensors worked to mitigate through such detailed merchandising plans. 50 
It also reveals the importance of accurate audience measurement for 
licensors and sponsors alike that giveaways were intended to furnish. As 
such, securing retailer cooperation became doubly important, as they 
served as both the point of product purchase and of audience interaction.  
 Aside from extending The Lone Ranger radio program into non-
competitive markets, King-Trendle also expanded the brand’s reach into 
other media. King-Trendle entered into a production deal with Republic 
Productions, Inc on June 22, 1937 to produce a 15-part film serial based 
on the licensor’s Lone Ranger radio personality. The first installment was 
released in early 1938 and played a significant role in expanding the 
national reach of the property. Billed by Republic as the first movie serial 
to use a fictional character invented on radio, The Lone Ranger earned 
$594,137 at the box office (the 1939 sequel, The Lone Ranger Rides 
Again, earned $523,026), for which The Lone Ranger Inc received 
$18,750 up front plus 10 percent of all film rental fees once the film 
exceeded  $390,000.51 The actual revenue King-Trendle received for the 
film is difficult to measure, in part because the above-mentioned 10 
percent came out of Republic’s share of the profits, which was 60 percent 
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of the film rentals, the rest going to distributors and exhibitors. King-
Trendle’s revenue is estimated at around $60,000.52  
 Because Republic did not own distribution and exhibition outlets 
like the vertically integrated major studios, it relied heavily on pre-sold 
properties that would generate large audiences. As such, it was reluctant to 
release the Lone Ranger serial in markets where the radio series was not 
already being broadcast. As Trendle explained, “after we got the Republic 
production on the market, we found out from Republic that wherever the 
picture played, if there was no radio program, the picture died; and they 
were on our necks all the time to be ahead of the program with the radio 
program... we expanded the radio program just as rapidly as possible for 
our own selfish interests, but the Republic people withheld the release of 
their motion picture until after we got into the territory with the radio 
program, in order to boost their own grosses.”53  Since King-Trendle’s 
profits were tied directly to film rentals, the company initiated a major 
campaign to license the radio series to independent radio stations across 
the US. Once again, though responding to external pressure, King-Trendle 
marshaled these efforts into developing detailed and integrated cross-
marketing campaigns that sold local stations on the added promotional 
value of tying the series to the film serial release and vice-versa.  
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 Michele Hilmes has argued that 1938 was the year that Hollywood 
and the broadcast networks finally achieved “cross-fertilization... on a 
multiplicity of levels, each contributing to the other in an increasingly 
symbiotic relationship.”54 Though the two media had shared resources for 
several years - borrowing story ideas and characters, adapting each other’s 
works, publicizing each other’s projects - Hilmes contends that the 
relationship had previously been hampered by film exhibitor complaints 
that radio was costing them patrons. Exhibitors pressured the studios to 
minimize their involvement with radio.55 At the same time newspaper 
publishers, fearing lost advertising revenue to radio, also engaged in a 
smear campaign against radio programming while often refusing to 
publicize radio schedules.56 Hilmes notes that these reactions were not 
uniform, and that many exhibitors saw radio as an effective local 
promotional tool, but she situates the primary cause for Hollywood-
network symbiosis post-1938 in the telephone company’s reduction of 
wire rates, which allowed for cheaper delivery of Hollywood fare.57 While 
this is clearly an important factor, there is also a need to investigate the 
roles of licensing intermediaries in massaging local interests, paving the 
way for locally competitive media outlets to see the mutual benefit of 
promoting a like brand. 
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 The same 1937 brochure that emphasized how easily Safety Club 
tie-ins could be reproduced across markets also stressed the importance of 
cross-marketing by announcing over a two page spread (these documents 
often unfolded from single covers to 2-page layouts to four-page layouts) 
that “Newspapers and Magazines tell of Lone Ranger’s RADIO and 
MOVIE popularity.”58 The announcement actually predated the film 
serial’s release in February 1938, already predicting its impact on 
increased sales.  
 Early cross-promotional efforts were often speculative and 
presumed that audiences would move between the different media out of 
sheer curiosity and without much directing from either sponsors or 
exhibitors. “Now, with Republic Corporation’s 13 weeks movie serial, 
based upon WXYZ’s original radio creation, it is reasonable to assume 
that the added interest to the radio programs will pave the way to publicity 
and will benefit all sponsors in all territories... due to nation-wide 
popularity of the radio feature people young and old who hear and have 
heard the radio programs will want to SEE it. And millions who SEE it on 
the screen will want to HEAR it on the air.”59 
 Quickly, however, careful management of cross-promotion became 
an integral part of King-Trendle’s procedure manuals for exploiting the 
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Lone Ranger for maximum retail results. By 1939, the coordination of 
local radio promotion with either Republic’s Lone Ranger film releases 
(the second serial was released in 1939) or The Lone Ranger comic strip 
distributed by the King Features Syndicate was billed as affording 
“unusual opportunity for cooperative exploitation.”60 The Lone Ranger 
comic strip began September 1938 and by 1939 was being published in  
over 50 daily and 25 Sunday newspapers. By the early 1950s, this number 
would grow to 172 daily newspapers, 122 Sunday newspapers. Sponsors 
were encouraged to enlist film exhibitor support in featuring their products 
in connection with the film release and in setting up lobby displays in the 
theatre that plugged the radio program in exchange for special 
announcements over the radio alerting listeners to the film serial. King-
Trendle reasoned, “If the radio station ‘plugs’ the movie and vice versa, 
the result will be added program interest for the sponsor; increased 
attendance at the theatre; and a final result of excellent audience gain for 
the station.”61 The manual even supplied sample copy on how radio station 
and film exhibitor could promote one another. Similarly, the manual 
“suggests” (the cover page explicitly instructed that all suggestions should 
be followed as outlined, since each step has been “tested and proven as 
workable and effective in any market”) that newspaper publishers would 
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be willing to mention the radio program’s airtime and station in a line 
above the comic strip in exchange for “cooperative mention of the comic 
in a special radio announcement.”62   
 Finally, the manual encouraged sponsors to obtain free movie 
passes for their retailers in order to ensure their cooperation in cross-
promoting the radio series and film.63 While their participation might have 
seemed obvious since retailers were the final point of purchase and stood to 
gain from such promotions, this coordination strategy reveals the degree to 
which licensors understood that the sponsor’s audience were the grocers 
who stocked their product and it was this intermediary consumer who had 
to be appeased before agreeing to help manufacturers reach larger markets.  
Left unmentioned is the added publicity generated for the licensor by 
getting media outlets to promote not one another, but their shared interest 
in King-Trendle’s product.  As Nicholas Sammond argues in his history of 
Disney, “the producer that could generate simultaneous advertisements, 
features, and reviews in local papers created the impression that its product 
was circulating on its own merits, having won a place in a network of 
common experience articulated in apparently separate locations within the 
community.”64 
 Licensors also promoted the added value that their popular 
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properties could bring to local merchants, encouraging them to create 
window displays and take out newspaper advertisements that publicized 
their trade characters alongside the store. Once again, licensors relied on 
statistics that they could accumulate and disseminate in order to promote 
the cross-merchandise sales power of their characters. A 1938 internal sales 
promotion document for the Lone Ranger detailed how Gimbel Bros had 
taken out a 240-line ad in New York City newspapers and sold over 6000 
Lone Ranger sun suits in 2 days, while W.T. Grant had placed 72 pairs of 
Lone Ranger shoes in each of its ten stores’ window displays on a Monday 
morning and had none left at the end of the day. The promotional value of 
collecting this information is revealed by the bracketed inclusion that 
Mondays are “not a particularly good shopping day.”65  
 Using somewhat circular logic, the document ended by stating that 
the most significant evidence of the selling power of the Lone Ranger was 
the fact that leading stores were spending $5000-$15,000 on Lone Ranger 
display materials.66 In this manner, licensors worked to justify the selling 
power of their properties through logics that extrapolated individual 
instances of success into general merchandising principles while using 
internal industry sales as evidence of wider appeal. This further suggests 
that licensors saw their primary audience as other media and product 
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manufacturers and retailers, not actual consumers, but often conflated their 
markets, suggesting a correlation between retailers buying display items 
and anticipated retail sales. Significantly, the assembled list did not include 
actual sales figures to real customers, but merely stressed the range and 
number of product manufacturers seeking to exploit the property as 
evidence of The Lone Ranger’s success.   
 To be certain, King-Trendle was not alone in developing these 
cross-promotional schemes. Walt Disney had begun selling Mickey Mouse 
dolls as early as 1930 to help subsidize his struggling animation studio. By 
1932, the merchandising aspect of Disney’s business had grown so large 
that it required a separate division to run it. Disney’s head of merchandise 
licensing, Harry Kay Kamen, worked with merchants and theater owners 
throughout the 1930s, coordinating marketing efforts and synchronizing 
newspaper advertising with window displays. Like King-Trendle, Disney 
licensed hundreds of Mickey Mouse brand items; each designed to promote 
the other items as well as the Disney name, which appeared on all licensed 
items.67 Disney was also adept at recycling publicity in order to generate 
excitement for its brand amongst new licensees and consumers. According 
to Sammond, “When the buzz caught, Disney could, like other companies, 
recirculate independent public commentary, acting as a sort of amplifier for 
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common sentiment.”68 Unlike King-Trendle, Disney’s licensing efforts 
throughout the 1930s were primarily intended to direct attention to the 
films that Disney produced. For instance, Snow White and the Seven 
Dwarfs (1937) merchandise was licensed in advance of the film release to 
build anticipation for the film.69 By the end of the decade, the Lone Ranger 
texts served primarily to promote the brand and its licensed merchandise 
and products. 
 The successful use of premiums to measure audiences and tie-in 
sponsors led to the extension of licenses beyond radio sponsorship. 
Merchandising would become licensing’s primary profit stream by the end 
of the 1930s, as manufacturers began seeking out trade characters as selling 
aids to bolster sales during the Depression. On May 23, 1938, Advertising 
Age announced that The Lone Ranger Inc was embarking on a “cooperative 
consumer advertising campaign” with 23 manufacturers all producing 
goods under the licensed title “trading post.”70 By February 1939, the 
number of product licensees had grown to sixty-two. 71  King-Trendle 
earned royalties ranging from 5-10 percent of gross receipts for each 
license.72 By 1941, King-Trendle had negotiated an impressive 74 separate 
merchandising licenses for the Lone Ranger.73 What all of these products 
shared was that they were cheap to manufacture, easily reproducible, and 
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primarily directed at children.  
 Manufacturers and advertisers had long found that sales to children 
(and their parents) increased when they attached particular personalities, 
drawn from comics and other popular entertainment forms, to their 
products.  As Cross explains, “toymakers found that these characters 
evoked strong emotions in American parents and children and that these 
feelings sold toys. Fantasy playthings were closely linked with the 
emergence about 1900 of a national entertainment industry built around 
‘stars’ and celebrity.”74 King-Trendle’s efforts to license the Lone Ranger 
also relied upon selling potential media producers and merchandise 
manufacturers on the appeal of the brand to children and the power of 
children as sales agents. The company had to mitigate the targeting of 
children as a potential sales force with growing concerns over exploiting 
this audience, and with accusations lobbied against corporate manipulation 
of the radio public as a whole.  
 
CHILDREN, BRANDING AND THE DEPRESSION 
 As unemployment rose from 1.55 million in 1929 (3.2 percent of 
the American workforce) to over 12.3 million in 1933 (24.9 percent), 
never dropping under 7.7 million (14.3 percent) throughout the 1930s, 
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American businesses were forced to seek new ways of selling not only 
goods, but also the virtue of consumption in an era of scarcity.75 As Gary 
Cross argues, many Americans began to see continued displays of wealth 
and excess that had characterized the 1920s as un-American.76 New 
approaches would be found in the coalescence of radio technologies, 
branding practices, and marketing directed at children.  Combined, these 
sites would help many businesses recover both their profit margins and 
their public reputation, but they would also open up new concerns, 
particularly over the exploitation of children. 
 While many businesses were hit hard during the Depression, radio 
blossomed. Providing a cheap means of entertainment and information, 
radio sales actually doubled between 1929-1933.77 Many corporations 
initially turned to radio in the 1930s as means of publicly combating 
President Roosevelt’s New Deal policies. Their polemical attacks on the 
federal government’s recovery policies did not always ingratiate them 
with suffering listeners. As William Bird summarizes: 
Business leaders demonstrated neither patience nor skill, 
other than in the scheduling of talks. It was left to their 
advertising, public relations, and network program builders 
to channel business’s inclination to react into a drama of 
substitution. The popularity of New Deal liberalism, they 
patiently explained, required that business abandon 
rhetorical one-upmanship for a selfless expression of social 
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purpose… Insularity and self-interest undermined 
business’s attack upon the anti-corporate features of the 
New Deal... because it failed to frame business’s interests 
and activities in terms of the hopes and aspirations of the 
American people.78 
 
 Roland Marchand argues that by the 1930s, advertising agencies 
believed that the public was better reached through entertainment than 
edification and that promotion should be conducted through 
showmanship.79 Radio became a key commercial site for promoting a 
“culture of abundance” through the distribution of “cheap luxuries” and 
for telling stories that “created a need for products largely through an 
appeal to a mythical past - lost community, lost intimacy, lost self-
assurance.”80 As Kate Lacey articulates, social attitudes as expressed 
through mass media “stressed the need for self-reliance, abstinence from 
the stressful distractions of modern urban life, and a return to a more 
‘wholesome’ community life,” but that these nostalgic images and 
messages were filtered through consumer culture’s “production of 
compensatory desires.”81 
 While radio programs targeted consumers of all ages and persuasions, 
one group that was especially identified was children. As Gary Cross 
argues, by the 1930s, advertisers learned that children were attentive and 
loyal listeners and thus excellent targets for commercial messages.82 In 
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addition, the Depression had pushed many adolescents into the workforce. 
Many 10-12-year-old boys now earned extra money at part-time jobs, a 
portion of which could be spent on cheap toys and other consumer goods 
marketed directly to them by enterprising manufacturers.83 While 
marketing to and through children had been common practice among toy 
manufacturers since the early 1900s, it accelerated during the 1930s.84  
 As personal consumption of toys dropped from estimated $336 
million in 1929 to $181 million in 1933 and at least 96 different toy 
makers went out of business, enterprising firms turned not only to radio, 
but celebrity culture in general to give them an added boost.85 Cross notes, 
“The key to the fantasy toy was that it embodied the story and image of a 
celebrity... marketed directly to children through new media like comic 
books and radio... generic toys and dolls became ‘name branded’... sales 
increased when buyers identified products with attractive ‘personalities,’ 
and these personalities in turn became the subjects of toys.”86 While 
sponsors typically tied premiums into radio plots, toy and other 
manufacturers did not have to be so literal. This environment was 
conducive for licensors like King-Trendle to extend the Lone Ranger 
brand across a wide swath of pre-existing products that gained added 
value simply by adorning the character’s name and/or image. The Lone 
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Ranger radio series became a promotional vehicle for the myriad licensed 
products bearing his brand insignia, rather than the other way around. 
 Cross effectively argues though that children’s radio was not merely a 
conduit for licensing products, but fundamentally reshaped toy culture by 
providing a story backdrop into which products could be fit. “It shaped the 
toy culture by introducing play narratives that were designed specifically 
for children and that required toys to serve as props for the re-enactment 
of radio storylines.”87 Beyond play narratives, branded toys allowed 
children to live vicariously through their heroes, gaining aspects of the 
star’s persona by acquiring their accessories. “These playthings often gave 
the owner something that the star had - the gun, rocket, decoder, hair bow, 
or just the ‘look’ of the personality. By possessing a celebrity toy the child 
owned a bit of the spunk, charm, power, or even good luck of the 
character... but these personalities did far more than endorse toys. Their 
heroism became an integral part of the toy itself when the boy was invited 
to take the role of the hero in fighting the bad guys.”88  
 It was the branded toy’s ability to embody the Lone Ranger’s 
personality that made it appealing, but also an object of great concern for 
its ability to exploit children’s culture through its overt commercial 
function and to impart the wrong values. Summarizing Helen and Robert 
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Lynd’s 1929 sociological study of Muncie, Indiana, labeled Middletown, 
America because of its “average” white, middle-class profile, Sammond 
articulates the growing concern over the mass media’s interference in 
child rearing during this era.  “Through its integration into a rapidly 
coalescing national network of mass media, [Lynd and Lynd, in their 
study of Middletown] argued, the ideal American middle class was 
confronting a loss of control over the means of enculturating their 
children.”89  
 Interestingly, these concerns were felt equally within corporate offices 
and by their commercial partners, the advertising agencies and mass media 
outlets, as well as by concerned parents, consumer advocates, and 
government regulators. While Marchand contends that the Parable of the 
Captivated Child, which suggested that mothers must become deft 
manipulators in order to get children to consume appropriate and healthy 
foods, was heavily endorsed by the advertising industry during the 1930s, 
such manipulations could take on potentially negative connotations when 
filtered through improperly managed branded personalities. 90  
 Licensors like King-Trendle positioned themselves as both cross-
merchandising and morality managers for their personality properties (see 
Lone Ranger Safety Club case study below).  However, for large media 
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corporations such as the Chicago Tribune Syndicate, for whom licensing 
was merely an ancillary profit generator and who rarely exerted much 
direct control over how sponsors used their product nor tried to coordinate 
image marketing across licenses, curtailing personality problems would 
prove more difficult. In particular, the Chicago Tribune Syndicate often 
had a difficult time reeling in the political visions of its creative personnel, 
which led to different media outlets featuring the same property working 
at cross purposes. 
THE CONFLICTED CAREER OF LITTLE ORPHAN ANNIE 
 A telling example from this era is the Little Orphan Annie comic 
strip created by Harold Gray. An archconservative, Gray vehemently 
opposed FDR’s New Deal legislation. Gray used his comic strip to wage 
an open attack on the government, while singing the praises and virtues of 
industry. Throughout 1934-1935, the serialized adventures focused on the 
trials and troubles of Annie’s benevolent benefactor, Daddy Warbucks.  In 
the strip, Warbucks faced trumped up charges of tax evasion orchestrated 
by a government eager to make an example of the wealthy philanthropist 
(even though they secretly admitted that they knew he was innocent).  
Reviews appearing in Time Magazine, The New Republic, and The Nation 
pointedly accused the cartoonist of propagandizing.91 On September 9, 
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1935, Time Magazine reprinted an editorial by the publisher of the 
Huntington, West Virginia Herald-Dispatch, a self-identified progressive 
conservative, calling the strip a “vehicle for a studied, veiled, and 
alarmingly vindictive propaganda” promoting “rugged individualism.”92 
The publisher asserted, “The creator of the comic strip Little Orphan 
Annie has violated his sacred reader trust... In the latest instance, all 
political leaders, and it follows every public official, are at once indicted 
as ‘crooks’ and to accept such a sweeping indictment is to permit the 
creator of Little Orphan Annie... and Chicago’s Tribune Syndicate, to 
attack and condemn all persons, all institutions, and all ideas save those 
they choose to label acceptable.”93 The New Republic warned that the strip 
is “distributed to 135 daily and 100 Sunday papers, and thence to millions 
of citizens” and, more alarmingly, “has its greatest influence on the 
youngsters, the voters of the next generation.”94  
 When threats of pro-business propaganda directed toward children 
led several newspapers, including the Herald-Dispatch, to cease printing 
the comic strip, the Chicago Tribune Syndicate quickly issued a statement 
that Gray had been ordered by them to stop editorializing and get back to 
entertaining.95 Gray would continue to push the boundaries of acceptable 
political discourse in his strip throughout the Depression (and beyond), 
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regularly engaging in a battle-of-wills with Annie’s licensor over how to 
maximize both profits and pro-business goodwill.     
 Whereas Gray’s comic strip had been accused of being too overtly 
political, radio concerns drifted more toward inappropriate content of a 
different sort: the kind that either (over) exploited children’s innocence for 
commercial gain or left children “on the verge of hysteria.”96 In a 
February 9, 1933 memo, Enid Beaupre, NBC’s standards and practices 
monitor for children’s programming, noted that the network had received 
telephone complaints that “some of the incidents [on Little Orphan Annie] 
had been disturbing enough to make children almost hysterical,” adding 
that such practices on behalf of the series’ sponsor, the Wander Company-
makers of Ovaltine malted milk, were “incongruous for a product 
supposed to soothe nerves and induce restful sleep to be promoted by the 
very means to defeat its purpose.”97 In a February 10, 1933 follow up 
memo, Beaupre suggested that this is perhaps “a new way of selling 
Ovaltine,” sarcastically pointing to the unethical economics of scaring 
children so as to then sell the sponsor’s product that was intended to relax 
them.98 
 Despite, or perhaps in response to, these accusations on July 12, 
1938, Blackett-Sample-Hummert (BSH), Wander’s advertising agency 
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and the producers of the series, issued a protest of its own to NBC over the 
“blood and thunder tactics used in child radio.”99 While BSH’s real 
intentions were to attack the merchandising strategies of another 
children’s series, Terry and the Pirates, whose sponsor directly competed 
with Orphan Annie’s, the argument and evidence it presented drew a clear 
correlation between the economic value of licensed properties and the 
need to project the right moral values. Objecting to the tactics of Terry and 
the Pirates “for selfish reasons, as well as moral reasons,” BSH bluntly 
stated, “This is another instance where ‘good morals’ are ‘good business.’ 
If the broadcasting companies do not bring the offenders into line, parents’ 
resentment may be aroused to the point where they will demand that the 
Federal Communication Commission intervene.”100   
 Of course, this did not prevent manufacturers, sponsors, agencies, 
and networks from pursuing the children’s market; it merely demanded 
that such pursuits be justified on moral and educational grounds, and not 
merely commercial terms. Hence, licensors worked to alleviate anxieties 
over exploitation by demonstrating to their clients that their properties also 
taught important moral lessons and instilled good character values. In 
other words, licensors made their clients feel as though it was all right to 
sell directly to children so long as what was being sold had moral, not 
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merely financial, value. By keeping the child’s best interests in mind (at 
least rhetorically), licensors both demonstrated their own ability to balance 
consumer and cultural concerns and proved their right to claim the mantle 
of cultural intermediaries between consumers and producers. 
  Sammond’s analysis of Disney in the 1930s reveals how the 
company carefully positioned itself as bridging commercial and moral 
values through its products. “But behind the company’s skill at producing 
popular, well-made cartoons, is also demonstrated an impressive ability to 
align itself, its founder, and its products with prevailing discourses about 
an ideal American culture, and to suggest that Disney was actually 
purposely contributing to the national good.”101 Cross similarly contends 
that Disney was careful to license only appropriate merchandise -- 
rejecting, for example, a Mickey Mouse ashtray, regardless of how much 
money it might have brought them, because it projected the wrong 
company image vis-à-vis children.102 Much as I have demonstrated King-
Trendle’s licensing practices as aligning with Disney’s business brand 
exploitation model in the previous section, I contend that King-Trendle 
also justified the Lone Ranger’s economic value in terms of the brand’s 
ability to teach children good moral values and its own role in the 
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licensing process as arbiter against moral infractions by teaching licensees 
how properly to use the brand.  
 As previously stated, The Lone Ranger was marketed initially to 
children because they were envisioned as a less discerning audience who 
would ignore low-budget production values in favor of the exciting plots. 
Additionally, as an October 14, 1939 Saturday Evening Post article 
bluntly stated, “Trendle believed that most parents buy advertised products 
because their kids coax them into it.”103 It is also apparent, however, that 
its creators were concerned that the direct appeal to children be tempered 
by the character’s good moral virtues. Responding to Striker’s initial 
vision of the Lone Ranger as a misunderstood anti-hero, fashioned on 
Jesse James, Jewell corrected, “I realize this is good theatre, but the bosses 
want the Lone Ranger more of a hero for the children to pattern after. We 
are going to publicize the fact that the Ranger is a Tom Mix type - always 
doing good, never doing wrong.”104  
 King-Trendle’s efforts to find sponsorship for The Lone Ranger 
also involved selling the program’s appeal to children, while rendering 
such sales initiatives morally acceptable to parents and other public 
officials. For example, accompanying the declaration that 24,607 letters 
had been received responding to the Lone Ranger pistol give-away is a 
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drawing of a family gathered around a radio. The family’s dress and 
appearance signify their upper-middle class white status, with the well-
dressed parents standing behind the radio, father smiling, mother looking 
downward contentedly at her two boys, who seem captivated by the 
device. The younger child, dressed in a sailor’s outfit popular among 
middle-class families in the era, looks up and off into the distance, deep in 
imagination, while the older child, dressed in a black suit, has his back 
turned to the reader as he looks directly at the radio. In all, the four figures 
and the machine complete the family circle, while their proximity to the 
device conveys the medium’s intimate space in the home lives of middle-
class Americans. Adjacent to this image is a thunderbolt with the words 
“Michigan Radio Network” striking a bulls-eye dead in the center, 
suggesting that the letter frenzy successfully indicated that the regional 
network has a large audience, and it appeals to the correct target audience 
as well, namely white, middle-class Michiganites, and especially children 
(with the loving approval of their parents). [See Image #2] 
 
LONE RANGER SAFETY CLUB 
 Efforts to align the Lone Ranger brand’s moral and economic 
values with both corporate interests in and parental concerns over children 
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and consumerism were concentrated in the careful development of Lone 
Ranger Safety Clubs in the local communities’ where The Lone Ranger 
radio program could be heard. Safety Clubs were promoted by King-
Trendle to various sponsors as valuable ways to measure the size of their 
audience, establish better relations with local retailers, and cultivate 
indirect and positive publicity through their endorsement of civic 
responsibility through teaching children about traffic safety. Lone Ranger 
Safety Clubs also offset concerns over exploiting children by refocusing 
attention away from products that bore the brand’s name onto the moral 
values the Lone Ranger brand advocated. In an era where corporations 
faced both mounting pressure from the federal administration through 
New Deal legislation and public mistrust over their continued avocation of 
consumerism even in the face of rising unemployment, Lone Ranger 
Safety Clubs were designed to offer pro-business alternatives to New Deal 
legislation disguised as apolitical lessons about codes of conduct 
(especially when crossing the street) and patriotic rhetoric about the great 
American heritage. While Lone Ranger Safety Clubs were designed with 
sponsor interests in mind, they also provided King-Trendle with added 
revenue streams and were a way to create fan communities that exceeded 
beyond the radio program and who were focused primarily on the Lone 
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Ranger brand’s inspirational personality. Lone Ranger Safety Clubs 
transformed the relationship between merchandise and text, as the radio 
program became a means to extend and promote the brand, not vice-versa 
(though, if successful, each branded product, including the radio program, 
promoted the other). 
 The Lone Ranger Safety Club was not unique. Many brands 
directed at children tried to tap into the popularity of burgeoning boys’ and 
girls’ clubs that were popping up all over the country, because they 
offered organized communities of potential consumers that sponsors could 
address indirectly by promoting activities built around the brand. 
Sammond reveals that as early as 1930, Disney “ attempted to join the 
network of clubs and organizations to which children belonged, creating 
the Mickey Mouse Club, precursor to the company’s famous television 
program two decades later.”105 Similarly, Little Orphan Annie, Jack 
Armstrong, and almost every other radio personality whose sponsor 
targeted children had some sort of club that listeners could join. Where the 
Lone Ranger Safety Club differed from these others was both in its 
inexhaustibility (whereas Disney abandoned the first Mickey Mouse Club 
by 1933 and Little Orphan Annie had disappeared from the airwaves by 
1942, the Lone Ranger Safety Club still boasted membership in the 
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millions well into the early 1950s) and in its ultimate focus on the brand 
rather than any specific products it sold. While Disney’s club was 
designed to get children into the theaters to watch the studio’s films and 
Little Orphan Annie used club membership to generate sales for Ovaltine 
by tying club activities in with sponsored products, the Lone Ranger 
Safety Club mentioned sponsors only indirectly and almost never 
promoted particular products as the locus of club activities. 
 The first Lone Ranger Safety Club began October 14, 1935 and 
was sponsored by Gordon Bakeries and implemented by Gordon’s 
advertising agency, Sehl Advertising. It is unclear how much King-
Trendle might have influenced Sehl and Gordon’s initial Safety Club 
initiative, though the idea of a Lone Ranger club had been bandied about 
since before the radio series debuted. Letters between Fran Striker and 
James Jewell confirm that The Lone Ranger was indeed targeted to 
children, in particular fourteen and fifteen year-olds, and that from a very 
early stage, the possibilities for cultivating and effectively measuring this 
audience were conceptualized in terms of socially engineering fan 
communities built around the character’s cult of personality. As Striker 
wrote on January 6, 1933, “I think there will be splendid possibilities in 
this character of the Lone Ranger and plan to establish him similar to 
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Warner Lester [the protagonist in Striker’s crime drama, Manhunter], as 
the one that is hunted by the law, and yet loved by the oppressed... the 
thought struck me as I was writing the play that you might organize a 
LONE RANGER CLUB of boys, and ask them to write in for their 
membership cards, etc.” Striker’s very next sentence establishes the 
connection between such a fan club and the potential for commercial 
exploitation. “There might be good commercial possibilities too, for a 
concern that is selling something that is designed especially for growing 
boys, clothes, breakfast food, or something of that sort.”106  
 Gordon and Sehl saw the club as a way of gauging the size of its 
audience by encouraging write-ins to MRN radio stations for membership 
cards. They also saw the club as fostering good business relations with 
local retailers to whom they supplied baked goods. Pledge cards were 
made available only at participating groceries, both necessitating point-of-
purchase contact between child consumers and retailers and providing a 
valuable sales incentive for manufacturers seeking to attract new retailers 
to stock their products. In this manner, the Lone Ranger Safety Club was 
designed to appeal to children consumers through exclusive giveaways 
and also to activate children as a potential sales force. King-Trendle would 
recycle both of those ideas in its merchandising campaigns to attract local 
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and regional sponsors in non-competing markets. Sponsors were strongly 
encouraged not only to launch the clubs but also to invest resources in 
starting up neighborhood versions, which would “intensify the club spirit” 
and “furnish a means of added sales strength to retailers in each zone.”107   
 Sehl objected to its promotional efforts being claimed by King-
Trendle.  Indeed, he stated, “if I read the third paragraph of the contract 
correctly, it would seem that the Famous Artists Syndicate [who licensed 
celebrity images of John Wayne, Clyde Beatty, Mickey Rooney amongst 
others, under the promotional banner of ‘Hitch your product to a star,’ and 
were briefly sub-contracted by King-Trendle to do the same for the Lone 
Ranger] have the authority to put other manufacturers in a position where 
they would reap the benefits of the great popularity of the Lone Ranger - 
and, of course, you know who has popularized him and spent hundreds of 
thousands of dollars in so doing [a reference to Sehl’s client, Gordon 
Bakeries].”108 Legally, however, their hands were tied, since all of the 
promotional efforts had been copyrighted in King-Trendle’s name.  
 The licensor’s incorporation of the Lone Ranger brand name a 
mere month prior to the Safety Club launch allowed King-Trendle to 
claim its sponsor’s promotional efforts as its own and recycle the initiative 
in every new market it sought to extend the Lone Ranger brand. King-
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Trendle developed a pre-packaged sales strategy that could be used 
interchangeably by different sponsors operating in competing areas, yet 
targeting similar consumers. Though sponsors benefited financially, the 
Lone Ranger Safety Clubs actually were designed to deflect attention 
away from sales efforts directed at children, and provided sponsors 
associative value instead by promoting the corporation’s civic-
mindedness. Safety Clubs supported traffic safety by encouraging boys 
and girls to form local clubs and earn Lone Ranger citations. Exploitation 
strategies devised by King-Trendle encouraged sponsors to get local 
authorities to endorse the initiative (and, indirectly, the sponsor). This 
strategy made additional sense in an era prior to national sponsorship, 
when the Lone Ranger was primarily licensed to local and regional 
sponsors, mostly bakeries, whose sales strategies often included home 
delivery and partnerships with local retailers, making them visible 
members of many of the communities in which their products were sold. 
 In a 1939 manual he put together, entitled “The Lone Ranger: 
Details of Procedure in Handling the Exploitation of the Program for 
Maximum Retail Results,” Trendle devoted several pages of ideas to 
maximizing the positive publicity the Safety Club might generate for 
sponsors. Among them are instructions to “Enlist support of local 
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authorities on safety, such as Mayor, Chief of Police, Superintendent of 
Schools” as well as pre-packaged publicity, in which sponsors merely had 
to plug in interchangeable community leaders: 
 
 
LONE RANGER Wins Praise 
 
... Parents, educators, and others keenly interested in 
children’s radio programs have been quick to recognize the 
healthful influence of this great radio feature which now is 
broadcast coast to coast... 
Among those who have commented on the outstanding 
nature of THE LONE RANGER have been John Doe, 
Superintendent of Schools of ____________, Richard 
Blank, President of _________ Chamber of Commerce; 
Mrs. Jane Roe, President of _______ Women’s Club; and 
Mrs. John Jones, Chairman of the Parent-Teacher 
Association.109 
  
 The effectiveness of privileging civic duty over commercial sales 
and then garnering official support from local authorities for these 
initiatives can be summarized by a January 11, 1941 article in The New 
Republic, which extolled King-Trendle’s socially valuable achievements. 
“The Safety Clubs give the necessary check on popularity and secure the 
type of local support for which publicity men give their shirts. The mayor 
or at least the local police chief will always sound off for safety, sales of 
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(insert name of product) go up, and accidents go down in the community. 
‘Hi Yo, Silver! Away...!’”110 
 Safety Club merchandising suggestions also avoided promoting the 
initiative as primarily a sales generator, and instead described it as “an 
organization for boys and girls which promotes safety and builds 
character.”111 Though licensors were eager to sell potential sponsors on 
the power of personality to attract consumers, particularly children, they 
were equally anxious to reassure clients that the cult of personality could 
actually impart important moral lessons to youngsters that built character. 
King-Trendle included the story of the Lone Ranger’s first public 
appearance in a Detroit parade in its promotional packet for potential 
sponsors. Under the heading “POPULARITY - THAT CANNOT BE 
BOUGHT AT ANY PRICE,” the licensor explained how thousands of 
children in the crowd broke through the guards and disrupted the 
festivities for two hours in their efforts to see and touch the Lone Ranger. 
While this story provided tangible evidence of the brand’s popularity, and 
therefore its sales appeal, it also raised the specter of unruly children 
disrespecting authority that businesses, especially those reliant upon local 
community support, could ill afford to be associated with. Thus, the story 
concluded by reassuring potential sponsors that even though the Lone 
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Ranger’s popularity excited the crowd, it also was the only force capable 
of restoring order. “The police were able to reform the parade only 
because the children’s beloved radio hero directed them to their places.”112 
A powerful personality could command obedience, and if employed 
correctly, could work to teach proper “moral values,” such as respect for 
authority.  
 Sponsors often employed similar justifications for commercially 
exploiting the Lone Ranger’s personality to children. On October 29, 
1937, the Emil Reinhardt Advertising Agency wrote to King-Trendle on 
behalf of their client, Kilpatrick’s bakery, which had just launched the 
Safety Club. Reporting a membership of 49,000, the agency boasted 
“many, many letters from parents tell us they do not dare buy any other 
bread because of the children’s demand for Kilpatrick’s.” The very next 
sentence immediately tempered the Safety Club’s sales appeal by 
couching its value, as well as the value of the radio program, in moral 
terms. “We have received many letters from parents approving the 
program. Many others thank us for the lessons in character building which 




 Beyond redressing commercial value in civic terms, the promotion 
of traffic safety seemed largely apolitical, allowing sponsors to appear as 
good citizens without having to address their on-going feud with FDR. In 
an era when many corporations were heavily scrutinized by the federal 
government and consumer advocates alike, promoting an image of 
community service through sponsorship of the Lone Ranger and his Safety 
Club helped offset accusations of greed and claims that businesses were 
out of touch with consumer needs and concerns. It also re-framed the 
terrain of struggle away from national opposition between corporations 
and government toward local partnerships between the two. 
 While appearing on the surface to be “blandly civic,” Lone Ranger 
Safety Clubs often indirectly promoted private enterprise as inherently 
American.114 For instance, the 1939 Safety Club Manual produced for 
Weber’s Bread makes several references to the Lone Ranger’s desire for 
boys and girls to “grow up to be happy, healthy and useful citizens” and is 
filled with patriotic content, including the reprinting of the words to The 
Star-Spangled Banner and extolling that “Almost everything this country 
has is the result of people pulling together for good and worthy causes.”115 
Yet, what sort of citizenship did the Safety Club advocate? Decidedly, it 
endorsed one that limited federal intervention; encouraged local, 
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communal, and individual initiatives; and praised the historic role that free 
enterprise and corporate sponsorship have played promoting progress. 
 While Daniel Czitrom has argued that media constructs 
contemporary needs through nostalgic appeals to a mythical past, William 
Bird has pointed to the ways that American corporations during the 
Depression sought to invoke a “usable past” in order to justify their 
continued appeals for consumption in the face of economic hardship. “A 
usable past... animated business leaders’ talks to the public... in 1935, 
General Foods’ Colby M. Chester, [the National Association of 
Manufacturers] newly elected President, likened the partnership of labor, 
the investor and the consuming public to the ‘adventurous pioneers’ of 
Jamestown and Plymouth, who wrestled civilization from the wilderness 
and built institutions to match. ‘They came,’ Chester explained, ‘in search 
of liberty, of freedom for intolerable restrictions’. The story of business, 
Chester concluded, was the story of America.”116 Corporations stressed 
the historic continuity between the growth of the American corporation 
and America itself, with the Depression as an anomaly that would be 
countered so long as the market was left free to pursue its natural course. 
A 1936 Time Magazine article summarized these efforts by describing a 
recent pro-business advertising campaign:  
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“What Is Your America All About?” blazed the copy, 
adding apologetically, “You probably know every single 
fact in this advertisement.” Most people indeed did. A box 
headed “You are a stockholder in the United States Inc.” 
related that the country had produced three times as much 
wealth since the Revolution as the entire world had 
produced prior to 1776; that the US worker’s share of the 
national income had risen from 38% in 1850 to 65% in 
1929; that there were 44,000,000 savings accounts in the 
US even in the Depression. These and other facts, read the 
advertisement, reached “right into the very roots of your 
own life - and your family - and your future,” were as 
“deep, as abiding, as encompassing as hunger, love, 
religion.”117 
 
 Similarly, Lone Ranger Safety Clubs confirmed that their hero’s 
mission began when “The West of old was fraught with dangers of many 
kinds: highwaymen, land sharks and roving bands of outlaws were found 
everywhere. This condition was, in large measure, due to the fact that the 
US government was unable to establish army posts except in strategic 
places, because of lack of funds.”118 The Lone Ranger Safety Clubs 
grounded their public service mission squarely within a history of 
corporate support for easing the transition to modernity for local 
communities. Where the government was unable to help local 
communities grow, corporations could. Without ever directly attacking the 
New Deal, The Lone Ranger Safety Club offers an alternative vision of 
American citizenship - one that stressed individual efforts, emphasized 
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safeguarding home and community, and embedded in a complicated and 
paternalistic relationship between corporate sponsors and local 
governments. The stress on individual responsibility, local community, 
and corporate stewardship all advocated, though indirectly, for Americans 
to pull together without government intervention. 
 The Safety Clubs promoted civic participation as rooted in 
individual, rather than collective, action.  Traffic safety was positioned as 
entirely the responsibility of individual children, not rooted in the need for 
safer automobiles built by corporations or stricter government regulations 
for drivers. After providing shocking statistics about automobile-related 
deaths, the Safety Guide argued “COURTESY PREVENTS 
ACCIDENTS. So lets be courteous - everyone of us - all the time!” and 
then resorted to scare tactics, scolding, “How would you feel, Safety 
Ranger, if it was copying your careless dash into the street playing, or 
some other thoughtless action, that caused one of these smaller boys or 
girls to be injured or killed? ALWAYS REMEMBER THAT YOUR 
CARELESS EXAMPLE MAY CAUSE A SMALLER CHILD’S INJURY 
OR DEATH! PLAY SAFE FOR THE SAKE OF OTHERS.”119 
 Tellingly, the organization of neighborhood Safety Clubs also took 
on decidedly corporate structures. Under the heading, Constitution and 
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By-Laws, the guide explained, “at the first meeting a temporary chairman 
and secretary should be elected. Regular officers would not be elected 
until after the constitution is formed and adopted... all future business of 
your club will be managed by these laws.”120 Further along, the guide 
proposes “although it is not necessary for a club to adopt a regular order of 
business, most clubs do follow a regular business procedure in order to 
save time and effort.”121 The use of titles such as “chairman,” and 
“secretary” and the reference to Club activities as “business” requiring 
efficient time and work management clearly position Safety Ranger 
activities within corporate management hierarchies and procedures. 
 While it is perhaps an exaggeration to suggest that the Lone 
Ranger Safety Clubs were explicitly designed to promote corporate 
propaganda, it is fair to suggest that King-Trendle was interested in 
making its property both attractive to corporate sponsorship and appealing 
to radio stations fearing the FCC’s “raised eyebrow.” In the process, King-
Trendle sought to construct the Lone Ranger as a powerful yet indirect 
sales agent. The summary to the Lone Ranger exploitation manual plainly 
states that the steps outlined for effectively maximizing the character’s 
merchandising potential, including launching the Lone Ranger Safety 
Club, were devised “to make the Lone Ranger program series a profitable 
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investment and a source of pride to the radio stations selected to carry the 
feature” and help sponsors, ad agencies and radio stations work together in 
“a plan of exploitation best suited to conditions governing the market.”122 
These conditions included threats of government regulation for 
manufacturers and broadcasters, public mistrust of corporate pro-
consumption advocacy, and a need to tap into newly emergent markets 
through sales strategies that imbued products with extra personality value.   
 Not only did King-Trendle use the Safety Clubs as a lure for 
sponsors, but the licensor also profited handsomely from all of the extra 
premiums and promotional materials that sponsors had to order as part of 
the package, including Lone Ranger pledge cards, badges, merit citations, 
and Safety Club guide books. In each instance, King-Trendle would issue 
a non-exclusive license to a manufacturer and collect a 5-10 percent 
royalty on a sponsor’s order.  While King-Trendle supplied commercial 
typescripts for sponsors to use in promoting the Safety Club, personalized 
Lone Ranger announcements were also sold to sponsors as separate 
special script recordings, both ensuring extra profits for The Lone Ranger 
Inc., and complete control over the tone of the commercials. 
 Perhaps the greatest reward King-Trendle received, however, was 
the free publicity Safety Club materials generated for the Lone Ranger 
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brand. Radio sponsors paid all expenses for a promotional campaign that 
only indirectly marketed their product and only tangentially involved the 
radio program. Lone Ranger Safety Clubs used radio announcements on 
The Lone Ranger series to promote club activities, such as awarding merit 
badges for doing something traffic-safety related or directing members to 
retailers where they could pick up free Safety Club paraphernalia (also, 
conveniently, those retailers who stocked the sponsor’s products), but the 
Safety Club rarely promoted the radio series in return. Sponsors were 
willing to foot the bill because it provided good public relations and offset 
any negative attention that might have resulted from their product 
targeting children.  
 The benefits for the licensor were far greater though, since the 
Safety Club ostensibly promoted an all-inclusive fantasy world where 
children could interact with the Lone Ranger, generating a friendly 
environment for all merchandise and media that might bear the brand’s 
name. In much the same way that Sammond describes Disney’s overall 
goal to “maximize its presence in the daily practices of average people,” 
King-Trendle used the Lone Ranger Safety Club as a habit-forming fan 
community that routinized children’s encounters with their hero and 
elevated those encounters to more than opportunities for entertainment or 
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play.123 This, in turn, justified the endless consumption of Lone Ranger 
products as a character building, albeit commercial, intertext.124 The Lone 
Ranger’s face on a pail may have boosted sales for toy manufacturers, but 
it also offered the possibility of teaching children important lessons about 
heroism and virtue because the Lone Ranger’s image - and all it stood for - 
might be embodied by the child’s use of that item. 
 The Lone Ranger Safety Club guide answered the important 
question of “Who is The Lone Ranger?” with “he has thousands of 
friends, due to the fine work he carries on in the cause of justice. His chief 
friends, aside from Tonto and Silver, are the boys and girls of 
America.”125 The guide then reminded Safety Rangers “the pledge you 
sign is an indication of character - a promise to yourself of courageous 
living and thinking. It is a belief in the right way to do things, as 
exemplified by The Lone Ranger.” Almost as an afterthought, the guide 
also offered that in choosing to join, “there are, of course, many thrilling 
and pleasant activities to be considered as well.”126 
  Arguing that powerful personalities could instill healthy values in 
children, commercial announcements for the Lone Ranger Safety Clubs 
explicitly sold a fantasy friendship with the Lone Ranger as a character 
building experience. In one radio commercial (supplied to sponsors for an 
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extra fee), the Lone Ranger spoke directly to children, personally asking 
each child to join his club: “In fact, I must have you all as working 
partners, or I will surely fail. And boys and girls, I don’t want to fail – you 
don’t want me to fail either.”127 Continuing, the Lone Ranger then 
described the qualities Safety Club member possessed, equating these 
characteristics with the heroism exhibited by Americans of yesteryear. 
“Lone Ranger Safety Club members are brave, upright, honorable, and 
worthy of being Safety Club members... we want our club... your club and 
mine... to carry on with the courageous spirit of the sturdy pioneers of the 
Old West.”128 In this manner, King-Trendle sought to argue that The Lone 
Ranger offered inspirational leadership for youngsters, with adventure and 
fantasy mere byproducts. Moreover, by devising merchandising and 
exploitation manuals that provided sponsors with step-by-step instructions 
on how to develop the Lone Ranger Safety Club, King-Trendle sold itself 
as an intermediary that arbitrated sales to children with moral education 
through the brand management it coordinated. 
 
CONCLUSION 
 In this chapter, I have argued that shifting marketing practices and 
accompanying moral and economic anxieties felt within the cultural 
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industries shaped the ways properties like the Lone Ranger and Little 
Orphan Annie were sold to potential sponsors and constructed for 
particular audiences. In part, I have argued that strategies of recycling and 
cross-merchandizing that emerged out of King-Trendle’s need to sell The 
Lone Ranger market-by-market as well as across merchandising and 
media terrains contributed to industry perceptions that the property was a 
sales phenomenon that, in turn, contributed to increased cultural 
circulation. Moreover, King-Trendle marketed The Lone Ranger as a 
bridge between competing industries and media and as a relationship 
builder between sales staff and retailers. In order to do so, King-Trendle 
positioned itself as a merchandising manager, creating a detailed 
exploitation manual and using recycled statistical data to prove the selling 
power of their brand. Recycling sales statistics and creating merchandising 
campaigns were also integral to King-Trendle’s need to produce tangible 
evidence of the selling potential of their otherwise intangible property. 
Moreover, such materials also solidified the licensor’s managerial 
authority over the brand, allowing King-Trendle to control how the brand 
was marketed while foregrounding the company’s oversight role as a vital 
component for exploiting the brand. These documents suggested that 
without King-Trendle’s careful management the brand could not be 
 
 164
properly exploited, and thus, they sutured the Lone Ranger property’s 
value to the licensor’s authorial role in shaping it.  
 The Depression also required American businesses to rethink their 
marketing strategies. Many began targeting children directly. Others 
simply sought to overcome negative publicity that posited they were out of 
touch with the needs and economic circumstances of the general 
population. Personality became a sales tool that could bolster sales to 
children and also put a positive spin on continued corporate support for 
consumption even in hard times. Personality was also a potentially 
dangerous force for the same reasons (as evidenced by public outcry over 
Gray’s propagandizing through his Little Orphan Annie comic strip). As 
children became commodities exchanged within cultural production 
contexts, King-Trendle worked to both sell the Lone Ranger’s cult of 
personality as key to attracting the child consumer, but also to imbue their 
property with the ‘right’ moral values.  Selling to children became 
justifiable only if what was being sold would also build character or teach 
important moral lessons. Once again, King-Trendle used this cultural 
concern to foreground its authorial role in creating and managing the Lone 
Ranger formula, ensuring that it struck the proper balance between 
commercial and civic values. This was particularly important given the 
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dispersal of actual writers working in different cultural production sites 
who contributed to producing Lone Ranger radio, film, comic book, comic 
strip and other texts. King-Trendle solidified its brand ownership by 
elevating the formula’s authorship over any of these individual texts and 
by claiming managerial authority based on moral and financial concerns 
that other producers might misappropriate the formula. 
 Still, character building needed to be commensurate with corporate 
notions of citizenship, which encouraged consumption, individualism, and 
self-reliance, over thrift, collectivism, and government assistance. Lone 
Ranger Safety Clubs seamlessly linked consumption with citizenship 
through the Lone Ranger’s civic mission and upstanding character. 
Coupled with the recycling strategies and centralized management that 
King-Trendle utilized, by decade’s end The Lone Ranger had gained a 
significant reputation within the cultural industries and amongst sponsors 
as a morally upright salesman for corporate capitalism. By shifting 
attention away from sponsored products, the Lone Ranger Safety Clubs 
also worked to habitualize children’s encounters with their hero in ways 
that promoted the brand as existing separately from, but also embodying, 
the myriad licensed merchandise that bore his name. This, in turn, would 
establish several early parameters for the creation of fan-communities 
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centered on commercial intertexts that characterizes contemporary media 
production efforts. The property was thus poised for national sponsorship 
and an expanding notion of American consumer-citizen identity 
integration as America entered World War II. As shifting definitions of 
copyright coupled with efforts by others to capitalize on the goodwill 
generated by the Lone Ranger’s personality emerged, King-Trendle also 
would also face its first serious legal challenges to its ownership rights 
over the brand. 
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Chapter Three: Introduction 
By 1938, The Lone Ranger was being heard coast-to-coast on 107 
radio stations and the series had amassed forty-two sponsors. The King 
Features Syndicate published a daily Lone Ranger comic strip in 80 
newspapers across the country (and 60 newspapers on Sundays). Republic 
Studios had released two fifteen-part movie serials, spurring new radio 
sponsorship opportunities and transcription sales. Several Lone Ranger 
novels were in print and a comic book would debut in 1940. Nearly 
seventy separate merchandising licenses had also already been issued for 
products ranging from toy pistols to bed linens. Across America, Lone 
Ranger Safety Clubs boasted membership in the millions, teaching 
children consumer-friendly forms of citizenship. They also linked together 
the myriad Lone Ranger products in circulation and elevated the Lone 
Ranger brand above any one of these items, as an iconic personality that 
club members could befriend or even embody through habitual brand 
consumption. The radio series remained tied, however, to the Mutual 
Radio Network and its various independent local and regional partnerships 
and sponsorships. In short, the Lone Ranger was a national sales and 




NBC and CBS had been working to establish themselves as 
national networks since the early 1930s. The Lone Ranger’s origins, in 
contrast, resulted from an initial need to create profitable local and 
regional programming for station WXYZ and the Michigan Radio 
Network, which had purposely broken free from CBS’ centralized 
programming initiatives in the early 1930s.  By the end of the decade, 
however, King-Trendle began to see the upside of partnering with a 
national network.1 King-Trendle’s growing interest in national 
sponsorship coincided with NBC’s desires to acquire proven ratings and 
revenue-generating programs to compete against CBS. Both NBC and 
CBS regularly raided Mutual’s most successful programs, promising 
national exposure and sponsorship for those that jumped ship. In reality, 
many of Mutual’s programs were already proven coast-to-coast successes, 
but the network lacked the centralized structure and resources to attract 
large national sponsors. As such, an established iconic brand like the Lone 
Ranger could help legitimate NBC’s claims to national status as much as 
NBC could help King-Trendle land a more lucrative sponsorship deal for 
his radio product.  
It is perhaps surprising then that King-Trendle’s first foray into the 
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nationally networked spotlight was not with the Lone Ranger, but with the 
company’s other brand, the Green Hornet. Britt Reid, The Green Hornet, 
was the fictional distant relative of the Lone Ranger, taking up the latter’s 
legacy of fighting crime, this time in a contemporary urban setting. 
Created in 1936, The Green Hornet radio series, also owned and produced 
by King-Trendle, purposely evoked its distant cousin’s “memory” (in 
reality, both series ran simultaneously) in order to capitalize on The 
LoneRanger’s success. The Green Hornet updated, but also basically 
repeated The Lone Ranger’s narrative formula. Both series featured 
masked men fighting crime. Both heroes were known for their weapons of 
choice (the Lone Ranger had his silver-handled six shooters that fired 
silver bullets; the Green Hornet had his gas gun that fired pellets of 
“instant sleep”), their modes of transport (the Lone Ranger’s mighty steed, 
Silver; the Green Hornet’s souped up car, the Black Beauty), and their 
non-white companions (the “half-breed” Tonto and the ever-shifting 
“Oriental” Kato).  
Reminders of the connection between the two series were not 
reserved for radio audiences alone. Promotional materials created by 
King-Trendle also repeatedly stressed the sales potential of The Green 
Hornet by pointing to the licensor’s proven success with The Lone 
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Ranger. Moreover, both series were also initially marketed in similar 
ways, sold market-by-market to regional sponsors, relying on audience 
measurement techniques and premium giveaways that revealed the selling 
power of personality, especially to children, and stressing the cross-
merchandising potential of the properties. Similar to how it sold its own 
role with the Lone Ranger brand, King-Trendle once again positioned the 
company as both merchandising manager and moral arbiter, devising 
reusable marketing materials and justifying the business of selling to 
children on the grounds of the character-building power of the Green 
Hornet’s personality.  
Yet, where The Lone Ranger was an unmitigated sales success, 
having achieved coast-to-coast popularity by 1938 and a reputation as a 
good moral spokesperson for its commercially minded sponsors, The 
Green Hornet struggled to find sponsors. Some of these difficulties 
resulted from the areas of difference between The Lone Ranger and The 
Green Hornet that King-Trendle’s marketing strategies unintentionally 
called attention to by consistently comparing the two series. Partnering 
with NBC offered the opportunity to forego the market-by-market 
approach in favor of landing a single national sponsor. The Green Hornet 
made the initial leap to a national network before The Lone Ranger 
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because The Lone Ranger’s multiple radio sponsorships, with varying end-
dates (depending on when and for how long a given contract had been 
signed), meant that it was a much more difficult series to move off the 
Mutual network without defaulting on existing deals. Moreover, as King-
Trendle had learned through its dealing with Republic Studios, film serials 
based on its brands did far better at the box-office in pre-sold markets 
where the radio series was already heard, adding incentive to maximize 
the number of stations airing its product as quickly as possible. Debuting 
three years after The Lone Ranger, The Green Hornet had more ground to 
cover in less time if King-Trendle wanted to achieve the same cross-
promotional success with this brand. Once again, NBC seemingly offered 
a quick solution. Though The Green Hornet was not the commercial 
success The Lone Ranger was, its ratings were impressive and its owners 
had an established reputation, making it an intriguing property for NBC as 
well.  
NBC’s investment in balancing profit with public service, as well 
as the greater scrutiny it faced from the FCC and pressure groups than 
networks like Mutual because of its claims to national status,  brought 
unanticipated complications in promoting the Green Hornet as a national 
brand. King-Trendle’s partnership with NBC would prove short-lived but 
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disastrous for the brand’s future development. Whereas The Lone Ranger 
had firmly established its commercial and moral respectability by 1938, 
The Green Hornet did not have the same reputation to fall back on. As a 
result, the series oscillated between targeting regional and national 
sponsorship, shifting networks multiple times accordingly.  
This uncertainty also reared its head in the ways the series’ target 
audience was constructed. While clearly directed at children prior to 1938, 
promotional materials between 1938-1941 constructed the series as 
appealing primarily to adults, but still pulling in a large juvenile audience 
that would bolster sales. Though this shift in target audience was intended 
to avert accusations that the series was unsuitable for children, the attempt 
at selling the dual appeal of the series to both adults and youth only 
managed to further confuse potential sponsors and networks, particularly 
as radio schedules became more and more routinized according to gender 
and age-specific hours of the day. This confusion was exacerbated by the 
selling strategies used in approaching ad agencies and sponsors, which 
often reinforced the child-like qualities of The Green Hornet program, 
even as brochures argued for its adult orientation. 
Promotional materials, as well as internal memos discussing 
potential premiums for the Green Hornet property, between 1938-1941 
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also reveal considerable confusion over how to visually represent the 
characters of the Green Hornet and Kato. In part, this confusion relates to 
the shifting construction of the series’ audience from children to adults, 
which seemed to necessitate (and evoked considerable anxiety over) a 
greater degree of realism in how the Green Hornet, a masked modern day 
crime fighter, might actually look. In part, such debates also stemmed 
from the expanding number of visual media sites seeking to license the 
property and the corresponding need to translate previously exclusive oral 
markers of distinction into a coherent, managed, yet still unique image (a 
feat far easier to accomplish - though not without compromises - with the 
Lone Ranger, where the cowboy icon simply needed a mask). Finally, 
debates over how to represent Kato were informed both by shifting 
cultural assumptions about different Asian nationalities as well as by 
institutionalized racist markers of distinction, which sought to differentiate 
Kato from other racialized groups, yet still mark him as non-white.   
While licensed properties sold the power of their “unique” 
personality, by 1938 the field was beginning to get crowded and efforts to 
distinguish between programs and properties became more overt. Aside 
from financial concerns over being labeled a derivative or a copy, there 
was mounting legal ramifications, as efforts to capitalize on the goodwill 
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of a property through either direct or indirect “borrowing” challenged 
licensors to prove their ownership and sole right to exploit their properties. 
Licensors also found themselves deflecting accusations that they had 
stolen the essence of another property in creating their own brand.  
King-Trendle faced these concerns on multiple fronts during this 
period and with both of its properties. In King-Trendle’s efforts to ground 
The Green Hornet within a decidedly adult genre, the brand drew 
uncomfortable comparisons to other radio crime dramas which, in turn, 
opened up debates over whose program had inspired the others. 
Meanwhile, The Lone Ranger Inc engaged in a series of legal battles 
resulting from the cross-merchandising and multi-mediated success King-
Trendle had with that property. In other words, concerns over ownership 
were factors regardless of the success or failure of a property, though they 
manifested themselves differently depending on their established 
popularity and profitability.  
The Lone Ranger first faced legal problems in 1939 when the 
success of the Republic Pictures film serial brought a lawsuit from 
cowboy actor Buck Jones accusing Republic Studios and King-Trendle of 
stealing and profiting from his established film personality. Almost 
immediately afterwards, King-Trendle faced more legal troubles when 
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Republic Studios attempted to produce a film serial titled The Lone Star 
Ranger, which the licensor claimed was clearly an attempt to capitalize on 
the Lone Ranger’s popularity without sharing in the profits. Finally, in 
what would turn out to be a groundbreaking case, The Lone Ranger Inc 
sued The Wallace Brothers Circus and Lee Powell, an actor who had 
played the Lone Ranger in the Republic film serial, for an act in which he 
claimed to be the “real” Lone Ranger. The manner of argumentation and 
the rulings in these cases are significant for the way they attempted to 
demonstrate tangible ownership over intangible properties and conflated 
public icons with intellectual property. They are also significant because 
they posed a final hurdle that needed to be overcome before The Lone 
Ranger could procure a national sponsor.  
In many ways, this chapter is a continuation of the previous one, 
but also an important and complicating intervention. Focusing on the 
period 1938-1941, just prior to the US entry into WWII and General Mills 
assuming national sponsorship of both The Lone Ranger (1942) and The 
Green Hornet (1946), this chapter focuses on the struggles that needed to 
be overcome to pave the way for this shift, as well as the new troubles that 
emerged as a result of the transition to national network and sponsorship 
strategies. The first chapter argued for the ways King-Trendle’s successful 
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managing of both multiple markets and merchandising outlets, coupled 
with the alleviation of concerns over marketing powerful personalities 
directly to children led to the Lone Ranger’s growth as a reputable sales 
agent and opened up possibilities for national exploitation by one sponsor; 
this chapter suggests, by looking primarily at the Green Hornet, that there 
were incentives for licensors to abandon the market-by-market approach, 
but also that complications that arose when doing so. This chapter points 
out some of the historically specific difficulties that arose from efforts to 
sell properties across multiple audiences (children and adults) and from 
attempts to bank on the reputation of one property to sell another (the 
Lone Ranger selling the Green Hornet), strategies that would later become 
common amongst conglomerates cross-marketing their wares. Finally, I 
argue that licensors success spurred a new set of troubles. In the case of 
the Lone Ranger, this resulted in King-Trendle’s need to both defend and 
litigate against attempts to capitalize on the goodwill established by the 
property as an effective and morally upright sales agent. 
The development of a successful national brand requires aligning 
the property with multiple and often competing economic and cultural 
interests. As such, there is much that can be learned from studying 
unsuccessful branding attempts because they illuminate the complexities 
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of trans-media management. The Green Hornet, though not an unpopular 
radio program, represents precisely such a failed branding effort. King-
Trendle’s attempts to extend the Green Hornet brand coincided with the 
licensor’s initial efforts to abandon its market-to-market recyclable sales 
strategies in favor of landing a single national sponsor. Without the pre-
established groundwork that had been invested in developing the Lone 
Ranger brand, the Green Hornet was simply unable to make the 
adjustment. Therefore, the Green Hornet’s counter-example also provides 
important insight into the relationship between recyclable local sales 
initiatives and the achievement of national status, revealing how important 
first cultivating local fan communities was for the Lone Ranger before the 
brand became nationally sponsored.  
Finally, the more successful a brand becomes, the less clearly 
identified it is with a particular owner. While the elevation of a brand 
above the specific products it adorns is key to how contemporary 
commercial intertexts work, it is important to situate historically and 
analyze the legal struggles and work practices that have allowed licensors 
to keep control over their intangible and iconic properties. King-Trendle’s 
efforts to prove its ownership over the Lone Ranger brand in the late 
1930s was central to establishing the parameters of what constitutes 
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intellectual property and differentiates it from free-floating cultural images 
and ideas that anyone can exploit. 
 
SHARED HERITAGE 
The Green Hornet made its radio debut on station WXYZ on 
January 31, 1936, three years and one day after The Lone Ranger was first 
broadcast. Shortly thereafter, King-Trendle went in search of a local 
sponsor by demonstrating the popularity of the program through a write-in 
giveaway campaign. Announcements for The Green Hornet program 
offered “lucky token” premiums to the first 2000 listeners who wrote in 
(this number was significantly larger than the 300 toy guns offered by The 
Lone Ranger). Six-thousand three-hundred thirty-seven letters were 
received (this was significantly less than the 24, 607 requests The Lone 
Ranger drew). The effort succeeded in landing the Detroit Creamery 
Company, makers of Golden Jersey Milk, as the series’ initial sponsor, 
beginning November 10, 1936. The Detroit Creamery was represented by 
the N.W. Ayer & Co Advertising Agency. 
Though the numbers were considerably smaller than those of The 
Lone Ranger, the strategy of using audience size measurement to gauge 
The Green Hornet’s popularity remained the same. Susan Smulyan argues 
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that radio stations not only encouraged listeners to write in by offering 
giveaways, but also used these same letters as a means of proving a 
particular program’s popularity, but also combined this method in the 
1930s with newer, more ‘scientific’ measurement strategies, such as phone 
surveys. Because letters and surveys were utilized to attract advertisers, 
the people who commissioned them always selectively spun the results to 
make any program seem like a potential commercial windfall.2 
In addition to premiums, by 1938 King-Trendle was contracting 
independent surveyors such as the Ross Federal Research Corp and 
Crossley to conduct telephone interviews that asked respondents what 
radio program they were listening to at the time of the call. While 
telephone surveys could produce impressive statistical evidence of the 
listening audience (a 1938 survey of 100 homes in the Detroit area 
revealed that 60 percent listened to The Green Hornet3), they were not as 
revealing of whether a particular program could get listeners to interact 
with a given personality (and, by extension, the product that personality 
sponsored) as write-in letters for premiums. Giveaways were used as the 
primary evidence that listeners “definitely... bought the product because of 
‘THE GREEN HORNET.’”4 
Nonetheless, telephone surveys served two important functions: 
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they could break audiences down by geographic location, gender and age, 
and they could assure certain legitimacy to the measurement process 
because independent contractors conducted them. Thus, Chas C. Hicks, 
manager of King-Trendle’s sales promotion department could confidently 
report to his equivalent at the Mutual Broadcast System that within the 60 
homes the Ross survey found listening to The Green Hornet, the actual 
audience consisted of 54 men, 56 women and 82 children “scattered city-
wide to cover all classes of listeners,” which in turn proved King-
Trendle’s claim that the program was “a giant for results in metropolitan 
centers as well as in small towns and rural communities.”5 The concern 
with identifying an audience that was both urban and rural for the program 
suggests that even as radio was becoming increasingly national, sponsors 
still measured their consumer-base in regional configurations, making it 
crucial that a licensed radio property be popular across various landscapes. 
This might have been especially true of a property such as The Green 
Hornet, which was narratively linked to the big city through his crime-
fighting exploits.  The seemingly large adult listenership that the survey 
also revealed would later be put to use in re-constructing The Green 
Hornet’s supposed audience appeal. 
Beyond cold figures and rudimentary demographics, by the early 
 
 187
1940s popularity was also being measured qualitatively by “human 
interest stories reflecting the adoptation of a radio character by the 
public.”6 As such, a 1942 sales brochure complemented its statistics with 
accounts of how Lt. General George S. Patton’s nickname was “The 
Green Hornet,” a title also given to an “untouchable” Detroit police officer 
by the criminal elements that feared him.  Similarly, a professional 
wrestler was listed as having taken the shown name “The Green Hornet” 
in order to gain attention. Whereas Patton and the police’s adoption of the 
GH moniker  was pointed out proudly as evidence of the character’s 
popularity, the brochure assured readers that the wrestler “was shorn of his 
adopted title immediately by King-Trendle for obvious reasons.”7 While 
identification with the character could be used as proof of its public 
appeal, it was important that the right people identified with the Green 
Hornet, in this case moral authorities rather than entertainers seeking to 
“profit handsomely” by association.8  Human-interest measurement had 
the potential to further specify the type of audience a program attracted, 
but such specification had to be carefully monitored. 
While by 1940, The Green Hornet was being sold as an adult 
program, this audience was not the central one identified in the late 1930s 
for the show. Though there is considerable confusion over and allusion to 
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an adult listernership (as with the Ross survey above), the initial Jersey 
Milk campaign and its subsequent exploitation sought to foreground how 
the Green Hornet’s personality increased sales to children and converted 
them into sales agents. The Jersey Milk campaign, transcribed in its 
entirety as a case history for future sponsors, provides all of the 
commercial interludes used by the sponsor, which are largely directed 
either at children or at their parents. The very first Jersey Milk 
advertisement on November 10, 1936 bluntly stated, “We’re going to have 
some interesting things to say to children on these programs. They’ll 
idolize THE GREEN HORNET - and they’ll love Golden Jersey Milk.”9 
Other spots evoked memories of childhood for adult listeners. Listed as 
typical commercial copy for a March 2, 1937 episode, the announcement 
read, “Remember the old spring house on the farm where the rich milk 
was stored in stone crocks for the cream to rise... Those childhood thrills 
live again when you drink Golden Jersey Milk...”10 Proof of the property’s 
commercial value was offered in the form of anecdotal evidence that 
children “chased the [milk delivery] drivers in order to obtain a jar of 
cottage cheese as announced on the program.”11 At other moments, 
publicity transformed the child audience from consumers into actual 
workers. A February 3, 1939 letter from Hicks to Trendle offered some 
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quick references on selling the Green Hornet, discussed a photograph 
giveaway that attracted 181,640 requests, and emphasized that this number 
was all the more impressive because of the work assignment listeners were 
given in order to obtain this premium. “BUT respondents had the difficult 
assignment of an early rising to meet the milkman at the door, in order to 
secure photos.”12  
Designed as a sales aid, The Green Hornet program was promoted 
as one that “stimulates action in its listeners... in writing, in requesting 
premiums and in buying!”13 Selling the program to other sellers, King-
Trendle promoted the program’s popularity not just with children listeners, 
but also amongst retailers who, Hicks “reminds” the Badger, Browning & 
Hersey Advertising Agency, “are not to be forgotten in today’s advertising 
and exploitation campaigns.”14 Likewise, the Golden Jersey Milk ads 
made repeated reference to the “courteous salesman” who delivers both 
milk and Green Hornet premiums, at times even imbuing him with a 
heroic work ethic on par with the Green Hornet.15 Other spots directly 
conflated the sponsor with its spokesperson or attribute the power of the 
product to confer the Green Hornet’s character attributes on its consumers. 
A November 10, 1936 ad boasted, “The story of Golden Jersey Milk is a 
dramatic one – as dramatic, in its own way, as the story of THE GREEN 
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HORNET.”16 Another ad promised, “These crisp Fall days should make 
you feel full of vigor – full of the ‘up-and-at-‘em’ spirit that characterizes 
THE GREEN HORNET in his relentless search for criminals that even the 
law cannot reach! Drink plenty of Golden Jersey Milk.”17  
At the same time, marketing strategies were devised to alleviate 
the anxiety felt by parents and sponsors alike in selling directly to children 
by emphasizing the product’s beneficial qualities and the Green Hornet’s 
ability to sell children (and their parents) on such helpful and healthful 
consumer goods.  The Golden Jersey Milk campaign repeatedly stressed 
the healthful qualities of its product in promoting extra vigor and energy. 
“It is mighty good to drink – mighty good for you – and especially for 
children.”18 Other suggested marketing strategies included approaching 
law enforcement officials to endorse the program’s crusading themes.19 
King-Trendle also positioned itself as moral arbiter and guardian of 
children. An internal memo discussing a licensing contract between The 
Green Hornet Inc and Feinberg-Henry Co to produce a Green Hornet gun 
articulated the licensor’s moral obligation to include language in the 
contract that would guard against the toy manufacturer “capitalizing on the 
type of gun used in the radio script... by producing something which might 
be harmful to children using same.”20 As with the Lone Ranger, protecting 
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children once again became a moral commodity to be bandied about as 
negotiating chips in sales drives. Responding to Sydney Gaynor, assistant 
commercial manager at the Don Lee Broadcasting System, regarding the 
cost of a Green Hornet seal ring premium, Hicks wondered if the lower 
manufacturing price Gaynor was able to find was due to poor quality, 
which would in turn take away from both the moral and economic value of 
the giveaway. “THE GREEN HORNET seal ring we show will be one that 
children will strive to earn and one that will cause other children to 
become so envious of the present wearer that they in turn will work hard 
to get one... a high grade premium will live longer in popularity and 
accomplish the purpose in greater volume than that which is made to meet 
a certain price.”21 
As these examples suggest, King-Trendle also relied upon 
strategies of duplication and recycling in its marketing of The Green 
Hornet. A 1939 promotional packet assembled to sell the upcoming 
availability of the radio series via transcription through NBC makes this 
abundantly clear when it stated, “Original sponsors success in Detroit and 
Michigan is a ‘Yard-Stick’ for all prospective sponsors.”22 Much like The 
Lone Ranger, The Green Hornet was initially sold market-by-market, with 
King-Trendle approaching independent radio stations with the promise of 
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helping them attract local sponsorship in exchange for their purchasing 
two 30-minute episodes per week, the radio program on a limited 
sustaining basis. As with The Lone Ranger, Trendle usually charged 30-50 
percent of the highest priced half-hour drama on a station’s schedule, 
depending on the size of the market, ranging from a low of fifteen dollars 
to a high of several hundred dollars per episode.23 This localized 
marketing focus required King-Trendle to maintain a certain amount of 
flexibility, which would dissipate as their properties became more 
nationally established. For instance, a letter responding to station WHEAF 
in Binghamton, New York’s request for information on The Green Hornet 
series offered, “if you will be kind enough to send us just how you operate 
your sales and what your own plans are, it will be our pleasure to work 
out, according to the expertise of others, a plan for your consideration in 
this present circumstance.”24 By November 1939, the series was heard 
over 64 stations along the Mutual and Don Lee radio networks and was 
available via transcription from NBC. 
King-Trendle also ensured that all materials it provided, from 
advertising copy to premiums, were copyrighted at the licensee’s expense, 
in the name of the Green Hornet, Inc.25 Moreover, while King-Trendle 
supplied promotional materials intended to help radio stations find 
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sponsorship for the series, this assistance came with the caveat that 
stations “shall not, under any circumstances, be permitted to engage in, 
publish, promote, manufacture, disperse or dispose of any GREEN 
HORNET material of any type, nature or description whatsoever, unless 
and until our approval has been first given to you in writing and then only 
upon such terms and conditions which we may have a right to impose.”26 
These restrictions extended to the types of sponsorship stations could seek 
for the property. 
Just as with The Lone Ranger, Inc., the Green Hornet was 
incorporated soon after it landed its initial commercial sponsorship. The 
incorporation stipulates a wide range of activities and areas of exploitation 
that The Green Hornet, Inc., laid claim to, beginning with ownership of 
the name “The Green Hornet” and the right to “do anything and 
everything to promote, publicize, ameliorate and sponsor the name.” The 
document then listed the various areas of exploitation claimed by the 
company, including radio programs, theatrical productions, toys, games, 
novelties, amusement parks, amusement games, amusement devices, 
amusement rides, public dance halls, cafes, exhibitions, athletic 
competitions, food products, wearing apparel, publishing, and motion 
pictures.27 While this evidences the expansive licensing arenas conceived 
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by King-Trendle, it also reveals the legal need to cover all bases against 
infringement.   
Moreover, King-Trendle saw the opportunity to profit from cross-
promoting various Green Hornet licenses, rather than simply extending its 
reach in multiple directions. While premium manufacturers such as the 
Sackman Brothers were contractually obliged to meet a minimum 
guarantee of $3000 paid to The Green Hornet Inc., regardless of the actual 
number of play suits and uniforms it sold, the licensor also claimed a 
royalty ranging from 2-5 percent of each sale, depending on to whom 
articles were sold--wholesalers or retailers. In turn, King-Trendle 
promoted its manufacturing licensors to its radio sponsors for the purpose 
of premiums and giveaways.28 Similarly, 1940 and 1941 Green Hornet 
movie serials (titled The Green Hornet and The Green Hornet Strikes 
Again respectively) produced by Universal Pictures were used as both 
promotional strategies to attract new radio sponsors and as cross-
promotional endeavors to build premium tie-ins. In an effort to entice the 
Badger, Browning & Hersey ad agency to sell the Green Hornet to a 
potential radio sponsor, King-Trendle stated, “The Green Hornet is a great 
show - and greater today than when it originated... The best 
recommendation for such a claim is the fact that... the movies do not make 
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pictures out of radio shows that do not meet a certain audience level.”29  
A letter to the sales contact at Universal Pictures, which provided 
an updated list of radio stations carrying the Green Hornet for cross-
promotional purposes, further argued that “as news of the forthcoming 
movie gets around there certainly will be additions, at least by stations 
desiring to carry the program sustaining from which, as you know, 
commercial sponsors derive”.30 The implications of this letter are that 
Universal should go all out in promoting the film serial, not just placing it 
in cities where the radio program was already heard, but also helping to 
generate new sponsors and audiences through the popularity of the serial. 
The radio series was positioned as the central node in the cross-marketing 
matrix, but the film serial was looked to as key to expanding the 
property’s market reach. “This movie tie-in will not only be immensely 
valuable in extending the audience of the ‘Green Hornet’, it will also offer 
splendid tie-in and promotion opportunities for the sponsor of this 
program.”31 
Of course, King-Trendle also drew upon the success of the Lone 
Ranger in their efforts to sell the Green Hornet. The sales potential of 
tying in with The Green Hornet movie serial was guaranteed because “as 
experienced by the success of ‘The Lone Ranger’ movie serials in 
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strengthening the popularity of the radio feature, the far reaching effects of 
‘The Green Hornet’ movie serial needs no further mention.”32 The fact 
that the Lone Ranger had accumulated 74 licenses by 1941 was used to 
convince potential sponsors that the Green Hornet “could also develop a 
number of them.”33 In a letter to radio station KBJ offering suggestions on 
how it might lure a sponsor for The Green Hornet, Hicks encloses a copy 
of a letter from The Lone Ranger’s sponsor, Gordon’s Bakery, on how it 
cut down on bread returns through a story book giveaway of “How The 
Lone Ranger Captured Silver.”34 In devising the marketing campaign for 
the Green Hornet transcription sale, Hicks explicitly informed Frank 
Chizzini at NBC Transcription Services that “the plan requires... definite 
identification of THE LONE RANGER program success as accentuating 
the value of THE GREEN HORNET.”35 In a lengthy explication, worth 
quoting in full, Hicks stated: 
Certainly such mention will be carried in the copy, but in 
our opinion THE LONE RANGER success should be 
strongly identified in the heading of the broadside as it 
opens up flat. For instance, timely ordering and 
consideration of THE GREEN HORNET will remove the 
disappointment that occurred in many cases to those who 
wanted THE LONE RANGER and could not get it because 
of their delay. This point inspires the thought that THE 
LONE RANGER made its own network and now by the 





While such comparisons seem reasonable given the need for 
licensors to demonstrate their proven success in an overcrowded market, 
King-Trendle’s reliance on the strategy often seemed to work to the 
detriment of its Green Hornet property, which always seemed to pale in 
comparison to the Lone Ranger’s popularity. Various audience 
measurement polls included in promotional brochures for The Green 
Hornet include survey statistics for both radio programs. In one instance, a 
survey of Baltimore school children revealed that 85 percent of boys and 
84 percent of girls listened regularly to The Lone Ranger as compared 
with 73 percent of boys and 66 percent of girls for The Green Hornet.37 
Though the percentages were high for both shows, The Green Hornet was 
always depicted as The Lone Ranger’s poorer cousin through such 
comparisons. 
 
DIFFICULTIES IN MARKETING/MERCHANDISING  
As the examples above suggest, The Green Hornet’s initial 
licensing and merchandising campaign bore many similarities to that of 
The Lone Ranger’s, even incorporating the success of the latter into its 
publicity. Still, where The Lone Ranger had established a significant 
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sponsorship base and salesmanship record by 1938, The Green Hornet 
struggled to do the same. Several of the problems King-Trendle 
encountered with this property resulted from broader concerns over the 
feasibility of managing sponsorships and licensing arrangements at the 
local and regional level, issues that affected the whole of broadcasting 
during this era. While Susan Smulyan has argued that by the early 1930s 
radio had become a nationally sponsored medium, this is true only of NBC 
and CBS and, even with these networks, national sponsorship was often 
more of a rhetorical flourish than a fait accomplis.38 Throughout the 
1930s, these so-called national networks competed with locally owned and 
operated independent radio stations, as well as regional (The Michigan 
Radio Network) and quasi-national (Mutual) networks. The independents 
selected programs that suited the specific (and imagined) demands of local 
businesses and radio listeners and wanted programming tailored to the 
idiosyncrasies of their specific communities.   
Even NBC and CBS’s own affiliates and sponsors regularly 
spurned certain programs or markets that did not suit their imagined client 
base, whether radio audiences or consumers. In order to attract truly 
national sponsors (sponsors who would agree to pay to be heard over the 
entire network) and enlist all of their affiliates, NBC and CBS needed pre-
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sold properties that already had established their reputation with 
consumers and sponsors in multiple markets. Properties like the Lone 
Ranger and the Green Hornet, which were sold market-by-market, offered 
that established quality that the national networks needed in order to 
become truly national. CBS and NBC regularly attempted to steal 
programs from Mutual and other more regional networks for this purpose.  
By the end of the decade, the national model also was fast becoming 
attractive to licensors like King-Trendle because it seemingly offered a 
more manageable model for exploiting and controlling its properties.  
Moreover, licensors felt an added pressure to extend the radio 
market in order to sell their properties to other media. While the release of 
the Lone Ranger Republic serial had significantly increased the number of 
radio stations carrying the program, the film studios were also reluctant to 
release serials in markets where there had been no previous penetration. A 
similar problem existed with the comic strip, which publishing syndicates 
sought to place (and had the most success placing) in markets where the 
radio show was already being heard. Since properties such as The Green 
Hornet and The Lone Ranger were sold based on their proven success, it 
was essential that King-Trendle capture as much of the national radio 
market as possible in order to increase its other licensing arrangements.  
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By 1938, King-Trendle had begun moving in the direction of 
national sponsorship for both The Green Hornet and The Lone Ranger, but 
as the case of the former reveals, moving from the regional to the national 
spotlight exposed a series of new problems of The Green Hornet. Whereas 
King-Trendle was able to exercise a fairly tight yet flexible model of 
recycling and adapting marketing strategies to accommodate sponsor and 
station needs region-by-region, the search for a national sponsor required 
the licensor  to identify definitively both the audience for its properties and 
their uniqueness within a highly competitive and costly market. Moreover, 
anxieties over selling to children were accentuated even further on the 
national stage, causing King-Trendle to change its marketing strategies for 
The Green Hornet by targeting adults as the principal listening group for 
the series. This claim did not match either the audience measurements or 
merchandising strategies that had been previously conducted and 
implemented for the series.   
As King-Trendle pursued its market-by-market expansion 
throughout the late 1930s, several management problems arose, 
particularly in relation to The Green Hornet.39  These included concerns 
over sharing marketing materials across potential sales sights. King-
Trendle had successfully incorporated The Lone Ranger one month before 
 
 201
the Sehl Advertising Agency began its Lone Ranger promotions on behalf 
of Gordon’s Bakeries, including The Safety Club, thus requiring that all 
marketing materials by copyrighted in the name of The Lone Ranger, Inc. 
The company was slow in doing likewise with The Green Hornet. As a 
result, the incorporation went into effect after the N.W. Ayer & Son 
advertising agency had begun its promotion of the series for the Detroit 
Creamery. Thus, when King-Trendle was initially asked by station KHJ to 
share its marketing strategies for the series, it expressed a certain degree of 
ambivalence over circulating materials for which it did not officially own 
the copyright. Carefully wording his response, Hicks informed Station 
KHJ,   
 
as the agency’s problem has been entirely one of original 
creations for merchandising and exploitation, there is a 
certain amount of courtesy due them in so far as our 
sending information entirely devised by them and to be 
used generally... Our position in the matter is that we 
cannot use items and plans created by an advertising 
agency without seeming to be unethical and yet the need of 
creating such pieces did not arise with us because from the 
beginning the program swept into such audience popularity 
immediately followed by sale to the present sponsor that 
the onus of creating all the ideas fell to the N. W. Ayer 
Company.40  
 
Hicks tried to transform a handicap into an advantage by arguing that the 
lack of available marketing materials was itself evidence of the property’s 
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popularity, since its unprecedented success did not give King-Trendle 
enough time to develop its own materials. 
Similar problems arose in sharing information about premiums for 
the series. Sydney B. Gaynor, assistant commercial manager at KHJ, Los 
Angeles, wrote to Hicks on June 30, 1938, stating, “I am at a loss to 
understand why it is so difficult for us to obtain necessary information on 
premiums to be used for the GREEN HORNET program.”41 Evidencing 
the seriousness of the problem, Thayer Ridgeway, KHJ’s commercial 
manager wrote to H. Allen Campbell, King-Trendle’s sales manager on 
the same day, “We can’t afford to do a sloppy job on this show either for 
you, the client, or ourselves, and, the giveaways, being an important part, 
must be out of production by the [time] the show goes on in August.”42 
Hicks’ response to Ridgway, sent twelve days later, suggested that the 
delays were due to difficulties in designing a uniform giveaway that could 
be usefully licensed to all potential sponsors regardless of geographic 
location:  
While there seems to be a delay in the opinion of yourself 
and Mr. Gaynor and Mr. Weiss [the sponsor’s sales 
representative], we are doing everything we can to produce 
these items correctly and faultlessly so that later on when 
THE GREEN HORNET reaches greater proportions we 
will have no regrets as to things we should have done. Bear 
in mind that in presenting to you a GREEN HORNET ring 
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we must devise an emblem that will meet the requirements 
on the East coast as well as in your territory, and also one 
that will satisfy individual sponsor’s requirements as to 
identity, etc.43  
 
The letter outlined several other anxieties over the appearance of 
premiums as not capturing the grandness of the radio program, but being 
necessary compromises for the sake of safety and good ethics.44 I will 
return to this question of representation later on in this chapter.  
Concerns over the cost of premiums were another problem. 
Immediately after King-Trendle supplied KHJ with information about the 
Green Hornet seal ring, Gaynor balked at the price, forcing Hicks to 
defend the six-cent per ring price tag. Hicks initially justified the cost on 
the basis of quality, arguing that the King-Trendle ring was more 
expensive because the seal was etched--not raised-- into the ring, which 
would make a better imprint and would be two colors. Rhetorically, Hicks 
asked, “Again referring to the ring manufacturer, does his price include 
two colors, whereby the black is shiny, like enamel, adding to the 
beauty?”45 Hicks also defended the cost in moral terms, pointing out how 
the ring’s appeal to children would help build good character (as referred 
to above, children would want one so much that they would “work hard” 
to obtain it).46 Nonetheless, the licensor regularly was forced to capitulate 
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to sponsor demands for cheaper premiums, which not only threatened the 
overall quality of the giveaway, but also took money out of King-
Trendle’s pockets, since its royalty share also was reduced. 
Beyond haggling over premiums, King-Trendle also had difficulty 
in keeping track of sponsors for its products. Since the licensor would 
lease a property to a radio station or regional network on a sustaining 
basis, and then rely on that station’s local sales staff to procure a sponsor, 
King-Trendle relied upon stations to supply accurate and up-to-date 
information. It is evident from correspondence that the licensor was often 
suspicious that its clients were not abiding by the terms of their contracts. 
On September 14, 1938, Hicks wrote to Ridgeway asking for an updated 
list of stations carrying The Green Hornet on a sustaining basis over the 
Don Lee Broadcasting System, intimating that several were not airing the 
program twice weekly, which was a stipulation of sponsorship.47 In 1940, 
Hicks wrote to Keith Kiggins at NBC, who was selling transcriptions of 
The Green Hornet,  and inquired about letters that had been received for a 
Green Hornet giveaway over a station that not only had no sponsor for the 
series, but had not received permission from King-Trendle. “Probably, I 
am over-suspicious, but there must be some reason for such requests and 
my interest is along the lines that if by such meager plans as various 
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stations use, response can be secured, a sponsor taking over the program, 
with good merchandising and sales tie-ins can expect to do a big job.”48 
As always, Hicks worked to transform a potential negative - the difficulty 
in keeping track of what local stations did with the series - into a positive, 
by suggesting that these successful infringements could be put to use in 
attracting a sponsor. 
Another series of problems King-Trendle regularly encountered in 
market-by-market licensing of The Green Hornet had to do with the 
complex affiliate relationships certain stations had with the Mutual 
Broadcasting System, as well as with the varying signal strength of 
various inquiring radio stations in nearby markets. Where a Mutual 
affiliate was available, King-Trendle was required to offer The Green 
Hornet first to that station, regardless of other inquiries.49 Where no 
Mutual affiliate was available, sales depended either upon electrical 
transcriptions (recordings of the live program broadcast from WXYZ) 
through NBC as of May 1, 1939, or upon an independent station accepting 
entrance into the Mutual family.50  Beyond the availability and/or 
willingness of stations to either become Mutual affiliates or take lower 
quality recordings, was the additional concern that certain markets were 
geographically located too close to one another and would therefore 
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compete for listeners, scaring off potential or existing sponsors.51   
Despite these market concessions, Mutual did not respond 
favorably to King-Trendle’s transcription arrangement with NBC. In 
particular, it objected to advertisements that mentioned NBC, but not 
Mutual, forcing King-Trendle to remove all mention of either network 
from its ads, which raised  NBC’s ire.  Granted, this tactic also worked to 
King-Trendle’s advantage, since it established the licensor’s sole 
ownership of the property without confusion over network involvement. 
Still, these types of disputes caused tension between the licensor and the 
key clients it had to satisfy if it hoped to expand The Green Hornet’s 
market reach. 52  
Moreover, once transcriptions became available through NBC, 
concerns over overlapping markets only intensified. Hicks was forced to 
turn away requests for transcriptions because of existing relations with 
stations in certain markets. On September 29, 1939, he responded to 
Mortimer C. Watters, general manager of Station WCPO in Cincinnati, 
informing Watters that The Green Hornet would not be available to his 
station because of a previous commitment to Station WKRC, which 
carried The Lone Ranger (but not, as yet, The Green Hornet). WKRC 
recently had become a Mutual affiliate, giving it priority in the Cincinnati 
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market and, additionally, King-Trendle felt obliged to support the long-
time Lone Ranger sponsor in its choice of radio stations. As Hicks 
explained, “this selection nominates that station for priority rights with 
THE GREEN HORNET.” Hicks pointed to the clause in the marketing 
brochure that stipulated that any license is “subject to prior sale” as a 
safeguard against such competing bids, but he evidently was anxious 
about this refusal. WCPO had made strides toward securing a sponsor for 
the series, yet Hicks was forced to shut down this possibility due to 
“circumstances beyond our control whereby you will undoubtedly be 
disappointed in having gone so far toward a sale, and, of necessity, being 
called off from further effort.”53 
As it had done with The Lone Ranger, King-Trendle contracted 
with NBC to sell transcription recordings to the latter’s own affiliate 
stations in markets where no Mutual station was either available or 
interested. While the transcription deal with NBC opened up new potential 
markets, it also generated concern over how to best reach them. NBC’s 
marketing, while further reaching than King-Trendle’s, was also out of 
sync with how the licensor previously had sold its properties to other 
sellers. Frank E. Chizzini, assistant manager of NBC Transcription 
Services, wrote to H. Allen Campbell of NBC’s plans to promote The 
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Green Hornet series at an upcoming National Association of Broadcasters 
(NAB) conference by adapting the mark of the Green Hornet, left behind 
at the end of every episode as proof of his presence, and leaving this 
insignia all over the convention.54   NBC also created a series of postcards 
sent at intervals to advertising agencies and radio stations teasing the 
upcoming transcription campaign. The postcards featured a hornet in a top 
hat promising to ‘buzz’ into offices in the near future to pitch a ‘stinger’ of 
an idea that would bring in “plenty of long GREEN... if you’d like to 
HORN in on IT.”55 [See image #1] 
Hicks responded to this campaign with trepidation, warning that it 
had been King-Trendle’s experience that such a teaser campaign 
“becomes a bit of an annoyance” if not received by buyers in quick 
succession, provoking the negative response of “‘For God’s sake if you’ve 
got anything good send it along to us and don’t delay something that we 
might need right now.’”56 Whereas King-Trendle’s marketing of The 
Green Hornet stressed the property’s ability to transform children into a 
sales force, working hard to obtain giveaways from the sponsor, NBC’s 
campaign seemed to transform sales agents into children, providing them 
with graphic illustrations, teasers, and hidden hornet insignias hiding 
around the sales convention.  
 
 209
Hicks further suggested that the hornet illustration used in the NBC 
teaser campaign elicited too much of an “insect” response, and urged 
Chizinni to merge “the showing of THE GREEN HORNET device with 
THE GREEN HORNET personality in some way so that to a person who 
would merely look at the display without reading it would not get the idea 
that we were selling insecticides.”57 The continued concern over how to 
represent an otherwise intangible and non-corporeal personality would 
reach greater proportions as the radio character readied to enter other 
media (comic books, comic strips, films) and merchandise (more below). 
While all of these factors pushed King-Trendle to look for a single 
national sponsor that would eliminate all of its competing station, affiliate, 
marketing, and merchandising concerns, important pull factors made 
national sponsorship an attractive proposition. As King-Trendle had 
discovered with the Republic produced Lone Ranger film serials, 
expansion into other markets largely depended on radio penetration. King-
Trendle was eager to maximize the exposure for the Green Hornet’s 
pending film debut, by having a ready-made pre-sold national market 
already in place. As Trendle explained, “I am withholding any closing of 
the deal until we get the program over a larger territory, a larger portion of 
the country, because I know that the show will not go on the screen unless 
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the program precedes it on the air.”58  
Thus, once again, King-Trendle’s strategies for exploiting The 
Green Hornet built upon prior experiences with The Lone Ranger 
property, this time leading the licensor to seek the type of complete 
geographic coverage that NBC promised would come with a national 
sponsor. As the next section discusses, however, the national spotlight 




By April 1939, King-Trendle sought out a national sponsor for The 
Green Hornet. In a letter to the N. W. Ayer & Son ad agency, the licensor 
suggested that a food product sponsor would be ideal and that the 
imminent cancellation of regional sponsors on the West Coast (where The 
Green Hornet had been sponsored by Jell-Well) now made a nationally 
sponsored coast-to-coast series a possibility. The letter made clear that the 
company was no longer willing to accept regional sponsors with limited 
station coverage, arguing that The Green Hornet had already been built up 
for a national advertiser.59 On November 12, 1939, King-Trendle jumped 
ship from Mutual to NBC, which offered more stations, with the intent of 
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landing a national sponsor. The relationship was short lived. 
On January 18, 1940, Trendle wrote to Kiggins at NBC expressing 
his dismay over the network’s failures to find sponsorship for the series. 
“You know, I made the change from Mutual to NBC because you fellows 
were so enthusiastic and were quite positive that within a month or so you 
could get a sponsor. In making that change, I gave up a Chicago sponsor, a 
New York sponsor and a Southern state sponsor all of whom were willing 
to start immediately.”60 Kiggins’s response was that perhaps both parties 
had engaged in some “wishful thinking” and that “rightfully or 
wrongfully,” ad agencies were insisting that the program cost too much 
and that, additionally, the two-times-per-week provision limited 
prospective sponsors to those with budgets exceeding $750,000.61 
Whereas King-Trendle’s price per episode previously had varied 
depending on the size of each local market, determining a cumulative 
national price tag for the property was a bit more difficult.   Kiggins 
suggested that the series could be sold if it were aired once weekly for 
$2500/week with an increasing option, rather than the current $5000 
asking price for twice weekly.62 Trendle countered by suggesting that he 
could let one broadcast per week go for an asking price of $3500/week.63 
Whether through further negotiation or misunderstanding, a March 8, 
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1940 internal memo to NBC salesmen stated that The Green Hornet 
would now be available twice per week at $3500.64 While Kiggins 
objected that such a price slash would encourage other sponsors to wait for 
price drops, by April 8, 1940, NBC was offering the series to the Young & 
Rubicam ad agency for $2200/week for a single episode guaranteed for 
26-weeks.65 Young & Rubicam passed and by August 20, 1940, King-
Trendle had returned The Green Hornet to the Mutual Broadcasting 
System and its regional sponsorship arrangement.66 
A return to the past was not in the cards, as local stations and 
sponsors, sensing King-Trendle’s weakened position and seeking 
compensation for the inconvenience of being dropped in favor a national 
sponsor that failed to materialize, demanded greatly reduced rates. For 
example, Dick Ross at Station KMO in Tacoma, WA argued, “in view of 
the shift back to Mutual following the somewhat turbulent period of 
adjustment, we are wondering about the feasibility of renewing for another 
year.” Ross suggested that if King-Trendle reduced its rate to $7.50 per 
half-hour episode (a return to the local sales market entailed a return to the 
local market price tag as well), it might be able to broker a deal with a 
sponsor.67 Hicks tried to counter that $15 per episode was the lowest 
King-Trendle would go, adding that with the release of the upcoming 
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Green Hornet film serial sequel from Universal Pictures in January 1941, 
the program would be appreciated by audiences as it had never been 
before.68 
Universal Pictures, however, saw matters differently. The first film 
serial had been released just as The Green Hornet was being switched 
from Mutual to NBC, resulting in neither broadcast system offering much 
cooperation in terms of cross-promotion.69 While it was hopeful that the 
situation would not repeat itself with the sequel, its concern reveals just 
how important stability was to the cross merchandising practices licensors 
promoted. Undoubtedly, the move from Mutual to NBC had been timed to 
coincide with the release of the film serial in order to maximize the market 
reach for both, but the unwillingness of either NBC or Mutual to work 
with Universal during this transitional period to cross-promote also 
suggests the vulnerability of licensors reliant upon cooperation from 
mutually exclusive media outlets they did not fully control. Thus, unable 
to produce statistical evidence of the cross-benefit to a station like KMO 
to keep The Green Hornet at a higher rate due to the imminent release of 
the film serial, King-Trendle failed to secure many of the markets it 
originally had under the first Mutual contract. By January 1942, King-
Trendle had jumped  back to NBC and had re-embraced the search for a 
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national sponsor, this time at a greatly reduced rate: $1500 for one half-
hour episode per week.70  
 
AUDIENCE CONFUSION 
Though outwardly, NBC argued that sponsor difficulties were due 
to King-Trendle’s hefty price tag for The Green Hornet, internally 
discussion focused on the unsuitability of the series for children and 
concerns over upsetting important constituencies like Parent-Teacher’s 
Associations.71 Internal memos debated whether the series was truly 
intended for adult or child listeners, seeing greater commercial potential 
with the latter but a quick escape route from a moral quagmire by 
promoting the former. In the end, sales materials emphasized the series’ 
appeal to both adults and juveniles. This confusion inevitably played an 
important part in the series failure to land a sponsor.  
As early as November 15, 1939, only several weeks after NBC 
made its deal with King-Trendle, Margaret Cuthbert, in charge of 
monitoring children’s programming at NBC, sent a memo to Phillips 
Carlin, president of the network, that objected to her having been kept out 
of the loop and warned that The Green Hornet had a bad reputation with 
parents. Gendering her argument, Cuthbert stated, “I feel it might have 
 
 215
been wise if I had had the opportunity to tell you how women feel about 
The GREEN HORNET before you took it on... We cannot expect the 
continued support of [Parent-Teacher Association President] Mrs. 
Milligan and her various groups if our intent is to continue with programs 
that the women do not approve of. They are our support!”72 Cuthbert’s 
objections were echoed by James R. Angell, who pointed to the difficulty 
of maintaining coherent policies across such a large company and argued 
for the need for better centralization.73  
Angell also suggested that the assumption that because the 
program would air at a late hour it would not be heard by children was 
“fallacious,” and expressed dismay that “the program suffers from some of 
the defects which have been most vigorously criticized by women’s 
organizations.”74 Significantly, none of the memos exchanged ever 
identified the precise objections of women’s organizations, but rather 
expressed concern that the complaints will bring negative publicity to the 
network. While it is possible that these objections were so thoroughly 
known as to not warrant repetition, these omissions are also revealing of 
NBC’s bottom-line concerns - not with content, but public perception. 
Consequently, NBC’s response to the problem was not to alter the content 
(which it most likely could not have done in any event, given King-
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Trendle’s proprietary rights over the radio production) or cancel the 
contract, but to shift the target market emphasis.  Thus, Bertha Brainard 
issued a memo that clearly stipulated that even if The Green Hornet were 
to be sold during a children’s time slot (normally late afternoon/ early 
evening), “it still must be pointed for adult appeal... This means that even 
the commercials must not urge ‘ask your mother to buy so-and-so...’ but 
must be sold directly to grown-ups.”75 
That the same memo supported both the airing of the program 
during a children’s time slot and the exclusive targeting of adults indicates 
how confused NBC was over what to do with The Green Hornet. This 
confusion stemmed, in part, from NBC’s desire both to appease and 
differentiate itself from watchdog organizations. Thus, Janet MacRorie 
responded to Brainard that “while from a broadcast point of view we may 
be aware that this program is not intended for child-listening, that belief 
will have no weight with pressure groups... we [must] be prepared for the 
criticism that will rain down on us, should the program be sold.”76 
Meanwhile, I.E. Showerman, taking the opposite position to MacRorie, 
responded to Brainard’s suggested restrictions by sarcastically stating, “I 
may have been deluded but I am under the quaint impression that we crave 
to sell the Blue Network and that commercially we should like nothing 
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more than to sell The Green Hornet on the Blue Network.”77 Clearly, 
NBC’s acquisition of The Green Hornet and the ensuing debate over what 
to do with it are revealing of internal struggles within the broadcasting 
company between maintaining its moral high ground as defender of 
quality programming and its commercial imperative to attract sponsors 
under increasingly competitive conditions.  
As Michele Hilmes has argued, tensions between public service 
and profits were an ongoing concern for NBC, precisely because its 
business model required that educational and cultural programming be 
commercially supported. NBC’s chief rival, CBS, had no such qualms, 
since the latter was envisioned as a commercial enterprise from its 
inception.78 By the late 1930s, competition from CBS, the Depression, and 
the Federal Radio Commission’s (later FCC) 1932 lift on the ban on 
recorded commercials had pushed NBC further in the direction of 
commercial programming. The percentage of its sponsored programs rose 
from 23 percent in 1932 to 49.4 percent in 1940. Educational children’s 
programming dropped from 3.6 percent to 0.4 percent of NBC’s schedule 
during the same time period.79 Still, as discussions of The Green Hornet’s 
suitability for children versus its commercial potential suggest, this 
transition was protracted and much debated, and was not an immediate 
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reversal for NBC. Perhaps not surprisingly, in order to quell such tensions, 
Sydney N. Strotz shifted the internal discussion away from the child 
concern toward the contractual stipulation that the program be sold twice 
per week which, he argued, greatly reduced the number of potential 
sponsors.80 This too was the response NBC gave Trendle when he 
complained about the network’s failure to land a sponsor.  
Even as the debate over The Green Hornet’s audience raged 
internally, NBC already had begun to stress the adult appeal of the 
program as early as September 1939, while it was still only selling the 
series as a transcription. Under the blunt title ADULT AUDIENCE, the 
sales brochure stated, “‘The Green Hornet’ program feature is designed 
for grown-up appeal... King-Trendle’s idea in creating this mystery drama 
was to satisfy the innate desires of adult listeners who enjoy mystery 
thrillers as a form of relaxation.”81 Though this was definitely a shift away 
from how the program had been marketed by the Detroit Creamery less 
than two years earlier, the brochure could not make a complete break with 
the past. In a proverbial attempt to have its cake and it eat it too, the adult 
audience pitch continued, “But children in countless numbers do listen to 
‘The Green Hornet’ So much so that a prospective sponsor desiring the 
sales influence of children upon their parents, could use the juvenile 
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audience alone to great advantage.”82 
In truth, King-Trendle could not completely abandon the potential 
appeal of the property to children, not because they constituted the actual 
listenership for the series (though a 1940 NBC survey suggested that 
children, 3-17 years old did, in fact, make up 69 percent of the audience, 
further deflating the adult claims),83 but because, financially, the licensor’s 
merchandising contracts were still largely invested in children’s 
commodities. The brochure listed as available premiums a Green Hornet 
gun, a mask, a seal ring, and a model car,84 all materials produced by 
manufacturers still under contract. King-Trendle earned a royalty on each 
sale and was contractually obligated to promote the materials to potential 
sponsors. Even more revealing of the incongruity of marketing the 
property for adult audiences was King-Trendle’s imposed set of 
restrictions on sponsorship. Manufacturers of alcoholic beverages, loan 
companies, (certain) patent medicines, and cigarettes were prohibited from 
sponsoring the series.85 The elimination of sponsors whose products were 
deemed “bad for children” within a promotional brochure arguing that the 
program was intended for adults pretty much sums up the network’s 
confusion over selling the series.  
A November 1939 NBC sales brochure, promoting the series’ 
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availability coast-to-coast via live transmission, continued to stress the 
dual appeal of the series - “it is a completely ‘grown-up; program... [It] 
also has a large juvenile following”86 - but added a selling ploy designed 
to identify firmly The Green Hornet as an adult series. It drew a 
comparison between the King-Trendle production and three other popular 
NBC series, calling The Green Hornet “a sort of cross between ‘Big 
Town’ and ‘Mr. District Attorney’ with the added mystery flavor of ‘The 
Shadow,’” adding as an afterthought, “but it is an imitation of no program 
– its appeal is distinctly its own.”87  
There was a definite explosion of vigilante heroes on radio, in pulp 
fiction, and in comics during the Depression years. As the series’ NBC 
listed suggest, these characters were not confined to only one genre, but 
could be found in crime procedurals as well as in mystery/thrillers. Even 
the Lone Ranger, despite its western setting, qualified as a vigilante, 
particularly in the earlier episodes. Most of these shows featured heroes 
with cloaked identities who took justice into their own hands because of 
either police corruption or inefficiency. These heroes responded to the 
social conditions of the Depression, fought for the little man and 
advocated a kind of rugged individualism, but often also indirectly argued 
in favor of bourgeois values. The Green Hornet’s alter ego, for instance, 
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was a publishing magnate with his own servant, but who fought grafts and 
crooked officials who took advantage of the public’s desperation. The 
Shadow’s alter ego, Lamont Cranston, was also a rich playboy. Even a 
science fiction hero like Superman began his crime-fighting career as a 
rugged individualist seeking vigilante justice instead of reform. By the 
time the US entered World War II, many of these figures had been 
transformed into super-patriots who helped the police and local 
government officials instead of offering an alternative to them.88  
Though intended to situate The Green Hornet within a particularly 
adult genre and thus attract sponsors interested in reaching this audience, 
the comparison to other programs tapped into a central anxiety felt by 
King-Trendle regarding its properties, namely how to represent an 
intangible idea as distinct and proprietarily owned. The next section will 
explore a series of these concerns about ownership and representation 
surrounding the Green Hornet property. A memo issued by Trendle to his 
right-hand man Campbell lay bare the concerns the licensor had over 
having The Green Hornet compared, even if favorably, with other radio 
properties, not owned by King-Trendle (it was no problem, however, - in 
fact, it was encouraged - if The Green Hornet were compared with The 
Lone Ranger). Trendle stated, “we do not want to, in any way, create the 
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thought that we have stolen anything from any other programs to produce 
this one as they definitely followed [The Green Hornet] on the air, each 
trying in its own way to come as closely to it as possible without 
infringing.”89 In place of NBC’s above quoted description, Trendle 
substituted a clunky, yet unmistakably clear comparative explanation of 
his series: “Since then, programs such as ‘Big Town’ and ‘Mr. District 
Attorney’ have been produced and as an idea of the type of story of ‘The 
Green Hornet’ we might say that ‘Big Town’, ‘Mr. District Attorney’ and 
‘The Shadow’ combined into one program would most clearly describe it, 
i.e., they have followed it - it is not an imitation of any program - its 
appeal is distinctly its own.”90  
While Trendle’s concern that his program not appear to imitate 
another’s resulted from increased competition in the radio market as well 
as from his own legal struggles with The Lone Ranger during this exact 
time period (see below), it was also indicative of a larger set of concerns 
over how best to represent an intangible property in order to imbue it with 
a marketable personality (or, more importantly, to not detract from its 
saleable qualities).   
 




The representation of radio properties was a particularly precarious 
business. Both the Lone Ranger and the Green Hornet were supposed to 
be mysterious figures. Their existence on radio allowed audiences to 
imagine them as larger than life. Their iconic status depended to a certain 
extent on their idealized images, which defied representation. Since 
licensors also depended on marketing, merchandising, and trans-media 
contracts to exploit their brands, however, a tension existed between the 
ideals properties like the Lone Ranger and Green Hornet stood for and 
their actual embodiment. Where representation was necessary, licensors 
emphasized the importance of brand continuity across media, choosing 
actors who looked most like their properties rather than changing the 
brand image to suit a given performer’s appearance. Obviously, real actors 
voiced the characters on radio and represented them on the screen or in 
publicity, but King-Trendle saw these performers as invisible placeholders 
at best, potential threats to the licensor’s brand ownership at worst. The 
Lone Ranger and the Green Hornet worked best for their owners when the 
actor’s portraying them remained anonymous and interchangeable. This 
invisibility would become increasingly difficult to sustain as the properties 
expanded from radio to visual media and merchandise that required a face 
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that audiences could identify with the brand, but one that also met the 
idealized expectations built up on the radio. In the case of the Green 
Hornet, these concerns were further complicated by the shift in imagined 
audiences for the property. As the Green Hornet was transformed from a 
children’s hero into a serious crime fighter appealing to adults, it became 
increasingly important to represent the brand realistically, since it was 
imagined that adult audiences were not taken in by fantastical imagery. 
Given the Green Hornet’s masked identity, however, “realistically” 
representing him would prove to be no simple feat. Additionally, as 
tensions mounted between the US and Japan, representing the nationality 
of the Green Hornet’s valet, Kato, also became an object of concern.  
King-Trendle not only sought to have its properties stand out as 
unique, but also sought to submerge the names of the actors playing key 
roles on the series “in deference to high-lighting the characters they 
play.”91 As far back as 1933, Trendle had sold The Lone Ranger as 
popular and affordable because of its focus on character rather than star-
power. There was economic advantage in preventing any one actor from 
becoming too associated with a particular property, as this meant Trendle 
could keep salaries low while licensing the character widely across media 
and merchandising outlets without either the performer demanding a 
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royalty or the manufacturer requiring his inclusion in the marketing of the 
product (once these properties made the leap to television, such controlled 
separation of actor and character would become impossible).  As both the 
Lone Ranger and the Green Hornet were sold as mysterious figures with 
larger-than-life personalities, there was further economic advantage in 
concealing the identities of the real life actors who played them so as to 
maintain the illusion. Finally, as intellectual property, Trendle had a 
vested interest in keeping the Lone Ranger and the Green Hornet un-
associated with any particular performer (or writer/ artist) in order to 
prevent confusion over his ownership rights to the property. 
To this effect, Striker admitted that visual representations of the 
Lone Ranger were left intentionally vague “as far as facial characteristics 
were concerned, so that children could visualize what they wanted to.”92 
As a radio property, the Lone Ranger’s personality had been linked 
explicitly to his voice. WXYZ station manager, Harold True described 
efforts to land a voice that was “outstanding” and “easily discernable from 
others” with a “stentorian tone”.93 Trendle confessed that said voice was 
intentionally classed, but not intended to be geographically specific to any 
particular part of the country. “When we selected a voice, we wanted a 
man who spoke the King’s English correctly, and had no particular dialect, 
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but he was supposed to portray a well-educated rancher... from any section 
of the country.”94  
The Lone Ranger’s physical dimensions were devised only to 
provide listeners with the barest means of distinguishing him from the 
other characters and were left purposely vague and “idealistic.”95 In court, 
Striker testified that he made the Lone Ranger tall, “to stand above the rest 
of the people that would be visualized by the listeners,” but otherwise he 
described the character’s appearance in very generic terms. “He had to be 
heroic, active, good-looking in a rugged, masculine way, and the sort of 
person that could be figured on to dominate any situation in which he 
might find himself.”96 The Lone Ranger’s most discernable feature, his 
mask, was intended to add “mystery to the character, for showmanship 
purposes.” 97 
Of course, this approach created a tension inasmuch as the 
marketing and exploitation strategies for both properties relied upon 
developing premiums and merchandise that depicted the heroes and 
accurately captured the essence of their personalities. Hicks testified that 
early publicity photos of the Lone Ranger were necessitated by demands 
made by radio magazines and newspapers because of the popularity of the 
program.98 While Striker admitted that they made certain concessions in 
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concretizing the character for the Republic motion picture, such as 
adjusting his height and weight to conform to more realistic proportions 
for the sake of casting, it was otherwise maintained that the contractual 
specifications of the Lone Ranger’s appearance were intended simply to 
conform to those characteristics already established and made popular by 
the radio broadcasts, with which the public was already familiar.99 In other 
words, no visual elements of the character were intended to remind 
listeners of any particular person. As King-Trendle’s chief counsel, 
Raymond Meurer, repeatedly instructed witnesses at the various trials the 
company took part in defending its rights to the property, “Bring out also 
from the start that from the time of the origin of the broadcasts the Lone 
Ranger has always been depicted as a masked character, and that the idea 
behind this was to make him a mysterious and unique character that could 
not be identified with any particular individual or actor.”100  
As such, while Trendle worked to submerge the identities of his 
performers and not to have his series compared with others, he put equal 
energy into monitoring the ways his characters were represented. This 
became especially true of the Green Hornet character and his valet Kato, 
as the marketing for the series attempted to position it for an adult market, 
rather than as kids fare, and as cultural attitudes toward Asians in the US 
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began to shift with the advent of World War II. 
A series of memos exchanged between Trendle and Hicks in 1939 
described in great detail a set of Green Hornet action drawings being 
prepared by an artist named Ward for an upcoming promotional campaign. 
The suggested revisions that Hicks repeatedly made were largely 
concerned with 1) capturing the essence, but also the accuracy of the 
characters, particularly the Green Hornet, 2) the need for greater realism in 
the drawings, and 3) the depiction of an appropriate, if also appropriately 
inscrutable, Asianness for Kato. An early memo suggested that sketch #1 
needed changing because the car drawn by Ward did not match the radio 
descriptions of Black Beauty, according to 1938 scripts. Hicks also 
commented that the Green Hornet should be drawn wearing a “richly 
expensive muffler” because this too was an important element in many 
scripts.101 Hicks assumed that audiences would become distracted by the 
lack of continuity between radio imagination and visual image. He also 
recommended that the smile on the Green Hornet’s face be eliminated 
because “when THE GREEN HORNET takes his mystery car, the 
grimness of purpose requires features of determination.”102 Here, Hicks 
shifted from maintaining visual continuity with the radio scripts to 
concerns over capturing the appropriate personality for the character. As a 
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radio personality, listeners and sponsors could imbue whatever 
characteristics they so desired on the Green Hornet using only their 
imagination. Premiums risked upsetting this imaginary bond and therefore 
required careful monitoring of everything from the positions of the 
characters appeared to their facial details, which were both purposely 
broad (with only one or two specific denotations of character, such as the 
Green Hornet’s muffler or mask) and subtly expressive, in order to capture 
the essence of the character’s personality without making him too 
concrete, and thus too unlike what listeners had imagined. 
As the series was being pitched as an adult crime drama, there was 
also added emphasis placed on capturing the character and his actions 
realistically, distinguishing this current incarnation from the more fanciful 
and less detailed depictions of the Green Hornet that had adorned 1937 
premium glass container giveaways. The Detroit Creamery had sold 
cottage cheese bottles with sketches of the Green Hornet in which only the 
character’s head appeared (bottles featuring the other three main 
characters, Kato, Mike Axford, and Lenore Kase each depicted them from 
the torso up) [see image #2]. The Green Hornet wore a derby hat on top of 
a green hornet-shaped head. No effort was made to distinguish whether the 
character was wearing a mask or just was a well-dressed insect. By 1939, 
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the question of what a realistic mask might look like was a central concern 
for Hicks in his critiques of Ward’s drawings. In an attempt to combine an 
emphasis on realistic representation with the need to brand the character 
properly as unique, Ward suggested that by placing a large green hornet 
emblem at the center of the hero’s mask, the image would be easily 
distinguished even when reduced to cartoon size and would also designate 
an appropriate opening in the mask through which the Green Hornet might 
speak effectively. Hicks argued, “otherwise if the mask has no opening it 
would be presumed that THE GREEN HORNET would be talking through 
cloth.”103 In another memo, Hicks recommended softening the 
highlighting on the Green Hornet’s face because “shows too theatrical and 
make-uppish in the reproductions.”104 Ward sent countless sketches of 
masks designed to appear realistic, and went as far as to embroider a cloth 
mask with eye slits and a sewed-on Hornet insignia in his efforts to design 
what the “real” Green Hornet might wear [see images 3-10].105  
Hicks’ concern for realistically depicting the Green Hornet 
extended beyond the physical representation of the character to encompass 
the settings and actions in which he was engaged. A September 11, 1939 
memo to Trendle contemplated questionable details regarding the lighting 
in one of Wards drawings, in which the Green Hornet’s shadow is 
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supposed to scare a table of crooks. “Obviously to throw the shadow of 
The Green Hornet on the wall the lighting would have to be in back of 
him, which would light up the four occupants of the table to a greater 
degree than is shown.”106 The emerging emphasis on realistic depictions 
had much to do with the imagined adult audience for the series, an 
audience that would not be as easily appeased as children and would 
demand a higher standard of quality and “realism” from their 
entertainment. Hicks’ concern with accuracy in these sketches seems also 
to have stemmed from his desire to avoid accusations that the images 
over-stimulated the imagination of audiences. In his critique of sketch #6, 
Hicks argued that a chair should be removed from the picture because it 
might be construed as about to poke one of the racketeers the Green 
Hornet is fighting in the back and “may cause some people to allow their 
imagination to run to cruelty” [see image #11].107 This concern might have 
stemmed from King-Trendle’s continued efforts to sell the series both as 
adult in its orientation and as appealing to children. In a similar manner, 
the depiction of the Green Hornet mask differed on radio than it did as a 
giveaway, because it had stirred negative imaginings (it looked like a 
burglar’s mask) and was unsafe for children. 
While confusion and concern over striking the right chord with 
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different audiences (or, more accurately, with the assumptions of sponsors, 
networks, regulators, and advocacy groups about these audiences) played 
a part in how the Green Hornet was represented, shifting cultural attitudes 
toward Asians during this period framed how Kato was depicted. Between 
1936-1944, Kato was described in various promotional materials and 
memos as Japanese, then Filipino, then Korean, and finally Filipino again. 
Brian Locke has argued that inscrutability has long been a stereotype used 
when depicting Asian men.108 Kato’s shifting national allegiances 
certainly could be explained as part this broader signifying practice. 
However, it is far more likely that Kato’s changing nationality 
corresponded with shifting US relations with the Far East as the countries 
moved closer toward war. Kato’s nationality is what kept his loyalty and 
subservience to the Green Hornet unquestioned. At the same time, King-
Trendle was emphatic in both its attempts to depict the character’s 
nationality realistically and to ascribe general stereotypes about Asians 
that Kato’s appearance was intended to convey (because his physicality 
and facial features were seen as the surest visual marker of his 
personality). Kato’s depiction was intended both to distinguish what sort 
of Asian he was and to emphasize the general differences between all 
Asians and Whites. 
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Michele Hilmes has discussed the ways early radio attempted to 
counter cultural anxieties over its ability to transcend visual 
representations and upset social hierarchies, potentially blurring the race, 
gender, and/or class status of the performers whose voices entered the 
private home by “obsessively rehearsing those distinctions.”109 Hilmes 
discusses institutionally sanctioned and monitored strategies of assigning 
linguistic markers to difference for each ethnic group in order to make 
them more easily identifiable.110 Black characters spoke in minstrel 
dialect, regardless of how the actual performer spoke (and regardless of 
whether the performer was actually black), while Asian characters spoke 
in broken English often dispensing “Eastern wisdom” through “folksy 
sayings.”111 While Hilmes suggests that such efforts to distinguish racial 
groups worked to reinforce white normative values by projecting 
culturally undesirable traits onto “easily identifiable, culturally devalued 
minority groups,” Russo’s analysis of The Green Hornet radio program 
suggests that Asian stereotypes also played important narrative functions 
in allowing the white hero to move between the legitimate and corrupt 
worlds necessitated by his dual identity.112 
In fact, Russo argues that The Green Hornet’s narrative formula 
revolved around Kato’s dual and inseparable role as Britt Reid’s valet and 
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the Green Hornet’s sidekick, because the character embodied both 
stereotypical Orientalist discourses associated with “yellow peril” and had 
domesticated these attributes in the service of his white master. “Yellow 
Peril” discourses imbued Orientals with “immense, unknowable power” 
that combined Western knowledge with mysterious “Eastern” abilities that 
could be used to mobilize an attack against the West.113 Oriental access to 
these dark forces cast them as “indelibly alien” from whites and a 
“contaminating element” that whites needed to guard against.114 Yet, 
according to popular myth (as rehearsed through popular cultural 
representations like The Green Hornet radio series), these same “yellow 
peril” powers could be marshaled by whites who received training from 
Orientals, usually in exchange for having saved the latter’s life. Using 
somewhat contradictory logic, these all-powerful Orientals then freely 
accepted a subservient role to their new white masters. Thus, Russo 
concludes, Kato provided the Green Hornet access to the criminal 
underworld as well as the power to fight these forces. “Referencing 
Orientalist themes of yellow peril, The Green Hornet’s representational 
strategies allowed Reid to draw upon the power, support, and knowledge 
of the Orient to rectify problems that cannot be solved within the law... 
The Green Hornet literally and figuratively domesticates the power of the 
 
 235
Oriental to structure its own ideological position.”115 
Accordingly, The Green Hornet radio series played up Kato’s 
Japanese identity from its very inception, indelibly linking his subservient 
status to his Oriental identity through the often-used stock phrase that 
described him at the beginning of each episode as the Green Hornet’s 
“faithful Jap valet.” Kato’s Japanese nationality allowed the writers on the 
series not only to tap into Orientalist stereotypes, but specifically Japanese 
ones, which included loyalty and industriousness.116 Kato would remain 
Japanese until February 1938, when Japan’s invasion of China and sinking 
of the US gunboat, Panang, called the commercial viability of the 
character’s national identity into question. Tellingly, this was also the 
period when King-Trendle was attempting to build upon its local success 
with Jersey Milk by extending the Green Hornet brand beyond the 
Michigan Radio Network. Still, as Russo asserts, “The Green Hornet 
could not erase Kato’s Asian identity completely because its racial 
associations were too important to the program’s narrative structure.”117 
Nor could Kato become a universal Oriental stereotype because of 
growing concerns over Asian unification propaganda circulated by Japan. 
Kato needed a new national identity, and in 1939 he became Filipino. 
While Russo argues that the transference of Orientalist stereotypes unto a 
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malleable Asian national body allowed The Green Hornet radio program 
to “use race as a flexible tool that adjusted to changing situations,”118 I 
contend that representing Kato’s Asian identity, both literally and 
figuratively, and its function within the larger Green Hornet brand proved 
a somewhat more difficult proposition.    
As early as October 20, 1936, less than a full year after The Green 
Hornet radio series had debuted, problems emerged over how best to 
represent Kato. In discussing the poor quality of a photo giveaway of the 
character, Hicks wrote to Gaynor at the Don Lee Broadcasting System that 
the licensor was hesitant to take another photo from a different angle (one 
that would put the character into clearer focus), because Kato is “a 
difficult subject to photograph, particularly for the one reason that unless 
you get the right angle, there is danger of making him look like a Chinese, 
which of course to a Jap is next to Hari-Kari.”119 Hicks’ explanation of the 
choice of photograph (a picture of Kato “well encased” behind the wheel 
of the Black Beauty and taken at a distance), reveals how racial logic 
played a part in determining even the most minute of details such as a free 
giveaway. Interestingly, however, Hicks pointed to another group as 
determining King-Trendle’s policies, suggesting that the licensor would 
not want to offend the Japanese community by making Kato appear to be 
 
 237
Chinese. Hicks’ argument articulates that nationality matters in how Kato 
was depicted (possibly for the mere sake of maintaining continuity with 
the radio series), but effaces questions of race by suggesting that this 
difference mattered less to white audiences than it did to Japanese and 
Chinese Americans. 
This concern with realistically capturing Kato’s Japaneseness 
extended to supplying Ward with photos of actual Japanese men taken 
from magazines such as Asia.120  At the same time, verisimilitude was 
tempered by stereotypical assumptions about Japanese physicality, which 
required that it be far less daunting than its white equivalent. On March 
10, 1939, Hicks wrote to Ward, encouraging him to use the magazine 
photos, but also reminding him that Kato “actually weighs 98 pounds, is 
just a trifle over 5 ft tall and has been so exploited in our publicity.”121 
Overtly drawing a connection between this physical description and the 
personality traits it was meant to convey, Hicks continued, “Mr. Trendle 
wants a KATO who shows intelligence, affability, servility, alertness and 
a certain sparkle”122  
Finally, in a nod toward changing US attitudes toward Japan as the 
latter’s expansionist policies threatened the US’ own presence in the Far 
East, Hicks argues that these personality traits are intended to “remove all 
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traces of the usual Japanese immobility and austereness.”123 Hicks’ 
strategy was to downplay the racialized characteristics that would mark 
Kato as a dangerous, intransigent and untrustworthy Japanese character 
while playing up his subservience to the Green Hornet (denoted through 
his physical frailty). At the same time, Hicks had the Japanese characters 
originally included on Kato’s photo removed because of concern that they 
might be construed as implying a “code,” defending this choice by 
pointing to a complaint lodged by a Californian, “where Japs are watched 
very closely.”124  Finally, by late June 1939, under mounting concern that 
Kato’s Japanese ancestry might have a negative impact on the show, Hicks 
had Ward “soften” Kato’s features in order to make him appear more 
Filipino. In a letter to Trendle, Hicks commented on these changes “there 
is just enough leaning toward Filipino to remove the stigma you were 
mentioning regarding Japs.”125 By August, Hicks was gloating, “Ward has 
removed the Japanese effect quite successfully.”126 Trendle and Hicks’ 
choice of Filipino as Kato’s “new” nationality might have been inspired 
by the US’s colonial history with the Philippines and the continued 
American paternalism and military presence in that country. When Japan 
invaded the Philippines in 1940, Kato became Korean.127  
Kato’s diminutive physical description never changed, even as his 
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national heritage flip-flopped. The only visual elements that appear to 
have been altered were Kato’s facial expressions, centered on his eyes and 
mouth, in order to communicate his faithful and servile relationship to the 
Green Hornet. This consistency suggests that what mattered most was 
maintaining Kato’s stereotypical Asian inferiority but also unquestioning 
loyalty to his white boss ,and that the interchange of national heritages 
merely reflected American-centric assumptions about whatever East Asian 
country fit the bill best at any given point in time. As Russo summarizes, 
“Kato’s Filipino status allowed the show to maintain its Orientalist modes 
of representation without the disquieting connotations of the Japanese co-
prosperity sphere.”128 In the case of NBC’s depiction of the character as 
Korean instead of Filipino, none of publicity materials were changed other 
than the name of the country, indicating that the assumed cultural traits 
Kato possessed were not rendered visually, as much as associatively with 
particular countries and not others. Whether Kato actually looked 
Japanese, Filipino, or Korean mattered less than what nationality the 
drawing or photograph claimed to represent. 
Of course, while Kato’s nationality was interchangeable, his 
ethnicity was not. Evidencing both a clear racial hierarchy and an assumed 
representability of moral defects attributable to different racialized groups, 
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Hicks’ replacement as sales manager, L. B. Beeuwkes decried the 
misrepresentation of Kato in the proposed 1944 Green Hornet comic strip. 
Beeuwkes argued that “Kato looks more like a Senegambian (coon to you 
and me) than a Philipino [sic]” because his mouth was too “wide and 
lascivious-lipped.”129 Even as Beeuwkes drew unwarranted racial 
connections between physical features and character values, his reasoning 
for pointing out the misrepresentation continued to be couched in the logic 
that visual continuity was essential to maintaining consistency across 
licensed Green Hornet brands.  He insisted that since Kato was a regular 
feature in the comic strip, he needed to be drawn accurately from the 
start.130  
That the Green Hornet comic strip failed to materialize (King-
Trendle never successfully launched a Green Hornet comic strip) likely 
had more to do with King-Trendle’s failures to generate the necessary 
cross-promotional environment for the brand than with Kato’s ambiguous 
national and ethnic heritage. The licensor’s concerns over precisely these 
representational issues, however, suggest both the centrality of race to the 
Green Hornet narrative formula and the racist assumptions that under-
girded its continuity. The Green Hornet’s authority relied upon his access 
to and mastery over certain racialized forces, namely the mystical and dark 
 
 241
“yellow peril,” which required Kato to continue to embody those qualities 
regardless of which national identity the brand’s creators ascribed to him. 
Kato’s national identity could change, but his function within the Green 
Hornet formula had to remain continuous. Thus, the attribution of cultural 
meanings to particular visual cues took on increased importance when the 
brand attempted to extend beyond radio into premiums, merchandise, and 
other visual media precisely because they risked upsetting not just how 
Kato was imagined as looking by radio listeners, but also the role he 
played in legitimating the Green Hornet’s authority.    
King-Trendle’s obsession with upholding certain continuities 
between the various texts its brands adorned only intensified in the 
postwar era, as the licensor began reaping even greater financial rewards 
(in turn, reinforcing the rigidity of the profitable formula) and faced 
increasing pressures to maintain control over how its properties were 
exploited. Even prior to World War II, King-Trendle’s efforts to extend 
their brands into other media and sell their value as icons existing apart 
from the various merchandise it sold led to legal struggles to delineate 
how precisely the licensor could claim proprietary ownership over 
intangible ideas, especially when those ideas were used to sell non-
competitive products. The next section will explore how legal battles over 
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the Lone Ranger both legitimated the roles licensors played in managing 
trans-mediated brands and, in turn, their exclusive ownership over them.    
 
LEGAL BATTLES 
In the late 1930s and early 1940s, representational concerns 
exceeded merely aligning racial stereotypes with national identities and 
anxieties over whether the masked Green Hornet would look “realistic.” 
Representation was also a hotly contested legal issue, as Trendle and 
company first faced accusations that they had stolen the concept of the 
Lone Ranger, and then had to defend their copyright against multiple 
parties who they claimed were trying to profit from the goodwill King-
Trendle had built with the Lone Ranger. While King-Trendle struggled to 
replicate their successful exploitation of the Lone Ranger with the Green 
Hornet, they also encountered unexpected difficulties in holding onto their 
exclusive rights to exploit their famous fictional cowboy.  
In part, all of these legal problems were precisely the result of 
King-Trendle’s calculated and successful expansion into other media 
outlets. All three legal battles over the Lone Ranger related to and 
extended out of King-Trendle’s licensing deal with Republic Pictures to 
produce the 1938 Lone Ranger serial. All three cases also related to 
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questions of property ownership over an intangible, but highly profitable, 
entity and the relationship between a non-corporeal idea and those 
claiming the right to represent it. The resolution of these cases evoked 
some of the recurring cultural anxieties, themes, and business strategies 
that had structured and inspired King-Trendle’s licensing operations for its 
properties: the representability of personality and the protection of 
children. 
King-Trendle entered into a production deal with Republic 
Productions, Inc on June 22, 1937 to produce a 15-part film serial based 
on the licensor’s Lone Ranger radio personality. Trendle sent Fran Striker, 
the series head writer, to Hollywood to consult on the script and help 
visualize the largely unseen hero so that he might conform to the 
imaginations of radio listeners going to see his exploits on screen. The 
first installment was released in early 1938 and would play a significant 
role in expanding the national reach of the property.  
In July 1938, Buck Jones, a professional cowboy and part-time 
movie actor filed suit against Republic Pictures claiming that the Lone 
Ranger serial had stolen its representation of the lead hero from his own 
established personality and was, thus, profiting from the reputation and 
goodwill Jones already had established. In his accusation, Jones pointed 
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out that he had starred in more than two-dozen Western film serials 
(several for Republic), often playing a heroic role similar to that of the 
Lone Ranger and that he too rode a white horse named Silver. In turn, 
Republic filed suit against King-Trendle, who was contractually obliged to 
defend against any legal claims made on properties it licensed. King-
Trendle now had to prove that the Lone Ranger had not been inspired by 
Buck Jones and that the idea of how the character should act and appear 
were wholly the licensor’s own. 
Trendle’s chief counsel, Raymond Meurer, who would later 
become a partner in The Lone Ranger, Inc., and Green Hornet, Inc., 
immediately assembled a list of items to be used in the company’s 
defense. This list included many of the original correspondences between 
Striker and James Jewell, as well as early promotional materials developed 
to exploit the property. The same materials that the licensor habitually 
recycled and sent out to potential clients would now become the primary 
evidence in its defense, used in order to demonstrate the popularity and 
growth of the property prior to the release of the Republic serial.131 
Though Jones’ film career also predated the radio series, his lawsuit 
targeted only the Republic serial and, as such, King-Trendle only had to 
establish that the radio series had popularized the film version of the radio 
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character, not Jones. As A.H. Williams, Trendle’s deposition lawyer 
explained, over the objections of Jones’ attorney Karl E. Scott, that said 
materials were “colored” by their sales promotion function and contained 
claims that were little more than hearsay, “the testimony as to these 
matters is for the purpose of showing the progressive and increased 
popularity of the program.”132 
Trendle, Hicks, Striker, True and Brace Beemer --the then-radio 
announcer and later voice of the Lone Ranger, Harold True all testified as 
to the inspirations for the Lone Ranger. Repeatedly, Scott raised the 
question of whether any of them had ever heard of or seen Buck Jones, 
live or in films. All denied they had. Yet, responding to the need to 
acknowledge that all inspiration has roots in some form of imitation, the 
defendants repeatedly fell back on drawing connections between the Lone 
Ranger and character types, as well as fictional figures long in the public 
domain. True testified that “of course, I think that any time we... try to 
create a character, I think we are all somewhat prone to imitation...my 
ideal of this man was a portrayal like the character of Robin Hood by 
Doug Fairbanks.”133 Similarly, Striker admitted that “it is the custom of 
writers to always visualize someone or group of people in creating a 




The oft-repeated comparison of the Lone Ranger to a Robin Hood 
type was a calculated choice of inspirations. Though the characters shared 
little in common narratively (other than their vague heroic similarities), 
Robin Hood was an un-copyrighted character in the public domain whom 
King-Trendle could make claims to copying without risking a lawsuit. 
Still, almost all the defendants took the further step of saying that the Lone 
Ranger was inspired by a Robin Hood “type” character, further distancing 
their property from any direct attribution. In this manner, when True 
admitted that Douglas Fairbanks’ portrayal of Robin Hood had inspired 
his own contributions to the Lone Ranger, he essentially was confessing 
only to imitating a characterization of a type, twice removed. 
When living persons were mentioned, such as Fairbanks and Tom 
Mix, defendants were quick to point out that they had been inspired by 
either a character they had portrayed or a character value they possessed, 
not the actual physical or unique persona of these performers. Striker also 
admitted to drawing inspiration from Fairbanks, but was careful to qualify 
that it was “not from the appearance, but from the virile activity that he 
portrayed in a picture from a story I read in the Argosy magazine, one of 
the Zorro series.”135  Trendle denied any knowledge of Buck Jones, 
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instead evoked Tom Mix, another cowboy star, as an inspirational source. 
“We discussed Tom Mix during that discussion, as I recall it, as the type 
of character we thought The Lone Ranger ought to be, that is, a great big 
strong, hard-hitting, fast-riding cowboy type.”136  Generalizeable 
characteristics found in particular performances--such as being virile, 
active or hard-hitting--are not covered by copyright;  the selective 
discussion of these qualities as demonstrated by particular performers, 
rather than the performers themselves, was calculated so as to admit that 
the Lone Ranger character bore resemblance to others, but was not a 
replication of a particular person or copyrighted character.  
In preparing for the deposition, Meurer stressed that the use of 
different persons in publicity photos should be used as evidence that “no 
[one in] particular was being imitated.”137 He made the same argument 
about the use of multiple horses in publicity stills of Silver.138 In court, 
even when Striker admitted on cross examination that others had told him 
of a cowboy actor named Buck Jones who rode a horse named Silver, he 
re-framed the comparison by stating “they pointed out that a movie actor 
was using the same name as The Lone Ranger for his horse.”139 The 
reversal made it seem as though Jones had stolen King-Trendle’s idea, and 
not vice versa, though Scott quickly corrected Striker that Jones had been 
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riding Silver for nearly fifteen years, a full decade before the Lone Ranger 
was created.140 Nonetheless, Striker’s rhetorical inversion did have the 
desired effect of confirming that the Lone Ranger had popularized Silver, 
not Jones, a “fact” further testified to by Hicks and “confirmed” with 
publicity materials entered as evidence.141 
King-Trendle defended its sole creation of the property through a 
circular logic that relied on pointing to the public’s preconceptions of what 
the Lone Ranger looked like as justification for the way he was 
represented on screen and in publicity materials. It further pointed to Buck 
Jones’ failure to bring suit against the company prior to the film serial, 
thus reducing his claims of infringement to physical and costume 
similarities. These, the licensor argued, either had been left purposely 
vague in order to conform to the imaginations of listeners or had been 
previously crafted for premium exploitation and showmanship via the 
radio program. Any physical or conceptual similarities, including a horse 
by the same name, that could be found between the Lone Ranger and Buck 
Jones were explained away as natural outgrowths of the need to represent 
the Lone Ranger’s personality visually for publicity, premium, and 
popularity’s sake; as such, they were both too general and too unique to 
the property to be rightfully compared. Regardless of whether or not King-
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Trendle did draw any inspiration for the Lone Ranger from Buck Jones, its 
rhetorical inversion of who first popularized Silver and its careful 
admission to inspirations drawn from public domain characters and 
copyright-eligible character traits and performances successfully 
established their creative ownership over the property. The court found in 
Republic’s favor and Jones was forced to withdraw his complaint. 
Republic soon repaid this legal victory by trying to profit from the 
Lone Ranger’s popularity itself once its contract with King-Trendle 
expired. After the second movie serial, The Lone Ranger Rides Again was 
released in 1939, the licensor moved to strike a deal with Universal 
Pictures, a company with greater exposure potential for the property than 
Republic because of its exhibition arrangement. Republic did not own its 
own theatrical chains or distribution arm like Universal did. Therefore, 
Republic’s profits came only after distributors and exhibitors had taken 
their share. Since King-Trendle’s earnings came from the gross receipts 
that the studio earned only after these groups had been paid, the licensor 
received substantially less from Republic than it stood to gain from 
Universal.  Universal was also producing the Green Hornet serials. 
Republic set out to produce a film serial titled The Lone Star Ranger 
which, it claimed, bore no relation to the Lone Ranger and therefore was 
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not an infringement on King-Trendle’s business.142 Trendle disagreed and 
took Republic to court. Republic countersued that King-Trendle had 
breached its contract by not allowing them to match Universal’s offer for 
another serial.  The two companies settled out of court.  Republic agreed 
to post notices on its publicity for The Lone Star Ranger that it bore no 
relation to the Lone Ranger and released King-Trendle to pursue a deal 
with Universal.143  The net result stymied any further production of Lone 
Ranger serials or motion pictures during this period. Universal withdrew 
its offer, possibly out of concern that The Lone Star Ranger would take 
away from Lone Ranger box office receipts regardless of Republic’s 
small-print clarifications, though also possibly due to the other major court 
battle King-Trendle was engaged in during this period over ownership 
rights to the Lone Ranger name across media – a battle King-Trendle 
initially would lose. 
Perhaps the most significant court battle King-Trendle took part in 
defending its ownership rights, The Lone Ranger Inc v Wallace Brothers 
Circus and Lee Powell, was fought over actor Powell’s performance as the 
Lone Ranger in the Wallace Brothers Circus, which the latter promoted as 
an appearance by “the original ‘Lone Ranger’” or “‘The Lone Ranger’ in 
person.”144 Powell had appeared as the Lone Ranger in the first Republic 
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movie serial, which was also mentioned, though in small type, in the 
ads.145 The Lone Ranger Inc claimed that Powell was infringing on its 
trademark by perpetuating a deception on the public over the origin of his 
performance and by seeking to profit from the goodwill King-Trendle had 
established with The Lone Ranger property on radio and elsewhere. 
Wallace Brothers and Powell contended that since they made no claim to 
be impersonating the Lone Ranger from the radio, it was their right to 
publicize Powell’s appearance as the Lone Ranger in the films. Moreover, 
they defended Powell’s right to use the Lone Ranger’s famous call, “Hi 
Yo, Silver,” which first had been used on the radio, on the grounds that 
Republic had released a full-length motion picture of the assembled serial 
under that same title, and that Powell was merely calling attention to this 
fact in his performances and publicity for the circus.  
The lower courts originally sided with Powell against The Lone 
Ranger, Inc., drawing a distinction between the radio program and the 
films as entirely different and, thereby, non-competitive products that 
would not confuse the public. Trademark legislation is intended to protect 
the public against confusion and deception through the use of similar 
marks by competing businesses, and as such, should promote competition 
by facilitating comparison-shopping.  It also has preserved the “goodwill” 
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that trademark owners have invested and generated in the property.  
Historically, there have been considerable struggles over defining what 
categories of business are in competition with one another so as to 
generate public confusion and, moreover, what defines “goodwill”. 
According to J. Thomas McCarthy, early arguments over trademark 
infringement often centered on whether plaintiffs and defendants were in 
direct competition with one another.146  
It was only in the 1930s that a concerted effort to modernize 
trademark law was undertaken, with the initial draft of the Lanham 
Trademark Act, still the basis for all modern-day intellectual property law, 
and first introduced before Congress in 1938. Nonetheless, it would not be 
until 1946, with the passing of the Lanham Trademark Act and the 
establishment of secondary meaning justifications for ownership claims, 
that independent licensors would finally attain a secure base from which to 
operate. Secondary meanings become attached to suggestive and 
descriptive properties by demonstrating that the public has come to 
associate the brand name exclusively with particular products. Names and 
physical characteristics of licensed characters are protected under 
trademark law through the secondary meaning clause, though abilities and 
personality traits are not. As such, when on January 5, 1942, the Court of 
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Appeals overturned the lower court’s verdict in Lone Ranger, Inc., v 
Wallace Brothers Circus and Lee Powell, it issued a landmark decision 
that preceded, but also paved the way for, interpreting secondary meanings 
in modern-day copyright. 
The Court of Appeals sided with The Lone Ranger, Inc., by 
proclaiming that both the plaintiff and the defendant were in the same 
business, the “business of furnishing entertainment.”147 Moreover, the 
court acknowledged that “the specific and distinctive characteristics” of 
The Lone Ranger broadcast “have a peculiar monetary value” that entitled 
The Lone Ranger, Inc and its licensees protection against non-licensed 
uses of “the name or the character of the program which have been 
identified to the general public.”148 Significanlty, the court invoked 
children in its decision, and it recognized the tenuous relationship between 
the profitable personality developed for the Lone Ranger and its un-
managed representation through tangible performances and artifacts. 
First, the court justified the confusion the Wallace Brothers 
publicity would generate on the grounds that it was aimed primarily at 
children. “Newspaper advertisements are addressed particularly to 
children and stress that ‘The Lone Ranger’ is appearing in person. In all, 
the effect of the advertisement is to create the impression that the original 
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‘Lone Ranger’, made famous by the radio programs, is appearing with the 
circus - a result more easily achieved because the public interested s 
composed very largely of children.”149 Thus, the ruling sidestepped 
whether or not the products of these two companies were sufficiently 
competitive as to confuse the public at large, by arguing that Wallace 
Brothers had used deceptive practices on children, who were less likely to 
distinguish between different forms of entertainment. Once again, moral 
concern over the exploitation of children as a market was central, though 
this time within a legal setting that would shape business practices. 
Second, the court recognized King-Trendle’s position that the 
unlicensed representation of its property not only costed the company in 
terms of lost revenue, but also damaged the overall value of the Lone 
Ranger by concretizing and corporealizing his mysterious and enigmatic 
personality in the form of a real and ordinary person. “The inevitable 
effect of this infringement... is to destroy the element of mystery 
surrounding the character... and show him to be a very commonplace 
person in whom the young people have no further interest, once he has 
been seen.”150 Thus, the court both called attention to some of the very 
same anxieties King-Trendle experienced in their development of visual 
materials for the Green Hornet over how to best represent personality, 
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while also legitimating the licensor’s management practices, including its 
suppression of the real identities of their performers. Further along, the 
ruling even denied Powell’s claim to being the “real” on-screen Lone 
Ranger, by identifying him as merely a “moving picture actor who took 
the part of ‘The Lone Ranger.’”  
Even as Powell was denied his status as the real Lone Ranger, the 
ruling definitively marked the property as having real value to its owners.  
In stating, “Powell is not ‘The Lone Ranger’ at all,” the ruling opened up 
the question of who exactly was the Lone Ranger.151 The answer, given a 
page earlier, was that the Lone Ranger was the corporate entity that 
produced the radio series. “There can be no question, we think, but that 
‘The Lone Ranger’ should be considered as a trade name under which 
plaintiff’s radio programs are broadcast, and that defendants infringed 
plaintiff’s rights therein when they advertised Powell as the ‘Original 
Lone Ranger.’”152 The title belonged exclusively to The Lone Ranger, Inc. 
In recognizing a) the intersections of all media and merchandising bearing 
the Lone Ranger’s name as belonging to the same “entertainment” 
category, and b) in delineating the synchronicity between brand and 
corporate identities, the court of appeals ruling paved the way for both the 
shift from copyright to trademark incorporation that would take effect in 
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the 1950s, in which certain brands like Superman became actual corporate 
logos rather than just exploitable properties  The ruling also established 
the legal parameters for media conglomerations by ascribing their new 
integrated function in generating trans-mediated commercial intertexts.  
 
CONCLUSION  
The parallel growth of licensed brands and national radio networks 
in the late 1930s was mutually constitutive. NBC relied on pre-established 
programming to unify affiliates and attract national sponsors, while King-
Trendle saw opportunities to bypass and eliminate some of the 
management difficulties that came from selling his product market-by-
market. Yet, these early arrangements were often fraught with other 
unanticipated problems for licensors.  The national spotlight raised 
concerns over audience appropriateness, racial representations, genre 
comparisons, brand inspirations, and ownership justifications. The failures 
King-Trendle encountered in trying to replicate the Lone Ranger’s 
formula with the Green Hornet were exacerbated by the licensor’s 
attempts to develop the latter brand on a national scale without first 
building the local fan networks and salesmanship records, which were 
preconditions that made the Lone Ranger iconic before it became 
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nationally sponsored. Meanwhile, the Lone Ranger’s successful brand 
identity extended across media and merchandise and, more importantly, 
was marketed as separate from any of the items that bore its image 
brought unforeseen troubles for its licensor. Legal challenges to both 
King-Trendle’s authorial inspiration and control over the brand forced the 
company to prove how and why an intangible icon should be proprietarily 
owned.    
The success that King-Trendle had with The Lone Ranger property 
in the mid-1930s could not be duplicated in exploiting The Green Hornet 
at the end of the decade. In part, this discrepancy reflected changes in the 
relationships the licensor had with the national and regional broadcast 
networks and independent radio stations as it expanded its markets and 
tried to eliminate management inefficiencies by seeking a national sponsor 
for its property. In part, the differing popularities had to do with the overly 
close comparisons that King-Trendle drew between The Lone Ranger and 
The Green Hornet, which pointed out the shortcomings of the latter, 
particularly as a children’s program. 
Indecisions about how to sell The Green Hornet plagued King-
Trendle. The licensor oscillated between selling the series as children’s or 
adult fare, finally opting for a middle ground that failed to attract sponsors 
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for either. The licensor also went back-and-forth in its desire for a national 
sponsor, moving between Mutual and NBC four times within a two-year 
period. This would prove costly, as the stability of the radio market was 
essential to the licensor’s cross-promotional strategies with other media 
and merchandising outlets. This stability failed to materialize. These 
indecisions over audience and network were not separate concerns, but 
deeply intertwined, as NBC offered greater opportunities for national 
exposure and single sponsorship, but also was far more scrutinizing of and 
concerned about the negative publicity The Green Hornet would attract 
from concerned parents and other watchdog organizations. NBC’s 
trepidations played a part in the difficulties the series had finding a 
national sponsor as well as in further confusing how to sell the series to 
sponsors seeking particular audiences. 
The shifting audience for the series also raised questions over how 
best to represent the Green Hornet character in publicity and giveaways. 
Representation had always been an anxious endeavor for King-Trendle, 
who relied upon premiums and expanding into more visually-centered 
markets in order to increase its revenue, but also faced the challenge of 
representing its intangible, imaginary, and idealistic radio heroes in ways 
that would not disappoint, demystify, or otherwise decrease the popularity 
 
 259
of their properties. Radio properties had been built up on the power of 
their personalities, conveyed largely through vocal qualities that inspired 
imagination in listeners. Visibly rendering these personalities risked 
breaking that illusion. In the case of The Green Hornet and its ever-
changing audience appeal, this tension revolved around how to make the 
costumed crime-fighter appear realistic enough that the supposedly adult 
audience that listened to the series would not feel pandered to.  
Of course, questions of representation were culturally informed. 
While the character of Kato, the Green Hornet’s valet, merely repeated 
The Lone Ranger formula of giving the hero a racialized - and, thereby, 
inferior and subservient - companion, Kato’s Asianness would 
increasingly become a problem as Japan’s expansionist policies in the Far 
East brought the US and Japan closer to the brink of war. Efforts to first 
play down, and then switch, Kato’s national identity entirely, from 
Japanese to Filipino to Korean are indicative of how representation was 
informed by the cultural politics of the era. Yet, the unchanging servility 
and diminutiveness of the character, especially as his country of origin 
became increasingly interchangeable, is also revealing of how cultural 
stereotypes of Asian inferiority were re-inscribed, even as Japan asserted 
its military might. This, in turn, reveals just how central racial paradigms 
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were to The Green Hornet’s formula, necessitating their continuity even in 
the face changing national allegiances. The Japanese not only were 
constructed negatively as aggressive and untrustworthy, but also as “bad 
Asians” who refused to conform to the cultural expectations of qhite 
America. As such, Kato’s nationality switched to that of an Asian culture 
that the US felt more comfortable ascribing such stereotypes to. 
Finally, representation risked comparison and the accusation of 
imitation. The late 1930s also brought about the first real legal challenges 
that King-Trendle would face. Given the success of The Lone Ranger, it is 
perhaps not surprising that others would attempt to claim ownership over 
the character’s image. These battles were largely fought over questions of 
inspiration, imitation, and representation, with King-Trendle both 
defending itself against accusations that it had stolen the Lone Ranger’s 
characterization from actor Buck Jones and, in turn, accusing others of 
misleading the public by impersonating their character. In all, the legal 
strategies employed and the outcomes of these cases established precedent 
over the ownership of distinct personality types that exceeded and moved 
across various media and merchandising outlets. Once again, as with the 
selling of particular sponsors, it was the moral obligation of protecting 
children from the abuses of un-managed personalities that took center 
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stage. If representation of the Lone Ranger escaped King-Trendle’s 
control, the argument went, it might be used to exploit children, who 
would be easily duped by this unauthorized imitation, confusing it with the 
morally upstanding personality it licensed. In turn, this might cause unfair 
financial injury to King-Trendle, who had worked to build goodwill for 
the Lone Ranger by safeguarding against and managing the more 
questionable and threatening aspects of its personality. Thus, these legal 
battles successfully established the inter-textual management and moral 
arbitration practices that King-Trendle had used in extending the Lone 
Ranger brand as the parameters for both the licensor’s continued 
ownership and authorship over the property. With a firmer legal foot to 
stand on, King-Trendle would take both practices to new extremes in the 
postwar era to come. 
Yet, these legal decisions also provided the foundation for creating 
trans-mediated corporate trademark brands that did not require the same 
type independent stewardship and guardianship that licensors had sold as 
part of their authorial function. As the next chapter will elaborate, the 
same rulings that ensconced King-Trendle’s control over their brands also 
set in motion the conditions that would eventually lead to the company’s 
demise and the constriction of independent producer and licensor authority 
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Chapter Four: Introduction 
 Having expanded market-by-market, regional sponsor by regional 
sponsor, Safety Club by Safety Club throughout the 1930s, The Lone 
Ranger successfully landed a national sponsor, General Mills, in 1941. 
General Mills would employ the masked rider as its spokesperson for 
fifteen years (1941-1956), greatly contributing to the character’s 
expansion in the popular imagination. Moreover, King-Trendle’s 
successful legal defense of its ownership over the Lone Ranger brand in 
the late 1930s gave the licensor the security to merchandise the property to 
a greater extent than it had before.  George Trendle bought out his 
longtime silent partner, John King, in 1943. By decade’s end, Trendle’s 
long term associates H. Allen Campbell and Raymond Meurer would 
become his new partners, forming Trendle-Campbell-Meurer, Inc., (TCM) 
in 1950.1 Meurer, in particular, would become very active in promoting 
the Lone Ranger brand’s patriotic virtues. The post-World War II era 
(1946-1954) was the height of the Lone Ranger’s popularity among 
consumers and licensees alike.  
 By 1953, the twentieth anniversary of the radio series debut, The 
Lone Ranger was being heard over 221 radio stations on the ABC-Radio 
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network by an estimated audience of 12 million each week. The Lone 
Ranger comic strip appeared in 177 daily newspapers, including 28 
foreign newspapers and 119 Sunday newspapers, including 33 foreign 
newspapers - by far the most for any western hero. Comic strip readership 
was estimated at 71 million people per week. There were three separate 
Lone Ranger comic books in circulation: “The Lone Ranger,” “Tonto,” 
and “Hi Yo Silver,” combining for over 2,000,000 copies sold each 
month. There were also fifteen Lone Ranger novels available in 
bookstores. Decca Records had recorded eight original Lone Ranger 
adventures. These records were listed among the top fifteen best selling 
children’s records of the early 1950s. In 1953, TCM had 60 active 
merchandise licenses in effect. While this number was down from 1942's 
high of 81 licenses, the licensor actually had become more selective, 
issuing primarily exclusive contracts that brought higher royalties. In 
1950, merchandise licenses alone had brought TCM $2,500,000 in 
revenue.  The Lone Ranger Safety Club was still going strong in the early 
1950s with an estimated membership of 4,000,000 children, primarily in 
the Southeast, where American Bakeries sponsored the radio series in 
eight states. The Lone Ranger television series, which debuted September 
15, 1949 on ABC-TV and was sponsored by General Mills in forty states, 
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and by American Bakeries in eight others, had an estimated 5,000,000 
viewers by 1952. The radio and television series won a combined 19 
“Distinguished Service” Awards over their twenty year run. Additionally, 
throughout the early 1950s, the Lone Ranger made multiple public 
appearances at various circuses, charity events, and parades. Finally, to 
celebrate the Lone Ranger’s twentieth birthday, Michigan Senator Homer 
Ferguson honored the hero by entering into the Congressional record 
heartfelt thanks for all the public service work the brand had performed on 
behalf of children. The Lone Ranger’s ubiquity by 1953 caused one author 
to comment,  “The impression that had been accumulated by the twentieth 
anniversary of the Lone Ranger’s creation might reasonably have been 
that the ‘masked man of justice’ had become, as his creators put it, ‘an 
American institution.’”2 
 Significantly, though, the postwar era also provoked new anxieties 
for TCM over ownership and control of its property. As the Lone Ranger 
brand extended across media and merchandising outlets throughout the 
1940s and early 1950s, TCM experienced a series of significant transitions 
to its business model that lessened the licensor’s direct control over its 
brand. First, as media production for radio and film (and soon television) 
became increasingly centralized in Hollywood, TCM found its continued 
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location in Detroit an impediment to negotiating new media licenses. 
Since Trendle also owned radio station WXYZ, however, he was 
unwilling to relocate. Thus, the licensor began employing a Hollywood 
representative to seek out and negotiate deals and oversee productions on 
its behalf. The long-distance management that this required increased 
TCM’s efforts to codify how the Lone Ranger formula functioned. 
Second, as television eventually eclipsed radio as the central advertising 
medium for sponsors by the early 1950s, TCM’s direct involvement in 
Lone Ranger productions decreased significantly. The licensor still 
produced the radio series from its WXYZ studios in Detroit until 1955, but 
TCM subcontracted Jack Chertok and Apex Film Productions to produce 
the General Mills’ sponsored television series that launched in 1949 and 
ran until 1956. This further drove TCM to insist on continuity between 
radio and television productions when it came to following the Lone 
Ranger formula. Finally, as The Lone Ranger’s popularity grew, greater 
demands arose from sponsors and licensees for public appearances. As a 
radio property, TCM had been able to exercise tremendous control over 
the brand’s image through publicity and script approval. Public 
appearances purposely had been kept to a minimum to maximize the 
character’s mystery appeal. Now, however, new strategies would be 
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needed to promote, but also control, the Lone Ranger’s public persona. 
 In this chapter, I argue that TCM’s managerial concerns led it to 
embrace containment strategies that informed both their business 
operations and the cultural meanings the Lone Ranger character embodied 
during this period. These management concerns are significant precisely 
because it was during this period that the Lone Ranger reached the zenith 
of its popularity. The brand’s increasing financial success and iconic status 
went hand-in-hand with new cultural and economic anxieties for its 
owners This, in turn, led TCM to employ strategies designed to maintain 
control over the Lone Ranger brand, which included the rigid contractual 
enforcement of script approval for every Lone Ranger appearance, 
whether on television, comic books, or in person, as well as the 
codification of a series of Lone Ranger rules to be followed across all sites 
where the brand was deployed. Overall, TCM sought to maintain 
continuity between the various Lone Ranger iterations in circulation. 
 The type of sales agent that the Lone Ranger represented in 
postwar America was also very different than its Depression-era 
incarnation. As corporate and government interests began promoting an 
American identity that was inherently linked with consumerism, the Lone 
Ranger’s marketing shifted away from offsetting consumer impulses 
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through civic lessons to equating consumption with the American heritage. 
Thus, the property was not merely a sales agent for General Mills, but for 
Americanism in general, an Americanism expressed through and 
commensurate with consumption. While the Lone Ranger, as well as many 
other media personalities, had begun selling patriotism alongside 
sponsored products during WWII as part of their work with the Office of 
War Information (OWI), this practice reached new heights after the war. 
The Lone Ranger now taught children (and their parents) to trust fully in 
the corporate economy and to defend it against those who would question 
its validity or point out its shortcomings.   
 The Lone Ranger brand was also an important force for helping 
non-consuming youth (i.e., children who did not display adequately 
euphoric consumer values), deemed sickly, onto the right path. Difference 
became threatening in postwar America. While the decade of 1950s often 
is labeled the era of containment culture, it was riddled with unrest and 
tensions resulting from social demands for rigid conformity. The 
formulaic rigidity expressed through the Lone Ranger’s “Do’s and 
Don’ts” intersected with these anxieties over the need to contain 
difference. Not only did the Lone Ranger have an inalterable formula that 
resisted change, an intransigence justified by both its own proven twenty-
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year history of economic success and its embrace of centuries-old 
American values rooted in capitalism, but the formula also responded to 
industry concerns over threats of consumer boycotts and negative 
publicity generated by those seeking entry into the consumers’ republic.  
 In the postwar era, African Americans and other minorities began 
to be recognized as markets that had not yet been fully tapped.  In an 
environment increasingly cognizant of the African American consumer, 
the Lone Ranger’s long-term partnership with Tonto suddenly gained new 
significance. Though Tonto had existed since 1933 (though, as discussed 
in chapter 2, not from the very first Lone Ranger episode), it was only in 
the early 1950s that TCM began actively to stress the racial aspects of the 
character’s friendship with the Lone Ranger through its codified rules of 
conduct.  Though advocating tolerance, these rules often reinforced 
stereotypical and demeaning representations of difference that positioned 
Tonto specifically as subservient to the Lone Ranger, and minorities 
generally as outside the realm of American national identity. 
Contradictory strategies for managing race through the Lone Ranger 
formula were informed by the consumer ethos of the era, which sought to 
erase difference when it came to consumption, but also repeatedly re-
articulated racial hierarchies in other aspects of American life. Even as 
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these ideas circulated within the larger cultural landscape, they also were 
filtered through and addressed the needs of cultural producers and 
sponsors to recognize minority consumers without alienating established 
white fan bases.   
 While self-serving, the equation of Americanism with consumer 
choice and free market expansion was also in-line with the cultural 
attitudes licensors like TCM possessed. Through their successful branding 
practices, licensors embodied the populist myth of individual 
accomplishment, entrepreneurship, and faith in the market-driven 
economy that the new consumers’ republic now exalted. The Lone Ranger 
became a symbol for the corporate spirit that was now credited for having 
made America great. Still, the very exaltation of the American 
corporation, and its increased centralization in the postwar era, actually 
threatened the independence that licensors sought to maintain. As such, 
while publicity materials regularly called attention to the Lone Ranger’s 
embrace of capitalism and his salesmanship on behalf of American 
industries, they also repeatedly stressed the heroic actions and pioneering 
spirit of the licensing agents that owned the brand and managed its 
formula. 
 The postwar period is significant not only for the ways licensed 
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brands became American cultural icons concurrently with their conflation 
of corporate capitalism, conformity, consumption and patriotism, but also 
for how licensors embraced containment strategies as a means of 
maintaining their authority in the midst of changing institutions of cultures 
of production. The paradox of the Lone Ranger’s success is that it both 
relied upon TCM’s rigid inter-textual management practices and paved the 
way for the independent licensor’s obsolescence by the end of the 1950s.  
 After briefly elaborating upon the shifting social and media 
institutional climates during WWII and the postwar years, this chapter will 
explore how TCM’s brand management strategies responded to the 
transition to Hollywood and to the emergence and growing centrality of 
television. I will also expand upon TCM’s relationship with General Mills 
and illustrate how national sponsorship differed from the multiple regional 
partnerships TCM previously had cultivated in managing the Lone Ranger 
formula. I will also situate TCM’s containment strategies within 
institutional and cultural concerns about tapping minority and youth 
markets, as well as in relation to the licensors own declining sense of 




World War II 
 The US entrance into World War II in December 1941 put on hold 
the competing visions of consumer citizenship, between big business and 
big government that had dominated the Depression years. New energies 
were directed toward munitions manufacturing and other essential military 
needs. The US government also asked advertising agencies and 
manufacturers to help promote mobilization, war bond sales, rationing, 
and other public safety information through their advertising copy and 
sponsored radio programming. In exchange, ad agencies and their 
corporate clients received government manufacturing contracts, tax 
breaks, and public good will. Moreover, ad agencies were permitted to 
continue to operate commercially, whereas the work of auto and steel 
manufacturers was converted to war production.  
 In mobilizing Americans for the war effort, advertisers and 
government agencies concentrated on the tangible benefits society would 
reap from a decisive victory: a revitalized economy, gratification through 
consumer goods, modern creature comforts, and idyllic memories of 
simpler (and wealthier) times.3 As Cross argues, the answer to the 
rhetorical question, ”What are we fighting for?”  taken up by the Office of 
War Information in its mobilization campaigns, “was well summarized by 
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one ad: ‘For years we have fought for a higher standard of living, and now 
we are fighting to protect it against those who are jealous of our national 
accomplishments.’”4 
 Many radio personalities pitched patriotism alongside their 
sponsor’s products during WWII. Advertisers and their clients worked 
closely with the OWI to “sell” the war to the American public, in turn 
building goodwill for themselves (and enjoying heavy tax breaks). While 
never as publicly as advertising agencies, many licensors attempted to 
stress the educational value of trade characters, now directed toward 
national causes, in selling the war and appropriate modes of wartime 
citizenship, including self-sacrifice, conservation, and delayed 
gratification. Like their sponsors, licensors tried to position themselves as 
patriots first and profiteers second and moreover, to demonstrate how their 
properties promoted similar virtues.  “Who won social acceptance for our 
new-style doughboys? The USO, the Red Cross, the YMCA? No, Joe 
Palooka’s ma,” explained an article entitled “The Fighting Funnies.” “And 
who sold the kids of America on pitching in to help war-working mothers 
with the housework? Little Orphan Annie, that’s who. The minute Annie 
organized her Junior Commandos, millions of little nippers uttered hoarse 
cries and sprang to their brooms.”5 Trendle too took much pride in 
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extolling “that the Lone Ranger has become part of America is borne out 
by the fact that during the African campaign of World War II, the soldiers 
chose the expression, ‘Hi Yo Silver!’ as a battle cry. It seemed to inspire 
them to action in behalf of justice. It seemed to embody in three short 
words the whole American Heritage for which they were fighting.”6 
 As Hilmes argues, the “who we are and why we fight” campaign 
also opened up many sites of contradiction in US society. While the OWI 
argued for a united Americanism, minorities questioned why they should 
fight for freedoms abroad denied to them at home. The war years saw a 
greater degree of racial unrest than previously had been visible, with riots 
breaking out in cities with significant African-American and Latino 
populations.  The black press mediated these tensions by arguing for a 
double victory over the Nazis abroad and racial inequality at home. 
Though the armed services remained segregated during World War II, the 
rhetoric of postwar rewards tended to overlook these racial inequalities by 
guaranteeing a consumerist utopia for all.7  
 The economic turnaround generated by the war, and corporate 
success in selling patriotism through cautious consumption and delayed 
gratification, erased much of the consumer distrust that had shrouded 
businesses during the Depression. American corporations found 
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themselves key players in setting the postwar consumer agenda, this time 
on an unprecedented level. 8 Advertising agencies, public relations firms, 
licensors, and other cultural intermediaries also reinvented a central place 
for themselves as wholesalers of democracy. They began extolling the 
patriotic sensibilities of their clients and the important role that the 
advertising industry was playing in helping big business and government 
work together to win the war. A Time Magazine article from March 22, 
1943, argued that the number-one reason advertising copy had improved 
since the beginning of the war was that “advertisers, like other human 
beings, are inherently patriotic and sensible. Inevitably they saw the 
nation’s real needs - strong morale, capacity production, patriotic sacrifice 
- and began to shape their advertising to fit it”. The same article praises 
the formation of the Advertising Council, whose chief task is to “get 
advertisers to cooperate with the government.”9  
 Others argued that the Advertising Council’s greatest victory was 
in usurping the OWI as the central coordinating office for war promotion. 
In so doing, industry gained near exclusive bragging rights for their 
mobilization efforts, more so than even government or labor. “By a 
combination of brag and exclusive patriotism, the groundwork is laid for 
the sale of political and economic ideas. Industry is cheered and 
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celebrates, in its own language, its exit ‘out of the dog-house.’”10  Many 
articles pointed to the preparatory work done in war advertising for the 
anticipated postwar consumer spree, couching it in patriotic jingoism. 
“They have pointed up the abiding faith of people in better years ahead.”11 
 Perhaps the single greatest change that occurred in how licensors 
marketed characters during the war years was in the characters’ supposed 
inspirational ability to teach the American public “obedience, self-
discipline and good citizenship”12 on a national scale.  In following the 
trend toward advertising that promoted responsible consumption and 
delayed gratification, Lone Ranger public service campaigns shifted away 
from the promotion of individualistic acts of merit in pursuit of local 
safety needs (characterized by the Safety Club message) toward promoting 
a series of sweeping “American” beliefs intended to inspire actions that 
went beyond self-preservation (though were still rooted in the individual, 
not the state). Whereas the Lone Ranger taught a certain type of 
citizenship during the Depression, he simply embodied American virtue 
during World War II. For example, in 1943, hundreds of thousands of 
wallet-sized cards with “The Lone Ranger’s beliefs” printed on them were 
distributed to adolescents and young adults, many of whom were newly 
enlisted soldiers. Beginning with “I Believe...”, the confessional tone and 
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first-person address of the cards were far less preachy than the Safety Club 
booklets:  
I BELIEVE... 
- that to have a friend, a man must be one. 
- that all men are created equal and that everyone has 
within himself the power to help make this a better world. 
- that God put the firewood there - but every man must 
gather and light it himself 
- in being prepared physically, mentally and morally to 
fight when necessary, for that which is right. 
- that a man should make the most of what equipment he 
has. 
- that ‘this Government of the people, by the people, and 
for the people’ shall live always. 
- that men should live by the rule of what is best for the 
greatest number. 
- that sooner or later - somewhere - somehow - we must 
settle with the world and make payment for what we have 
taken. 
- that all things change but truth and that truth alone lives 
on forever. 
- in my Creator, my country, my fellow man. 13 
 
 While the Safety Clubs prescribed a concrete, if somewhat 
formulaic, set of actions for both sponsors and radio listeners to follow to 
be good citizens, the Lone Ranger’s WWII beliefs seem purposely devoid 
of easy answers. Tellingly, they are also devoid appeals to consume Lone 
Ranger products. With no direct product pitch to make, the Lone Ranger 
was particularly well suited to embrace a vision of Americanism that 
seemed “genuine,” while both TCM and General Mills came across as 
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enlightened businesses preaching responsible consumption. The brand 
could be used, however, to promote indirectly the corporate values of its 
sponsor. As such, the sweeping language repeatedly pointed toward 
continuity, not change, and reassured Americans that current sacrifices 
were not indicative of long-term disruptions, but were temporary 
interruptions of long held traditions that the Lone Ranger believed in. This 
gesture toward a brighter future that extended naturally out of an 
unchanging past,  which would be realized once again through 
momentarily sacrificing individualistic pleasures for a greater cause, 
complimented other advertising efforts that prepared Americans for the 
postwar consumers’ republic. These rhetorical strategies also guaranteed 
corporations and their emissaries, like the Lone Ranger, a leading role in 
determining how postwar America would define itself.14 
 
The Post-War Consumers’ Republic 
 In the postwar era, consumption was not only a reward for years of 
economic hardship, sacrifice and bloodshed, it was inherently patriotic. As 
Lizabeth Cohen argues, “Mass consumption did not only deliver 
wonderful things for purchase... it also dictated the most central 
dimensions of postwar society, including the political economy (the way 
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public policy and the mass consumption economy mutually reinforced 
each other), as well as the political culture (how political practice and 
American values, attitudes, and behaviors tied to mass consumption 
became intertwined).”15  
 In the postwar consumers’ republic, economic growth and 
democratic freedom became synonymous. In a 1956 speech, President 
Eisenhower advocated the potential for “peoples’ capitalism” to erase 
class lines. Key debates in the political arena no longer questioned the 
distribution of wealth and the influence of big business, but instead 
centered on determining which policies would bring about greater 
purchasing power. The Advertising Council, which formed at a 1944 Hot 
Springs Convention and eventually usurped the OWI as coordinator of 
wartime advertising, continued to push big business to adopt a “corporate 
idiom of public service” that transformed advertising agencies and their 
clients from greedy industrialists into patriotic citizens.16 The consumers’ 
republic that the Lone Ranger championed would be built on promoting 
new consumer goods as rooted in an American Heritage of free enterprise, 
opportunity, and conflation of citizenship and consumption. Whereas the 
Lone Ranger Safety Club had offset the commercial appeal of the 
character, redeeming corporate greed by offering a sort of side project that 
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showed that corporations still cared, the postwar configuration of the Lone 
Ranger brand made very little distinction between commercial intentions 
and acts of civic virtue.  
 The corporation became the public face of postwar society, 
offering liberal concessions, such as health and retirement benefits to their 
employees, in exchange for their unquestioning cooperation in building 
the postwar economy.17  In so doing, political and social concerns and 
anti-consumerist efforts effectively were marginalized amidst  “a 
proliferation of creature comforts nestled in nurturant settings of 
domesticity and small-town community,” while corporate interests were 
interpreted as mere neutral agents of progress and democracy.18 Efforts to 
challenge the corporate system were met with accusations of treason, as 
the consumers’ republic became synonymous with the American Heritage 
and Way of Life and, during the Cold War, stood in opposition to “the 
material deprivations of Communism.”19 The groups that continued to be 
marginalized in the postwar economy felt these accusations most readily: 
peoples of color, labor organizers, and women. At the same time, a 1944 
Supreme Court decision overturned the white-only primary laws in the 
South and the black vote became increasingly important to northern 
Democrats was matched only by a growing recognition of minority 
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consumers as an untapped market. Early civil rights boycott campaigns 
linked this consumer power to demands for economic, political, and 
representational change.20  
 Douglas Holt reminds us that cultural brands succeed by 
addressing social anxieties and supplying populist resolutions to them.21 
Russo argues that resolving fears over and appropriating the power of the 
yellow peril was an integral part of the Green Hornet’s formula. 22 In the 
postwar, the Lone Ranger formula similarly asserted its racial dimensions, 
placing the hero’s friendship with Tonto front-and-center in its efforts to 
address minorities as consumers and simultaneously to quell industry 
concerns over minorities who exercised their new consumer status by 
boycotting sponsored products.  
 The era also saw many accusations of Communist infiltration of 
the cultural industries, which had long been perceived as a bastion of 
socialist sympathizers. Mere mention of one’s name in anti-Communist 
publications such as Red Channels could (and did) spell the end of one’s 
career in entertainment.23 Many cultural producers responded by 
vigorously promoting their corporate loyalties and American patriotism. 
 The spread of Communism abroad became equated with fears of 
social unrest at home. Any group perceived to question or threaten the 
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status quo was under suspicion. Containment culture often involved 
asserting a moralistic condemnation of anything that fell outside the 
“norm” of white, suburban, middle-class values, that stressed the virtues 
of conformity, the nuclear family, and consumption as inherently 
American. Aside from minorities, women who wished to continue 
working and questioned their required return to the home came under 
scrutiny.  
 As did the emergent youth-culture, whose rebelliousness inspired 
fear that American children were suffering from lethargy and other 
psychological ailments that impeded their ability to become ideal 
consumers. These anxieties went hand-in-hand with an increased 
recognition of this demographic as an important consumer-base.  
Containment logic also contained the seeds of its own unraveling, as the 
over-determined efforts to defend these norms repeatedly hinted that there 
were many who did not share these beliefs.24 As such, the Lone Ranger 
formula often foregrounded the hero’s near miraculous ability to cure sick 
children and transform them into “healthy” consumers. Yet, that the 
existence of sickly children in need of curing was built into promoting the 
Lone Ranger brand also revealed the failures of containment to preserve a 




 The postwar period was also one of major change within the media 
industries. Beginning before World War II, but reaching its height in the 
1948 Paramount Decree, Hollywood film studios found themselves at the 
center of anti-trust scandals that eventually would force the major studios 
to divest themselves of film exhibition outlets. Selling off their theaters 
caused a ripple effect throughout the industry, as the B-films that sustained 
a steady exhibition schedule were no longer necessary. As B-film 
production declined, so too did collaborations between newspaper and 
radio properties and Hollywood, since these brands were exploited 
primarily through film serials and shorts targeting children. As the studios 
shifted toward producing blockbuster prestige pictures, many B-producers 
became independents, carving out niches for themselves in low-grade 
exploitation films, corporate-sponsored documentaries and public 
relations/ public service work, and telefilm production.25 These changes to 
the established Hollywood mode of production necessitated new strategies 
on the part of  licensors like TCM, who could no longer rely on studios 
like Republic or Universal to call on them. While TCM never relocated to 
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Hollywood, the licensor did maintain a more proactive presence there 
from the early 1940s onwards.   
 Print media also found itself at a crossroads. Newspaper readership 
was at its height after World War II as were comic book sales. In 1943, 
comic book sales were at 18 million issues monthly, with sales 
constituting one third of all magazine revenue, at $72 million. Comic 
books were particularly popular amongst soldiers and, to cater to this 
increasingly adult audience, comic books began to embrace more mature 
genres, such as crime and horror, instead of superhero adventures. The 
increased violence and sex in comic books was, in turn, seen as 
contributing to the corruption of American youth and the outbreak of 
juvenile delinquency. Those making accusations often misinterpreted the 
changing audience for comic books, continuing to define moral panics in 
terms of protecting children. In 1951 and 1954, Congressional hearings 
were conducted into the influence of violent media on children, with 
comic books front and center in the debates.26 These accusations, 
however, were also made against the film, radio, and nascent television 
industries. The different regulatory responses that these industries would 
adopt would wreck havoc with licensor efforts to address a uniform 
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audience across different media. This will be taken up further in the next 
chapter. 
 After the war, radio audiences radically declined, dropping from 
4.4 hours of listening per day in 1948 to 2.2 hours in 1956. This decline 
correlated with the increased investment by networks in television during 
these years. These transition years saw many of radio’s most popular 
programs simulcast on both radio and television, while their sponsors and 
advertising-agencies made similar leaps. The Lone Ranger was never 
simulcast, but the radio and television series did coexist. TCM spent much 
of these early years trying to coordinate the Lone Ranger formula across 
both media (more below). While this doubling (radio and television) 
strategy sustained network investments by lessening risks, it eventually led 
to the elimination of radio programming entirely, replaced by musical 
formats and disk jockeys by the mid-1950s.27 The decline of fictional 
radio programming further distanced TCM from exercising direct control 
over either the Lone Ranger or Green Hornet brands. While the licensor 
previously had produced the radio versions for these brands, it would sub-
license television production rights to Hollywood independent telefilm 
producers. 
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 The Federal Communications Commission also played an 
important role in determining the shape television would take. At first, the 
radio networks and Hollywood film studios both saw themselves taking 
over television. The studios had invested heavily in television operations 
throughout the 1940s, seeing the new medium as either an alternative 
theater-going experience that would compliment filmed productions or as 
pay-per-view home viewing alternative to going to the movie theater. The 
Paramount decree enabled the FCC to force the studios to sell off their 
established TV interests, while the FCC’s 1948-1952 freeze on new 
station license allocations allowed the pre-established network TV 
operations to take shape without further interference from the studios. 
These decisions led to an early rift between the studios and networks, 
opening up spaces for independent producers to create the earliest filmed 
television series. The studios and networks would reconcile by the end of 
the 1950s, as the studios transformed their B-lots into television studios. 
The ABC network would be a leader in turning to the studios for product, 
as it was a leader in telefilm productions during the early phases of 
television.28  
 Created in 1943 when the FCC forced NBC to sell off its Blue 
network, ABC (the Blue network sold to Edward Noble) regularly lagged 
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behind the other networks in ratings and total station affiliates, forcing it 
to find alternatives to the prestigious live anthology drama model that 
NBC and CBS used. 29 During this early phase, ABC-TV was more 
inclined than the other networks to air filmed genre series that were shot in 
Hollywood and featured pre-sold properties. Thus, ABC would prove to 
be a natural site The Lone Ranger to debut. 
 
GOING TO HOLLYWOOD 
 Michele Hilmes has identified the period between 1928-1938 as 
one that produced a symbiotic relationship between Hollywood studios 
and network radio.30 By 1938, most prime time radio programming was 
being produced in Hollywood and broadcast coast-to-coast via telephone 
line at reduced rates. The first two chapters of this project attest to the 
roles licensors like King-Trendle played in intertwining these two media 
production sites. Although these relationships would continue throughout 
and after the Second World War, most especially through joint-
coordinated efforts with the OWI, Hilmes suggests that the radio and 
motion picture industries began experiencing renewed conflict around 
1938, as both took a serious and competing interest in broadcast 
television.31 The renewed conflict between the radio networks and the film 
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studios over television were exacerbated by the 1948 Paramount decree, 
which forced the Hollywood majors to divest themselves of their 
exhibition arms. The Paramount decree was anticipated for some time 
prior to actually coming into being and had an impact on the entire mode 
of production throughout the 1940s, as did World War II. Both factors 
shifted the emphasis studios placed on B-film productions, which included 
film serials, a prime site for pre-sold brand adaptations. Amidst these 
changes, TCM found it increasingly necessary to have a presence in 
Hollywood that could monitor and negotiate Lone Ranger productions. 
Since the licensor was unwilling to relocate from Detroit, negotiations 
were either conducted long-distance or via an intermediary. In both 
instances, the degree of direct control TCM was able exercise over the 
Lone Ranger formula was diminished greatly .  
 Whereas increasingly more radio programming was being 
produced in Hollywood and fed via telephone lines across the country 
throughout the 1930s, King-Trendle’s Lone Ranger continued to be 
written and performed from the WXYZ studios in Detroit. Trendle had 
negotiated motion picture serial deals with Republic and Universal 
Pictures for the Lone Ranger and Green Hornet brands respectively, but 
according to testimony he would give at the Buck Jones versus Republic 
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trial, these negotiations were conducted largely over the telephone, with a 
studio representative making the trip to Detroit to sign the actual 
contracts.32 Though Fran Striker had consulted on the first Lone Ranger 
serial, this had involved only a two-week trip to Los Angeles. The other 
serials were apparently given only cursory oversight from a far. 
 By 1940, however, Trendle could no longer afford to wait for 
Hollywood to call on him, nor could he continue to trust in the film 
studios’ careful and dutiful oversight of his properties. The Justice 
Department’s clamping down on the studios’ monopolistic practices 
brought with it much uncertainty, especially amongst the smaller studios 
that supplied serials (many of whom also shifted production strategies 
during World War II, producing more news reel shorts than serials), 
cutting into the viable production streams Trendle had previously relied 
on. Moreover, following all the legal troubles the Lone Ranger had 
encountered that partially seemed to be linked to the Republic serials, 
TCM decided that it needed to have a full-time advocate in Hollywood to 
negotiate and ensure their properties’ protection. For a company based out 
of Detroit, Michigan, this shift required the employment of various 
intermediary agents to promote and monitor the ways its properties were 
being exploited. 
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 The person Trendle turned to was Freddie Fralick, a talent manager 
located in Beverly Hills, whom he had known from back in the early days 
of his theater management work for the United Detroit Theaters. Fralick’s 
initial job was to procure a film deal for the Lone Ranger, a task he was 
neither well trained to accomplish nor financially prudent about. As a 
talent manager, Fralick failed to understand the nuances between TCM 
getting 10 percent of a film’s net profits versus its gross receipts for its 
license. On December 23, 1940, Fralick wrote to Trendle of an impending 
deal he had Ed Gross, an independent producer, for six Lone Ranger 
pictures that would cost $80,000 each and would be distributed over the 
course of a single year through a major studio.33 More impressively, Gross 
had agreed to finance the films 100 percent while guaranteeing Fralick full 
jurisdiction over the production, cast ,and director.34 Gross even agreed to 
pay TCM a $10,000 advance per picture.35  
 Trendle’s concerns arose from Gross’ stipulation that he would pay 
the licensor 10 percent of the net profits of the films. While Fralick was 
enthusiastic, Trendle explained that his previous deals had given him 10 
percent of the gross box office receipts, which did not yet incorporate 
overhead deductions, such as distribution and promotional expenses.36 
Fralick went back to Gross and reported that the producer was willing to 
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give Trendle 10 percent of his gross returns.37 Trendle once again 
explained to Fralick the difference between gross returns and gross 
receipts, pointing out that if 35 percent of the gross receipts were paid in 
distribution fees and only then was the licensor’s commission factored in, 
the company’s profits would be significantly reduced.38 Trendle tried to 
temper Fralick’s exuberance, letting him know that he was being “a little 
bit optimistic about contracts” and explaining that while he too was 
anxious to make a deal, it would have to be a fair one.39  
 While it is certainly arguable that Fralick’s understanding of the 
profit margins for film productions were limited by his lack of experience 
in this area, it is also likely that Fralick’s anxiousness to make a deal had 
to do with his getting paid. Fralick was not a salaried employee, but 
instead was promised 5 percent of whatever arrangement he might broker 
between TCM and a Hollywood producer.40 As such, while Fralick’s 
presence in Hollywood offered Trendle added insurance that the licensor 
would have full “jurisdiction over the product, inasmuch as I am here 
where the pictures are going to be made,”41 his incentive for securing the 
fairest deal was tempered somewhat by the immediacy with which he 
wanted to reap the rewards of his efforts. 
 300
 Profit margins were not Trendle’s only concerns when it came to 
making a motion picture deal. He expressed great concern over the quality 
of film that would be produced for only $75,000, telling Fralick that “the 
Lone Ranger is such a darn big thing that I want to be doubly careful that 
we don’t cheapen it by putting out motion pictures that are not high-grade 
in every respect.”42 In this manner, the licensor equated quality with the 
amount of money put into a film’s production budget, not necessarily its 
content. At the same time, Trendle seemed to oscillate between his 
enthusiasm for a feature film or a film serial. While the latter were 
distinctly lesser-quality productions in terms of their budgets, the thirteen 
consecutive weeks that these films ran were “a lot better for the radio 
program than four, third-grade features, running once every three 
months.”43 As such, it is perhaps not surprising that when the deal with 
Gross fell through. 
 Trendle also saw a Lone Ranger feature film as a sign of prestige, a 
position he would come to fully embrace by 1950, despite continued 
difficulties in making this happen. “I am not keen on a serial, as I 
explained to you I thought it would lower the reputation of the Lone 
Ranger. None of the top Western stars continue to make serials after they 
make good. They go from serials to features and a drop from a feature into 
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serials, does not sound very sensible to me. At the same time we do have 
to get a picture somehow.”44 Trendle saw various licenses working 
interdependently to promote one another. The emphasis he placed on 
producing a “quality” film, whether referring to budget or length, hints at 
his belief that audiences viewed these texts relationally, not as separate 
entities, and that a poor quality film could negatively impact the radio 
program.  
 Trendle’s interest in producing a Lone Ranger feature film was 
also likely in response to Hollywood’s own renewed interest in A-list 
westerns. In 1938, A-list westerns comprised only 1.1 percent of studio 
productions, and only 6.9 percent of all westerns produced. The majority 
were B-films, serials, and short subject films. By 1940, the percentage of 
A-list westerns produced had more tripled to 3.5 percent, while the overall 
number of westerns had declined to the point where A-list westerns 
comprised 21.7 percent of all films produced in that genre.45 While this 
trend would come to a halt during the Second World War and B-class 
westerns would continue to account for 15 percent of all Hollywood 
productions in the prewar period,46 these shifts would have been felt quite 
acutely by licensors seeking to hitch their brands to the latest fad. 
Moreover, the A-list western might have appealed to Trendle as 
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complimenting the Lone Ranger brand’s recent acquisition of a national 
radio sponsor in General Mills in 1941.  
 Trendle next turned to an independent producer with a reputation 
for creating “spectacular” films, David O. Selznick. Selznick was perhaps 
Hollywood’s premiere independent producer, whose blockbuster films 
Gone with the Wind (1939) and Rebecca (1939) both demonstrated an eye 
for pre-sold properties. Moreover, Selznick was no novice when it came to 
adapting branded properties. He had produced two Little Orphan Annie 
films in the mid-1930s for Paramount. The film producer was also 
rumored to be interested in making an epic western. The Lone Ranger’s 
established reputation and TCM’s independent status made for an 
encouraging possible collaboration. In 1943, Trendle sent Raymond 
Meurer out to Hollywood to negotiate with Selznick.  At first, Selznick 
saw the opportunity to create a star-studded motion picture extravaganza, 
starring Hollywood icon Gary Cooper as the Lone Ranger and giving the 
film his patented quality touch. However, the deal quickly fell apart when 
Selznick became concerned that the property had already been over-
merchandised through the multitude of licensing arrangements TCM had 
in place. Selznick went in a different direction for his epic western, 
shooting Duel in the Sun in 1946. 
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 Trendle would encounter this problem throughout the 1940s and 
early 1950s. As the Hollywood studios reinvented the western genre in the 
postwar years as high-budget spectacles of Americana, the Lone Ranger’s 
commercial success actually worked against its inclusion. In 1947, 14 A-
list westerns were produced. In 1956, the number had more than tripled to 
46.47 These films, however, both stressed adult themes and made claims to 
being more “authentic” than previous B-films by recounting the stories of 
real cowboy heroes.48 The Lone Ranger brand was designed to generate 
merchandising licenses by appealing to children through fairly simple 
morality tales of good and evil and, as such, was not a particularly good fit 
for this new prestige western model. 
 Reluctantly, Trendle turned toward another uncertain site of 
production, television. While Trendle held out hope that these new 
televised films could be assembled together and transformed into motion 
picture features (for this reason, the initial episodes of the television series 
would be serialized, which was a drastic change from the radio production 
formula of self-contained episodic adventures), he soon ran into the 
emerging turf conflict between the studios and the networks that would 
make such an arrangement nearly impossible.49 As Jack Chertok, president 
of the Apex Film Corporation and producer of The Lone Ranger TV 
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series, would explain to Trendle in 1950, “our original idea was to take an 
episode or episodes from the programs and add to this so as to have 
additional footage to round out a feature film... but now, inasmuch as no 
studio will allow us to use one foot of film shot specifically for television 
purposes, we would have to make a completely new story.”50 With 
television, at least, the licensor would be working within a familiar 
financing terrain, having the sponsor, General Mills, pay the costs of 
production and promotion, just as it did on radio. 
 
GENERAL MILLS  
 General Mills’ significance in extending the Lone Ranger’s reach 
between 1941-1956 cannot be understated. Not only did the corporation 
sponsor both the radio and television series, but the brand also adorned 
hundreds of General Mills’ premiums, advertisements, and cereal boxes. 
More than these tangible promotional sites, however, General Mills 
brought decades of experience to the table in using radio as a propaganda 
tool for teaching American consumers about corporate values. While 
King-Trendle’s successful exploitation of the Lone Ranger in the 1930s 
along similar pro-corporate lines made the brand appealing to General 
Mills, the sponsor’s deep pockets ensured that the Lone Ranger’s 
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philosophical perspective further would intensify. While TCM sought to 
appease its primary sponsor, it was also wary of the amount of control 
General Mills could wield over the Lone Ranger brand. As such, the 
management strategies the licensor employed throughout this period often 
were intended to promote its own role in policing the Lone Ranger 
formula. 
 In Cerealizing America, Scott Bruce and Bill Crawford argue that 
unlike some of the earlier breakfast cereal companies that had initially 
emerged out of religious and health crazes of the nineteenth century, 
General Mills was created as a corporate entity from the very beginning.51  
Originally called the Washburn Crosby Company in 1924 and renamed 
General Mills in 1928, the company was founded by James Ford Bell and 
managed by Donald Davis. Davis also had a penchant for radio, investing 
in a Minneapolis based radio station, WCCO, named after Washburn 
Crosby, in 1924.52  Under his guidance, General Mills would become one 
of the pioneering radio sponsor , credited with creating the first singing 
commercial, for Wheaties, first sung by the company’s sponsored quartet, 
The Wheaties Quartet, on Christmas Eve 1926.53  
 Davis believed that radio was not only a significant advertising 
medium, but also had an important role to play in “molding public 
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opinion.” During the Depression, Davis would take to the air on WCCO 
under the fictitious guise of Si Perkins, a “common man” commentator, to 
rail against FDR’s New Deal politics.54 He advocated for private industry 
to sponsor news programming.55 He also was one of the earliest supporters 
of using fictional entertainment programming with educational value, 
offering indirect lessons on civic virtue tied to consumerism. 
Programming such as The American Family Robinson offered the public 
entertaining expressions of corporate social leadership.56  
 While Davis championed radio as a promotional medium for both 
merchandise and politics, many of his ideas, including The Wheaties 
Quartet, actually were failures.57 Samuel Chester Gale, head of the 
company’s advertising division, however, often tweaked Davis’ vision in 
order to make General Mills’ radio efforts successful.58 It was Gale, for 
instance, who suggested that the company expand the Wheaties Quartet’s 
audience by buying time on the newly formed Columbia Broadcasting 
Network in 1929, rather than simply canceling the locally broadcast 
show.59 Wheaties sales tripled in its first year of national advertising and 
quadrupled during the second.60 General Mills followed up on the national 
success of the now renamed Gold Medal Fast Freight Quartet by turning to 
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Frank Hummert at the Blackett, Sample & Hummert Advertising Agency 
to create a daytime drama for them, Betty and Bob. 
 As the Depression set in, General Mills quickly adjusted its selling 
strategies, targeting children directly. Once again, it turned to Hummert, 
who had been instrumental in adapting Little Orphan Annie to radio for 
Ovaltine. Hummert’s children’s adventure series creation, Skippy, debuted 
on August 3, 1931. It quickly ran into problems. Black and Crawford cite 
the unfortunate timing of a kidnapping plot on the series that coincided 
with the real-life abduction of the Lindbergh baby as leading to an 
unprecedented number of complaints by outraged parents who accused the 
show of trying to profit from the Lindbergh’s misfortune.  In reality, 
however, the show regularly was under fire from NBC’s Standards and 
Practices division for its perceived negative over-stimulation of children’s 
emotions.61  The show was cancelled in 1932, and replaced by Jack 
Armstrong, the All-American Boy, a year later. Jack Armstrong proved 
immensely popular amongst children, millions of whom wrote in regularly 
for premiums,62 but the series also was readily scrutinized for its 
exploitative practices, such as asking children to buy Wheaties so that Jack 
could raise money for his mother’s operation. 
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 General Mills was not the only cereal company using radio to 
target children in the 1930s. The Hot Ralston account was managed by the 
Gardner Agency, who sent advertisers into local St. Louis schools to ask 
children who their favorite heroes were with the intention of fastening a 
radio series based on their findings. The results pointed to Tom Mix, 
cowboy hero of many silent film serials (and, incidentally, one of the 
people that Trendle was willing to admit inspired the Lone Ranger). 
Ralston bought the rights to use Mix’s name in 1933 and the radio series 
debuted without him.63 Other cereal companies soon copied Ralston’s 
success with Mix. Bobby Benson pitched for H-O Oats, Gene Autry for 
Quaker, rancher turned Comanche warrior Straight Arrow for Nabisco 
Shredded Wheat, and even Buck Jones appeared in the radio series, Hoof 
Beats, sponsored by Grape Nuts. The combination of General Mills’ 
marketing strategies aimed at children, increased scrutiny from the 
networks directed against adventure series such as Skippy and Jack 
Armstrong, and the cereal industry’s habit of cannibalizing on one 
another’s successes combined to lead General Mills to enter into a national 
sponsorship deal with TCM in 1941 for The Lone Ranger. Additionally, 
by the end of the 1930s, the Lone Ranger had proven his ability to sell 
“The American Way” through his Safety Clubs and other merchandising 
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efforts, which taught important civic and character values to children even 
as it mobilized them as a sales force. 
 The first contract signed between TCM, General Mills, and 
Blackett-Sample-Hummert on March 3, 1941, gave the sponsor full rights 
to merchandise the series in 37 US states.  The American Bakeries 
Company, makers of Merita Bread, and their advertising agency, Tucker 
Wayne & Company, Inc., sponsored the radio series in eight Southeast 
states and continued to do so through the mid-1950s.64 California, 
Washington state, and Oregon were promised to General Mills as these 
states became available for sponsorship.65 TCM was bound contractually 
not to license the series to any other flour or breakfast cereals sponsor.66  
 The first General Mills sponsored broadcast commenced May 5, 
1941. The contract stipulated that TCM would produce three live half-
hour Lone Ranger broadcasts, Mondays, Wednesdays, Fridays, between 
7:30-8:00 PM, as well as up to two live repeat broadcasts for stations 
under contract by the sponsor unable to air the show during that time 
slot.67 TCM furnished all scripts and was solely responsible for the cast, 
sound effects, music, and all other aspects of the production except the 
commercial announcements and the broadcasting facilities. TCM was 
required, however, to supply advanced synopses of every episode to BSH 
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for approval.68  In exchange, BSH agreed to pay TCM $3000 per week 
($144,000/ year) for the series during the first year of the contract, and 
$4100 per week ($196,800/ year) during the second year, if the sponsor 
chose to renew.69 While General Mills would renew its contract for five-
years in 1942, it did so only after TCM agreed to defer the raise in price 
until May 30, 1944.70 In May, 1947, General Mills signed a seven-year 
extension through May 31, 1953 at a rate of $6607.11/week 
($343,569.72/year) in addition to a $20 bonus for every tenth of a 
Hooper’s rating point The Lone Ranger exceeded the set standard of 
12.9.71 
 During the first year of the contract, it was agreed that the series 
would remain on the Mutual Broadcasting System (MBS), so long as the 
sponsor had the right to broadcast The Lone Ranger on unaffiliated 
stations that did not conflict with MBS. This was necessary because 
Mutual’s reach was not fully national. After the first year, BSH had the 
right to move the series to another network, with the exception that the 
series would always be heard on Trendle’s own WXYZ in Detroit, 
regardless of that station’s affiliation.72 BSH transferred the series to the 
NBC Blue network one year to the day after the initial contract was 
signed. The series would remain on NBC Blue until 1946. Afterwards, The 
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Lone Ranger was broadcast on the ABC network.73 ABC was also the 
network that first aired The Lone Ranger television series. 
 
LONE RANGER TELEVISION 
 Though Trendle repeatedly expressed uncertainty about the 
viability of television, his property made the leap, as many radio 
properties initially did, because of the networks and sponsors vested 
interest in the medium. Achieving its greatest popularity on TV during 
what is known as “the freeze,” when the allocation of television licenses 
temporarily was suspended by the FCC, The Lone Ranger TV series 
gained considerable cultural attention in part because there were few 
viewing alternatives. Yet, the series’ presence on network television also 
placed it at odds with motion picture studio plans for the medium, 
complicating TCM’s initial plan to spin serialized episodes of the TV 
series into motion picture feature releases and vice-versa. 
 General Mills agreed to pay $10,000 per episode toward the 
production costs of The Lone Ranger television series and an additional 
$2000/week to the Lone Ranger Inc.74 Barbara Moore suggests that the 
average cost per telefilm episode in 1949 was $12,400.75  The General 
Mills agreement put TCM in charge of money transfers to the series 
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producer and gave the licensor absolute and final script approval. The 
parties mutually agreed to let Jack Chertok at The Apex Film Corporation 
produce the series.  
 Chertok had a previous relationship with both General Mills and 
the NAM, having filmed the former’s 1946 annual report, called 
Operation ‘46 and directed the latter’s The Price of Freedom (1949), a 
fictional film designed to promote postwar industry and warn against 
complacency in political life.76 It was not uncommon for corporations to 
turn to Hollywood in the postwar era to create film’s that would get the 
pro-business, pro-consumer message across through fictional 
entertainment.77 Corporate entities and their public relations arms found 
receptive producers and studios to take on these projects, in no small part 
due to the gradual demise of the B-film units that had kept so many of 
them employed during the 1930s and early 1940s.   
 Like many independent producers in postwar Hollywood who had 
to adjust to the new economics of the industry as it faced divestiture, 
Chertok looked to telefilm productions as a golden opportunity to make 
his name and fortune.78 Apex joined a long list of small, independent 
production companies that flooded the telefilm market from the mid-1940s 
on. In general, independent telefilm producers made their money by 
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shooting a series cheaply and syndicating it to locally-owned and operated 
stations.79 
  Chertok’s profits came from the overhead he collected on each 
$10,000 episode he produced, with the added possibility of earning extra 
income by bringing episodes in under budget. Trendle’s concerns over 
managing his property in general, and the production quality of telefilm in 
particular, meant that he would regularly insist upon changes and re-
shoots that ate into Chertok’s profits.80 Trendle also was insistent that his 
representative in Hollywood, Fralick, check expenses and monitor the 
production process, at a salary of $200/week to be paid out of monies 
allotted by General Mills for the Apex productions.81 Trendle and Chertok 
would butt heads on several occasions over expense irregularities.82 
Nevertheless, their arrangement would remain in place for five years, with 
monies made available to Apex to produce each episode rising to $16,800 
by 1952.83 Chertok also earned extra income by shooting General Mills’ 
commercial interludes, which had been negotiated under separate 
contract.84 While General Mills could advertise their products through the 
series, it was contractually forbidden for them to have the Lone Ranger (or 
any other character) directly endorse any particular product.85 This often 
led to commercials in which actors Clayton Moore and Jay Silverheels 
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(the television Lone Ranger and Tonto respectively) appeared in costume, 
interacted with General Mills products like Wheaties cereal, but never 
directly encouraged children to buy these items. Eating Wheaties simply 
became part of the Lone Ranger mythos, rather than a product the brand 
endorsed.  
 The Lone Ranger television series debuted on September 15, 1949. 
It ran for eight seasons and 180 episodes, until September 12, 1957. 
Throughout most of its run, the series was scheduled on ABC from 7:30-
8:00PM on Thursday evenings, often programmed against the nightly 
news on both CBS and NBC. By 1953, the series was broadcast on 90 
stations coast-to-coast. The Lone Ranger was the biggest hit ABC-TV had 
in its early years, averaging five million viewers per week. It was the only 
ABC show to make it into the top 15 in 1950-51, the year Nielsen started 
calculating national television ratings. The Lone Ranger finished 7th 
overall with a 41.2 rating. While its ratings would decline every year after 
that, finishing 18th in 1951-52 and 28th in 1952-53, The Lone Ranger 
remained the only ABC series to crack Nielsen’s top 30 shows. It also was 
the highest nationally rated western TV series during those initial years, 
outperforming both Hopalong Cassidy and The Roy Rogers Show.86 
  
 315
 Many remember the series as appearing on multiple channels at 
varying points in the day, encouraging the assumption that The Lone 
Ranger was sold primarily as a first-run syndication series to local stations 
to fill non-prime-time hours; this is simply not the case. William Boddy 
identifies 1952-1956 as the Golden Era of first-run syndication. Indeed, 
many early radio adaptations to television (Ziv’s The Cisco Kid, Mr. 
District Attorney, and Boston Blackie and Louis Snader Productions Dick 
Tracy among many others) as well as re-edited B-westerns (starring the 
likes of  Lash Larue, Gabby Hayes, Gene Autry, and Duncan Renaldo) 
were sold directly to local markets or nationally syndicated during this 
period. The Lone Ranger production differed from these series because it 
was nationally sponsored on the ABC-TV network from the very 
beginning. The February 1, 1949 contract signed between TCM and 
General Mills did stipulate, however, that in cities yet without an ABC 
affiliate due to the FCC freeze, General Mills was permitted to contract 
with any station available in that territory. Since ABC-TV only had 18 
affiliate stations during this period, General Mills likely made multiple 
deals with other stations. Barbara Moore has surmised that these types of 
fuzzy network/program affiliations were common during television’s early 
years. “The difference between a program produced for the network and 
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for syndication was not always clear. Sponsors would buy a program, put 
it on the network, and simultaneously syndicate it to stations not 
interconnected.”87 
 As such, The Lone Ranger television series may have appeared on 
other network stations in territories without an ABC affiliate while still 
remaining an ABC series. Beyond this, TCM’s contract with General 
Mills granted the sponsor the rights to one free repeat of each episode over 
the course of a second year, after which all rights to the individual 
episodes reverted back to the licensor.88 TCM was then free to sell these 
episodes to other networks without any grace period, so long as they did 
not appear in prime time. The Lone Ranger TV reruns began airing on 
CBS on Saturday mornings beginning June 1953 and lasting until 
September 1960, even as new episodes continued to air on ABC until 
1957 (General Mills had bought a third repeat from TCM for the initial 26 
episodes that delayed the CBS deal until 1953).  
 Not only did the television contract stipulate that Trendle was to 
have all final approvals over script, casting, and other production 
decisions, it also explicitly stipulated that General Mills would have “no 
voice in the production of the ‘programs.’”89 The inclusion of this clause 
points to the delicate balance of power between General Mills and TCM, 
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whose Lone Ranger property was its chief sales agent. As sponsorship 
took on national proportions and the actual productions fell out of the 
licensor’s hands, there was increased concern over losing control over 
their creation to more powerful corporate forces. TCM was headquartered 
in Detroit, not Hollywood, meaning that the licensor could not devote the 
same level of attention to the TV series as it did the radio series. 
Moreover, Apex and General Mills had a prior working relationship while 
Blackett-Sample-Hummert (BSH) was a pioneering ad agency in radio 
production. In general, advertising agencies had exercised increasing 
control over radio productions from the mid 1930s onwards.90  The 
combination of these factors made Trendle nervous.  Thus, in a letter to 
Fralick, informing him of BSH’s Ade Samish’s upcoming visit to the Lone 
Ranger television set on behalf of their client, Trendle warned his west 
coast representative to be prudent and selective in offering up information 
on the production. “My main objection in talking too much to those 
fellows [the ad agency representatives], is that I am of the opinion they 
might try to take over and tell us what to do.”91 
 These concerns also found expression in Trendle’s humorless 
admonition of Apex’s production manager, Harry Poppe, for taking 
publicity stills of Clayton Moore in Lone Ranger guise getting a piece of 
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cake. “It might be good General Mills publicity but it is not the type of 
material we wish to use for newspaper copy.”92 A six-page puff piece 
prepared in 1952 that announced new episodes of the TV show also was 
selectively edited by Trendle to remove the opening and closing 
paragraphs which, arguably, attributed too much of the series’ success to 
its sponsor, General Mills. The excised paragraphs read: 
When we of the Lone Ranger Corporation, learned that 
General Mills had decided to send their masked, two-gun 
super-salesman riding Silver on the television airwaves, we 
knew that new trails would have to be blazed across the 
field of entertainment... 
We share with General Mills a feeling of pride in what has 
been accomplished. From the start, the Lone Ranger on 
television has been one of the world’s most popular 
features. General Mills has never been an organization to 
rest on past laurels. We of the Lone Ranger, are trying to 
emulate the example of the Mills. A new series of Lone 
Ranger films is now in production. In these, we are 
incorporating what we have learned from experience and 
further research.93     
  
The remaining document glorified TCM’s oversight of the production and 
its concern for presenting the most “realistic” and technologically 
advanced series possible. Citing their obligation to loyal Lone Ranger 
radio listeners not to disappoint in the visual interpretation of the mental 
pictures they had formed from the radio show, TCM described its intense 
efforts to bring “the real thing” to the screen.94 By the “real thing,” TCM 
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was referring the Lone Ranger, which the radio series and Safety Club had 
worked to establish as an idealized American icon, if not an actual person. 
The television series required that the character be visually represented in 
ways that the radio show simply left to the imagination. As such, there 
was now a need to carefully balance the imaginary image The Lone 
Ranger radio series had developed in relation to the tangible 
characterization on the TV screen. Both had to match up, with the TV 
version meeting audience expectations for their idealized hero as 
“realistically” as possible.  
 
THE RADIO-TV INTER-TEXT 
 In their analysis of the various meanings negotiated by the 
character of James Bond at any given historical moment, Tony Bennett 
and Janet Woollacott argue for the need to read the Bond’s myriad 
representations in films, books, publicity materials and merchandise inter-
textually, or by referring to “the social organization of the relations 
between texts within specific conditions of reading. The figure of Bond 
has been produced in the constantly changing relations between a wide 
range of texts brought into association with one another via the 
functioning of Bond as the signifier which they have jointly 
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constructed.”95 Here, I argue that such inter-textual concerns informed 
licensor efforts to manage meanings behind the scene, just as much as they 
should inform those conducting cultural analysis of their properties.  
 Many early television series were adapted directly from network 
radio, often by simulcasting the same series over both media.96 
Simulcasting ranged across genres, from comedy-variety (Jack Benny) to 
sitcoms (The Goldbergs) to action-adventure series (Tom Mix). As 
discussed earlier, The Lone Ranger was not simulcast, though there was a 
distinct concern that both radio and television series follow the same 
formula. The simultaneous broadcast of both a radio and televised Lone 
Ranger presented Trendle with two overlapping anxieties: the relational 
meanings audiences might form between both texts and the visual 
representation of his mythic hero. As Trendle explained to Chertok in a 
letter critiquing an early episode of the series, “I think the directors are 
forgetting all about the fact that there must be some comparison made 
between the television Ranger and the AM [radio] Ranger and we cannot 
afford to ignore it.”97 Both concerns fixated on financial losses incurred by 
improper adherence to formula and detail, and both located their solutions 
in Trendle’s hands-on management of these inter-textual meanings so as to 
ensure consistency between radio and television representations. 
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 While the television contract TCM signed with General Mills was 
exclusive of the radio deal, it stipulated that The Lone Ranger radio 
program could not be cancelled for the first two years of the television 
contract. If General Mills entered into an arrangement for a third year of 
telecasts, the radio program also became non-cancelable for that third 
year. This requirement indicates the degree of uncertainty with which both 
licensor and sponsor entered into television, unwilling to lose the 
established profit and promotional channels they had been using for nearly 
two decades.98 As Trendle would admit to Fralick, “Everybody I meet 
seems to think we are making a mistake by putting it in television, on the 
theory that people will be disappointed and the Lone Ranger will not look 
like what they thought he did, when they think of him as a radio character, 
so it becomes increasingly important that we have the right cast” (more on 
casting issues below).99 Moreover, Hilmes notes that given television’s 
limited reach during the 1948-1952 freeze years, when many communities 
remained without access to the major network channels (or any at all) and 
AT&T’s coaxial cables had not yet extended to the west coast, advertisers 
still preferred radio’s larger national reach.100 
 Having already contractually ensured his script approval, Trendle 
proceeded to argue repeatedly that Chertok’s scripts and stories should 
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follow the basic plot structure of the radio program. On August 25, 1949, 
Trendle complained “we have sent 300 plots to California and we cannot 
understand why out of these 300 there cannot be 52 adapted to visual 
production by the insertion of visual business and visual gimmicks without 
complete distortion.” In his zeal for continuity, Trendle had Striker review 
scripts so that they would “aline [sic]... as closely as possible to the radio 
stories” and compare plot points with both the radio scripts and Lone 
Ranger novels he had written.101 
 Trendle raised objections to the insertion of romantic plots into the 
TV episodes; the Lone Ranger’s use of improper English (but also Tonto’s 
occasional use of too proper English); depictions of murder, kidnapping, 
or drinking; plots that featured the Lone Ranger in disguise or in 
improbable situations that should logically (but because of plot 
contrivance did not) lead to his unmasking. Trendle insisted all these 
elements were contrary to the successful formula strictly adhered to on the 
radio.102 “It is too bad, Jack, that your writers and directors resent 
suggestions for changes that we know will make the story more logical 
and will more generally follow the Lone Ranger pattern, which has been 
successful now for almost seventeen years.”103 
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 Trendle particularly was bothered that the television endings and 
commercial interludes did not follow the radio series’ efforts to 
mythologize the character. “I cannot seem to get you fellows to take our 
viewpoint of the ending and I am afraid, Jack, that we are going to have to 
make this a ‘MUST’. The ending of these stories must definitely follow 
the pattern of the Lone Ranger radio broadcasts.”104 The radio broadcasts 
usually ended with someone asking who the masked man was and another 
answering “Why, he is The Lone Ranger.” Trendle complained that 
television scripts either seemed afraid to identify directly the character by 
name or, when they did, the voice inflection did not give this identification 
enough weight. “Change the voice inflection on those endings, so that they 
follow the radio program... the closing of the show should definitely put 
the Lone Ranger on a pedestal instead of just dropping him off the 
script.”105 Trendle also objected to transitions between the episode and the 
commercial, calling attention to the fictive aspects of the character and 
explaining that the radio series had stopped referring to the program as a 
“story” per se, but as an “adventure.” “Whenever we use the word ‘story’ 
in our narration, we get the impression that the Lone Ranger adventure is 
not a real adventure.”106 Once again, slippage between exclaiming the 
veracity and/or idealization of the brand and the historical existence of the 
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Lone Ranger himself occurred regularly in the licensors discussion of the 
Lone Ranger formula.  
 It is clear that many of Trendle’s objections failed to take into 
account visual storytelling devices that rendered unnecessary the  
identification of the Lone Ranger by name or the use of voice over 
narration to explain plot elements to viewers.107  It is also evident that 
many of his complaints originated from his assumptions that the audience 
for the radio series would be same as the television one, and moreover, 
that said audience, consisting of both children and adults, would respond 
to the Lone Ranger’s personality in the same way they did on radio - 
through oral cues. Trendle’s justification for using proper English on the 
television series was that “poor English... [does] not increase the sympathy 
toward the character but cause[s] a lot of complaints from the parents and 
Parent-Teachers’ Associations, and other women’s clubs that feel we 
should try to teach the youngsters correct English, rather than 
otherwise.”108 While invoking the need to protect children, Trendle was 
equally insistent that adult audiences, who comprised 55 percent of 
viewers, demanded logical plots. “It is very, very phoney putting the 
Ranger in a cell with a mask on and saying that the only reason the man 
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does not want to see what he looks like is because he is in a hurry. I think 
every adult would snicker at that.”109 
 As is evident by the tone of many of these letters, Chertok’s 
writers and directors did not always listen to Trendle. While the licensor 
exercised his approval rights often, his objections regularly were met with 
incredulity by Chertok who, in one letter, both questioned why Trendle 
was objecting to a plot device - the Lone Ranger dropping his guns - that 
had been incorporated into previous scripts without remark and asked, 
somewhat facetiously, for Trendle’s input on how to create jeopardy for 
the character, given all of the rules imposed that limited these possibilities. 
“You must realize that if you continue to eliminate the few methods we 
now have of creating jeopardy for the Lone Ranger he will soon be in no 
jeopardy at all.”110 Trendle’s legitimate ability to demand and oversee 
changes were constrained severely by both his presence in Detroit, which 
conflicted with the swift revisions required for the telefilm production 
schedule (Fralick was not trusted to make script suggestions, just to keep 
an eye on the set), and the very different working conditions his radio 
writers encountered. Trendle paid his writers significantly less per radio 
script than the union requirements  for television ($100 versus $375), 
making it very difficult for him to farm out television work to his radio 
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writing staff, out of concern that they would revolt when they found out 
how much less they were earning.111 Moreover, Trendle’s writers were not 
members of the Screen Writers Guild, making it illegal for them to be 
employed legitimately as television writers.112 None of this, however, 
prevented Trendle from assembling a list of Lone Ranger don’ts that he 
used as shorthand in his efforts too get the television production to line up 
with the radio series. 
 Perhaps no issue concerned Trendle more than having the 
television Lone Ranger meet the imaginary expectations of radio listeners. 
Trendle had originally wanted Brace Beemer, the radio voice of the 
character and the only person legally to have made public appearances as 
the Lone Ranger to be the television hero.113 General Mills rejected this 
idea, however, because it considered the radio series to be “the backbone 
of [its] radio operation... and we don’t relish anything being done which 
could harm it in the slightest. We realize full well that the Lone Ranger 
radio show is a paying proposition for General Mills, whereas the 
television show is pretty much an experimental operation and we don’t 
think it is good business to jeopardize a solid operation such as the radio 
show for an adventure into television. We feel that putting a substitute in 
the radio show may hurt that operation.”114 
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 Once Beemer was no longer an option, Trendle turned his attention 
to monitor how closely Clayton Moore, the actor hired as the TV Lone 
Ranger, sounded like his radio counterpart. Once again, Trendle’s 
demands that both actors sound identical were informed by radio’s strict 
concern with voice type as the key signifier of personality, ignoring the 
visual cues almost entirely. “I am definitely worried about our Lone 
Ranger. I am willing to go along with you on the thought the fellow is 
good looking, he wears a mask and he does his work well, but... the matter 
of voice is the most important of all.. I would like to have you work with 
Mr. Moore so that he gets that easy, slow-moving, slightly nasal, languid 
type of voice that Mr. Beemer uses... unless this fellow does the same 
thing, he will not be the Lone Ranger.”115 Beyond threats, Trendle 
repeatedly offered to send Chertok voice recordings of Beemer in order to 
help Moore to mimic his voice. Trendle’s concern was that audiences 
would recognize the differences in voice, which would alert them to the 
fictional construction of the mythical hero. “His voice is beginning to pick 
up a little too much speed, while Mr. Beemer’s is fairly slow. I want to hit 
a happy medium [sic] but not have the voices so far apart that it creates 
comment. I think you know what I mean.”116 
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 While Trendle complained about Moore’s vocal deficiencies, he 
contractually bound Apex and other licensees to visibly represent the Lone 
Ranger, Tonto, Silver, Scout (Tonto’s horse) and Dan Reid (the Lone 
Ranger’s teen-aged nephew and the Green Hornet’s great-grandfather, 
who began appearing regularly on the radio series in 1944 to pull in a 
larger child audience through the presence of a sophomore companion 
with whom they could identify)117 in particular ways. Schedule B of the 
Lone Ranger Inc.,-Apex contract, titled “Descriptions,” provided both 
detailed physical characteristics and habits that these characters possessed 
that had to be included in their television representation. The Lone 
Ranger’s physical attributes included his height (between 6' and 6'2"), 
weight (190-210 lbs, no fat;, broad shoulders, and lean hips), and facial 
features (beyond always being masked, the Lone Ranger had to have a 
rather long chin, a “well-shaped, generous mouth,” and be always clean 
shaven). His eyes were steely but also sympathetic (later contracts also 
would specify them as blue). His nose was straight or slightly aquiline; his 
hair dark and parted on one side. When the Lone Ranger walked, he was 
graceful, showing no “indication of being muscle-bound in spite great 
strength.”118  The level of detail demanded represents a tremendous 
change in strategy from earlier concerns the licensor had over keeping the 
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Lone Ranger’s appearance as undefined as possible in order to meet the 
different imaginary expectations of the radio audience (see chapter 3) and 
seems largely in response to TCM losing direct control over the 
production.  
 
MAKING AN APPEARANCE 
 By 1949, the Lone Ranger had begun making public appearances 
that further forced the licensor to concretize its mythical hero. While TCM 
previously had been reluctant to have their fictional creation appear “live,” 
out of concern that its mysterious appeal would somehow be ruined 
through the character’s corporealization (see previous chapter), the 
financial rewards of such appearances, couple with the increased 
importance placed on tying popular stars in with real world charity events 
and troop morale since WWII, made untenable the Lone Ranger’s 
continued physical absence. Though TCM would profit handsomely 
through these public appearance licenses, and the character’s cultural 
status would also grow, these live performances also brought with them 
increased anxiety over managing the character’s representation, which 
took the form of detailed rules of public conduct that were written into the 
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contracts licensees and performers signed, as well as the furnishing of 
actual scripts that had to be used at all public appearances.   
 Beyond the early Detroit Belle-Isle appearance in 1935, which 
supposedly had led to children breaking through barricades just to get a 
glimpse of the Lone Ranger, the radio property remained non-corporeal 
until after General Mills began sponsoring the series.119 The Lone Ranger 
made various guest appearances on other radio programs also sponsored 
by General Mills, given a guest-star status that further defined the 
character as “real,” and not a performer in a mask.120 The timing of these 
radio appearances also coincided with the US’s entry into WWII and often 
included public service announcements on behalf of the OWI to stimulate 
sales of war bonds and other wartime initiatives. These appearances 
crossed over from radio to live, as the Lone Ranger made personal 
appearances at the Rainbow Division (a multi-racial military unit that 
included Native American enlistees) reactivation ceremony on July 12, 
1943. He was made an honorary Indian chief. The character also appeared 
at the Douglas war munitions plant from July 12-15, 1943 and at the 
President’s Ball on January 31, 1945.  
 In 1943, the Lone Ranger circuses began to appear in Chicago and 
Detroit. While King-Trendle had objected to Powell’s unsanctioned circus 
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appearances, it also saw the profits these public performances could 
reap.121 By 1944, these circus performances were so profitable that TCM 
sent their property all the way to Montreal, Canada, and Providence, 
Rhode Island to make appearances. During this three-week tour, the 
character was actually written out of the radio series so that Brace Beemer, 
the voice of the Ranger, could make public appearances.122  
 The star system in Hollywood complicated these personal 
appearances. Beemer was not well known outside of his Lone Ranger 
appearances. Clayton Moore, however, sought to build upon his fame in 
the TV role to establish a separate star persona. Trendle quickly put an end 
to such ideas. In his contract, Moore agreed never to make public 
appearances as the Lone Ranger unless previously sanctioned by TCM. 
These instances were reserved for appearances of national importance 
only, as befit the Lone Ranger’s status.123 Furthermore, he was not to draw 
attention to himself as performer, whether in or out of costume. As 
Trendle firmly reminded the actor, “Theoretically the Lone Ranger is a 
mythical character. I have told Mr. Beemer that many, many times. When 
Mr. Beemer is on set in costume or before the microphone playing the 
Lone Ranger, then we assume that he is the Lone Ranger. The minute he is 
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off the mike or out of costume, then he is just Brace Beemer and the 
mythical character, the Lone Ranger, carries on.”124 
 The further away these appearances took the Lone Ranger from 
under the watchful eye of its licensor, the more detailed and stringent the 
rules of public conduct became. By the time the Lone Ranger made a two-
day, four-performance appearance at the Variety Club of Greater Miami 
Circus to benefit crippled children in 1951, every detail of the 
performance was codified, including the scripts for radio announcements 
promoting his appearance, the act itself, and expected behavior of the 
actor (whether Beemer or Moore) while in costume.125 These Lone Ranger 
rules included not appearing in costume or being photographed without 
the mask, smoking in the presence of children, drinking in costume, 
receiving guests in his hotel room, or making unauthorized speeches. The 
eleventh and final rule spelled out Trendle’s reasoning: “The Lone Ranger 
is to be kept strictly a myth, handled as a business and kept on a business-
like basis.”126 
 Trendle seemed relatively unconcerned with addressing the 
historical impossibility of the Lone Ranger making a public appearance in 
1950s America even though his adventures took place nearly a century 
earlier. These personal appearance rules, however, suggest tensions 
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between maintaining the property’s mythical status and the potential moral 
fallibility of the real-life performers who appeared at these public events. 
Some rules, such as appearing without a mask, seem designed to preserve 
the character’s mysteriousness by denying the “ordinariness” of the 
performer behind it. Others are intended to suppress “immoral” behaviors 
“actual people” might engage in  - such as having sex or drinking alcohol - 
which would prove dangerous to the economic value of the property.  
 Even as these rules seem intent on denying the existence and 
lifestyles of the actual peoples that performed publicly as the Lone 
Ranger, other scripted elements of the performances worked to ground the 
Lone Ranger’s mythology in the real world. For instance, at every public 
appearance the announcer, claiming to be reading a representative letter 
from a local child, would ask the Lone Ranger: “Are you a Texas Ranger, 
and do you belong to any other police or military organizations?” The 
Lone Ranger then would recite the various law-enforcement and military 
organizations that had deputized him or made him a life-long member, 
including Texas Governor Coke Stevenson’s commissioning him a real 
Texas Ranger in 1946. The Lone Ranger would also list the number of 
Native American tribes that had made him either an honorary member or 
chief as authentic evidence of his lifelong partnership with Tonto.127 
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Often, these tensions between the continuation of the character’s mythic, 
mysterious (but not fictional)  status and the need to concretize him for the 
sake of public appearances were resolved through promotional strategies 
that presented the Lone Ranger as a living embodiment of the American 
heritage and, as such, both capable of being corporeal and superceding any 
particular tangible representation.  
 
AMERICAN HERITAGE 
 The Lone Ranger’s postwar personal appearances and other 
publicity materials were carefully orchestrated to conflate patriotism and 
consumption. They did so by evoking America’s mythical past and 
situating the corporate ethos within the pioneering spirit that had helped 
build the nation. Even as the Lone Ranger was positioned as an advocate 
for consumerism’s supposedly democratic nature and the freedoms 
afforded under corporate capitalism, the stifling control TCM attempted to 
exercise over its brand reveals tensions underpinning its very existence as 
a privately owned, yet American icon. 
 An integral part of the postwar performance was the Lone 
Ranger’s recitation of the Pledge to America, a variation on the Pledge of 
Allegiance. Several scripted public appearances confirm the precision with 
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which the moment was enacted, designed to arouse as much patriotic 
sentiment as possible. The lights dimmed, music of the “Battle Hymn of 
the Republic” played, an assortment of extras dressed in color guard 
flanked the Ranger, the music faded and there would be a brief segue into 
“America, The Beautiful.” The Lone Ranger then recited his pledge. 
Afterwards, the Lone Ranger circled the stadium shaking hands with 
children and their parents while the announcer intermittently told the 
audience of all the various sites where the Lone Ranger was available, 
from radio to TV, novels to comic strips, and other merchandise, such as 
Decca Records’ Lone Ranger adventure recordings. In each instance, the 
script was designed to insert the sponsor’s name  and the local affiliate or 
merchant where these products could be found.128 
 In 1953, The Lone Ranger celebrated its twentieth year of 
existence. The recently renamed Trendle-Campbell-Meurer (TCM) hired 
several public relations firms to generate publicity for the occasion, 
ranging from press releases to promotional kits targeting both the general 
public and the cultural production and manufacturing communities the 
company operated within.129  In a document titled “Subject: Lone Ranger 
Anniversary Story,” Trendle and his associates simultaneously positioned 
their hero within and outside of history. The document began:  
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In January, 1933, Franklin D. Roosevelt became President. 
In Germany, a man named Hitler was made chancellor. 
That month saw the beginning of the New Deal in America, 
and the beginning of upheaval in Europe. That was the 
month in which the words, ‘Hi Yo Silver,’ were first heard 
by radio listeners...The New Deal, the Fair Deal, war and 
peace have come and gone. Great men have risen for their 
hour of glory - only to be forgotten. Fiends who seemed 
invincible have been stomped into the dust. During the past 
two decades the world has changed. But the Lone Ranger 
still rides the airways three times every week.130  
 
The Lone Ranger’s popularity both reflected and transcended historical 
events and figures. Notably, the Lone Ranger’s primary competitors in this 
narrative are FDR and Hitler, two people that American corporations had 
positioned themselves against (and not Tom Mix or Hopalong Cassidy, 
who were both fellow advocates for corporate notions of democracy and 
also intense Lone Ranger rivals for licensing and merchandising deals). 
The message was simple. Like corporate America, the Lone Ranger had 
survived the dual threats of government regulation and consumer rationing 
and, while those “anomalous” events passed, “forgotten” into history, the 
Lone Ranger’s popularity remained intact. By evoking continuity between 
the past and the present, the Lone Ranger’s rightful place in America 
seemed as inevitable as the American heritage of capitalism that had both 
produced him and for which he fought.  
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 And yet, the document continued, while “in the minds of many, the 
Lone Ranger is classified as a legendary character comparable to Paul 
Bunyan, Rip Van Winkle and Robin Hood... contrary to what many people 
think, the Lone Ranger is not a character from early folklore. He is a 
character born of radio. He is radio’s contribution to Americana.”131 To 
fully understand the reasons why Trendle felt the need  to compare his 
creation with other fictional heroes with longer historical track records, 
but still exclaim the Lone Ranger’s modern origins, it is necessary to 
understand how postwar corporate America sold new technologies to 
consumers. A central strategy was to appeal to consumers’ nostalgia for 
simpler lives and to position new commodities as emerging naturally out 
of a stable and continuous past, rather than as a break with traditional 
modes of living.132 As an article in The New Republic on the dangers of 
advertiser manipulations warned: 
Consider the phenomenon of the most read advertisement 
of the year. It is an inspirational message in full color. The 
voice is that of the yearning, lonesome soldier telling what 
kind of an America he wants when he returns. The music is 
strictly Nash Kelvinator, which paid for the advertisement. 
‘Don’t Change Anything!’... The idea is definitely not 
related to products... ‘Don’t Change Anything’ excludes the 
wonderful world of tomorrow’s mechanical devices. It 
deals, short and simple as it is, with vital political, social, 
and economic factors. It commits the country to the status 
quo with what the economists call a base year of about 
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1928. In the face of this slogan, postwar conversion is to be 
without benefit of government guidance - most certainly 
without the cushion of publicly supported housing, social 
security and increasingly stable labor relations.133 
 
Similarly, Trendle sought to position the Lone Ranger as sharing 
continuity with other great American (and Western) fictional heroes, while 
still stressing the character’s newness and his affinity with other modern 
technologies and products, which potential sponsors might seek to sell. As 
such, the Lone Ranger’s values remained “unchanged,” even as he helped 
reconcile contemporary consumer products with traditional American 
ways of life, as represented through the pioneers he repeatedly defends in 
his various adventures. As early as 1944, The Lone Ranger radio series 
began devoting each Monday episode to a real historical event or figure 
for whom the Lone Ranger would ride to the rescue.134 By the early 1950s, 
the imperative that the Lone Ranger’s adventuring “must work and fight to 
promote the development of the West” and not merely to rescue 
individuals in need was worked into the list of “Don’ts” Trendle had 
prepared for Chertok.135  
 In 1951, TCM began writing letters to various corporations that 
traced their origins back to the Old West, requesting early histories that 
could be incorporated into The Lone Ranger adventures. As the licensor 
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explained, “We have been giving considerable thought toward story 
treatment of pioneer industries who, as a result of initiative and under our 
free enterprise system, were greatly responsible for the building of the 
Southwest in the years immediately following the Civil War... We would 
like to make use of such history with a series of Lone Ranger stories... as 
our effort toward showing Democracy in action, and the part played by 
industry in the building of this great territory.”136  
 In fact, “The Lone Ranger: Standards and Background” guide 
assembled for Chertok’s TV production and other potential Hollywood 
producers explicitly linked the pioneering spirit of the American West 
with postwar consumerist goals. “The Lone Ranger has contributed to 
Americana by showing as accurately as possible how hardships were 
overcome by the courage and determination of the pioneers... without 
benefit of government assistance... how these pioneers toiled and suffered 
to improve their nation that life might be better for their descendants... The 
Lone Ranger programs show that young people of America today owe 
much to their ancestors and to pay this debt, they must make the most of 
opportunities and in turn, pass on to their descendants an even greater 
country.”137 
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 The licensor credited The Lone Ranger’s tremendous success with 
its “message” of “Patriotism - Tolerance - Fairness and a Sympathetic 
Understanding of fellow men and their rights and privileges.”138 All noble 
virtues, to be certain, but as Trendle went through this list, it becomes 
apparent that such lessons were intended to impart versions of patriotism 
and fairness that served corporate visions of America. Under “Patriotism,” 
the document explained, “The Lone Ranger is motivated by love of 
country - a desire to help those who are building the West... Patriotism 
means service to a community; voting; aiding in community projects and 
the development of schools and churches.”139 Love of country is equated 
with economic expansion, “the building of the West,” while service and 
voting were rooted in local politics and communal living, just as they had 
been positioned by American corporations during the Depression. Under 
the lesson of “Fairness,” the document stated, “The Lone Ranger 
advocates the American Tradition, which gives each man the right to 
choose his work and to profit in proportion to his effort; and to retain for 
himself a fair proportion of his profits. The Lone Ranger also advocates 
the right to possess and hold worldly goods.”140  
While clearly there is a certain amount of anti-Communist rhetoric 
at play here (after all, as the “Communist leanings” of the entertainment 
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industries came under scrutiny, it became even more important for cultural 
producers to declare emphatically their allegiances to God and Country), 
Lizabeth Cohen has argued that much of the promotion of postwar 
consumerism was not directly influenced or inspired by Cold War 
rhetoric.141 As such, it is also remarkable how the concept of the American 
Heritage had  been reduced entirely to the fight for property ownership 
and untaxed income. This rhetoric idealistically equated hard work with 
economic reward, ignoring the growing complaints of minorities, women, 
and the working class throughout the first half of the twentieth century of 
unfair wage distribution and prejudicial business practices.  While labor 
and ownership had been at war with one another prior to World War II,, in 
this instance they were reconciled. 
 The overarching messages sold by the Lone Ranger during this 
period were that free enterprise had made America great and that the 
benevolent power of contemporary American corporations had direct 
historical linkages with the pioneering spirit that had built the country. 
These rhetorical statements often were accompanied by a fair amount of 
anxiety that the “consumerist utopia” was teetering on the edge of 
destruction. The Lone Ranger warned that Americans were taking the 
things their government was giving them, such as unemployment 
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compensation and social security, for granted instead of emulating the 
pioneering efforts of their ancestors. In a script prepared as a suggested 
Lone Ranger interview aimed at parents, the character explained, “the 
builders of America had none of the benefits and privileges of the people 
who are living today... Yet, those pioneers did great things... We want the 
young people to realize that we owe all that we have to the pioneers. We 
can pay our debt to those early settlers by making the most of today’s 
opportunity.”142  
 This script is only one of many examples of how the Lone Ranger 
was sold through Americanism in the postwar era. The character preached 
free enterprise and yet his personal appearances and interviews were 
scripted so meticulously to ensure that the licensor and its sponsors kept as 
tight a leash on their property as possible. Ironically, there was a clear 
contradiction between the public message the character communicated and 
the practices of the businesses that were responsible for the character. 
Moreover, though the character’s transcendence from mythic hero to 
contemporary icon worked to establish a seamless relationship between 
past and present of a stable corporate capitalism, this American Heritage 
also was constantly presented as under threat and in need of protection. 
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 The 1950s have often been described as an era of containment, as 
the need to stop the spread of Communism abroad became equated with 
the need to curtail any deviation from the norm at home. The marketing of 
the Lone Ranger in the postwar era often attempted to contain any possible 
deviations from the formula the licensor had created for the property. The 
greater the character’s popularity, the further its reach extended, the more 
stringent TCM’s efforts to manage the Lone Ranger’s meanings and 
movements.  
That licensors like TCM would support the logics of containment 
makes sense from an economic vantage point. TCM believed its profits 
were generated through the maintenance of a stable character property that 
could be replicated across media and merchandising outlets without 
confusing consumers or diminishing their brand expectations. Its business 
model was conservative, focused far more intently on strategies of 
repetition, rather than innovation. The clearest example of this effort to 
conform the various texts featuring the Lone Ranger is the list of “Don’ts” 
prepared by TCM for Chertok and others. These set of rules mostly 
focused on plot consistency (for example, rule #4 states “with emphasis on 
logic, the Lone Ranger cannot be captured and held for any length of 
time”) and efforts to maintain the mysteriousness of the character (the 
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reason for rule # 4 is given in rule #3, which states, “The Lone Ranger is 
never seen without his mask or disguise”).143  
 Moreover, as The Lone Ranger’s popularity grew amongst 
licensees and as General Mills’ corporate sponsorship consolidated around 
the property, TCM’s licensing strategies were directed toward maintaining 
managerial control over their property. The licensor’s anxiety over losing 
control of its cash cow and the strategies it employed in order to hold on 
meshed well with the larger cultural climate of containment during this 
era.  While I am not arguing that the Lone Ranger officially endorsed 
Containment culture (though the brand’s overt Americanism was heavily 
marketed), I suggest that the work values Trendle, Campbell and Meurer 
embraced were commensurate with maintaining the status quo. The Lone 
Ranger formula was carefully monitored in order to ensure that the civic 
values built into the brand remained consistent. While TCM argued that 
such consistency ensured economic rewards, they also selectively shaped 
the formula’s rules in ways that conformed with broader social concerns 
over maintaining the cultural status quo, particularly when it came down 
to lifestyle politics. For instance, the Lone Ranger rules often slipped into 
moralistic condemnations of certain lifestyle choices in which the hero 
does not partake such as smoking, drinking, swearing, and having sex.144 
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While the licensor justified such prohibitions in terms of the imagined 
child audience’s innocence, the restrictions nonetheless denote a clear 
strategy of moral containment designed not simply to protect the brand’s 
reputation, but also to align its representation with the “correct” American 
values.  
In part, this was a marketing strategy designed to transform 
historically shifting concerns over the role of media in childhood into 
productive and positive attributes that sponsors and parents alike could 
embrace. While it would be easy to assign these moralizing rules a simple 
business function (attaching the wrong values to the brand would diminish 
its economic values as well), I argue that these values were fully ingrained 
within licensing agents’ occupational identities. Pierre Bourdieu has 
argued that cultural intermediaries, or figures that exist in the interstices of 
producers and consumers, often share a habitus of lifestyles and class 
backgrounds that inform their actions, in opposition to the more 
commonly held assumption that intermediaries intuitively understand 
audience desires and needs. These shared values are reinforced by the 
cultural and monetary capital reaped through their actions.145 According to 
Keith Negus, “[Bourdieu] emphasized the broader social, economic and 
political contexts through which aesthetic judgments are made, cultural 
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hierarchies established and within which artists have to struggle for 
position... this occurs across the social activities which are conventionally 
designated as ‘production’ and ‘consumption.’”146 Bourdieu’s interests lie 
in explaining  the way power and class help designate taste cultures.  
However, his insights can explain licensor behavior, whose embrace of the 
logics of free enterprise garnered them insider status and wealth. They 
were not about to risk such truly American rewards by challenging a 
system that had produced them.  The rules not only safeguarded TCM’s 
business model, but also protected the very values the licensor believed 
had brought them success. 
 
 The very need to include such rules, however, reveals a certain 
underlying anxiety over their maintainability. That TCM equated 
Americanism with embodying the correct moral values, and that these 
values were commensurate with both the economic value of the property 
and the status quo logics of postwar life, was evident in the ways TCM 
proudly promoted their efforts to prevent any negative publicity from 
sullying the property. “The Lone Ranger could be a vital factor in the 
teaching of Americanism. It was something that must be preserved, 
protected against cheap imitation and carefully guarded at all times. 
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Moreover, there must never be the slightest degree of unfavorable 
publicity about the program or any individual connected with it that might 
disillusion the millions of boys and girls who idolized the masked 
hero.”147  
 Whereas the first sentence suggested that the Lone Ranger has an 
educational function - to teach Americanism - the second sentence 
emphasized the imminent threat both to the brand and America itself. It is 
unclear if it was Americanism or the Lone Ranger property that was in 
need of protection. Finally, the third sentence restated the containment 
logic by equating the threat faced by the Lone Ranger, guardian of 
Americanism, with any criticism lobbied against the property or those 
associated with it. This assertion was justified not on economic grounds, 
but also by the need to protect children’s ideals of their hero. Negative or 
critical interpretations of the character were those that deviated from the 
status quo formula TCM adhered to, but they also were those that deviated 
from the conformist values the character championed. As such, the 
scripted response to one of the suggested interview questions for a Lone 
Ranger publicity announcement explicitly aimed at parents, which asked if 
the character was based on a particular pioneering lawman, was “no, the 
character is a composite of all men who stood for law and order. If 
 348
children respect the Lone Ranger, they will respect the law and the rights 
of other people. Also, they will respect anyone in authority.”148  
 Of course, such efforts to teach conformity hint at fears of unrest 
and instability. A publicity stunt suggested by Pauline E. Mandigo, a 
public relations consultant hired by TCM to promote the Lone Ranger’s 
20th Anniversary, involved the establishment of a Lone Ranger college 
scholarship for outstanding students. Mandigo suggested that applicants 
should have to write an essay on the subject of “why men of the type of 
the Lone Ranger are especially needed in the world today.”149 While the 
essay topic ostensibly celebrated the Lone Ranger’s virtuous character, the 
underlying assumption was  that the values the Lone Ranger represented 
were in danger of dissipating.  
 The Lone Ranger’s containment rhetoric usually focused on 
teaching children to trust in (rather than question) authority. Mandigo 
practically drooled over the possibility of using a quote from J. Edgar 
Hoover that called the Lone Ranger “one of the greatest forces for juvenile 
good in this country” as part of the 20th Anniversary publicity 
campaign.150 The licensor insisted on characterizations and plots that 
eschewed moral complexity or ambiguity.  TCM believed that the key to 
capturing juvenile interests lay in telling stories where “the good guy 
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should be all good, and the bad guy rotten to the core.” TCM also argued 
for plots that emphasized physical rather than psychological conflict.151 
 Fears of juvenile delinquency grew in the 1950s, often 
accompanied by pointed accusations of a dangerous emphasis on sex and 
gore found in films, television and comic books. Consequently,  the Lone 
Ranger’s over-determined marketing campaign shifted into high gear. 
Lone Ranger interview scripts called for the character to tell young 
listeners to “be clean - personally - clean in sports and play and clean in 
your thoughts.”152  An integral part of King-Trendle’s marketing and 
merchandising strategies from a very early point in the Lone Ranger’s 
existence was to alleviate potential negative publicity over the bad 
influence powerful personalities could have over children. The postwar 
containment logic shifted these strategies somewhat. Children no longer 
needed to be protected from threats of consumer exploitation, but instead 
from social illnesses that took away their healthful desire to consume. 
Dozens of articles and press materials were produced during this period 
emphasizing the Lone Ranger’s “miraculous” ability to cure young 
children of psychological afflictions. In one case, the Lone Ranger 
convinced a child who was healthy but afraid to stop using her crutches to 
walk again. In another much ballyhooed case, the Lone Ranger visited a 
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hospital and convinced a child to eat solid foods for the first time in three 
years. The masked hero also furnished the child with a set of Lone Ranger 
dishes, which led to the child’s continued nourishment.  
 I am interested in the rhetorical conflation of consumer goods with 
curing social ills – ills defined as having a negative impact on 
consumption itself. According to the story, the child refused to consume 
until the Lone Ranger sold him on eating and gave him a piece of licensed 
merchandise that transformed him from sickly to healthy, non-consumer to 
consumer. TCM referred to the Lone Ranger’s power to cure sick children 
“psychosomatic medicine.”153 The publicity emphasized the property’s 
healing potential. The very acknowledgment that American youth suffered 
from psychological afflictions and were in need cure was a radical 
departure from the 1930s Safety Club rhetoric that encouraged youth to 
mobilize and prevent traffic accidents. While both instances suggest the 
need to protect children, the Safety Club depicted youth as self-reliant, 
active, and self-mobilizing, while the postwar Ranger cured children 
suffering from “imaginary” illnesses that prevented them from either 
participating fully in the consumers’ republic or caused them to deviate 
from the norms imposed upon them for their own protection. 
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TONTO IS AN INDIAN?  
 Children and their parents weren’t the only consumer groups the 
Lone Ranger brand was concerned with addressing in the postwar era. 
Tonto’s Native American identity began to take on added significance in 
the brand’s efforts to appeal to minority consumers. Though the emphasis 
TCM placed on the Lone Ranger and Tonto’s friendship had progressive 
possibilities, the Lone Ranger formula inevitably continued to promote 
racial hierarchies that reinforced existing stereotypes of minority 
inferiority and national exclusion. These contradictions point to fissures in 
both the consumer republic’s utopian rhetoric and within the cultural 
industries’ targeting of minority consumers. In the first instance, consumer 
equality did not translate into social equality and failures to achieve the 
latter often fed back onto the former. In the second instance, the cultural 
producers’ recognition of minority consumers did not necessarily yield 
greater understanding of minority struggles. In fact, as minorities began 
exercising their newfound consumer status in order to fight for other social 
and political reforms, whether through product boycotts or lunch counter 
sit-ins, the Lone Ranger formula, especially in its emphasis on the hero’s 
friendship with Tonto, worked to dissuade any actions that might upset the 
status quo. The following section explores the changing function of race in 
 352
the Lone Ranger formula and some of the tensions these new articulations 
sought to resolve.     
 In the postwar era, there was a growing recognition that minorities 
remained a largely untapped market. Many minorities were happy for this 
recognition, as it was seen as an important step toward achieving equality 
and normalcy. Having served their country during World War II, many 
minorities returned home equally anxious to partake in the consumer 
fantasy that had been promised all Americans. The consumers’ republic 
would embrace all.154 As television made its debut, several early programs 
featured African Americans in central roles. Unfortunately, representation 
often went hand in hand with misrepresentation, as these early efforts 
largely replicated stereotypical images of African Americans as lazy, 
incompetent, and happily subservient to their white benefactors.155 
Lizabeth Cohen has argued that African Americans faced a paradoxical 
dilemma in the postwar consumer euphoria. On the one hand, the public 
trust in the fairness of the private market often was not justified. 
Discriminatory policies continued, as the private institutions responsible 
for meeting out the government’s commitment to war veterans through the 
G.I. Bill often systematically denied and misdirected African American 
veterans. On the other hand, the new conflation of citizenship with 
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consumption presented African Americans (and other minorities) new 
opportunities to fight discrimination publicly by challenging their 
exclusion from public sites of consumption and leisure, culminating in the 
sit-in protests of the 1960s. Minority advocacy groups such as the NAACP 
targeted television as an important site of consumer resistance through 
boycotts of sponsors whose programs misrepresented the black 
experience. In 1950-52, the NAACP launched a fairly vocal attack against 
the Blatz Beer sponsored Amos n’ Andy television program.156  
 As the previous chapter argued, racial representations figured into 
King-Trendle’s concerns when marketing The Green Hornet in the late 
1930s, but these primarily were designed to address the assumed 
stereotypical views of Asians and Japanese by white American audiences. 
In the postwar era, TCM responded to both the possibility of tapping into a 
minority audience and the anxiety of having that same audience boycott its 
show and sponsor with a sudden recognition of Tonto’s Native American 
status. Though the Lone Ranger’s sidekick had been around since 1933, 
the character was unabashedly described on radio as a “half-breed” until 
1950.157 In 1951, however, the licensor seized upon the strategy of 
promoting the program’s pro-tolerance stance precisely because the Lone 
Ranger’s closest companion was non-white. As such, Meurer often 
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recounted the story of the Lone Ranger’s 1951 public appearance at the 
Miami Orange Bowl, where the hero crossed the color line to shake hands 
with African American children as well as whites. Meurer argued that the 
Lone Ranger stood for tolerance, but linked this tolerance to formulations 
of audiences and consumer groups. As Meurer explained, “the likelihood 
of audience segregation had completely escaped his thinking.”158 
 The Lone Ranger Standards and Background packet elaborated on 
the economic viability of tolerance, but also revealed some of the anxieties 
faced by the licensor over threats of boycotts. Appropriately, the section 
also positioned its arguments within the discourse of Americanism so 
central to promoting the Lone Ranger. In a section titled “American 
Heritage,” the brochure selectively excerpts a speech delivered by the 
Lone Ranger over the air in June, 1948: 
Our forefathers were men among whom uncommon valor 
was common virtue. Those men have handed down a great 
heritage which you, and others like you, must protect and 
preserve. It is the heritage of every American. The Right to 
live as free people in a land where there is true equality and 
opportunity. 
It is your duty to be eternally vigilant - prepared at all times 
to fight those who dare to challenge our way of life. And 
you must build. It is your duty to make this a greater nation 
- to build homes and farms and villages - mills, factories 
and great cities. 
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Property is the fruit of labor. That some should be rich 
shows that others may become rich, and hence is 
encouragement to industry and enterprise. 159 
 
The conflation of an American heritage with corporate values (economic 
expansion, privatization, and property ownership) this section suggests, 
also have ensured equal opportunity for all. 
 The reprinted “American Heritage” speech provides insight into 
the ways that the culture industries anxiously recognized and attempted to 
transform minority and working-class resentment into appropriate modes 
of economic behavior. Even as the speech affirmed the inspirational 
ability of the wealthy to encourage others to follow suit, it warned, 
strategically quoting Abraham Lincoln, “‘Let not him who is houseless 
pull down the house of another...But let him labor diligently and build one 
for himself. Thus, by example assuring that his own shall be safe from 
violence when built.”160 
  Concern over minority uprisings were expressed in economic 
terms as threats of property damage, and the threat to private property was 
conflated with alleged dangers to the private sphere of the home.  
Appropriately, the solution was identified as harder work, not acts of 
economic sabotage like boycotts levied against those more fortunate. As 
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minorities bristled under the institutionalized continuation of racist 
practices that denied them full access to and participation in the 
consumers’ republic, and as they embraced economic boycotts and other 
forms of protest and demanded citizenship rights by foregrounding their 
consumer identities, licensors like Trendle responded by using their 
properties to advocate tolerance as not only economically rewarding, but 
as a necessary alternative to the potential disruption of the American 
consumer ideal.  
 Promoting tolerance was not entirely motivated by economics. In 
the postwar era, not only was citizenship expressed through consumption, 
but there was a genuine utopian embrace of the consumers’ republic’s 
ability to provide equally for all groups in society. This vision had grown 
out of WWII mobilization efforts that attempted to counter minority 
dissent over fighting for freedoms abroad unavailable to them at home by 
promising them greater freedoms once they returned from the war. The 
rhetoric of “why we fight” stressed the consumer utopia just over the 
horizon as available to all Americans. The Lone Ranger and Tonto did 
their parts in selling this vision. In public appearances, Tonto would 
proclaim his people’s preparedness to fight for a good cause, and the Lone 
 357
Ranger would explain to his companion that this was the American Way, 
not just the Indian way.161   
 In the postwar era, as US foreign policy shifted toward trying to 
contain the spread of Communism, in part by promoting the United 
Nations as an international overseer of democracy and human rights, 
public officials would often invoke the rhetoric of tolerance, comparing 
the squabbles of the world to those already solved between Americans and 
Native Americans. An October 29, 1949 episode of The Lone Ranger 
radio series featured a public service announcement by its protagonist that 
foregrounded the US’s role in helping to bring together the nations of the 
world by stating “it is a problem that was solved by our forefathers who 
found many nations of Indians in our United States.”162 In the margins, 
Meurer proudly admitted that the announcement was approved because of 
his personal association with UN Ambassador Warren Austin.163 
 Meurer believed that in order for this international brotherhood of 
man to form, it was vital that the US advocate for tolerance at home. The 
Lone Ranger Standards and Background addressed the importance of 
teaching tolerance by acknowledging, for the first time in twenty years, 
that the Lone Ranger’s Native American companion, Tonto, was also his 
friend. Somewhat paternalistically, the document suggested that the lesson 
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taught through such an admission was that “If the Lone Ranger accepts the 
Indian as his closest companion, it is obvious to the child listener that 
great men have no racial or religious prejudice.”164 
 Of course, advocating the consumption of tolerance did not 
necessarily mean that licensors recognized the citizenship rights minorities 
demanded. Tellingly, in his list of “Don’ts,” Trendle acknowledged the 
impact minority protests had on the Lone Ranger’s representational 
strategies, while he completely failed to connect minority consumer 
demands with their status as American citizens. Rule #8 stated: “Because 
of minority groups who have complained, there should be no unfavorable 
characters who are unmistakably Negro, Mexican, English, Italian, Polish, 
etc. In short, all bad characters must be American.”165 Not only was 
Trendle’s solution to  avoid controversy at all costs by literally 
whitewashing the adventures of his hero, but it also categorically erased 
peoples of color from American history in the process, conflating 
Americans with whites and minorities with foreigners, perhaps deserving 
of tolerance, but not citizenship.    
 Even Tonto often fell victim to discourses of difference that 
reaffirmed his outsider status. As previously discussed, Trendle was 
particularly insistent that the Lone Ranger speak pure English in order to 
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teach American children the importance of proper speech. Such 
educational possibilities did not extend to Tonto. In letters to Chertok 
offering script advice in order to keep the radio and TV series consistent, 
Fran Striker admonished the producer for having Tonto speak too 
properly. In one letter, Striker told Chertok that “our Tonto generally 
grunts affirmation instead of saying ‘yes.’” In another, he elaborated that 
“Tonto speaks in a stilted manner” and provides examples of the incorrect 
speech patterns Tonto should speak in.166  
 While Striker’s comments were overtly racist, it is also important 
to situate them within particular institutionalized norms of differentiation. 
Radio imposed linguistic markers of difference so that audiences could 
recognize the different racial identities of the voices they heard. As Hilmes 
has argued, such practices were rooted in underlying fears of race mixing, 
and the inability to distinguish voices often forcibly inscribed racial 
stereotypes into speech patterns, so that African American characters 
always spoke in minstrel voices.167 By the early 1950s, these practices had 
become so codified that Striker’s insistence seems equally motivated by 
his concern that audiences would be confused if Tonto spoke differently. 
 In the postwar era, tolerance did not mean eliminating difference, 
nor was difference presented on equal footing.  In advocating tolerance as 
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economically valuable, essentializing difference provided for import 
rationales. Embracing minorities as equal participants in the consumers’ 
republic could allow for an expansion of consumer resources, as could 
equal division of labor to be garnered through transforming previously 
negative stereotypes into positive resources. In The Green Hornet, the 
hero’s “oriental” valet, Kato was not merely Britt Reid’s obedient servant, 
but also a brilliant scientific mind who designed all of the Hornet’s 
contraptions. His dangerous inscrutability was domesticated and put to 
positive use. The Lone Ranger’s friend and partner, Tonto, also served an 
important function in permitting the white hero to succeed in his work. 
Tonto’s usefulness, derived from stereotypes of Native American savagery 
and loyalty, actually allowed the Lone Ranger to remain morally 
righteous, even as he violently engaged unscrupulous criminals.  
 As the description of Tonto’s habits included in the 1952 television 
production contract signed by Apex Productions and The Lone Ranger 
inc., clearly stipulated, when killing was absolutely necessary to the plot, 
this was Tonto’s job. Equally as important, the contract was quick to add, 
“and then somewhat secretly and without the Lone Ranger’s 
permission.”168 Tonto’s characterization effectively allowed the Lone 
Ranger’s licensors to negotiate the property’s contradictory position as a 
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popular commodity sold primarily to children and also a morally upright 
advocate of citizenship that appeased parental concerns over the 
commercialization of children’s culture. Tonto allowed the Lone Ranger 
to have both commercial value and moral values, and therefore served an 
important role in configuring the consumer/citizen nexus that 
characterized the postwar era, though one that excluded him (and other 
minorities) from achieving a similar and equal conflation of identities. 
Appropriately, though Trendle preached tolerance by emphasizing the 
friendship between the Lone Ranger and Tonto, this was not a friendship 
among equals. As the habits clause in the contract made clear, “When The 
Lone Ranger removes his mask for any purpose, [Tonto] makes a point of 
looking the other way.”169 The consumers’ republic might have promised 
opportunity for all, but this was premised on whites tolerating the 
economically useful (but otherwise ethically dubious) qualities minorities 
possessed.  Minorities, in turn, showed the necessary deference to an 
American Heritage that they were apparently not fully a part of, but whose 
fairness and tolerance would eventually yield rewards, as long as they did 
not challenge its authority. 
 
RISE OF THE CORPORATION -  DECLINE OF THE LICENSOR? 
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 While TCM certainly did its part to promote the consumers’ 
republic, including embracing some its more repressive aspects, licensors 
also faced anxieties over their own changing position as authority figures, 
both within the culture industries and society at large. Changes in the 
workplace began altering the populist interpretations of free enterprise that 
had informed licensor attitudes and beliefs. The growth of the corporate 
ethos in the postwar era conflicted with TCM’s vision of itself as an 
independent enterprise existing at the interstices of multiple cultural 
producers and managing the terrain between them that their properties 
occupied. Paradoxically, as the Lone Ranger reached the zenith of both its 
popularity and profits, TCM’s sense of control and authority were 
dwindling. Even as it worked toward making the Lone Ranger into the 
ultimate organization man, they struggled to affirm their own heroic status 
within white-collar America. 
The cultural industries in the late 1940s and early 1950s were 
largely composed of white men, particularly at the managerial levels, and 
while licensors like TCM might have felt some anxiety over the increased 
demands of minorities, there was very little direct threat to the authority 
licensors carried as members of the managerial-owner class. This is not to 
say, however, that licensors did not feel their status and identities to be in 
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flux in the postwar era. The postwar years were boom years in terms of 
profits for many licensors, and in many instances their properties required 
very little salesmanship on licensors’ parts to find new merchandising 
opportunities and to secure corporate sponsorship. Yet, this economic 
success was accompanied by changes in the cultural valuation of the 
independent professional in the workplace, expressed in new ideals and 
concerns for American manhood. As Michael Kimmel argues, “modern 
corporate capitalism had transformed a nation of entrepreneurs - Self-
Made Men - into a nation of hired employees.”170  
 Independent licensors had prided themselves for nearly twenty 
years on their insider/outsider status, able to amass great fortunes by 
working between cultural industries and offering their managerial skills 
and cultural intermediary status - their understanding of how to talk to 
actual consumers - to multiple corporate sponsors, all the while working 
exclusively for their own economic self-interest. While their characters 
might have enforced corporate ideals, licensors saw themselves as 
descendants of the heroic artisan, a new class of “independent 
professionals” who supported corporate goals, but did not work for them. 
It is perhaps not surprising then that even as the Lone Ranger became a 
loyal company man, selling the new corporate family and endorsing the 
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easy postwar slippage between consumption and civic participation, 
licensors bristled somewhat over playing similarly conformist roles. While 
TCM may no longer have had to sell the values (both economic and 
cultural) of the Lone Ranger to corporate sponsors as rigorously as it had 
during the Depression, the licensors did feel an acute need to sell their 
own heroic virtues, in ways that simultaneously stressed their 
entrepreneurialism but also their contiguous role within corporate 
America. They advocated for a return to the status quo that had allowed 
them to serve corporate interests without relinquishing their independent 
authority.  
 Significantly, the 1952 Lone Ranger Twentieth Anniversary Story 
promotional packet prepared by Trendle-Campbell-Meurer, Inc., seems far 
more eager to celebrate the roles that Trendle, his partner and salesman H. 
Allen Campbell, and his partner/lawyer, Raymond Meurer, played in 
making the Lone Ranger a star than in discussing the sales appeal of their 
property. Trendle repeatedly was referred to as “truly a twentieth century 
pioneer” in radio broadcasting, film distribution and exhibition, and for his 
creation of the Lone Ranger.171 Campbell’s work of selling The Lone 
Ranger to potential sponsors is described in practically mythic terms that 
conflate salesmanship with more traditionally vaunted heroic endeavors. 
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“Mr. Campbell accepted the challenge... unabashed by the countless 
difficulties... He could have rested on these laurels but he didn’t... Allen 
Campbell went on from there, like the Lone Ranger himself, he was not 
one to rest on past performances.”172 The comparison of Campbell to the 
Lone Ranger allowed the latter to be situated within corporate ideals while 
permitting the former to assert a kind of heroic independence that is at 
once compatible with yet removed from corporate life. 
 Meurer’s role in elevating the Lone Ranger to the status of 
American icon was given even more weight; the document implied that 
American values were synonymous with the protection of property values. 
Meurer was identified as the team member who saw the greatest potential 
for the Lone Ranger to teach Americanism, but also the one most 
concerned with the safeguarding the property’s virtuousness. In order to 
protect the American values the Lone Ranger embodied, Meurer was 
described as tirelessly traveling to every part of the country to “put down 
imposters, block infringements and guard against misrepresentation in 
publicity or advertising.”173  
 Meurer’s litigation powers were championed. While no direct 
comparison to the Lone Ranger was made, the language used in describing 
his exploits might easily be used in describing the hard-riding Western 
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hero who traversed the West putting down injustice. Corporate values 
were galvanized, Meurer was shown as possessing those qualities, and like 
Campbell, was positioned somewhat outside the conformist corporate 
culture he nobly defended (much as the Western hero himself was never a 
member of the civilization he helps develop). 
 In the end, TCM’s efforts at asserting the vitality of its independent 
position were for naught. By the end of the 1950s, many of the branding 
strategies and licensing practices they had helped shepherd were 
beginning to be handled in house by the networks and film studios. ABC 
launched its character licensing division in 1957 to merchandise Maverick 
toys and clothing.174 The degree to which ABC’s actions were motivated 
by the success TCM had with The Lone Ranger television series remains 
unclear, but there was doubtless a ripple of inspiration. The validation of 
consumerism as now patriotic and healthy for children lessened the 
perceived need for independent licensors to act as intermediaries between 
the public and the corporations.  
 Perhaps unsurprisingly, TCM sold its rights to the Lone Ranger 
property to the Wrather Corporation in 1953, for $3,000,000.175 Wrather 
was a Hollywood-based licensing agency that, to some extent, was even 
more independent than TCM, in that it had absolutely no involvement in 
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the production of materials based on the properties it purchased (whereas 
TCM continued to produce The Lone Ranger radio series until 1954), but 
to a greater extent, was far more of an industry insider than TCM ever 
desired to be.176 To be certain, other factors beyond a sense of dwindling 
authority motivated TCM  to sell. Despite the continued popularity of the 
Lone Ranger brand, by 1952 TCM noticed a sharp decline in its revenues 
from production licenses. While the Lone Ranger still generated royalties 
from merchandising, the phasing out of network radio programming, the 
transition of the B-lots into television production facilities, and the 
difficulties in making a feature film deal all led to a downturn in profits. 
TCM saw the height of its property’s popularity as also its summit.  
 
CONCLUSION 
 In this chapter, I have argued that containment, both on the 
business and cultural fronts, were central to TCM’s postwar licensing 
strategies. Even as the Lone Ranger entered into its most popular and 
profitable years, TCM’s anxieties over controlling and maintaining the 
success of its property grew exponentially.  Paradoxically, while the 
centralization of media industries in Hollywood provided increased 
opportunities for cross-merchandising licensed brands, it also further 
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loosened the degree of direct management TCM could exercise over the 
Lone Ranger. This, in turn, led the licensor to develop detailed and 
meticulous “rules” of conduct that licensees and producers were directed 
to follow at all costs. These rules were especially designed to address The 
Lone Ranger television production. Regularly broken, the rules’ very 
existence suggested the difficulties in managing properties long distance 
and exposed the cultural assumptions that informed TCM’s understanding 
of the Lone Ranger’s appeal and market value. 
 Television not only complicated the cross-merchandising strategies 
King-Trendle had been using since the mid 1930s, it also brought with it a 
different set of representational and inter-textual concerns. TCM’s 
insistence on conformity between radio and television indicates both an 
awareness and strategic employment of inter-textual meanings across texts 
long before conglomeration.  Concerns over formulaic inconsistencies also 
point to TCM’s increasing anxieties over maintaining control over its 
property, as production and promotion fell further outside its direct 
oversight.  
 Meanwhile, the cultural climate in postwar America necessitated a 
shift in sales strategies. Whereas King-Trendle had worked during the 
Depression years to position their property as a moral arbiter with an 
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ability to teach children good character values, the postwar period saw a 
transformation in the relationship between consumption and citizenship 
that no longer placed these identities in conflict with one another.  The 
licensor continued to promote the character’s unique appeal to children, 
but rather than stressing the Lone Ranger’s character-building qualities, 
TCM now bestowed an almost messianic power on its brand. Often, such 
rhetorical exaltation went hand-in-hand with overtly selling the power of 
the Lone Ranger’s personality through consumer products that could raise 
the healthful spirit of American youth. At the same time, it pointed to an 
underlying concern that postwar youth were sickly and in need of 
reinvigoration. TCM stressed the Lone Ranger’s power to reverse these 
trends through the character’s inspirational heroics and embrace of the 
American pioneering heritage. In fact, TCM incorporated the American 
Heritage rhetoric into almost  every sales pitch and promotional press 
release prepared for the Lone Ranger. 
 The American Heritage of free enterprise was used as a means of 
offsetting growing minority audience demands for improved 
representation through boycott threats. TCM’s newfound emphasis on 
tolerance was motivated by desires to reach minority consumers and to 
deflect negative publicity from its representational politics. The rhetoric of 
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tolerance was wholly commensurate with advocating consumer equality 
while continuing to maintain existing racial hierarchies and stereotypes. 
Promotional materials show a growing incongruity in the postwar era 
between the economic rewards TCM reaped and the mobility and 
managerial constraints they experienced. As their fortunes soared, their 
relative autonomy and authority, as agents who moved between difference 
cultural sites of production, diminished. 
 The accumulation of these containment anxieties, coupled with the 
changing cultural production landscape, led TCM to sell off its most 
profitable property. The timing of the sale was fortuitous as the very 
conditions within the media industries that had led to the series’ enormous 
popularity were already changing. Trendle’s struggles to duplicate the 
television success of The Lone Ranger with The Green Hornet, in part the 
result of these changes in production, in part due to Trendle’s 
unwillingness to adapt his licensing practices to meet these changes, will 
be discussed in the next chapter. 
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Chapter Five: Introduction 
Despite his day job as a publishing magnate, the Green Hornet 
always was lagging behind his richer great-uncle, the Lone Ranger. When 
it came to television, things were no different. While The Lone Ranger 
soared to new heights of popularity and profits in postwar America and 
was an early television pioneer, partially paving the way for the 
predominance of the TV Western genre in the 1950s, The Green Hornet 
continued to be haunted by the genre and audience confusions that had 
been a problem since the late 1930s. Trendle-Campbell-Meurer’s (TCM) 
success with The Lone Ranger had caused the licensor to embrace 
containment strategies that both reproduced and reified the cultural and 
industrial status quo in order to leverage its management over the 
property. The Green Hornet required something different; it required a 
willingness to rethink the formula, to innovate and adapt to a shifting 
cultural and industrial climate. Yet, the generic re-inventions TCM was 
willing to undertake would not extend to a its business practices, even as 
the terrain of television production itself was radically altered by the re-
emergence of the Hollywood studios and consolidation of network power. 
TCM’s intransigence certainly contributed to its failure to make a 
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television deal for the Green Hornet property, but it is equally true that its 
options as an independent licensor operating in this renewed regime of 
network and studio power were antithetical to the very cultural and 
economic values that had sustained the company since the 1930s. 
To some extent, TCM’s failures to extend the Green Hornet brand 
into television might seem surprising. Dozens of radio series made the 
leap to TV in the late 1940/ early 1950s, including two of TCM’s other 
properties, The Lone Ranger (1949-1957) and Sergeant Preston of the 
Yukon (1955-1958). Early 1950s television also offered greater 
opportunities for placing a series on television, with a viable first-run 
syndication market available in case the networks did not bite.1 
Independent producers sold several formulaic genre programs directly to 
local markets, for example Ziv’s success with the TV-adaptation of radio’s 
The Cisco Kid (1950-1956) and the spy drama I Led 3 Lives (1953-1956). 
I Led 3 Lives was the most successful syndicated program in the country 
in 1953, suggesting that there was a demand by audiences for 
crime/espionage dramas and by TV stations for inexpensive product shot 
on telefilm that could be flexibly inserted into the schedule and made 
available for local sponsorships. As Ziv’s early success, and the 
emergence of companies like Desilu and Mark VII, attest the 1950s was 
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the era for “independents.” While many would fold by mid-decade as the 
networks began consolidating their power and the Hollywood major 
studios entered into the production market, several independents, 
including Desilu, would continue to grow. In fact, independently produced 
telefilm series would become even more important to the networks as the 
decade progressed.  
All of these factors also seemed to favor the Green Hornet brand. 
TCM labeled the series a crime drama and even revised the Green Hornet 
formula in order to align it further with other popular crime thrillers. 
Moreover, TCM had a proven track record of selling its properties 
inexpensively market-to-market (usually at a fraction of the highest priced 
like-genre series available). Yet, TCM’s attempts would prove 
incongruous with industry standards and perceptions of the television 
audience. The most popular crime series claimed that they were 
dramatizing real-life events and used semi-documentary aesthetics. 
Despite efforts to position the Green Hornet brand within these traditions, 
the formula’s reliance on secret identities, costumed crime fighting, and 
gadgetry (like the Green Hornet’s gas gun or his super car, the Black 
Beauty) made it difficult for TCM to convince sponsors that the series 
possessed the “true crime” appeal that adult audiences allegedly craved. 
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Even as TCM argued for the adult appeal of its property, the 
networks continued to frame The Green Hornet as juvenile, which was a 
reversal of their previous concerns that the program was too adult for child 
radio listeners. TCM’s continued comic book licensing endeavors did not 
improve its position, in spite of the swing within the comic book industry 
toward more mature crime and horror genres. In fact, the backlash felt 
within the comic book field further complicated TCM’s efforts to reinvent 
its property. By the early 1950s, comic book publishers, under threat of 
government regulation, refocused their products almost entirely on the 
children’s market, just as crime dramas on television were embracing 
‘documentary realism’ as adult-oriented fare.  
Aside from genre difficulties, TCM could not adapt its business 
model to meet the rapidly changing culture of television production in the 
mid-to-late 1950s. In part, TCM’s business model was too closely tied to 
the old commercial radio model. TCM’s power rested in its strong 
relationship with corporate sponsors, advertising agencies, and 
independent stations, all of whom were being pushed to the side by the 
end of the 1950s. Moreover, even as other independents diversified their 
interests in order to stay relevant, expanding into multiple series’ 
productions, distribution, syndication, merchandising, etc., TCM was 
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actually moving backwards. The radio market for live and transcribed 
dramatic series dried up by mid-decade, depriving the company of its only 
direct production tie. From the mid-1950s onward, TCM operated only as 
a licensor. Furthermore, Trendle was simply unwilling to give up his 
intermediary status and managerial authority, which had sustained TCM’s 
licensing practices since the early 1930s. As the networks increased their 
control over television production throughout the 1950s, independent 
producers found themselves needing to adjust to new, less autonomous 
roles or risk being squeezed out. The same was true of independent 
licensors.  
TCM often responded to changing production conditions by 
reasserting its long history of successful management to prove that it 
should be given an opportunity to produce a Green Hornet television 
series.   Its efforts to leverage the established selling power of its company 
and property were often met with skepticism over the Green Hornet’s 
long-worn status. On the one hand, TCM’s arguments floundered because 
the Green Hornet did not have the sales credibility the Lone Ranger 
possessed. On the other hand, its discourse of “tried-and-true” failed to 
resonate with changing attitudes within the television industry that was 
seeking new ideas or, at least, new versions of old ones. The recycling 
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strategies that had fueled TCM’s successes for two decades were 
incompatible with an institutional production culture that could afford to 
demand updated products. 
In part, TCM’s unwillingness to change production strategies 
demonstrates its outdated practices, but it also points to the fewer outlets 
available to independents to make a profitable deal in the classical 
network era. TCM could ill-afford to produce a new Green Hornet pilot 
every year without guarantee of the series being picked up.  Those willing 
to put up the money increasingly wanted a bigger stake of the profits, 
including merchandising and syndication, to offset the risks. While both 
Trendle and The Green Hornet would have one last hurrah in the mid 
1960s when William Dozier’s Greenaway Productions took an interest in 
the property (see next chapter), the interim period between 1948-1964 
would result in TCM’s dissolution as an independent licensing agency as 
would the integration of many of the practices and strategies it and other 
licensors developed into larger corporate structures who now licensed in-
house. Significantly, the late 1950s were a transition period not only 
because the networks and Hollywood major studios began centralizing 
their authority over television production, but also because they would do 
so by appropriating the successful strategies and practices introduced by 
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independent producers and licensors, while marginalizing the cultural 
authority of these independents. While some adapted to the new climate, 
others like Trendle refused to abandon their position as autonomous moral 
arbiters and brand managers.    
In the rest of this chapter, I first will briefly outline the Green 
Hornet brand’s checkered history throughout the late 1940s and early 1950 
and will situate its progression within changing cultural and production 
contexts. I then will explore in greater detail TCM’s attempts to redress 
the Green Hornet formula to meet new expectations of “realism” in the 
crime drama and will identify why  potential networks and sponsors were 
not impressed sufficiently by these changes. Finally, I will address TCM’s 
refusal to adjust its business model in the face of institutional changes and 
will argue that cultural valuations of its own autonomy and authority 
played as big a part as economic rationales in TCM’s intransigence.  
 
THE GREEN HORNET POSTWAR BUSINESS 
TCM was as active throughout the 1950s as any independent 
licensor. The Lone Ranger brand was a phenomenal success (see previous 
chapter). Sergeant Preston of the Yukon, which the licensor had first 
introduced on radio in 1940, followed The Lone Ranger to television in 
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1955, lasting three seasons and seventy-eight episodes on the CBS 
network sponsored by Quaker Oats. CBS intentionally scheduled Sergeant 
Preston against ABC’s Lone Ranger on Thursday nights at 7:30PM. By 
1954, a year before Sergeant Preston debuted on television, however, 
TCM had already sold off the Lone Ranger brand to the Wrather 
Corporation for $3,000,000. In 1957, TCM would sell the Sergeant 
Preston brand to Wrather as well for $1,500,000. Raymond Meurer’s 
involvement with TCM decreased after the Lone Ranger sale, when he 
briefly was employed by Jack Wrather’s company to help sort through the 
legal concerns resulting from the transfer of copyright ownership. By the 
end of the decade, H. Allen Campbell also was considering other projects. 
Even though the day-to-day operations of the licensor were now almost 
exclusively in Trendle’s hands, both Allen Campbell and Meurer remained 
stockholders in the Green Hornet, Inc., meaning that Trendle still required 
their approval on any deal he made.2 
While the Green Hornet was not as successful as either the Lone 
Ranger or Sergeant Preston, TCM continued to work on extending the 
brand throughout the postwar era, with mixed results. Shifting production 
conditions coupled with the licensor’s “purposeful” neglect of the brand 
complicated efforts to transform the Green Hornet into the same type of 
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profitable and popular icon as TCM’s other properties. Toward the end the 
decade, Trendle would claimed that his company devoted less effort to the 
Green Hornet than the other two franchises because the revenues earned 
from the Lone Ranger and Sergeant Preston were so high, that 
consequently 90 percent of any earnings from the Green Hornet would 
have been taken away in taxes.3 While there is some truth to the fact that 
TCM had its hands full with its other properties, the company certainly did 
not ignore the Green Hornet. The licensor simply struggled to make the 
brand resonate with sponsors and licensees. 
In the postwar years, comic books were perhaps the most 
successful market that the Green Hornet brand tapped. Harvey 
Publications, Inc., published a quarterly 48-page Green Hornet comic 
book from 1941-1949, with print runs ranging from 400,000-600,000 
copies (this reflects the number of copies printed and distributed to 
retailers, not the number of copies sold, which would have been far less). 
TCM continued to maintain that the Green Hornet brand appealed to 
adults and the postwar era saw a burgeoning adult audience for comic 
books, partially because G.I.’s had become regular comic book readers 
during the war (an estimated 25 percent of readers were high school 
graduates).4,Harvey Comics, however, had a distinct children’s appeal. 
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The company would eventually become best known for publishing Richie 
Rich and Casper, the Friendly Ghost comic books. In the 1940s, Harvey’s 
other radio adaptation was Terry and the Pirates, a series that made no 
qualms about targeting children.  
Throughout the 1940s, Harvey paid TCM 15 percent of net profits 
per issue, but in 1947, the royalty agreement was changed to a $1000 
minimum on each issue printed, plus 15 percent on profits exceeding that 
minimum.5 By the late 1940s, however, the rising cost of newsprint was 
severely cutting into Harvey’s profits. Newsprint costs had risen 
significantly in the postwar era as the OPA’s wartime price controls were 
loosened and eventually abandoned. In 1942, newsprint cost $51/ton. In 
1947, the cost had risen to $91/ton. TCM’s contract with Harvey did not 
take into account cost hikes in printing. Harvey tried in vain to renegotiate, 
offering TCM 1/4 cent on every comic book sold instead of the flat $1000 
minimum royalty. Trendle balked, preferring the stability of a guaranteed 
royalty to speculative returns on comic book sales.6 After issue #43 was 
published, in November 1949, the contract was not renewed. 
TCM’s timing in canceling its comic book contract proved 
unfortunate, as the early 1950s were boom years for the comic book 
industry. The number of published titles rose from 300 in 1950 to 650 in 
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1953. Revenue rose accordingly from $41 million to $90 million. In 1953, 
it was estimated that the American public spent nearly $1 billion on comic 
book purchases at a nickel or dime an issue. The number of comic books 
in circulation was estimated to have risen from 17 million in 1940 to 70 
million in 1953. As the next section will elaborate, however, there were 
other reasons why TCM was not able simply to sign with a different comic 
book company that had to do with the Green Hornet’s formula butting 
heads with the comic book industry’s heavy investment in the “true crime” 
genre . 
TCM also continued to have troubles placing a Green Hornet 
comic strip with a major syndicate. Though the licensor had been singing 
the praises of a comic strip’s cross-marketing potential since the late 
1930s, nothing had ever materialized. In part, this had to do with the mis-
timing of the radio series’ network-hopping in the early 1940s with the 
release of Universal’s film serials and with the failure to attract other 
media and merchandising outlets that saw the stability of a proven radio 
presence as a prerequisite for investment. Newspaper syndicates were 
particularly loath to publish comic strips without proven track records. 
This would only intensify in the postwar era and into the 1950s. As Lloyd 
E. Smith, president of the Western Printing and Lithographing Company, 
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explained to Raymond Meurer in 1953, “the comic strip field is very much 
overcrowded... many of them are reluctant to take on a new strip until they 
are convinced that there is a special reason for doing so, such as a great 
deal of promotion and publicity behind a name.”7 Moreover, newspaper 
syndicates increasingly were reluctant to develop properties they did not 
own outright.8  In this manner, TCM possibly suffered from its own 
successful cross-promotion efforts, as by the 1950s syndicates were 
increasingly seeing the value of comic strip properties as brands first to be 
licensed to other media and manufacturing outlets, and only secondarily as 
popular strips in their own right. It is not coincidental that the early 1950s 
saw the births of two of the most merchandised comic strips of all time, 
Charles Schultz’s Peanuts (first run in 1950) and Hank Ketchum’s Dennis 
the Menace (first run in 1951). 
Green Hornet merchandising also was virtually non-existent. TCM 
devoted most of its efforts to licensing the Lone Ranger and Sergeant 
Preston of the Yukon, claiming that any profits they might have earned 
from the Green Hornet would have been eaten up by taxes because of the 
large sums of money being generated through the other two brands. 
Meanwhile,  the Green Hornet brand’s continued inability to land a steady 
radio sponsor and its absence from television also contributed to the basic 
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lack of exposure necessary for generating interest by other licensees. As 
Smith’s aforementioned correspondence with Meurer continued, “In this 
way the television program of the GREEN HORNET when it starts will 
certainly be of great help [in landing a comic strip deal].”  
Throughout the postwar period, The Green Hornet radio program 
was largely broadcast on a sustaining basis over the ABC radio network. 
The series made the jump from NBC Blue to ABC in November 1945 and 
would remain unsponsored until June 1947 when General Mills, also 
sponsoring The Lone Ranger, took on the series, airing it a 7:30PM and 
oddly choosing to play Betty Crocker commercials during the advertising 
breaks.  General Mills cancelled its contract in August 1948.  ABC once 
again took the series up on a sustaining basis and immediately moved it to 
a 5:00PM time slot. As a sustaining rather than a sponsored series, TCM 
was paid far less for the series. In 1948, ABC paid TCM $750 per 
broadcast, a fraction of the $2000 per broadcast TCM was asking from 
potential sponsors.9 The series was also subject to ABC’s scheduling 
decisions. Whereas it was assumed that both adults and children listened at 
7:30PM, 5:00PM was a far less ambiguous time that clearly targeted 
children.  
ABC immediately issued Trendle a warning about toning down the 
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violence and mature content on the series. Trendle complained that he did 
not have an interest in making a children’s program (though he admitted 
that The Green Hornet did have a healthy children’s following to 
complement its adult audience), but capitulated that his company was 
delighted to have the program placed at any time ABC felt might help it 
procure a new sponsor.10 Similarly, when Orange-Crush assumed 
sponsorship of the radio series in November 1951 and placed it on the 
Mutual Broadcasting System as part of the network’s “kid block” from 
5:00-6:00PM, TCM took no exception.11 Advocacy groups regularly 
derided the crime genre as bad for children, and sponsors were either 
loathe to take on this negative publicity or demanded that the program be 
softened in order to appease concerned parents. Radio network and 
sponsor demands conflicted with the direction both comic book publishers 
and television was taking the crime genre, which was decidedly more 
adult in tone. 
Revealing the extent to which radio’s centrality for sponsors was 
beginning to erode by the early 1950s, Orange-Crush initially also willing 
only to enter into a transcription arrangement with TCM at a cost of $500 
per acetate recording.12 Orange-Crush selectively chose the markets to 
broadcast these recording, leaving much of the country without the 
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program. The apparent success of the program in assisting Orange-Crush 
sales agents in reaching retailers led to a live recording contract in May 
1952, which promised $4000 per week for two episodes.13 Orange-Crush 
then abruptly cancelled its contract on June 4, 1952. 
Orange-Crush’s exact reasons for pulling out of its contract are 
unclear. The company changed management in November 1952 and, 
according to Charles C. Fitzmorris of Fitzmorris and Miller Advertising, 
the new O-C head, Jack Thompson, did not believe in network radio as an 
advertising medium. Fitzmorris’s arrangements with Orange-Crush, 
however, were somewhat dubious. The advertising agent sought to 
convince TCM that the May, 1952 contract did not require Orange-
Crush’s signature in order to be legally binding; it was only after TCM 
insisted upon this signature that the deal was cancelled. Orange-Crush also 
dropped Fitzmorris and Miller as its advertising agency soon afterwards. 
Trendle continued to hold Fitzmorris accountable for the contract, to no 
avail. In his correspondence with Fitzmorris, Trendle admitted that his 
company was counting on the Orange-Crush revenue to pay for a portion 
of the television pilot.14  
TCM understood full well the increasingly central role television 
was playing after 1949 in furthering trans-media licensing and 
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merchandising arrangements, especially for comic books and comic strips. 
As early as December 1950 TCM tried to bring the Green Hornet to the 
small screen by attempting to buy outright the two film serials, produced 
by Universal Pictures in 1940 and 1941, to exhibit on television. 
Christopher Anderson, Michele Hilmes, and Michael Kackman, amongst 
others, have pointed to the early presence of Hollywood B-westerns on 
television.15 These serials and shorts often were crudely spliced together 
and sold to local markets seeking to fill programming gaps and attract 
local sponsorship. In the early years of television, the first-run syndication 
market offered lucrative possibilities for independent producers to sell 
repackaged Hollywood B-fare as well as cheaply produced series shot on 
telefilm. William Boyd is often pointed to as having successfully 
relaunched the Hopalong Cassidy franchise after acquiring the television 
rights to the B-films he starred in throughout the 1930s and recirculating 
them on television.16 TCM’s negotiations with Universal suggest that B-
westerns were not the only Hollywood product that was deemed 
marketable on television. Universal and TCM reached an initial agreement 
on December 21, 1950, in which TCM agreed to pay $90,000 for both 
serials while granting Universal the foreign rights for six years.17 The deal 
was contingent upon TCM finding a sponsor for the serials. By January 
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31, 1951 Trendle conceded that he was unable to procure sponsorship 
because advertisers were reluctant to take on both serials at once.18 TCM’s 
failure to place the serials with a television sponsor may also have been 
due to the limited number of episodes available. There were only 30 Green 
Hornet “chapters” versus dozens of Hopalong Cassidy film shorts. 
While the networks primarily concentrated on producing live 
anthology dramas during television’s early years, they quickly recognized 
the value of telefilm in shoring up their control over affiliates and sponsors 
alike. Telefilm series could be “brokered” by networks to sponsors, 
inverting the live radio and anthology drama model, in which sponsors 
sought to use networks as common carriers for programming created by 
sponsors and their advertising agencies.19 Additionally, telefilm series 
offered far more flexibility than the live-anthology model. Telefilm 
allowed networks to rearrange the programming schedule at will and to 
time-delay materials for opposite coasts (whereas a live show broadcast 
out of a New York studio at 7PM would either be seen at 4PM, off-peak 
hours, in Los Angeles or need to be performed twice, either costing 
networks viewers or increasing their expenses). It also afforded networks 
the opportunity for residuals by selling an off-network series into 
syndication once it had run its course on the network. In fact, telefilm 
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series allowed the networks to hedge their bets entirely, giving them the 
option to either broadcast a series on the network or sell it directly into the 
first-run market. Networks began syndicating both first-run and rerun 
programming as early as 1951.20 By assuming greater control over the 
first-run syndication market and by offering affiliates better quality 
programming, the networks succeeded in either marginalizing or reeling in 
independent producers who previously had operated alongside or even 
outside of the network’s clutches.  
TCM expressed very little interest in the first-run syndication 
market during television’s early years, preferring the comforts of 
procuring sponsorship over a national network. The licensor had moved 
away from the market-to-market sales approach in the early 1940s and it 
had tremendous initial success with The Lone Ranger TV series sponsored 
by General Mills over ABC-TV. General Mills and its advertising agency, 
not ABC, were responsible for selling the series to markets still without an 
ABC affiliate. It perhaps was only natural that TCM would seek to 
replicate that model with The Green Hornet. By the time TCM recognized 
that it was not going to be able to do so, both the first-run syndication 
market and the number of independent producers still actively pursuing 
local single-sponsors had greatly diminished. Moreover, the continued 
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juvenile label thrust on the Green Hornet brand made it difficult to attract 
the largely beer and gasoline companies who continued to sponsor locally 
syndicated programming.21 
 Perhaps the single greatest reason though why TCM could not 
develop a Green Hornet television series as it had with the Lone Ranger 
and Sergeant Preston was that the former lacked the track record of its 
fellow-properties. Early television was an unproven, and thus expensive, 
proposition for sponsors, even for cheaply produced series. Many early 
television series adapted successful radio programs, often simulcast on 
both media to lessen the potential production cost for sponsors. Likewise, 
many early television series were paid for by their radio sponsors and 
appeared on the television network equivalents as their radio homes. 
General Mills paid for The Lone Ranger television series to be broadcast 
on the ABC network, the same network that had been airing the radio 
series since 1946 for the same sponsor, who had been attached to the Lone 
Ranger property since 1941. By 1952, The Green Hornet radio series was 
broadcast on the Mutual Broadcasting System. Mutual was the only radio 
network not actively seeking to move into television. TCM could not 
count on the network to help procure a TV deal as it had with ABC for 
The Lone Ranger. Mutual necessarily attracted more conservative 
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sponsors unwilling to invest in the more experimental medium.  Orange-
Crush was under fairly conservative management that did not see the 
value of pursuing the unproven television market (though it did demand 
the right of first refusal for any future TV deal in its contract).22 Moreover, 
The Green Hornet had not sustained a sponsor for more than a couple of 
years consecutively and had moved back-and-forth across networks 
throughout the late 1930s and early 1940s (see chapter 2). In fact, by 1950, 
it had spent more years on the air on a sustaining basis than as a sponsored 
series. In part, this had to do with the feared generic unsuitability of the 
Green Hornet formula for its assumed juvenile audience (despite TCM’s 
claims that the series was intended for adults). Consequently, even though 
the series had been around since 1937 and had fairly decent ratings on the 
radio, it was still seen by many early television sponsors as speculative at 
best.23 
Unable to convince a sponsor to invest in the Green Hornet serials, 
TCM decided to finance the production a television pilot that it would use 
to land a regular TV series. TCM entered into a contract with Jack Chertok 
at Apex Film Corporation on November 13, 1951 to produce a Green 
Hornet pilot. The total cost was $27,500, to be paid in three installments.24 
Chertok was also producing The Lone Ranger television series for TCM at 
 402
the time. The pilot’s price tag was high for an independently produced 
television program shot on telefilm. The Lone Ranger pilot had been shot 
for only $10,000 and by 1951, individual episodes of that series were 
being filmed at $13,600 each. While the Green Hornet’s urban 
contemporary setting might have driven the price up, Ziv’s similarly 
contemporary I Led 3 Lives (1953-1956) cost only approximately $18,000 
per episode.25 Likewise, Schatz notes that the average cost per telefilm 
episode sold by independents to the networks in 1951-52 was $14,000.26 
TCM might have sought to sell a Green Hornet series directly to a sponsor 
through a major network as it had with The Lone Ranger series, foregoing 
the market-to-market approach that independents like Ziv and Boyd 
specialized in. The budget for The Green Hornet pilot suggests that they 
were trying to impress a large sponsor, not produce an affordable series 
for local sponsors. Regardless, The Green Hornet pilot’s cost likely priced 
the property out of the first-run syndication market.27 Thus, without 
enough of a proven track record to appeal to national sponsors or 
networks, and too expensive for local sponsorship and the first-run 
syndication market, The Green Hornet failed to make the leap to TV. 
Despite this initial setback, TCM tried to generate a Green Hornet 
TV series throughout the decade and well into the early 1960s. After all, 
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TV was essential to extending the brand into other media and 
merchandising arenas. The licensor tried various strategies to convince 
sponsors, networks, and producers that a Green Hornet series could be as 
successful as any of the other crime shows on TV, as well as any of the 
adult westerns that would come to dominate the networks’ prime time 
lineups by the mid-1950s. TCM was even willing to alter the Green 
Hornet formula - within limits - to make the brand more adult-friendly.  
As the next section will explore in greater detail, the licensor also 
continually misunderstood the distinctions between its brand and the 
changing conventions of both the crime and western genres in which it 
repeatedly attempted to situate The Green Hornet, further confusing the 
way the brand was marketed. 
 
GENRE REFORMULATION AND CONFUSION  
Even as the Green Hornet brand supposedly existed above and 
outside of the particular texts and products in which it was featured, the 
Green Hornet formula relied on particular genre conventions for its 
articulation. The Green Hornet’s adventures positioned the brand within a 
crime drama narrative, but the Green Hornet’s characterization was 
intended to update the Lone Ranger’s personality, infusing elements of the 
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western into an urban milieu. Like the Lone Ranger, the Green Hornet was 
a masked vigilante fighting to clean up crime, while existing on the 
margins of the society he vowed to protect. While the western hero could 
never fully be civilized, his urban counterpart resorted to a dual identity in 
order to move in and out of society’s institutions. Beyond this, both the 
Lone Ranger and Green Hornet were accompanied by racialized sidekicks 
and used violence to administer swift justice. Moreover, both brands were 
designed to produce premiums and adorn merchandise that appealed most 
directly to children (despite Trendle’s repeated efforts to reposition The 
Green Hornet radio series as targeting adults).  As argued in chapter 3, the 
comparisons King-Trendle made in the 1930s between the two brands 
negatively impacted the Green Hornet’s popularity amongst sponsors and 
manufacturers. These troubles would be further confounded in the 1950s 
by the divergent directions the crime drama and western genres would 
take on television, along with their mutual though differently-constructed 
appeals to adult consumers. While the Green Hornet brand mixed 
elements from both genres, the Green Hornet formula conformed to 
neither. The formula adjustments TCM would attempt to make only 
seemed to confuse matters further.  
By the early 1950s, there were several successful crime series 
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already on television being produced by independents for both the 
networks and the first-run syndication market alike. These included Mark 
VII’s Dragnet (195X-1958) on NBC, Treasury Men in Action (1950-1954) 
on ABC/NBC and Ziv’s syndicated  I Led 3 Lives and The Man Called X 
(1955-1957). I Led 3 Lives was America’s top-rated syndicated series for 
nearly a year.28 The popularity of the crime drama certainly seemed to 
favor TCM making a Green Hornet deal. After all, the Green Hornet 
formula fit the crime series bill. The Green Hornet busted up rackets in an 
urban setting that the police could not touch.  
Multiple elements distinguished these series from the Green 
Hornet concept, including:  1) the protagonists for these series were 
usually lawmen and/or government agents battling Communist infiltrators 
(though Dragnet dealt with garden-variety criminals as well); 2) these 
series were often endorsed by the CIA or FBI as effectively teaching 
American’s about the imminent dangers of Communist expansionism; 3) 
these series transformed their limited budgets from liabilities to assets by 
promoting a semi-documentary aesthetic that gave the show a “real” look; 
and perhaps most importantly 4) these series claimed to be based on real 
events and people.29 I Led 3 Lives told the story of Herbert Philbrick, an 
actual undercover spy who infiltrated Communist rings for the US 
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government. Similarly, Dragnet stated at the beginning of every episode 
that all events depicted were true, with only names and dates changed to 
protect the innocent. According to Kackman, the reality claims made by 
these series served both as effective marketing and demonstrations of 
television’s civic responsibility. “Thus while produced on the cheap, these 
shows relied on their documentary status to gain credibility as quality 
television with a civic function.”30 
TCM did its best to reconstruct the Green Hornet formula to 
conform to these emerging criteria. In keeping with the licensor’s concern 
for inter-textual consistency, the Green Hornet formula was altered at the 
brand level, with changes incorporated into all Green Hornet texts. The 
most significant change that TCM made to the Green Hornet formula in 
the 1950s was to contain their hero within the law. Previously, the 
character was written as a vigilante who went after criminals the legal 
system could not bring down. The Green Hornet was feared and despised 
by criminals and the police alike --in fact, one of the recurring subplots of 
the radio series had been that Britt Reid’s bodyguard, ex-cop Mike 
Axford, was determined to bring the Green Hornet to justice, never 
realizing that his boss was secretly the anti-hero he was hunting.31 In a 
cold war climate where subversion of authority was viewed suspiciously, 
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TCM recast the hero as an upstanding citizen and a “civic corruption 
investigator,” who worked with the law to hunt down Communist threats 
and other non-conforming elements.32 As Trendle explained to Leon 
Harvey about the direction for future Green Hornet comic book stories, 
“change [has]... been made in the formula to take Britt Reid out of the 
criminal class and have him work with the police.”33 
While this formula change was certainly opportunistic, as it sought 
to build on the growth of congressional investigations and special 
prosecutors hunting down Communist threats in the US, it also was 
motivated by discourses of civic duty that could be found in other crime 
series. TCM had sought to have its brands endorse civic participation since 
the 1930s with the Lone Ranger Safety Clubs. Publicity kits sent in 1952 
to local radio stations on the Mutual network, designed to assist in the 
promotion of the Orange-Crush-sponsored series, encouraged salesmen to 
forge connections with “vigilante committees” and “social agencies” that 
were “mushrooming up all over the nation... [to aid in] the suppression of 
crime and the exposing of racketeers.”34 These largely anti-Communist 
groups were seen as sites of positive endorsement that would boost sales 
similar to the earlier Lone Ranger Safety Club efforts to get local police 
and public officials to lend support to that show’s (sponsor’s) efforts to 
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teach about traffic safety. Unsurprisingly, the tip-sheet for radio salesmen 
also encouraged them to promote the series in local schools with radio 
clubs as an example of outstanding mystery because “justice always 
triumphs.”35  
TCM also flirted with ways to make the Green Hornet formula 
conform to the increased emphasis on “realism” in the crime genre.  
Harvey Comics approached TCM in 1948 about adapting the Green 
Hornet comic book to follow this true crime formula in an effort to bolster 
sales. Harvey’s efforts to shift the Green Hornet formula anticipated the 
trend that several comic book publishers in the early 1950s would pursue 
to produce titles that catered to a growing teen and young adult consumer 
base.36 The genres that were most successful with this demographic were 
the horror and true crime books, many of which seemed to question and 
undermine conformist middle class values.37 Between 1950-1954, as a 
testament to the sales success of these types of books, twenty-eight 
different companies published nearly 100 titles in these genres.38  
Harvey’s idea was to have the Green Hornet narrate a lurid tale of 
corruption and crime that would end with the message that crime did not 
pay, but in the process would focus more on the criminal than on the hero 
who brought them to justice.39 TCM briefly considered the idea, asking 
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Harvey for a sample story, but also worried about legal problems that 
would arise from people claiming that the story recounted their lives 
without permission.40 Moreover, the licensor was unwilling to experiment 
with storytelling styles that took the spotlight off its property, in favor of 
promoting characters it did not license outright. They refused Harvey’s 
suggestion of emphasizing the words “racket buster” in the comic book’s 
title because “we are definitely taking the play away from the Green 
Hornet and putting it on Racket Busters... we would be the parties who 
would be helping you to build up a new comic magazine... and the 
GREEN HORNET could very readily be eliminated after a short 
period.”41 
Furthermore, comic books that focused on crime were also coming 
under attack for their anti-authoritarian stories that either glamorized 
criminality or equated moral corruption with middle-class values. Failing 
to recognize the shifting age demographic of comic book readers, many 
critics pointed to these same titles aimed at adults as proof that comic 
books were corrupting American youth, contributing to juvenile 
delinquency, and possibly leading to increased Communist sympathy, 
criminality, and even homosexuality.42 Frederick Wertham published in 
1954his highly influential indictment of comic books, Seduction of the 
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Innocent, which decried their harmful effect on children and their sinister 
ability to turn youth against their parents. On April 22, 1954, one day 
before the Army-McCarthy hearings commenced, the Senate 
Subcommittee to Investigate Juvenile Delinquency began its investigation 
of the comic book industry. The subcommittee’s most vocal member, 
Senator Estes Kefauver, argued, “not even the Communist conspiracy 
could devise a more effective way to demoralize, disrupt, confuse and 
destroy our future citizens than apathy on the part of adult Americans to 
the scourge known as juvenile delinquency.”43 At the heart of the problem, 
Kefauver saw the unregulated publishing of horror and true crime 
comics.44  
TCM’s formula modification also was somewhat determined by its 
need to separate the Green Hornet property from the crime genre with 
which it had previously been associated. As the licensor explained to 
Helen Meyer at Dell Publishing, “the force for good and patriotism and 
justice, together with scientific adventure and the outstanding sports car, 
coupled with the fact that the dominant character, Britt Reid, is a 
newspaper publisher, we believe, sets the Green Hornet apart from a 
‘crime Series.’”45 TCM thus was caught in a bind. While it reworked the 
Green Hornet formula to make it conform to emerging crime genre semi-
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documentary conventions on television aimed at adult audiences, it was 
unwilling to make changes that might make the property controversial 
amongst radio sponsors and other potential licensees who still defined the 
brand as primarily targeting children. The licensor remained economically 
tied to the interests of its sponsors and network relations, making refusal 
to comply with their wishes virtually impossible.  
By 1952, the radio series was no longer on the air and TCM was 
much more assertive in claiming a distinctly adult audience for The Green 
Hornet. Trendle blamed the time slot the series had occupied on radio for 
previous sponsor misperceptions of The Green Hornet’s child appeal.46 He 
pointed to outdated statistics that proved the series had an adult 
following.47 He hypothesized that because the series still resonated in 
popular memory, an adult audience was clamoring for its television 
version to debut.48 He reasoned that only slight variations in the 
characters’ appearances, the insertion of a romantic lead in place of a sleek 
automobile, and the drawing of story ideas from newspaper headlines 
were all that would be needed to modernize the property. As he wrote to 
Leo Bland, “I know your office has this typed as a juvenile show, but I 
shall be delighted to put long skirts on the automobile, and whiskers on 
Britt Reid, if that will make any difference.”49  
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While TCM had rejected Harvey’s suggestions, it was willing to 
promote the brand’s ability to tackle modern-day threats taken directly 
from the newspaper headlines of the day. Writing to Leonard Goldenson at 
ABC, Trendle promised that a Green Hornet series would “follow the 
latest newspaper stories of crime, political grafting and intrigue” in order 
to appeal to an adult audience supposedly clamoring for “realism.”50 In 
another instance Trendle wrote to John Goetz at NBC suggesting, “The 
present steel strike negotiations could easily be a basis for a GREEN 
HORNET-TV show. The negotiations with Russia, the Cuban situation, 
All of these things could be made into fascinating television shows and 
create a huge audience.”51 
Yet, perhaps because TCM desired to extend the brand into other 
media that catered more exclusively to children, such as comic books and 
comic strips, the licensor regularly tempered its claims to an adult 
audience by pointing to The Green Hornet’s potential for pleasing both 
adults and children. The same letter to Goetz spells out that though a 
Green Hornet TV series could be slanted toward an adult audience, it 
would “still capture the youth of America, because it is a show that will 
always be timely.”52 Moreover, the licensor never addressed the 
fundamental distinction between his brand and other crime genre series on 
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TV in the 1950s, namely the completely science-fiction basis for The 
Green Hornet. Kackman argues that the truth claims made by crime series 
in the 1950s were often more rhetorical flourish than fact, pointing to the 
great liberties they took in presenting historical events and to their 
tendency to “translate distant geopolitical events into familiar, and often 
familial, everyday incidents” rooted in the melodramatic tradition, rather 
than the documentary one. Still,  these series were at least able to point to 
an actual person or event they were fictionalizing.53  The Green Hornet 
sought to combine elements of the semi-documentary with aspects from 
superhero and mystery genres, including Britt Reid’s secret identity and 
use of cool gadgetry and disguise to catch criminals. Trendle never 
bothered to address how the Green Hornet’s costuming and gadgetry 
might potentially deter his property’s claims to realism, instead 
positioning the Green Hornet as providing the best of both worlds. “I think 
it would be a much better show than Dragnet, or any of that type and with 
the gadget, known as a ‘gas gun’ we retain the youngsters and still interest 
the adult audience.”54  
As the 1950s drew to a close, the institutional and social conditions 
that had produced the semi-documentary phase in crime dramas began to 
dissipate. TCM, however, continued to advocate for a Green Hornet series 
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that responded precisely to the civic mission and semi-documentary 
narrative logic of the earlier series. As late as 1958, Trendle’s point of 
comparison for a Green Hornet series remained Dragnet.  Dragnet had 
been a top rated show throughout the first half of the 1950s, even eclipsing 
I Love Lucy in a 1953 poll and winning several awards, including TV 
Guide’s “best cop show” and the Emmy for Best Mystery, Action or 
Adventure program from 1952-1954 respectively.  By 1958, the series’ 
popularity was diminishing as was the network’s interest in this type of 
program. 
The Hollywood majors entered into series production in 1955, 
bringing with them vastly improved production values and increased 
production costs. Studio production for television became the norm by the 
end of the decade. Series like Dragnet began to look amateurish and 
plodding in comparison. The first-run syndication market dwindled as the 
networks expanded both their schedules and affiliate base. The number of 
cheaply produced telefilm series declined as affiliates took advantage of 
the better quality programs offered by the networks and studios. 
Moreover, the waning of the Red Scare resulted in television no longer 
seeking federal endorsement of its public service mission. As Kackman 
summarizes, “The narrative model of ‘documentary melodrama’ that was 
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the product of these peculiar political relationships was becoming 
increasingly unwieldy in practice, and unconvincing to audiences; the 
simplistic treatment of the national interest central to the format was 
growing suspect, even to the point of parody.”55 By the late 1950s the type 
of reverence for authority that series like Dragnet or Naked City (1958-
1963) were steeped in (and with which The Green Hornet sought to align 
itself) was beginning to be phased out and replaced by a new breed of cop 
show like 77 Sunset Strip (1958-1964) and Peter Gunn (1958-1961), 
which injected humor and action into its plots and updated the hard-boiled 
private-eye, making him less authoritarian and more in tune with social 
issues.56 The continued comparisons Trendle sought to draw with Dragnet 
inevitably worked against the licensor’s efforts to have his property taken 
seriously as adult fare. 
TCM took the Green Hornet formula very seriously. Whereas the 
Green Hornet brand had been too unrealistic to conform to early 1950s 
crime drama expectations, the licensor’s continued refusal to recognize the 
Green Hornet’s parodic possibilities toward the end of the decade proved 
just as out of touch with industry conceptualizations of their audience. 
Amazingly, the crime genre was neither the only point of reference TCM 
attempted to use for The Green Hornet, nor was it the most improbable.  
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Though TCM devoted most of its energy in the 1950s to aligning 
The Green Hornet with other crime dramas, the licensor also regularly 
made comparisons between the brand and the adult westerns that were 
overtaking the prime time lineups by mid-decade. Building on the success 
of the B-westerns and more kid-friendly fare like The Lone Ranger and 
Hopalong Cassidy on early 1950s television, adult westerns were 
primarily produced by the Hollywood majors, a vast majority by Warner 
Bros. Conversion of their B-film units to television studios, and offsetting 
the costs of series production through their motion picture output (and 
vice-versa), put the studios in a position to produce more expensive 
programming than the independents and to hold out longer to recoup 
expenses, which meant that they could sell initial series for far less than 
independent producers could.  
In 1954, Disney Studios entered into a production arrangement 
with ABC to produce Disneyland. As Christopher Anderson argues, ABC 
was the most likely candidate to welcome filmed Hollywood products 
because of its perennial third-place status. Disney was eager because it 
saw the program as an opportunity to publicize its theme park and as a 
way to recycle its cartoon shorts that no longer were being shown in 
movie theaters.57 At the same time, Columbia Studios’ subsidiary, Screen 
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Gems, began producing Father Knows Best for CBS. In 1955, Warner 
Bros., the first Hollywood major, joined in. Warner Bros Presents adapted 
three of the studios biggest film hits, Cheyenne, King’s Row, and 
Casablanca into TV series. While the latter two would not catch on, 
Cheyenne lasted eight seasons.58 The majors offered primarily one-hour 
series and guaranteed “superior production values.”59 By 1959, 80 percent 
of the three networks’ prime-time schedules were being produced in 
Hollywood. Series like Gunsmoke (1955-1975), The Rifleman (1958-
1963), and Maverick (1957-1962) tackled more adult-oriented themes, like 
racism, poverty, and post-traumatic syndrome.  They used their historical 
setting and genre conventions to resolve conflict through old-fashioned 
fisticuffs or black-hat versus white-hat shootouts.60 By the mid 1950s, 
“adult” westerns made up the majority of prime time television’s line up, 
peaking in 1959 when they accounted for 30 individual series and 26 
percent of the total network prime time schedule.  
TCM sought to align its Green Hornet property with this craze.  It 
told General Mills President Henry Cox in 1957 that “THE GREEN 
HORNET would match ratings with your Wyatt Earp, without question” 
and Vice-President Clifford Samuelson in 1959 that a TV series “will have 
a much greater audience appeal, also an adult appeal as large as any of the 
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so-called adult Westerns.”61 At other instances, Trendle insisted that the 
series could be made as “adult” as Gunsmoke with very little change to the 
overall formula.62  While TCM’s comparisons might initially seem 
desperate or ridiculous, it is important to recall that TCM did not think of 
The Green Hornet as exclusively a crime series, but primarily as a branded 
formula that intentionally bore similarities to its Lone Ranger cousin. As 
such, the licensor had no difficulty in comparing The Green Hornet to 
both crime and western genre series present on TV during this decade as 
part of its efforts to sell the property. Interestingly, Warner Bros., would 
similarly exhibit little difficulty in swapping out the formulas for its crime 
and western TV series, suggesting both their generic similarities,  and 
what Chris Anderson has referred to as “the pathology of mass 
production” that dominated late-1950s TV, in which shows were 
assembled with seemingly interchangeable parts.63   
The Green Hornet’s modern setting, however, made it very 
difficult for the formula to address the same issues in a similar way to the 
adult western. Adult westerns appealed to sponsors and networks alike 
because they could take contemporary social concerns and reposition them 
in the American past.  These problems could be resolved through the 
western genre’s penchant for dichotomous articulations of right and wrong 
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and bursts of violence that ignored the increasingly complex bureaucratic 
and social conditions of contemporary life.64 The Green Hornet’s fight 
against racketeers repositioned the hero as part of the bureaucratic 
machine. Moreover, the Green Hornet’s use of violence to resolve 
contemporary concerns seemed simplistic and resulted in the brand 
consistently being labeled “juvenile” even as the licensor compared it with 
other adult westerns.65 Interestingly, this label was a reversal of the 
concerns expressed in the early 1940s when national broadcasters feared 
the series too adult for a presumed children’s audience because of its 
violent nature. 
The assumed juvenile appeal of The Green Hornet was reinforced 
through formula revisions that transformed the hero from a mysterious 
vigilante into a costumed super-cop. Furthermore, the poorly designed 
and/or timed comparisons with other genre programs, whether westerns or 
crime dramas, made it difficult for TCM to sell the property even as the 
adult western craze seemed destined to be replaced by spy programming 
by the early 1960s.66 Trendle often expressed exasperation over his 
inability to convince sponsors and network executives that The Green 
Hornet could have an adult appeal. On January 5, 1959, he wrote to 
Thomas W. Moore of ABC, “I am indeed sorry that you have not been 
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able to convince anyone that THE GREEN HORNET is an adult show, or 
can be made so with very little change. It bothers me very much, not 
because it makes an awful lot of difference whether we get a sponsor or 
not, but because I cannot get across the idea of the show being an adult 
product. It just lets me down badly.”67 
Trendle’s troubles, however, were not merely the result of the 
Green Hornet formula’s uncomfortable fit with other television genres of 
the era; they resulted from his unwillingness to adapt his business formula 
to other programming and production patterns emerging in television 
during the 1950s. While TCM was willing to tweak the Green Hornet 
formula, it was not willing or able to change its marketing strategies or 
financial arrangements to meet changes in the TV industry. The next 
section explores television’s changing production context from the early-
to-late-1950s, and will position both  Trendle’s business model in 
opposition to dominant modes of operation and Trendle’s business 
philosophy as an “independent” in opposition to the prevailing roles for 
independent producers that would emerge by decades end. 
 
LOSING “INDEPENDENCE” 
Mark Alvey has described late 1950s television as “a period of 
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stabilization, setting the stage for the stasis - both industrial and creative of 
the 1960s.”68 For independent producers, however, practically the entire 
decade was one of transition from relative autonomy to what Thomas 
Schatz has characterized as “subcontractor status.”69  The opportunities 
afforded to “self-contained firms” -- independent producers like Ziv who 
financed their own telefilm productions and distributed their products 
under their own corporate banners70 -- to sell series directly to sponsors 
(whether local or national), and to access the first-run syndication market 
by selling series directly to local stations, dwindled after 1952 and almost 
disappeared entirely by the early 1960s. As late as 1956, there were still 
30-odd syndicated shows on television during prime time hours. By 1963, 
there were only three such series. As Schatz explains, “In 1960, all three 
networks... pressured affiliates to accept their full prime-time schedules, 
which forced the first-run syndication series out of mainstream 
production.”71 What happened?  
The FCC freeze ended in late 1952, which lifted the four-year ban 
on issuing new station licenses. By 1955, the number of television stations 
quadrupled from 108 to over 400, while the percentage of American 
homes with at least one television set climbed rapidly from 12 percent in 
1950, to 67 percent in 1955, to 83 percent by January1958.72 Along with 
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this multiplication of television stations and viewers came increased 
financial stakes for those involved in television production up to this point, 
namely the producers, sponsors, ad agencies, and networks. Production 
costs rose as networks clamored to acquire affiliate stations in newly 
opened markets by offering better “quality” television. As costs rose, 
single sponsors found it more and more difficult to cover the entire cost of 
series production, leading to the gradual integration of the multiple-
sponsor system throughout the decade. With this shift, sponsor authority 
diminished and advertising agencies, which had been so heavily involved 
in radio production, ceded their roles in the programming process.73 
Though TCM usurped the role played by the advertising agency in 
the production of The Lone Ranger, Sergeant Preston, and Green Hornet 
radio series, the licensor’s understanding of series production was still 
deeply rooted in the radio production model. TCM continued to advocate 
for a single sponsor to assume the full cost of producing a Green Hornet 
series and place it on a network long after this system had become 
obsolete. Even when TCM was willing to consider alternative models of 
financing, these models all involved a sponsor putting up some percentage 
of the production cost as an advance and reimbursement upon the delivery 
of a rough cut of each episode, not after the series had entered into 
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syndication.74 With the shift from sponsor-produced programming to 
magazine-format advertising, it was virtually impossible to find a sponsor 
who would pay the cost of shooting a pilot, let alone a series. In 1961, 
responding to Desilu’s Warren Lewis’ suggested terms of sale for a Green 
Hornet television series, Trendle elaborated in great detail on his previous 
arrangement with Jack Chertok and General Mills for The Lone Ranger 
TV series.  He stated, “as I see the situation, our main trouble is a sponsor. 
If I have a sponsor, I can get the product financed and made without any 
difficulty.”75 While such arrangements were feasible in the early 1950s, 
Trendle continued to insist upon some variation thereof well into the early 
1960s.  
Beyond the single-sponsor model, TCM continued to follow the 
recycling strategies it had employed successfully in promoting its brands 
throughout the late 1930s and 1940s, This was most apparent when it 
came to the use of the 1952 Green Hornet television pilot, which was still 
in circulation as late as 1960. Despite repeated suggestions that the 
licensor film another pilot, TCM remained resolute that this was 
unnecessary when dealing with a proven product such the Green Hornet 
and an established and experienced production team such as themselves.76 
In fact, TCM regularly marketed its prior experiences with The Lone 
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Ranger and Sergeant Preston of the Yukon as all the proof necessary to 
ensure that The Green Hornet would make a successful television series. 
In 1954, a promotional packet for The Green Hornet pilot stated, “you - 
the advertiser - are prone to look for tested programs, established name 
franchises, and skilled, well capitalized offices to assist in your marketing 
problems as well as the mechanics of good show production... confidence 
and assurance are what you demand. That is our business.”77 The same 
rhetorical logic was still being used in 1957. “I have always had the 
distinct feeling that a pilot film is a great thing to have, when one does not 
know the producing company and the show is something that has never 
been on radio and is an unknown quantity... You know I did make 180 
Lone Ranger television shows and 78 Sergeant Preston of the Yukon 
shows... The ratings speak for themselves. The Hornet shows would be 
produced and handled by the same people.”78 Even in 1959, Trendle 
resisted shooting a new pilot: “We... feel that our reputation should not 
make it necessary for us to make a half dozen pilots of each film to 
convince a prospective advertiser that we know what we are doing.”79 
The recycling strategies that had succeeded for TCM in the past 
were out of step with the currency of “newness” that pervaded the 
television market in the late 1950s. As Bernard L. Schubert of the 
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Schubert Talent Agency warned Trendle in 1959, “In this business people 
are inclined to evaluate ideas on the basis of the year that it was submitted 
to them...the Madison Avenue mentality is such that to re-submit a show 
that’s been around, or was submitted some years ago, would only result in 
coloring any future decisions made on the series.”80 It is tempting to 
conclude that Trendle fundamentally misunderstood the direction 
broadcasting was heading. As late as 1959, Trendle was still hopeful that 
the golden age radio formats that had launched The Lone Ranger and The 
Green Hornet would soon return.81 Yet, such a conclusion ignores how 
new models of conducting business in the emergent classical network era 
favored the networks and larger Hollywood studios over the independent 
producers and licensors.  
At the end of the day, Trendle’s refusal to shoot a new pilot despite 
all warnings to the contrary was likely a financial decision. Whereas 
General Mills had paid the cost of production for the Lone Ranger pilot 
(and all 180 episodes filmed), TCM had financed the Green Hornet out of 
pocket. The licensor simply could not afford to shoot another pilot without 
guarantee of having the series picked up.82 Even by the mid 1950s, with 
the entrance of the major Hollywood studios into series production and the 
consolidation of network power over sponsors and advertising agencies, 
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production costs for pilots were increasing dramatically and the number of 
pilots selected by networks for series production reflected only a fraction 
of those actually produced. Whereas the cost of the 1951 Green Hornet 
pilot might have been too high for the first-run syndication market, by mid 
decade productions costs per episode could easily exceed five times the 
$28,000 TCM paid.  
Independent producers found themselves in need of a new strategy, 
as the single-sponsor system was gradually phased out, the direct 
syndication route was blocked, and the expectations of networks and 
audiences alike for telefilm series were raised by the expensive 
productions coming out of the Hollywood studio back lots, Many 
independents simply disappeared but others, like Desilu which produced I 
Love Lucy, remained - and even thrived - though at a great loss of their 
previous autonomy. Desilu and other independents survived because they 
diversified and accepted reduced creative authority over their productions 
by entering into “participation sponsorship” arrangements with the 
networks that made the latter de facto co-owners of Desilu’s properties. 
Many independent producers were one-shot companies, focused on 
creating a single telefilm series and selling it to a national sponsor to place 
on a network or syndicating the product to local affiliates.  Desilu quickly 
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recognized the importance of expanding its production repertoire to 
multiple series and genres and the value of retaining the rerun rights to 
their productions. Early on, Desilu negotiated to retain the syndication 
rights to I Love Lucy, eventually selling those back to CBS in 1955 for 
$4,500,000. The independent also produced other pre-sold properties like 
Our Miss Brooks (1952- 1956) and December Bride (1954-1959), both 
popular radio comedies for which Desilu bought the rights. Desilu 
convinced CBS to program December Bride immediately after I Love 
Lucy on Mondays at 9:30PM, guaranteeing the latter series a strong lead-
in audience. The company also diversified into other genres, producing, 
for example, the western The Adventures of Jim Bowie (1956-1958) and 
the crime drama The Untouchables (1958-1963). Desilu purchased RKO 
studios in 1957, primarily for its back lot, in order to accommodate these 
expansions. By 1959, even with its fortunes beginning to decline, Desilu 
was still producing upwards of 25 series for network television.83  
Having sold off its most successful properties by the mid 1950s, 
TCM seemed to be moving in the opposite direction of Desilu’s 
diversification efforts. Moreover, after the cancellation of The Green 
Hornet radio series in 1952, TCM abandoned its only direct link to series 
production, exclusively devoting its attention to licensing the brand. 
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Without access to production facilities or revenue from its other properties 
to fall back on, TCM could ill-afford to absorb the cost of financing a 
Green Hornet television series on its own. Yet, without a television series 
to generate exposure for the Green Hornet brand, TCM could not rustle up 
interest among other potential licensees. Ironically, TCM’s exclusive 
focus on licensing actually hurt its merchandising efforts. The company’s 
failure to diversify into either television production or distribution, or to 
retain the rights to its more lucrative properties, compounded its struggles 
to extend the Green Hornet brand, whereas Desilu was able to use profits 
from the sale of I Love Lucy reruns to finance new projects.  
Desilu’s ability to produce so much product for the networks was 
contingent upon new types of production relationships with them. The cost 
of series production required a company to engage in “deficit financing” 
practices in order to see profits. Deficit financing refers to the practice of 
producing a series at a loss and waiting for off-network syndication to 
recoup on one’s investment. Very few producers outside of the major 
Hollywood studios could afford to do this. The studios managed because 
they could defray costs from feature film revenue or by loaning out their 
production facilities.84 Desilu’s multiple on-going productions also 
allowed it to take revenue from one series and invest it in another. More 
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common were new forms of co-partnerships with the networks, which 
would invest in the production of a pilot or a series in exchange for 
retaining a share of the distribution, syndication, and merchandising rights, 
in addition to profits gleaned from advertising revenue.85 Network 
investment often only covered a fraction of the actual cost of production, 
but their ownership rights often reached 50 percent. In so doing, 
independent producers not only sacrificed part of their profits, but a good 
deal of their creative authority, as networks increasingly became involved 
in production decisions or dictated what types of programming might be 
worthy of their investment. Whereas previously there had been hundreds 
of potential sponsors to strike production deals with, now there were only 
three options. Networks demanded more control over production, partial 
ownership over product, and lower sales prices. All this made it 
increasingly difficult for independents to survive.86 Those that did were 
often independent in name only, functioning as de facto production arms 
for the networks or by employing similarly unfair business practices to 
squeeze out independents even smaller than themselves. As Schatz argues, 
even “Desilu’s autonomy and authority - its so-called ‘independence’ - 
steadily diminished as the economic stakes rose and the networks 
consolidated their control over the TV industry.”87 
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In fact, the networks greatly desired that independent producers 
remain active yet contained within the television production system. 
Independent producers allowed the networks to deflect accusations of 
monopolistic practices that had befallen the film industry in the 1940s. 
Independent productions also greatly reduced the risk of investing in a 
failed series. Co-financing multiple pilots at a fraction of their actual cost 
and then choosing the best ones to proceed with ensured the networks a 
wide array of choices for only a minimal investment.88  
While TCM’s business model drew on the single-sponsor system 
that was popular on radio, in many ways what the licensor actually sought 
for itself was the exact arrangement the networks managed to put in place 
by the early 1960s.  TCM wanted a situation  in which the licensor 
retained ownership of the product, had complete script and casting 
approval, and supervised the production, but made virtually no financial 
investment that might prove financially risky. This agreement had made 
sense when TCM’s managerial authority was extended beyond one 
medium across a vast inter-text of products bearing its brands. At its 
height, TCM essentially was the central node of a trans-mediated network, 
selecting the most appropriate licensees for its brands, while investing no 
more than the cost of promotional materials in order to keep its properties 
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in the eyes of potential sponsors and manufacturers.  By the end of the 
1950s, the networks not only were performing this supervisory role in-
house, but also were involved in inter-textual management. ABC opened 
up its own licensing and merchandising division in 1957. The other 
networks quickly followed suit. Network co-financing arrangements often 
involved securing the merchandising rights to series they help develop.  
Those independents still operating on the margins by the early 
1960s competed with one another for an increasingly smaller piece of the 
TV pie.  Moreover, they often were pressed into dubious partnership 
arrangements with each other, in which more entrenched independents 
sought to exploit their smaller counterparts the ways the networks, 
themselves, exploited them. Thus, it is not so much that TCM found itself 
in the position of having no takers for the Green Hornet property , but that 
the offers they did receive were often from parties who demanded a great 
deal of control and/or rights without guarantees that they could produce 
any results. Whereas the networks were willing to invest in a pilot in 
exchange for 50 percent ownership of a series, 89 independent production 
companies like Larry Harmon Pictures, producers of the Bozo the Clown 
cartoon series, and Desilu were willing to raise the money to produce a 
series but offered TCM only a small royalty on the net profits they might 
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earn if a series were to be produced.90 In exchange, these independents 
sought to tie up the exclusive rights to The Green Hornet for up to two 
years, own the merchandising and commercial tie-up rights to the property 
(for which they would also pay TCM a percentage of the gross sums 
received), and extend these exclusive rights into perpetuity so long as they 
paid TCM a nominal amount.  Harmon’s offer included the right for TCM 
to cancel his contract after eight years if the payment he received was less 
than $3000 and, even then, Harmon would retain non-exclusive rights to 
continue to exploit the episodes produced and related merchandise and 
commercial tie-ups.91  
Trendle expressed confusion over these stipulations. He responded 
to Desilu’s Lewis, “your sample contract... is so very different from 
anything I have ever seen, I cannot quite accustom myself to this type of a 
deal.”92 His objections included the tie-ing up of The Green Hornet on an 
exclusive basis for such a lengthy time period without a guaranteed 
sponsor and/or network deal, which meant that all the producer promised 
was that episodes would be filmed, and nothing else. Trendle also objected 
to the paltry percentage he would earn as the brand’s owner as well as the 
amount of time it would take for him to see payment (if any were to 
arrive), since he estimated that it would take several years for the series to 
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amass $100,000 in net profits.93  
His greatest reservation, however, lay in his managerial authority 
being usurped by the production company. His response to Lewis repeated 
at various points that all aspects of exploiting his previous properties were 
“subject to my approval.”94 In a letter to Mortimer Becker of Becker & 
London, Trendle expressed his frustration over the type of offer being 
made on his property. “We turn the product over to you and you may kill 
it or make saleable feature out of it at your discretion and that we cannot 
grant. Any product that we control will be supervised by us; the scripts 
will be approved by us, as well as the leads, and we shall exercise 
sufficient supervision to know that our product’s value is not being 
destroyed.”95 
Trendle’s demands for the same managerial oversight that he 
previously had enjoyed were now seen as unrealistic by prospective 
producers, who assumed they should have complete creative and 
merchandising authority as a condition for putting up the capital for the 
production. Trendle’s mode of property management was out of step with 
the pace independent producers followed during this transitional period.  
Trendle’s unwillingness to loosen the reigns, however, was not a mere 
matter of stubbornness. As has been argued throughout this project, the 
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licensor’s very identity and function had been defined by his ability to 
manage the movements of the intangible properties he owned, grounding 
them both economically and culturally within value systems favored by 
corporate capitalism and, not coincidentally, also financially rewarding to 
his company. As such, management was an essential part of the licensing 
process. Yet, by the early 1960s, Trendle was no longer in a position to 
make these demands legitimately. Increasingly, this type of managerial 
authority was possible only within diversified media producing 
corporations like Desilu or Warner Bros. (and even their authority was 
constrained), or within the networks themselves. 
 
CONCLUSION 
Heading into the 1950s, TCM had a proven track record of 
extending its brands across media. The Lone Ranger and Sergeant Preston 
of the Yukon were both phenomenally successful on radio and television. 
The Green Hornet had been on radio for many years with an established 
listening audience. Early television borrowed heavily from radio’s pre-
sold programming. Moreover, the crime drama would be one of the most 
successful genres on 1950s television. Independent producers would also 
continue to play an important role in series production throughout the 
 435
decade.  Yet, despite the apparent opportunities available throughout the 
1950s for TCM to extend the Green Hornet brand into television, the 
licensor repeatedly failed to do so.  
TCM’s difficulties came from both the incompatibility of the Green 
Hornet formula with the generic conventions of the 1950s crime drama 
and the obsolescence of the licensor’s business model for extending the 
Green Hornet brand. Crime dramas in the 1950s, particularly the cheaply 
produced telefilm variety, relied heavily on claims of “documentary 
realism” in their promotional rhetoric. Many crime shows adapted the 
“true” stories of real law enforcement officers or crimes. TCM’s efforts to 
align the Green Hornet formula with this model failed because the 
character’s costumed identity and gadgetry diminished the brand’s claim 
to realistically depict crime. Despite the licensor’s persistent claims that 
the Green Hornet was an adult property (or could be made into one with 
very little effort), TCM remained unable to convince TV networks and 
sponsors of this. Unfortunately, even as the crime drama’s semi-
documentary conventions waned by the end of the decade, TCM refused 
to play up the formulas eccentricities, continuing to take the Green Hornet 
very seriously.  
TCM also tried to compare a Green Hornet TV series with the 
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emerging adult westerns of the mid-1950s. While somewhat opportunistic, 
TCM’s comparisons between The Green Hornet and Gunsmoke 
demonstrated the fluidity with which the licensor transferred the 
repackaged formula across genres. The Green Hornet formula was 
originally an updated and modernized variation on the Lone Ranger’s and 
TCM had little trouble comparing the Green Hornet brand with other 
westerns on TV. TCM failed to take into account, however, that adult 
western, because of its historical setting, allowed for an exploration of 
contemporary social issues that could be resolved in relatively formulaic 
ways without seeming trite. The Green Hornet’s formula called for a black 
and white moral universe that seemed simplistic because of its 
contemporary setting.  
TCM’s willingness to innovate on the Green Hornet formula was 
often accompanied by an intransigence toward changing its business 
model. Even as the licensor pitched a potential Green Hornet TV series as 
modern and “torn from contemporary headlines,” it continued to circulate 
an outdated television pilot and rely on its past accomplishments as a 
rhetorical selling strategy meant to justify industry trust in their brand and 
in themselves as brand managers.  Failure to meet repeated requests for an 
updated pilot hampered TCM’s ability to sell the Green Hornet property. 
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Changing production conditions throughout the 1950s repositioned 
“independents” as sub-contractors to the networks. Rising production 
costs and the erosion of the first-run syndication market forced many 
independent producers out of business. While some companies like Desilu 
flourished, their success required elaborate and diversified operations and 
came at the expense of diminished autonomy and creative authority. By 
1954, TCM had sold off the rights to its most profitable brand, the Lone 
Ranger, and by 1957, Sergeant Preston as well. Moreover, as live series 
radio production came to a halt by mid-decade, TCM’s last hold on any 
direct control over programming vanished. TCM faced a culture of 
dwindling independent producers, the near-eradication of single sponsors, 
and increased network leverage. Any arrangement TCM considered now 
required the licensor to accept less money, offered fewer guarantees of 
success and, most importantly, demanded that it relinquish its managerial 
authority over its property. TCM was particularly unwilling to abandon 
the managerial authority it had commanded throughout the 1940s and 
early 1950s. TCM regularly rejected production opportunities for a Green 
Hornet TV series precisely because producers demanded strict control 
over exploiting the brand in exchange for putting up the financing. While 
other independents were willing to readjust their operations to 
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accommodate the emerging production climate, TCM’s identity remained 
too steeped in its autonomous control over its brands to fall in line. Even 
Desilu’s power would dissipate as the network hegemony took hold in the 
early 1960s, though they were able to hold out and remain productive 
somewhat longer than TCM  
Though Trendle would continue to pursue a television deal for The 
Green Hornet and would eventually succeed, his authority and value as an 
independent licensor was becoming obsolete. The practices and values 
Trendle championed were not vanishing entirely (though some were). By 
the mid 1960s, however,  they were increasingly being absorbed back into 
larger and more diversified media/corporate entities that preferred in-
house licensing and merchandising over their independently contracted 
equivalents. Companies like MCA-Universal, which formed in 1962, and 
was the first of the ‘modern’ conglomerates, and Time-Warner, which was 
gradually organized throughout the mid-to-late 1960s as the Kinney 
Corporation bought out both National Press Periodicals in 1966 and 
Warner Bros., in 1969, began usurping the power and “authority” that had 
been so important to Trendle’s earlier success. By the mid-1960s, the 
viability of the ‘independent licensor’ model was, quite simply, over, even 
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Chapter Six: Introduction 
In 1964, America went 007 crazy. One year later, Batmania swept 
the land. The James Bond movie franchise and the William Dozier 
produced Batman television series were both hip variations on long-
established popular genres, the spy thriller and the superhero adventure 
series; the latter was a campy television retelling of an already existing 
and proven commodity, the Batman comic book. Both texts were also 
licensing phenomena, generating nearly $130,000,000 in merchandising 
sales between them in 1964-65 alone. Batman also played an important 
role in reviving institutional memory and nostalgia for “forgotten” brands 
like the Green Hornet, which were now seen as prime properties for 
revision and repackaging as modern merchandising machines. As early as 
1957, ABC-TV operated its own merchandising department and by the 
mid-1960s, all three networks as well as the major Hollywood studios 
were heavily invested in the merchandising possibilities of any series they 
produced. In 1965, Dozier’s Greenaway Productions, in partnership with 
20th Century Fox licensed the television and merchandising rights to The 
Green Hornet. ABC, which also broadcast the Batman series, bought 
sixteen episodes before a pilot script was even developed, along with the 
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merchandising rights, which they sub-licensed from Greenaway and Fox. 
Trendle’s much-delayed hopes of landing a TV series for his remaining 
property were on the verge of being fulfilled. One year later though, the 
series would be cancelled after only 26 episodes, disappointing ratings, 
and poor product sales, effectively ending the property’s checkered trans-
mediated career for good. What happened?  
There are many explanations for why The Green Hornet series 
failed, including poor writing, an over-reliance by ABC on national 
Nielsen ratings instead of urban population measurements (the series rated 
much higher when only the top-30 urban markets were considered, but did 
poorly when rural communities were counted), and, ironically, a desire by 
Dozier not to ape his own prior success with Batman by giving The Green 
Hornet the same camp treatment (which is the opposite of what ABC 
likely expected when they purchased the series). There was also a 
miscalculation and misrepresentation of the property’s prior appeal. The 
Green Hornet had never achieved the same type of national exposure or 
merchandising success as the Lone Ranger or Batman. In this chapter, I 
argue that Dozier/ABC-TV’s and Trendle’s competing memories of the 
Green Hornet’s value played an integral part in the muddled production of 
the television series and its related merchandising campaign.  
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John Bodnar and Barbie Zelizer are careful to distinguish between 
history and memory, asserting that the latter is always a selective and 
malleable interpretation of actual past events.1 While most analyses of 
memory and television have either focused on textual representations of 
history or on audience recollections of particular televised programs or 
events, it is also important to consider how memories are strategically and 
selectively employed within the cultural industries at the production level 
and in the very selection processes of what products to produce. In other 
words, memory is not merely a product convention, but a production 
convention as well. Moreover, as Steve Anderson reminds, “Memory, like 
history, is best understood as a site of discursive struggle.”2 Different 
people working on the same production will bring different memories to 
bear on the product (whether of past production experiences or past 
experiences of the product itself) and these competing memories will 
shape the end result. Both Dozier and Trendle looked back on the 1930s 
Green Hornet radio series to justify their claims, each remembering quite 
differently the reasons for its success, while each also forgetting that The 
Green Hornet radio series had never really been successful. Licensors like 
Trendle, whose livelihood was staked on his ability to recycle past success 
stories with his brands, had selective memory strategies ingrained into the 
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very promotional practices he employed. Yet, Trendle’s memories also 
were shaped by the particular civic and moral values that had informed the 
creation of his brand formulas during the Depression and postwar era. 
Trendle believed that the Green Hornet’s ability to teach viewers about 
civic duty and police work were at the core of its appeal. In contrast, 
Dozier and ABC-TV saw the gadgetry (the gas gun, the car) and adventure 
built into the Green Hornet formula as central to the brand’s historical 
ability to generate merchandising opportunities, which now might be 
renewed.  
While both the Bond and Batman properties relied on the popular 
(and pre-sold) personalities of their protagonists to appeal to consumers, 
both were also clear examples of the turn within the cultural industries 
toward merchandise-driven content, with an emphasis on gimmicks and 
gadgets that could be quickly converted into toys (for both children and 
adults). To be certain, the recognition that unique personalities could sell 
the very products they used as part of their adventures was not new. As 
early as 1933, Trendle had stressed that the Lone Ranger shoot silver 
bullets as a way of generating premiums.3 Trendle had believed that it was 
the Lone Ranger, Green Hornet, and Sergeant Preston personalities that 
inevitably made these products appealing - that the gadgets were 
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outgrowths of the characters - and thus insisted on the significance of 
logical continuity between his characters and their devices; the James 
Bond films and Batman television series were purposely designed to 
introduce regularly (to the point of being formulaic) new gadgets that their 
heroes could use (and thus brand) in order to generate new merchandising 
possibilities at every turn. 
Trendle’s insistence that the Green Hornet remain continuous with 
its 1940s characterization and plotting was at odds with Dozier’s desire to 
introduce new gadgets and a wider variety of villains into the series. 
Trendle’s and Dozier’s conceptualizations of how to “modernize” the 
property also differed significantly, and Trendle repeatedly threatened to 
invoke his contractual right to script approval and voiced strong 
opposition to the changes Dozier sought to make. Trendle also remained 
intransigent about the audience for the series, adamantly (and selectively) 
remembering it as an adult property, despite Dozier’s and ABC’s need to 
appeal to younger viewers watching at 7:30PM. These tensions, which 
revolved around Dozier’s and Trendle’s different understandings of the 
property’s value, had a real impact on both the tonal consistency of the 
series and its ability to generate merchandising possibilities for ABC. 
Inevitably, it was this new in-house intersection between network 
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programming and merchandising that both initially renewed interest in the 
Green Hornet property and finally spelled its demise. 
By the mid-1960s, many of the practices and strategies that 
independent licensors had developed over the past thirty years were being 
reproduced within the increasingly diversified and integrated network 
television system that controlled production, distribution, and exhibition 
outlets and that operated sophisticated licensing and merchandising 
operations tied directly into these vertically integrated operations. Other 
cultural producers were also beginning to recognize the primary value of 
established properties as merchandising outlets, as evidenced by National 
Press Periodicals’ (NPP), publishers of DC Comics and owners of the 
Superman and Batman brands, purchase of the Licensing Corporation of 
America (LCA) in 1965. In 1966, NPP would be purchased by the Kinney 
Corporation, which would further integrate and diversify its media 
conglomerate empire by acquiring in 1969 Warner Bros. Studios, a 
leading television producer and established motion picture studio, and 
Time-Life Publishing in 1972.  Time-Warner joined MCA-Universal, 
which had officially merged in 1962, as one of the first major media 
conglomerates. Brand licensing and cross-promotion of commercial 
intertexts would become increasingly important to Time-Warner’s 
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business model. 
All that remained was the elimination of lingering independent 
licensors like Trendle, whose outmoded cultural values now interfered 
with the brand exploitation strategies they had shepherded. Not only did 
financial operations in the classical network era make it virtually 
impossible for independent licensors to profit from their properties, but the 
networks justified their increased creative control on the logic that 
competing ideas (especially from “outsiders”) interfered with the smooth 
management of cross-merchandized and trans-mediated brands. While The 
Green Hornet television series was a failure for many reasons, the fact that 
Trendle’s meddling was singled out as the central cause by both Dozier 
and the networks is key to understanding the direction the cultural 
industries were heading. 
 
THE CLASSICAL NETWORK ERA 
The mid-1960s to the mid-1970s are considered by many to be one 
of the most socially challenging eras in contemporary American history, 
as various marginalized and disaffected groups, including African-
Americans, women, homosexuals, anti-war protestors, and other counter-
culture enthusiasts, publicly resisted the containment logics of the 1950s. 
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By 1965, the year Batman debuted on national television, the Black Power 
Movement was in full swing, growing more militant following the 
assassination of Malcolm X that same year. The Watts riots erupted in Los 
Angeles in response to perceived police brutality against the African 
American community. The 1969 Stonewall riot shined a public light on 
the gay community’s struggle against discrimination, which had for 
decades been rendered invisible. Betty Friedan wrote The Feminine 
Mystique in 1963, challenging the patriarchal hierarchy that forced women 
into subordinate roles as mothers and housewives, and in 1966, Friedan 
helped launch the National Organization for Women (NOW), which 
quickly grew to 48,000 members by 1974. Draft-eligible college students 
began protesting the Vietnam War as early as 1964, while the counter-
culture also found a home on college campuses, advocating against 
materialist, militaristic, and repressive values. 
For most of the 1960s, however, these struggles were largely 
absent from network television. They did find expression in Hollywood 
films and alternative media catering to the youth culture’s more politicized 
sensibilities. Hollywood seized upon this youth market in response to 
declining box-office revenues from traditional genre films, but, as Tom 
Schatz has argued, the Hollywood art-cinema wave, led by Francis Ford-
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Coppola, Robert Altman, Sam Peckinpah, Stanley Kuberick, Arthur Penn, 
and Mike Nichols would be short-lived and eclipsed by the blockbuster 
and branding logics of the New Hollywood.4 Already in 1964, the James 
Bond franchise was pointing to a more viable profit model for the studios. 
Television was also interested in attracting the youth market, but 
the general boon experienced by the three networks during the height of 
the classical network era, also made them reluctant to fully abandon 
already successful programs and programming formulas. By 1965, the 
three networks either owned or shared in the profits for 91 percent of all 
prime-time programming. They also earned significant revenue from 
syndication rights and residuals. While rarely mentioned in most histories 
of this era, all three networks also operated their own licensing and 
merchandising divisions, earning significant profit from commercial tie-
ins to successful programs. Since the networks did not pay the full cost of 
series production, the Hollywood studios were practically the only players 
in the market who could afford to wait for syndication to recoup. Even the 
studios, however, began contracting independent producers to handle the 
creative end of series production and, beyond sharing in the net profits, 
charged these independents significant overhead fees in exchange for 
leasing out studio space and equipment.  
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Of the three networks, ABC was the most youth conscious. 
Though it was perennially in third place until the mid 1970s, ABC’s share 
of the market was still significant, and its focus on youth markets was 
partly a branding strategy – though one that was not entirely motivated by 
necessity. In general, however, all three networks began paying greater 
attention to the youth market in the 1960s, responding both to the 
increased disposable income and media-friendliness of this demographic 
and to the emergence of more specialized ratings data that segmented the 
market according to generational tastes. The teenagers the networks 
pursued were not the counter culture youth the film studios were going 
after, but a more sanitized variation. Programs like Gidget (1965-1966) 
and The Patty Duke Show (1963-1966) re-envisioned the traditional family 
sitcom from the perspectives of boy-crazy teenaged girls, providing their 
protagonists with greater agency than many previous representations, but 
whose content was  largely apolitical. The networks did not fail to 
recognize the increasing rebelliousness of the youth culture, and they did 
attempt to find ways of infusing vague anti-authoritarian themes into 
programming that targeted teens.  They also remained conscious that the 
older audience had not completely vanished. The result often was 
programming that tried to have it both ways, appealing to dual audiences 
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on varying levels.  
Lynn Spigel has termed the comedy variations of programs geared 
at multiple generational audiences “fantastical sitcoms” because they often 
infused unrealistic and bizarre twists into the otherwise traditional 
domestic setting for this genre. Series like Bewitched (1964-1972), I 
Dream of Jeannie (1965-1970), The Addams Family (1964-1966), and The 
Beverly Hillbillies (1962-1971) worked on two levels, simultaneously re-
affirming and deconstructing middle-class values through their surreal re-
interpretation of the nuclear family.5 Such programming often tried to 
infuse the parodic and anti-hierarchical style-politics embraced by the 
youth culture into established generic situations appreciated by more adult 
audiences. These programs also had the added advantage of generating 
multiple merchandising outlets catering to different viewer sensibilities. In 
this regard, they may have challenged middle-class values, but not the 
consumer culture that fostered them. Certainly, Batman was intended to be 
read through this bi-focal lens, as action-and-adventure friendly for small 
children and camp parody for young adults, while generating commercial 
tie-ins for audiences of all ages. By the early 1970s, these fantastical 
variations would be replaced by more overtly political “quality” sitcoms 
like All in the Family (1971-1983) and Mary Tyler Moore (1970-1977).  
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To a certain extent, TV series like Batman and film franchises like 
James Bond purposely blurred the boundaries between action and comedy. 
Batman was certainly action-packed, but at 30-minutes twice-weekly, 
instead of 60-minutes once a week, and with tongue-firmly-planted-in-
cheek, it is little wonder that it was nominated for best comedy series in 
1966. Similarly, Bond’s one-liners were as integral to the successful 
formula as were his myriad gadgets and sexual conquests. Arguably, by 
infusing a sense of ironic humor into the action-adventure format, these 
texts further allowed for multiple audience readings, suitable for both pro 
and anti-materialist, conservative and progressive, high and lowbrow 
tastes. The wide-ranging trans-media and merchandising potential of these 
texts were, in fact, not only a licensor’s dream come true, but were driven 
by licensing logic from their very outset.  
 
BOND, BATMANIA, INSTITUTIONAL NOSTALGIA AND 
MERCHANDISING  
The 1965-1967 Batman television series was one of the most 
successful integrated merchandising and licensing phenomena to date – 
something most historical accounts of the series only mention in passing. 
The analyses that have been written on the series have been primarily 
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concerned with either its appeals to multiple audiences, whether 
generational or queer, or with its relationship to the emerging pop art 
movement and camp sensibilities of the late 1960s.6 Both approaches are 
also largely directed outward, at audience reception and recollections of 
the series, while giving only a passing glance at the institutional context in 
which Batman emerged. Of these accounts, Will Brooker’s work is 
perhaps the most engaged with situating the series historically within the 
“institutional matrix” of television, but as Brooker concedes, his form of 
analysis “tends toward reconstructing institutions and audiences from 
textual analysis.”7 In other words, Brooker seeks to understand 1960s 
television’s institutional culture by reading backwards from the Batman 
TV text produced within it.  
The shortcoming of such an approach is that it often privileges a 
select set of texts (in Brooker’s case, the television text) over the brand 
inter-text that functions as the locus of managing cultural meanings for 
licensed trans-mediated properties like Batman and which is adjusted to 
institutional goals. As Bennett and Woollacott argue in relation to the 
James Bond phenomenon, “it is within the circulations and exchanges 
between [advertising, fanzine articles, interviews, spoofs, and parody] 
texts and the films and novels that the figure of Bond has achieved the 
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wider popular currency... as the relations between these texts have 
changed, so the figure of Bond has functioned as the bearer of different 
meanings at different points in time, in different contexts and for different 
audiences.”8 
While Bennett and Woollacott point to the significance of 
understanding how shifting relationships between institutions shape the 
meanings that popular icons like James Bond take on, they rarely if ever 
identify the roles that branding, licensing, and merchandising play in 
delineating, exploiting, and linking the various textual representations a 
licensed property inhabits within this institutional matrix, nor the 
licensor’s function as navigator of shifting institutional and cultural tides. 
Thus, they never once mention the Licensing Corporation of America’s 
(LCA) role in furthering Bond’s popularity, just as Brooker never 
mentions them in relation to the Batman television series. I argue that by 
focusing inwards on the roles licensing and merchandising played in 
furthering and shaping the public’s awareness of these properties, the 
significance of both Bond and Batman as “popular heroes” takes on 
additional meaning, because they point to a moment of integration within 
the cultural industries, where the licensing practices developed by the likes 
of Trendle-Campbell-Meurer (TCM) from the 1930s-1950s are beginning 
 459
to be fulfilled in-house by media producers and are becoming central to 
production strategies.  
Jay Emmett and Allan Stone formed the LCA in 1960. Both men 
had been involved in the licensing profession for many years before their 
partnership, Stone as licensor for Howdy Doody, the television puppet 
character created by his brother, Martin Stone, and Emmett for National 
Press Periodicals’ (NPP) stable of superhero characters. Emmett had been 
licensing Superman and Batman merchandise since the late 1940s, having 
convinced his uncle, National Periodicals CEO Jack Liebowitz, to let him 
handle the (at that point) peripheral aspects of the company’s business 
dealings, such as placing Superman’s face on t-shirts in exchange for a 
small royalty on every deal he could make. In the late 1950s, Stone also 
became the licensor for Lassie, while Emmett merchandised the Pat Boone 
show.  Both Stone and Emmett had tried unsuccessfully to expand their 
licensing businesses by representing actors in merchandising and 
sponsorship deals - Stone with Jackie Gleason and Emmett with Brigitte 
Bardot – but quickly learned that fictional properties could be 
merchandised far better than their often-unruly performers.9 The two 
partnered in 1960 and landed the James Bond licensing contract in 1965. 
LCA’s Bond licenses pulled in approximately $50 million in retail sales in 
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1965. Batman, which LCA also licensed through Emmett’s NPP 
connections, was expected to equal or surpass that total.10 Combined, 
these two properties accounted for 25 percent of the estimated total 
licensing business in the US in 1966.  Overall, LCA represented 35 
different properties for 11 publishing houses, motion picture and television 
producers and had licenses with over 900 manufacturers estimated at $100 
million annually.11 As a comparison, from January to June 1954, the six 
month period prior to Trendle selling the property to the Wrather 
Corporation, the licensor earned  
$37, 357.39 from 60 different Lone Ranger merchandising licenses, or, an 
estimated 5 percent of the total net sales on Lone Ranger merchandise, 
which was approximately $747,147.80.12 
LCA, in 1965-66, was bought by NPP, in exchange for 38,000 
shares of the publisher’s stock.13 A 1966 article in True Magazine called 
the deal an “all-in-the-family transaction,” since LCA already handled all 
of National’s licensing to begin with.14 From NPP’s perspective, the deal 
not only meant adding extra revenue from LCA’s existing licenses, but 
also further integrating their existing properties within an increasingly 
trans-mediated and merchandised web. As Liebowitz explained to stock 
holders, “in one form or another, Batman, Superman, Wonder Woman, 
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The Flash, Green Lantern and other members of our family of fiction 
heroes can be molded and merchandised to suit every taste - as television 
performers, as illustrations for magazine advertising and point-of-sale 
displays, as promotional products for the ice-cream, dairy, soft drink, 
baking and confectionary industries, as syndicated comic strips, and as 
hundreds of different toy and apparel products for children and 
teenagers.”15 
This year, 1965, was also when William Dozier’s Greenaway 
Productions and its partner, 20th Century Fox would enter into a 
production deal with NPP and ABC-TV for the creation of the Batman TV 
series. Since the mid 1950s, television had replaced radio as the central 
site for exposing trans-mediated brands nationally, and as such, the timing 
of NPP’s acquisition of LCA and its TV deal with Dozier and ABC was 
coordinated to generate a merchandising blitz. While the Batman TV text 
was necessary for developing new forms of brand recognition and 
merchandising outlets for the property, this function is often overlooked in 
favor of discussing whether the TV series inspired changes to the Batman 
comic book.  
Brooker, for instance, points to changes made to the comic book 
during this period in order to align it more firmly with the TV-series. 
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While Brooker points out that DC Comics did not sign away its rights to 
the Batman character or his representation, nor was it legally bound to 
incorporate changes Dozier suggested, he argues that they were 
opportunistic in building on the television series’ success.16 The Batman 
television series definitely helped revitalize interest in the sagging Batman 
comic book, which nearly doubled its sales the first year the TV series was 
on the air. 17  Changes made to the comic book included the reintroduction 
of Bruce Wayne’s butler, Alfred, who had been killed off several years 
earlier, because the Dozier production prominently featured the character.  
Brooker also cites DC Comics’ re-introduction of the Batgirl character 
because Dozier saw the need to add a female heroine to bolster the series 
sagging third-season ratings. Essentially, Brooker’s assessment places DC 
Comics in the passenger’s seat, occasionally giving directions, but 
essentially leaving the driving to Dozier. This is hardly the case. In fact, it 
was NPP’s production consultant, Allen Ducovny (who had also been 
involved in the production of the Superman radio series for Mutual radio 
throughout the 1940s), who initially approached Dozier with the idea of 
reintroducing the Batgirl character as a potential spin-off TV series.18 
Dozier acknowledged that LCA had similarly approached him about 
Batgirl possibly “opening up new merchandising possibilities.”19  
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Dozier’s hesitation came from his need for assurance that Batgirl 
would be prominently featured in the comic book before he invested part 
of his production budget in adding a new character to the mix. “What I 
would like to know is whether National Periodicals is planning to continue 
BATGIRL as an integral part of the BATMAN comic books or whether 
you will wait to get a reaction to the first BATGIRL installment before 
deciding whether or not to continue. We wouldn’t want to consider putting 
the BATGIRL into a show if we were to drop her shortly thereafter.”20 
While Batgirl’s eventual introduction on the TV series was in response to 
Batman’s ratings free fall, it was an idea already bandied about as a 
merchandising gimmick for nearly two years.  
Even as Brooker concedes that the series generated thousands of 
commercial tie-ins and hundreds of merchandised spin-off items, his 
continued privileging of the television text causes him to identify licensing 
and merchandising as by-products of the Batman series, rather than 
integral to its genesis. I argue that there was an explicit narrative 
connection between foregrounding Batman’s gizmos and gadgets as 
integral aspects of the plot of any given episode and the availability of 
Batman gizmos and gadgets for consumption in department stores and 
supermarkets across America. As Lorenzo Semple Jr., Batman’s 
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supervising scriptwriter, bluntly wrote to Dozier prior to the series debut, 
“I can tell you that we’ve created one absolutely guaranteed new t.v. star: 
The Batmobile.” 21 Similarly, LCA’s Jay Emmett explained that Batman 
was a better licensing property than Superman because of the gadgets. 
“Superman does everything with his own superhuman powers. This is fine 
for the forces of righteousness, but not so good for licensing agents. 
Batman, on the other hand, is a licensing agent’s dream. ‘Batman is a guy 
like you and me,’ Emmett said dreamily, ‘he needs equipment’.”22    
The DC Comics/Dozier agreement called for each party to get a 
percentage of the merchandising rights. ABC also got a share in exchange 
for handling the massive publicity campaign for the series.23 The 
Licensing Corporation of America, a subsidiary of National Press 
Periodicals, which also happened to own DC Comics, handled the 
licensing for the series. While DC Comics sales for Batman comic books 
doubled the year the Dozier series debuted, it is perhaps more significant 
that NPP’s net profits rose nearly 16 percent from the commissions they 
collected on Batman merchandising licenses, with an estimated 10-20 
percent rise anticipated for 1966.24 Batman comics sold at 25 cents a book; 
the commissions earned from merchandising licenses promised to be 
significantly higher. As an added bonus, Liebowitz boasted that profits 
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rose without NPP “gambling with its own capital” on the television 
production, whose budget was entirely absorbed by Greenaway/Fox and 
partly subsidized by ABC.25 Instead, NPP received a royalty of $1000 
each time an episode aired and 20 percent of the profits generated through 
advertising revenue and syndication sales.26 
Moreover, Dozier’s investment in foregrounding merchandising 
opportunities on the TV series was not only linked to his company’s 
percentage deal, but also to the changing production culture of television 
in general. The money ABC paid per episode of the Batman series was 
only a fraction of the actual production cost, meaning that Dozier had to 
hope the series would last long enough to generate the minimum number 
of episodes necessary to see profits from syndication rights.  ABC paid 
Dozier $65,000 per episode. Each episode was rumored to cost well over 
$75,000.27  This differential increased his eagerness to reap merchandising 
rewards, which were doled out yearly, in order to offset the uncertainty of 
syndication profits. In fact, Dozier wrote to Jay Emmett at LCA at the end 
of the 1965-66 season and requested a list of Batman merchandise 
available in order to help better promote those items on the series and in 
its surrounding publicity in the upcoming season. In response, Emmett 
sent Dozier a list of the 173 Batman licensees as of September 1966 (after 
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only half a season on television) and the items they manufactured.28 
Included on this list was a Batman and Robin trading card game 
manufactured by Trans World Sales, which claimed to be tied directly to 
the TV series, that advertised to potential retailers that “the fantastic story 
situations that will appear on next week’s ABC-TV’s BATMAN program 
are shown on every BATMAN GAME card you distribute this week.”29 
While the promotional gimmick was somewhat misleading (there was a 
possibility that the scenario portrayed on a game card might be included at 
the end of a Batman cliff-hanger episode and if so, customers could win 
cash prizes), it suggests a highly integrated relationship between programs 
and merchandise, designed to tie viewer ratings to consumer purchases.  
Brooker accurately identifies that the majority of merchandise 
generated was aimed at children (1/3 were toys), but points out that adults 
also partook in Batmania through creative “poaching” in pop art, 
discotheques, dances, and even haircuts inspired by the Batman series.30 
Much as Brooker claims that adult responses were directly related to the 
show’s pop-art status (a factor heavily promoted by ABC and Dozier), I 
argue that they were also explicitly linked to licensing and merchandising 
strategies. The Batman series generated a publicity blitzkrieg even before 
it debuted on television and a lot of the publicity overtly linked the series 
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to the pop art movement, going so far as to invite artists Andy Warhol and 
Roy Lichtenstein to an advance screening of the series premiere. Pop art 
drew upon advertising and comic books for inspiration.31 The publicity 
departments at ABC and LCA also heavily promoted these adult 
derivatives as evidence of the Batman brand’s popularity, even though 
most of them operated without official licensing approval or royalty 
payment. This is because these “poachings” were largely supportive of the 
larger consumer culture that Batman merchandise thrived on while taking 
the spotlight off the deliberate merchandising logic that drove the series.  
The changing television programming climate of the mid-1960s 
also contributed to the style politics of the Batman series.32 Lynn Spigel 
has identified the emergence of the “fantastic sit-com” during this period, 
which infused the genre’s familiar domestic setting and nuclear family 
formula with gimmicks such as making the main character a witch 
(Bewitched) or a genie (I Dream of Jeannie) or a Halloween monster (The 
Munsters, The Addams Family). 33 Fantastic sitcoms both re-enforced and 
unraveled the containment logic of the domestic comedies they parodied, 
and as such, were designed to appeal to audiences of different ages by 
operating on both a zany childlike level and by reveling in the ‘uncanny’ 
to the point of becoming satirical spoofs of the middle class values that 
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earlier domestic comedies unabashedly endorsed.34  
This dual-address strategy also bore an uneasy connection to 
licensing practices as they had been developed over the past thirty years. 
Whereas Trendle had repeatedly argued that his properties appealed to 
both adults and children and could be easily tweaked to cater to one over 
the other depending on sponsor needs, the Batman TV series, as well as 
others, sought to appeal to both audiences at once. Trendle argued against 
pandering to children, believing that the Lone Ranger’s appeal for all 
audiences laid in the virtues the character possessed, not the arousal of 
emotions through cliffhangers and illogical plot contrivances. Fantastic 
sitcoms purposely reveled in absurdity, however, and asked older viewers 
to read stories allegorically or with a sense of irony. As Semple explained 
the Batman audience strategy to Dozier, “I wrote the most dangerous line 
in Bat-Poop, when I reminded writers that we must appeal on two levels: 
to kids & grown-ups too. I see now, appeal on sophisticated level must 
come from inherent juvenility of story-line.”35 
  Despite their prior incarnations, such dual-address strategies, as 
well as the practices of licensing agencies like LCA in general, were 
treated as unprecedented by the trade and popular press coverage they 
received, rather than mere intensifications and adaptations of existing 
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processes. For example, in 1966, a True Magazine article described the 
licensing profession as “one of the least known ways to make a buck in the 
business world.”36 Elaborating on what LCA did, the article explained that 
licensors act as “broker[s], deal[ing] out permission to manufacturers to 
make products using the name of the property” while fulfilling the 
multiple roles of “legal advisor, salesman, merchandising expert, package 
designer, promoter, advertising consultant, brusher-offer, whooper-upper 
and Dutch Uncle.”37 Licensors performed these multiple roles in exchange 
for 5 percent of the wholesale price of a manufactured item, which was 
then split between the licensor, the intellectual property owner, and others 
involved in publicly promoting the property, such as television or film 
producers.38 The article also nicely articulated the complex relationship 
licensors had to their clients, both selling to them and advertising for them 
at the same time.39 It also pointed to the role of moral arbiter that licensors 
had to assume, choosing whom to license to or not based on existing 
assumptions of needing to protect children. In the article, Stone described 
a potential client who wanted to sell soft drinks for dogs bearing Lassie’s 
image. Stone turned him down, not because he didn’t think the product 
would sell, but because he worried that children might accidentally 
consume it.40 While the article accurately described the licensing trade, it 
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also a-historically identified Stone and Emmett’s work as essentially 
launching the licensing profession (with a brief nod to Mickey Mouse as 
well).41 Much of what I have argued in previous chapters situates these 
practices and attitudes as emerging in a much earlier era.  
What the article accurately conveyed, however, was the growing 
importance and recognition of licensing as central to business practices 
within cultural industries, rather than on the periphery or in the interstices, 
operated by independents. Beyond celebrating LCA’s “selling-out” to 
NPP, the piece also identified the television networks as also possessing 
their own internal licensing divisions, and discussed the growing 
complexity of divvying up royalties as merchandising rights became more 
important to production deals. Explaining how the royalties for James 
Bond merchandise were divided, the writer stated, “the divvy on the 
licensing fees is a complicated one. LCA gets its cut. [Bond Executive 
Producer, Harry] Saltzman and his co-producer, Albert R. (Cubby) 
Broccoli, get theirs. Glidrose Productions, to whom Bond’s creator, Ian 
Fleming, sold 51 percent just before he died, gets a cut, as do Fleming’s 
heirs. In addition, United Artists, the films’ distributors, gets a percentage, 
and even actor Sean Connery gets a percentage from Saltzman and 
Broccoli. That’s a lot of willing hands, but what they are cutting up is five 
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percent of a very rich and filling pie.”42 
It is perhaps both surprising and obvious that within this media 
environment, the Green Hornet would finally get its much delayed 
television series. On the one hand, the various practices that Trendle had 
championed were now a fully integrated facet of cultural production, and 
the success of the Dozier Batman series awakened institutional memories 
of other successfully merchandised properties that might be modernized 
and repackaged for consumption. On the other hand, Trendle’s valuation 
of his properties’ appeals were believed to be outmoded, as were his 
assertions of his rights to external managerial authority in order to protect 
and preserve the integrity of his brand and audience expectations of it. 
 
GREEN HORNET DEAL 
Nevertheless, Trendle finally made a deal on September 29, 1965 
with 20th Century Fox Television (TCFT) and Greenaway productions to 
create a television series based on the Green Hornet property. Trendle also 
had entertained offers from MGM-TV and Screen Gems for the property. 
As Trendle wrote to Lee Bland at the Leo Burnett agency, “everybody 
seems to want THE GREEN HORNET since the James Bond series turned 
out so well.”43 Dozier’s success with the pre-sale of the Batman TV series 
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to ABC likely also played a part in TCFT backing the deal. Both Bond and 
Batman were tremendous coalition-audience builders with multiple 
merchandising outlets, and the Green Hornet was likely seen as replicating 
this pattern.  
The Green Hornet TV series debuted on September 9, 1966 at 
7:30PM on ABC-TV opposite Wild, Wild West (1965-1970) on CBS and 
Tarzan (1966-1969) on NBC. Wild, Wild West was a hybrid-genre show 
that incorporated elements of the spy thriller into the western setting. 
Similar to the Green Hornet brand, Tarzan was based on a pre-sold 
property. The Tarzan brand had been much more fully exploited over the 
years than the Green Hornet though; by the 1960s it had generated 
multiple films, comic books, a long-running comic strip, and a radio 
series.  Both Tarzan and Wild, Wild West were  hour-long programs, while 
The Green Hornet was 30-minutes. Viewers would have had to miss the 
first half of these two programs in order to watch The Green Hornet (all 
three started at 7:30PM). The Green Hornet was followed by Time Tunnel 
(1966-1967) at 8:00PM. Of the three 7:30PM programs, Wild, Wild West 
was the only one to crack the Nielsen’s national top-30 ratings. It finished 
in 23rd place with a rating of 22.0. In comparison, The Green Hornet drew 
a National Nielsen rating of 16.1 during the first two weeks of October 
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1966. The Green Hornet outranked Tarzan and Wild, Wild West however 
when only the top-30 urban markets were counted, earning a 34.6 rating 
the week of October 19th, which was good for second overall behind Rat 
Patrol.44  As Dozier explained to Trendle, “some shows by their very 
nature do better with people in urban areas as against rural areas.”45 Since 
this was prior to the networks’ privileging urban markets over their rural 
counterparts, ABC cancelled The Green Hornet on January 21, 1967 after 
only 26 episodes. Though counter-programming on CBS and NBC played 
a part in the series’ demise, many of the difficulties encountered in the 
actual production can be traced back to the contract Trendle originally 
signed with TCFT. 
The TCFT contract called for a $2000 initial licensing fee to be 
paid to TCM’s licensing arm, The Green Hornet Inc. (GHI), plus an 
additional $750 for every episode produced. GHI also earned 25 percent of 
any net profits from sale of the series and related merchandising 
opportunities. Trendle was personally paid an additional $500 per episode 
as a consultant, and was granted final script and casting approval, so long 
as his suggested revisions were not “unreasonable.”  The contract also 
contained contradictory language that gave TCFT and Greenaway the 
rights to create derivative materials based on the original Green Hornet 
 474
series while it also protected the original source material against 
substantial revision. Article 1c of the contract gave the producers the right 
to “translate, adapt, arrange, change, transpose, add to and subtract from 
said property and its title as Fox may desire... subject to paragraph 7.”46 
Paragraph 7, however, stated, “the picture produced hereunder shall not 
depict ‘The Green Hornet’ in a manner substantially different from which 
he or the other major characters were depicted in the radio series. The 
relationship of the characters to each other and their reaction to any set of 
circumstances and their behavior much [sic] in general be consistent with 
that contained in the radio program.”47 As production of the series got 
under way, the conflicting interpretation of these clauses would become a 
central point of contestation between Dozier and Trendle. Trendle claimed 
he had the right to reject any materials that were deviations from the radio 
series, while Dozier argued that the contract gave him the right to 
modernize and update the property so long as the core cast and premise 
were maintained.  
The contract gave TCFT and Greenaway until April 1965 to 
submit a pilot script and until December 1965 to start principal 
photography on said pilot, and then allowed an additional year, until 
December 1966, to sell the series to one of the networks.48 They would 
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need only a fraction of that time to sell the series. On March 1, 1966, ABC 
bought the series before a pilot script had even been written, based largely 
on the success they had with Batman.49 On March 3, 1966, ABC 
committed to 17 initial episodes.50 The TCFT contract gave the producer 
exclusive merchandising and licensing rights, but also the right to sub-
license these, which TCFT did to ABC-TV on March 15, 1966.51 In 
exchange, ABC agreed to pay TCFT $72,500 per episode and $17,500 per 
repeat.52 The actual cost of producing a Green Hornet episode ranged 
from $112,000 to $120,000, requiring Dozier to engage in deficit 
financing until the series reached syndication. This was where 
Greenaway’s affiliation with TCFT came into play, as the film studio 
leased Dozier space and equipment, the cost of which would be deducted 
from the gross receipts the series earned. ABC immediately went to work 
on the merchandising and publicity campaigns for the new series, securing 
65 licenses and an estimated $267,500 in advance royalties from 
merchandisers before the Green Hornet pilot even aired.53 Finally, the 
contract prohibited GHI from entering into any other television deals for 
the Green Hornet property, including animation or live productions, for a 
period of five years following the final airing of the last permitted network 
telecast (whether of a new episode or a repeat).54 
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While theoretically generous, the contract Trendle signed with 
TCFT actually contained multiple clauses that worked against GHI 
sharing in any profits from the series or its related merchandising. Though 
guaranteed 25 percent of the net profits, the contract defined these as gross 
receipts minus distribution fees, distribution expenses and negative costs. 
Distribution fees included 10 percent to TCFT for selling the series to a 
domestic network, 10-35 percent for selling the syndication rights either 
nationally, regionally, or locally, 40 percent for selling the international 
syndication rights, and 50 percent for the merchandising rights. 
Distribution expenses included all monies spent by TCFT on publicity for 
the series, while negative costs incorporated all expenses borne in the 
production of the series, including a 15 percent overhead fee for leasing 
space and equipment from TCFT. Finally, a 6 percent accrued annual 
interest charge was also deducted before net profits were calculated.55 The 
deal with ABC transferred most of TCFT’s rights to the network and 
added a 36 percent merchandising fee that was also taken from the gross 
receipts. Any percentages guaranteed to talent (by the 1960s, actors, 
writers, directors, and producers had all started demanding a percentage of 
merchandising pie as part of their contracts) came out of the remaining 64 
percent of the gross receipts on merchandising, and only then was the 
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remainder divided up 4 ways between TCFT, Greenway, GHI, and ABC-
TV.56  Though all this might seem very complicated, what is crystal clear 
is that both TCFT and ABC built profit-generating mechanisms into their 
contracts that ensured that they made money before net profits were even 
calculated (and which, in turn, severely reduced the total possible net 
profits the series could make). TCFT profited from distribution and 
overhead fees, while ABC-TV took a percentage of the Gross 
Merchandising receipts, but both GHI and Greenaway had to wait until 
negative costs were recouped before sharing in net profits. Moreover, 
since the average production cost per episode of The Green Hornet greatly 
exceeded the amount of money ABC-TV paid Greenaway Productions, the 
negative costs were virtually impossible to recoup unless the series was 
successful enough to have a long syndication run.  
 
MEMORY 
In the end, The Green Hornet was not a phenomenal success.  
While institutional memory of the merchandising possibilities that golden 
age radio properties possessed ensured that TCFT and ABC horded The 
Green Hornet’s profit potential, competing memories over what precisely 
had made the series a success in the first place also contributed to its quick 
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decline. Much as the True article suffered from lapses of memory when it 
came to the history of licensing before LCA, competing and selective 
memories would also inform the production of The Green Hornet 
television series.  Independent licensor’s like Trendle had paved the way 
for emergent media conglomerates and their focus on synergy, cross-
promotion, and other integrated brand strategies.  The Green Hornet 
television series would prove that Trendle's values were incommensurate 
with this new conglomerate system. Quite simply, what Trendle believed 
was essential to the popularity of the Green Hornet brand was radically 
different from what Dozier, Greenaway Productions, 20th Century Fox, 
and ABC-TV believed.  
To a certain extent, memory had always been invoked strategically 
by licensors. As early as the 1930s, Trendle and others relied on recycling 
strategies that necessarily recalled past successes at merchandising or 
building an audience in one regional market in order to attract a sponsor or 
radio station in another. Trendle kept meticulous records of otherwise 
ephemeral events such as audience give-aways, phone surveys, and fan 
letters, which would continue to serve as contemporary justifications for 
the Green Hornet brand’s appeal as well as his own managerial authority 
over it. Pierre Nora has described modern memory as archival, relying on 
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“the materiality of the trace, the immediacy of the recording, the visibility 
of the image” for proof.57 Trendle’s practices suggest that the archiving of 
memory was not only profitable, but also essential to the continued 
viability of otherwise invisible properties. 
Ian Gordon has argued that various incarnations of the Superman 
text rely on nostalgia and popular memory for their appeals to audiences. 
According to Gordon, the pleasure audiences take from the text is the way 
it reworks familiar characters and tropes to fit with contemporary settings 
and ideals.58 Gordon uses the example of the late 1980s/early 1990s ABC 
series, Lois & Clark: The Further Adventures of Superman’s focus on the 
sexual relationship between the two protagonists as one way the Superman 
myth was updated. “For baby boomers, Superman and Lois Lane’s sexual 
liaison repositioned Superman as a hero of his times.”59  
In this manner, Gordon argues that Superman texts transform 
nostalgia and memory into ideology and commodity, using earlier 
iterations of the Superman story to connect past and present, memory and 
market. “That Superman is invoked in anecdotes of childhood adds to the 
commodity value of Superman as a brand name. These sort of narratives 
may be intensely personal, but the sentiment embedded in them gains 
significance not only in the repetition of the story but also at a material 
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level when the creators of the narratives live out those sentiments by 
watching a television show, collecting comic books, or seeing the latest 
movie.” 60 Similarly, Clare Birchall argues that contemporary television 
shows like Dawson’s Creek purposely rely on nostalgic strategies in their 
narrative and aesthetic compositions that are both politically and 
commercially motivated.61 Dawson’s Creek’s regular inclusion of 1960s 
music and 1980s teen movie references in its scripts, as well as the 
production’s use of blue-filtered and yellow-hued camera lenses that gives 
the mise-en-scene a 1950s Norman Rockwell feel work to construct a 
“nostalgia for the present,” links contemporary youth cultures 
ideologically to the 1950s while promoting continuity between past and 
present through consumer goods that span the past fifty years.62     
While I agree that cultural producers have developed “nostalgic 
strategies” in their efforts to reach audiences, I question the contemporary 
nature of these activities. After all, 1930s and 1940s minstrel radio 
programs like Amos n’ Andy or Beulah and commercial brands like Aunt 
Jemima and Uncle Ben often relied on patronizing and “reassuring” - for 
white audiences in any event - stereotypes of incompetent and complacent 
Blackness that were as financially rewarding as they were ideologically 
fraught. Additionally, I question the institutionally cohesive infrastructure 
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that both Gordon and Birchall assume exists in order to underpin such 
ideological projects. Whereas Gordon argues that it is the unchanging 
mythological and symbolic aspects of Superman that resonate across and 
unite the diverse texts that represent the character,63 Bennett and 
Woollacott assert that the figure of James Bond changes in relation to the 
shifting industrial and cultural contexts that evoke him.64 In managing 
brand formulas, licensors paid very close attention to continuity and 
change, relying on memories of past successes to justify what could or 
could not be reworked in new iterations. Certain rules were sacrosanct; 
others could be forgotten.  
 Brooker interviewed DC’s librarian, Alan Asherman, who 
maintained that NPP kept a close watch on continuity between the Batman 
TV series and the comic book and guarded against transgressions of 
particular character “rules.”65 For example, Batman could not kill, or 
willingly allow another character, even a villain, to be killed, but he could 
visit a discotheque in costume and tell Robin that he was going to act 
inconspicuous. Batman’s costume always had a utility belt, but the 
significance of these gadgets versus, say, the character’s detective or hand-
to-hand combat skills varied according to the cultural climate that inspired 
various textual interpretations. Trendle made similar concessions and 
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adjustments, so long as they did not interfere with the more enshrined 
codes of conduct and relationship hierarchies of his properties.  Kato could 
be Japanese, Filipino, or Korean, but he was always Britt Reid’s 
“Oriental” valet. Likewise, the Lone Ranger could rally children around 
traffic safety one day, and the virtues of patriotism another, but he was 
never to be placed in a situation that risked his mask being removed and 
his mysterious identity revealed. Trendle recognized the importance of 
malleability in allowing brands to be adapted to shifting institutional, 
cultural and social conventions. However, these formula changes existed 
in a state of tension with the need to maintain certain inalterable character 
tropes. While Trendle justified maintaining certain “rules” on the basis of 
his past marketing experiences and others according to his need to protect 
the economic value of his properties, in many instances he insisted on 
maintaining particular character traits and codes of conduct simply 
because they fit their own worldview. For instance, though it served little 
narrative purpose and was out of step with the more sexually-liberal 
politics of the 1960s, Trendle would insist that Dozier’s characterization 
of Britt Reid’s (the Green Hornet’s alter ego) relationship with his 
secretary and potential romantic interest remain chaste and formal at all 
times by always having the hero refer to her as Ms. Case instead of by her 
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first name. These tensions suggest that licensors and licensees negotiated 
the ways properties were represented, rather than always acting in 
ideological or economic unison.  
 It would also be a mistake to think that the invocation of memory 
was simply a proactive strategy, meant to increase business. As Benjamin 
asserts, “to articulate the past… means to seize hold of a memory as it 
flashes up at a moment of danger.”66 Licensors’ reliance upon 
remembering past successes were often defensive postures taken in 
response to shifting industry practices that sought to limit their authorial 
control and marginalize their properties, or both.  Moreover, licensor 
memories rarely went uncontested. Nostalgic claims to the everlasting 
appeals of a property were often met head-on by incredulous industry 
responses, which usually sought to ground the profit potentials of licensed 
properties within particular historical contexts and relegate past successes 
precisely to the past. The preceding chapter demonstrated how Trendle’s 
efforts to revitalize interest in the Green Hornet in the late 1950s were tied 
to his nostalgic and selective remembering of both his own and the 
property’s past successes; it  also demonstrated how this proved 
incongruent with the changing television production culture, which 
demanded new content, new pilots, and new relationships between 
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advertisers, producers, and networks. 
 Licensors have a vested interest in preserving the hegemonic, 
idealized cultural memory of their properties in order to demonstrate the 
properties’ constant appeal and the licensors’ continued control. Licensees 
often see the value of reviving nostalgically remembered properties, but 
are also invested in re-contextualizing such memories to suit shifting 
perceptions of audience expectations. This was particularly true in the 
mid-1960s, as nostalgia for ephemeral and debased popular cultural 
objects swept through the cultural industries, driven by both the cultural 
currency of the pop art movement and the economic rewards of the 
Batman television series. As I argued above, institutional memories of 
Batman were tied to the property’s merchandising potential of the use of 
gadgetry in his crime fighting. This was not always the main focus of 
earlier Batman stories, but was a significant element of the 1960s TV 
series. In this instance, NPP, LCA, and Greenaway’s memories were 
mutually aligned. Dozier and Trendle, however, would not remember the 
Green Hornet through the same green-hued lenses. While both Trendle 
and Dozier agreed that The Green Hornet needed to be modernized for a 
1960s audience, they had radically different understandings of what this 
meant. Whereas Dozier sought to emphasize the property’s gadgetry and 
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gimmickry as he had with Batman, Trendle believed that the property’s 
appeal lay in the civic virtues the Green Hornet embodied and his 
continuous battle against corrupt politicians and petty grafts.   
 Trendle’s intransigence versus NPP’s malleability emerges out of 
their respective production context. NPP was more flexible partly because 
of its existing production and distribution arms, which kept the 
corporation more directly in touch with consumer trends than Trendle, 
who had sold off the Lone Ranger and Sergeant Preston properties a 
decade earlier and had not produced new Green Hornet material since the 
early 1950s. In 1965, the same year he struck a deal with Dozier, Trendle 
formally dissolved TCM, the production arm of his licensing operation. In 
part, NPP’s flexibility when it came to questions of style derived from the 
primary source material for its properties, the comic book medium, which 
had been depicting fantastical visual images and stories for decades and 
had moved even further toward juvenile aesthetics in the 1950s because of 
the threat of government regulation. Trendle’s properties emerged out of 
radio, where the absence of visual cues required both added expository 
narration to explain what was happening in a logical manner and also a 
built-in anxiety that visible representations of radio heroes would not 
conform to audience expectations. Comic books were far less concerned 
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with realism and logic than radio productions. Moreover, radio’s historical 
requirement to act in the public interest had produced moral and civic 
justifications for plot developments and character motivations that comic 
books did not have to address until much later, after many of their star 
properties had already been introduced.  Whether these were followed 
through on or not, or appeased concerned citizen groups or not, is another 
matter. They nonetheless existed rhetorically and informed the culture of 
radio production. NPP’s apparent willingness to alter the Batman formula 
when measured against Trendle’s more entrenched position is, of course, a 
matter of degree. As I have argued, both Batman and the Lone Ranger had 
a set of fixed rules about what could or could not be done with the 
character.  
 Lynn Spigel and Henry Jenkins argue that memory often conflates 
personal and public history, producing a dialectic tension that allows 
people to explain their present identities by positioning themselves within 
a larger social historical context. “This autobiographical element 
continually entwines the past in present-day identities, so that people 
strive to place themselves in history, using the past as a way to understand 
their current lives.”67 I argue that a similar tension emerges within 
corporate cultures, as individual actors justify their right to make present-
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day economic and ideological decisions based on memories of their past 
accomplishments within a larger institutional history. The real impact of 
struggles between individuals within institutional cultures is largely 
dependent on the degree of authority each possesses. Precisely because the 
terrain of negotiation was often uneven, particularly following the shift to 
the classical network era, licensors like Trendle clung to particular 
memories of what the Green Hornet represented and why it was popular 
that attempted to recuperate his own diminishing authority. Trendle’s 
desire to maintain his managerial identity within a shifting production 
environment, and his reliance on memories of his past success to make 
demands, might seem merely misguided, if not for the script approval he 
was given as part of the contract he signed with Greenaway and 20th 
Century Fox. Trendle’s memories of the way he produced The Green 
Hornet radio series in the 1940s would be used to justify his efforts to 
police the present production.  
 
COMPETING AGENDAS: TRENDLE VERSUS DOZIER 
 On certain things, Trendle and Dozier were in complete agreement. 
Both understood that a Green Hornet television series debuting in the mid 
1960s would need to be modernized and updated to account for current 
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audience and network expectations.68 Some of the specific tensions that 
emerged, however, between Dozier and Trendle over The Green Hornet 
centered on competing memories of what made the radio series popular 
with audiences. Many of these struggles revolved around changing 
production and merchandising practices, differing cultural understandings 
of what made for “modern” entertainment, the need for inter-textual 
consistency, and the significance of the character’s moral values versus 
the gadgetry he used. 
 Initially, Dozier tried to suggest that Batman’s style would be 
appropriate and necessary in adapting The Green Hornet for the 
contemporary television market because of the network’s need to reach 
both adult and child audiences at a 7:30PM time slot. Urging Trendle to 
watch the Batman premiere as a point of reference, Dozier added, “I am 
sure you will agree that we can’t do straight GREEN HORNET stories 
today as they were done on radio. We must give the characters an added 
style and dimension which they didn’t have on radio in order to make the 
grade in the present day sophisticated television market.”69 Trendle’s 
vehement opposition, however, to The Green Hornet being compared to 
Batman quickly led Dozier to back away from this line of argumentation. 
Dozier relented that The Green Hornet would not be “camped up” like 
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Batman, but would be played straight. As Dozier explained to Trendle, “I 
certainly see no direct relationship between BATMAN and THE GREEN 
HORNET. They are entirely different characters and different kinds of 
material. BATMAN is infinitely more bizarre and un-real and therefore 
much less legitimate than GREEN HORNET. The only thing we must 
achieve in up-dating GREEN HORNET and making it palatable for 
today’s television market is to give it some sort of unique style without in 
any way detracting from its basic honesty and purpose.”70 Though Dozier 
had his own reasons for shifting away from any overt comparison of the 
proposed Green Hornet series with Batman, which included a desire to not 
become typecast by being his own copycat,71 this early disagreement with 
Trendle would set the stage for much confusion over where the 
distinctions between these two series really lay - stylistically, generically, 
and in terms of it’s imagined audience’s expectations.  
 It quickly became apparent that Dozier and Trendle each had a 
very different understanding of what the “unique style” of The Green 
Hornet series would be, which included what contemporary audiences 
wanted, what would make The Green Hornet modern, and, perhaps most 
importantly, what was meant by “playing it straight.”72 As Trendle would 
write to Leonard Goldenson, President of ABC, in 1970, bemoaning what 
 490
had become of the series, “the matter of ‘interpretation’ became 
paramount.”73 Trendle equated “playing it straight” with logic and realism, 
which he argued were key to attracting an adult audience. “I have the 
distinct impression that the minute that we get away from realism, and go 
into something that looks, more or less, fantastic, or ‘camp’, we’re taking 
away the effect of the balance of the picture... we might gain the younger 
element, but definitely kill the picture for the adults.” 74 Trendle defined 
the emphasis on gimmickry and gadgetry and the absence of logical and 
realistic plots or villains as the epitome of camp. 75 As he wrote to Dozier 
in 1965, while the show was still in pre-production, “I’m afraid you’re 
planning on making the GREEN HORNET a fantastic, unreal person 
which in my opinion would kill the show in six months.”76   
 Dozier repeatedly tried to explain to Trendle that the 1960s adult 
television audience appreciated exaggerated and parodist renditions of 
their childhood heroes and that by “playing it straight,” The Green Hornet 
was foregoing this audience in favor of a strictly juvenile one. “GREEN 
HORNET will likely not be as attractive to the adults as BATMAN 
because BATMAN has a campy approach which attracts many adults... 
Adults today are just not going to be interested in inconsequential crime 
stories about rackets in a city. Kids aren’t either, but kids are interested in 
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gimmicks, excitement, and action.”77 Even as he distinguished between 
the Batman and Green Hornet properties and conceived of their mode of 
address differently, Dozier still saw them both as part of the same generic 
and stylistic trend. One would be played for laughs,78 the other would tell 
straightforward costumed crime-fighter stories, but both were fantasy 
figures that fought bizarre villains with far-fetched gadgetry. As a 1966 
ABC promotional press release summarized, “Like ‘Batman’... ‘The 
Green Hornet’ will specialize in lots of action and plenty of far-out crime-
fighting gimmicks. But ‘The Green Hornet’ will be played for straight 
adventure, without the ‘camp’ humorous approach of ‘Batman.’”79 In fact, 
as The Green Hornet series began encountering ratings difficulties, Dozier 
drafted an 11-point plan to revitalize interest in it, which included 
“increased use of gadgets and gimmicks” and “more bizarre crimes and 
criminals, and more bizarre weapons used by criminals.”80  
 Trendle complained bitterly to Dozier about the ways the scripts he 
read detoured from the original Green Hornet formula. Amongst the 
elements Trendle objected to as “camping up” The Green Hornet  was the 
inclusion of a hidden door behind the fireplace from which the District 
Attorney would enter when visiting the hero.81 Trendle also objected to the 
characterization of the District Attorney as being at the Green Hornet’s 
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beck and call, instead of vice versa, as well as the generally inaccurate 
depiction of what a district attorney actually did. Dozier had changed the 
police commissioner character used in the 1950s Green Hornet radio series 
to a district attorney to avoid comparisons with Batman, which also had a 
police commissioner character, though the distinctions Dozier made 
between their function were largely titular.82   
 Trendle complained that plots were designed to emphasize 
gimmicks and gadgets over the character’s detective work and civic virtue 
and moreover, that these plots were often illogical and inconsistent when it 
came to the Green Hornet’s motivations.83 Dozier argued that audiences, 
particularly for a 7:30PM time slot, were willing to suspend disbelief in 
favor of fast-paced entertainment.84  Trendle demanded that plots be 
logical, or else audiences would feel cheated. “I’m a nut for trying to keep 
these things logical, so that when they’re viewed, the audience won’t say.. 
‘that’s crazy!’.. or, ‘that’s fantastic’... or, ‘this couldn’t be done!’. I like to 
stay within the realm of reality as far as we can. Give the audience all the 
action you want, but keep it believable.”85 In one instance, he complained 
that a script called for the Green Hornet’s car, the Black Beauty, to 
withstand a laser gun attack, which was illogical since it would obviously 
disintegrate the car’s windshield or tires. Dick Bluel, Dozier’s producer on 
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the series, wrote back agreeing with Trendle’s logic, but adding, 
“however, since there is no such thing as a laser gun in the first place, I 
think that once the premise is accepted the public will not offer any 
objection so long as we entertain them... At the point where logic and 
entertainment values are in conflict, as a Producer I will always choose 
entertainment.”86 Bluel compromised, however, by including a line of 
dialogue in the script that explained that the car had been coated with a 
special laser-proof liquid solution.87 Trendle responded, “in view of the 
fact that our friend Kato sits behind the windshield, I surely hope that the 
public get the idea that the special spray we are presumed to have used is 
transparent.”88 
 Trendle recalled that The Green Hornet was originally conceived 
for a young adult audience to teach them the civic importance of voting 
and to call their attention to crooked politicians and rackets that the 
government failed to bust.89 While these memories are inconsistent with 
the original Jersey-Milk-sponsored Green Hornet radio series on WXYZ, 
which was clearly aimed at children, they demonstrate Trendle’s 
continued belief that it was the hero’s moral values and civic/patriotic 
mission that attracted audiences and sponsors.90 Whereas Dozier sought to 
make the Green Hornet’s civic mission mere window dressing for a show 
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that focused on action, gadgetry, and frenetic entertainment, Trendle 
insisted that it was precisely this civic component that had made the Green 
Hornet popular. Invoking memories of audience responses to the radio 
series, Trendle boasted, “we received letters from all over the country 
asking if we could send the GREEN HORNET to those towns and clean 
up certain political problems which they weren’t able to solve 
themselves... One must keep the law-and-order man on a high scale doing 
things generally for the country not just for ordinary crooks and thieves - 
then you have show.”91 
 Dozier had to remind Trendle on several occasions that the Green 
Hornet was a fictional character and that there was a difference between 
playing the series “straight” and making it realistic. He reminded Trendle 
that it was the latter who had first introduced the Green Hornet’s gas gun 
and that this prop was far more outrageous than the trick fireplace Trendle 
griped endlessly about it. “Would you have me believe, George, old 
friend, that the moveable fireplace is more fantastic than a newspaper 
publisher who puts on a mask at night and goes out and fights crime 
carrying a gas gun and a hornet sting? Come now!”92 While Trendle 
conceded that the gas gun was the one “camp” element he had introduced, 
he remained resolute about the need for Green Hornet stories to be logical 
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and realistic in order to be popular. Noting that Jack Webb’s Dragnet was 
making a comeback in 1966, Trendle argued that The Green Hornet would 
have been better served following that series’ more logical storytelling 
than Dozier’s emphasis on gimmicks and gadgets.93 Dozier retorted, 
“Evidently you are never going to understand the difference between 
‘Dragnet’ and GREEN HORNET... ‘Dragnet’ is REAL... GREEN 
HORNET isn’t real. There is nothing real about a newspaper publisher 
who fights crime at night with a mask on. That’s the difference, and it’s 
the whole difference.”94 Dozier had wished to “play it straight” within the 
existing and recognizable fantasy that The Green Hornet fiction took place 
in, while Trendle sought to make the world the Green Hornet traveled in 
as realistic as possible. It is not that Trendle believed the Green Hornet 
character could ever be mistaken for a real person, as much as he saw the 
property as embodying an ideal that should exist in reality.  
 Inevitably, Trendle saw the value of the Green Hornet property as 
that of a role model who viewers sought to  become or to emulate through 
purchasing merchandise stamped with his insignia.  Dozier saw the 
property’s value as a fantasy that viewers could play along with through 
merchandise and other tie-ins, and as a distraction from the more serious 
and mundane aspects of American life. As the counterculture grew in the 
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mid-1960s and fears of juvenile delinquency were transformed into efforts 
to capitalize on (but also neutralize) the anti-authoritarian attitudes of a 
new generation of teenagers, such moralizing lessons became outdated. As 
such, where Trendle had changed the Green Hornet formula in the late 
1940s, transforming the character from a vigilante into a super cop 
working with the police commissioner, Dozier sought to re-introduce this 
anti-hero element. Trendle objected on the grounds that viewers would 
complain that they were glorifying criminals.95  
 In many ways, Trendle saw the new Green Hornet series 
continuing where the radio program had left off in 1952, with only a few 
ornate differences to account for changing fashion trends.96 In part, this 
reflected Trendle’s own antiquated values.  When Dozier sought to 
introduce the idea that Britt Reid’s father had been framed by criminals 
and perished in prison, Trendle insisted that the Green Hornet was 
motivated by patriotism and not vengeance. Trendle also objected to 
dialogue that suggested that Britt Reid’s secretary, Lenore Case, might 
challenge her employer’s authority.97 Trendle’s insistence on continuity, 
however, was also intrinsically linked with his understanding of what 
pleased audiences. He believed that the formula he and his partners had 
developed had to be maintained, or else audiences would complain that the 
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Hornet’s current incarnation bore no resemblance to his predecessor. 
 Trendle believed that viewers remembered the details and not the 
more general or prototypical aspects of the plot. He insisted that Dozier 
explain why the district attorney had replaced the police commissioner, 
the radio Green Hornet’s link to the justice system. He was concerned that 
audiences would be confused that Britt Reid and Kato no longer lived in 
the apartment they had inhabited on radio and that Mike Axford, Britt’s 
bodyguard on radio, no longer lived with them.98 Referring to proposed 
changes Dozier suggested regarding Britt Reid’s place of residence and 
the hidden location of the Green Hornet’s car, Trendle wrote, “These, I 
feel, must be preserved, to still have it a Green Hornet show, and popular. 
Otherwise, everybody will be making comparisons as to what it used to be 
and what it is now.”99 
 Trendle’s desire for continuity was itself continuous with his own 
inter-textual managerial role as consultant for The Lone Ranger TV series 
and producer of the radio series in the late 1940s and early 1950s. As I 
argued in chapter 3, Trendle sought to contain possible derivations from 
the successful and profitable formula his company had developed with the 
Lone Ranger, justifying homogeneity across texts in terms of meeting 
audience expectations for consistency. Trendle maintained a similar 
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attitude toward the Green Hornet property in the 1960s, believing that 
audiences would feel misled if the series changed its emphasis in any way 
and ratings would suffer accordingly.100   In a July 25, 1966 letter, Trendle 
states, “I know you fellows didn’t buy the Green Hornet for the sole 
purpose of using the name to make something else, so if you bought the 
Green Hornet because of its past reputation, then I think you ought to 
follow through on it... if we want to cash in on the past radio shows... and 
its national reputation, I think that’s what we’ll have to do.”101 
 Dozier objected that this made the series stale and bored viewers. 
“My personal feeling is that our shows have all looked pretty much the 
same and that our format is much too narrow... I want to move away from 
the rigid limitations of ‘racket’ stories. This is what gives our show the 
look of sameness... There just isn’t enough range in racket stories and they 
just aren’t exciting enough any more.”102 Moreover, Dozier believed that 
audiences might remember the radio series more generically (if at all) as a 
set of recurring (imagined) images and devices, but would not be 
concerned with (or even aware of) minor plot changes and character 
relationships.103  Dozier understood the series as putting a modern spin on 
an established, but essentially forgotten, property.  The Green Hornet, to 
Dozier, was a property for which the plot details and characterizations had 
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long faded from public memory, even as the broad surface elements - the 
Green Hornet’s mask, his gas gun, his suped-up automobile, the Black 
Beauty, his “mysterious Oriental” crime-fighting sidekick/ valet, Kato - 
continued to resonate in the popular imagination. Dozier saw those props 
as the centerpieces for the new program, with the stories acting as vehicles 
for focusing on these gimmicks and gadgets.104  
 To build on Elric Neisser’s distinction, Trendle and Dozier 
understood the function of memory differently, as episodic, or detailed and 
plot-driven versus repisodic, or broad and prop driven. Each attributed the 
pleasure audiences derived from the original series to these different forms 
of memory.105 Regardless of which perspective was more accurate -- there 
is ample evidence that contemporary comic book and television fans are 
intensely interested in continuity -- it is clear that Trendle misunderstood a 
fundamental aspect of 1960s television programming that tweaked 
established formulas with innovative or fantastical twists precisely to elicit 
comparisons with the original. As Spigel has argued about the fantastical 
sitcom, part of the pleasure producers believed it generated was the way it 
played with established viewer understandings of the genre’s 
conventions.106 Likewise, Spigel and Jenkins assert that the 1960s Batman 
TV series elicited many comparisons by critics with the 1940s comic 
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book, and while these were not all favorable, they still contributed to the 
tremendous publicity the series generated.107 Greenaway productions and 
ABC’s publicity campaign for Batman emphasized the ways they had 
changed the original comic book material, while still retaining its core 
elements. By comparison, the publicity for The Green Hornet stressed 
how the series was essentially the same as the one that had been on radio 
twenty-five years earlier, reproducing rather than updating conventions 
that audiences already understood (if not specifically from The Green 
Hornet series, than from the crime-fighting genre in general).108  
 In an era when parody and genre-mixing allowed the networks to 
have it both ways, Trendle’s refusal to foreground differences between the 
radio and television series’ was incongruent with the economic and 
cultural value the cultural industries staked in established brands. Dozier 
finally spelled this out for Trendle while responding to his repeated 
inquiries over why Greenaway Productions had bought the rights to the 
Green Hornet if they only intended to change the formula: 
The reason we bought GREEN HORNET was because we 
felt it was a well-known title which could be transformed 
from a 1940 radio series to a 1966 television series just as 
we had successfully transformed BATMAN from a 1935 
comic book success to a 1965 television smash. What you 
have insisted on our doing, however, is not transforming 
GREEN HORNET into a 1966 television show, but trying 
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to do a television version of the 1940 radio series — 
keeping all those stories about the petty rackets, etc., etc.; 
allowing THE GREEN HORNET to function only at night, 
etc., etc.; wanting ‘Extra! Extra!’ to be blurted out at the 
end of each show, etc., etc.... If there is anything wrong 
with the television series, it is simply that we have tried to 
keep the flavor of a 1940 show and push it off on a 1966 
audience in television form, and they just haven’t accepted 
it.109 
 
 Trendle’s desire for continuity extended beyond The Green Hornet 
text to his own role as licensor. He saw his managerial role in ensuring 
brand continuity as unchanged, with only a different financing 
arrangement to contend with. In reality, while his contract called for script 
approval, Trendle had very little leverage to actually refuse scripts. With 
The Lone Ranger television series, TCM allocated the production funds 
supplied by General Mills and thus could threaten to withhold payment if 
changes were not made according to their specifications. In 1966, ABC-
TV and TCFT had complete budgetary control and Trendle’s input was 
ceremonial at best. Dozier saw Trendle’s script approval rights as the 
ability to highlight broader elements, not to comment on the details of plot 
development and character consistency. As such, he expected Trendle to 
understand that Greenaway could not address every suggested change he 
made.110 Trendle often refused to accept this new role. He treated his 
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contractual right as a bargaining chip to hold over Dozier for the most 
minute of script inconsistencies. For example, referring to a script that he 
didn’t feel properly clarify that the crooks the Green Hornet had busted 
would be convicted in a court of law, Trendle threatened, “The purpose in 
the contract, of having final approval of scripts, was to avoid things like 
this, which do not interfere with your plot... Otherwise, I’ll have to send 
disapprovals on all these scripts, until I get a chance to straighten them 
out, and if I do that, you can’t shoot, and that will leave us in a bind.”111 
 His objections to scripts were regularly accompanied by 
suggestions that Dozier’s writers should listen to some of the radio 
programs he had produced.112 He also repeatedly reminded Dozier of his 
past successes, which he used to justify his careful reading of every script 
with an eye toward reproducing the formula that, in Trendle’s mind, was 
key to ensuring audience satisfaction. Before tearing apart The Green 
Hornet pilot script, he confessed to Dozier,  
It makes it embarrassing for me to differ with you on any of 
these things, so before I get into the matter of discussing 
the first draft, I’m going to brag a little bit, and see if it will 
soften any of the criticisms I may later make... I have 
personally proofread, corrected, approved, cast and assisted 
in the production of over 3000 Lone Ranger radio shows 
which were very successful. The program carried a high 
rating for over twenty years, and was sold to Jack Wrather 
for three million dollars. During the same time, I also 
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personally proofread, corrected, supervised and assisted in 
the production of some 2000 Sergeant Preston of the 
Yukon radio shows with like success over a long period of 
years, and later that program was sold to Jack Wrather for 
one million and four hundred thousand dollars...I feel that I 
do know audience reaction; I do know what kept those 
radio shows clicking for that long period of time; and I 
believe I still have the audience ‘feel’. This is rather an 
embarrassing statement to make, but I want you to know, 
Bill, that I am well qualified to judge whether [a] Green 
Hornet script is good or bad.113 
 
 Trendle’s constant objections and threats were finally met by 
Dozier sternly reminding him that they were not co-producing the series. 
Likewise, Bluel dismissed Trendle’s complaints as unreasonable, 
chastising, “You will have to allow me, as the producer, the choice of 
deciding what dramatic form to use in telling this story... You certainly 
have every right to suggest a different approach, but I cannot accept your 
turning down scripts for this reason.”114 Trendle simply retorted that he 
was exercising his contractual rights. “I haven’t rejected scripts right and 
left. I’ve only exercised the rights granted to me under the contract, which 
we all understood before it was signed... these pictures were not, in the 
main, Green Hornet radio stories.”115 While Trendle never went so far as 
to stop production, his micro-management resulted in multiple re-writes 
and a refocusing of the overall thrust of the series. Even though Trendle 
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was never satisfied with the final product, he succeeded in wearing Dozier 
down to the point where The Green Hornet never met either’s 
expectations.116 As Dozier conceded toward the end of the series:  
It has not been easy, George, to work around your 
particular brand of censorship, and I must tell you if I have 
my way about it again, I would never go into another deal 
where a basic owner of a property has any rights of final 
approval of scripts. I think one thing that has been wrong 
with GREEN HORNET is that we have tried too hard to 
make it too much like the radio series, whereas had we 
been left to our own devices we would have probably gone 
much more in the modern direction – and yes, even in the 
direction of BATMAN, which is what I think the public 
was expecting and also what the network was expecting. 
Everyone was expecting that but you, and I think we have 
let everybody down and apparently we have even let you 
down.117 
 
 Faced with imminent cancellation, Trendle finally admitted that 
the series “wasn’t particularly pleasing to either of us because it hit the 
middle of the road, instead of going one way or another.”118 Trendle’s 
recognition was accompanied by his relenting on his criticisms on the final 
two episodes that would be produced. It was too little too late. The Green 
Hornet was cancelled (or, more accurately, it received official notification 
that it would not be renewed) on January 21, 1967. In total, only 26 
episodes were produced. ABC chose to broadcast a new series during the 
second half of the season rather than showing Green Hornet repeats. 
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 While it would be inaccurate to argue that the struggles over 
memory in which Trendle and Dozier engaged were the only reason The 
Green Hornet television series failed, it is clear that these tensions led to a 
great deal of confusion over who the audience for the series was and how 
best to please it. In a last ditch effort to save the series, Dozier decided that 
rather than fight Trendle on his vision of the audience for the series, he 
would lobby the ABC network to extend The Green Hornet program from 
thirty to sixty minutes and put it on later in the evening, where a more 
adult audience could be reached.119 In this effort, he asked Trendle to 
supply him with concrete evidence that there had been a significant older 
following for the radio series, particularly amongst the teenagers and 
young adults.120 Trendle responded, “we now come to the embarrassing 
part of your letter, because I have no research available as to audience 
composition in these various time periods.”121 In place of statistical 
evidence, Trendle once again recited from memory his belief that “THE 
GREEN HORNET was created for the group between the ages of 18 and 
25, i.e., the young voters-to-be, to show them, dramatically, what crooked 
politicians could do, and what lax police departments don’t do to stop 
rackets... I think we did a swell job, and had a good audience.”122 This is 
not to suggest that Trendle was mistaken about the composition of the 
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original radio audience but that, in the end, these recollections could not 
be translated into the types of audience measurement information that 
Dozier needed to convince the networks.    
 There are certainly other factors that contributed to The Green 
Hornet’s failures. Even though Dozier and Trendle did not want The 
Green Hornet to become a copycat series for Batman, they could not 
break the Batman link. As argued above, while Dozier and Trendle were 
anxious not to replicate the Batman formula with this property, this is 
precisely what ABC was expecting and, to some extent, likely what 
audiences were expecting as well, given the way promotion of the two 
programs consistently emphasized their similar backgrounds as modern 
television adaptations of popular pulp heroes. Those backgrounds, 
however, were not as similar as it might seem. Emanating from very 
different source materials, Batman had a long history of visual 
representation in comic books that the Green Hornet did not. As Hal 
Humphrey explained in his disapproving LA Times TV Times review of 
The Green Hornet TV series, “on radio one couldn’t see the Green Hornet, 
or his ridiculous mask, or his even more ridiculous car. Within the privacy 
of our imaginations we allow for some stretching, but when we come face 
to face with anything so unbelievably bizarre as the Green Hornet, and are 
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asked to take him seriously, then credulity is taxed beyond limits even 
entertained by imbeciles.”123 While Humphrey ignores other existing 
Green Hornet visual representations that preceded the TV series  - the 
comic book, the film serials, and the premiums - his assertions point to the 
general absence of such images from popular culture since the 1940s.  
Whereas the Batman comic book was ongoing, there was not a continuous 
public record of Green Hornet materials available for audiences to 
compare the with the 1966 TV variation. Humphrey’s scathing review 
further pointed to the underlying confusion over what type of Green 
Hornet would appeal to audiences, noting that one of the series’ central 
failures was its insistence on the character being taken seriously despite 
the absurdity of the material. 124  
 In any event, The Green Hornet seemed to suffer by comparison 
with Batman on multiple fronts. It was not camp enough to build a dual 
audience of adults and children, nor gimmicky or bizarre enough to sustain 
children’s interest alone. It therefore could not live up to ABC’s 
expectations for the coalition audiences and merchandising tie-ins that 
Batman had produced. At the same time, The Green Hornet also suffered 
from Batman exhaustion. After an initial ratings bonanza, by 1966 
Batmania was beginning to cool off. . In 1965-1966, the Batman series’ 
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first year on television, Thursday episodes ranked fifth overall with a 
Nielsen rating of 27.0. The Wednesday episodes ranked tenth with a 24.7 
rating.  By 1966-1967, neither episode made the top thirty programs. In 
part, this was because the other networks switched their competing 
fantastical series to color, whereas in 1965 Batman went head-to-head 
with the still black-and-white Lost in Space series on NBC. In part, this 
was also because ABC had overexposed the series in their efforts to 
maximize on its early success. The Batman series ran on consecutive 
nights, Wednesday and Thursday, with a cliffhanger used at the end of 
every Wednesday episode to bring audiences back the following night. 
While this initially had proven successful, by 1966 audiences had realized 
that they could be filled in at the beginning of Thursday’s episode as to 
what had happened the night before and therefore did not need to watch on 
both nights. Tellingly, Batman’s ratings suffered most on Wednesday 
nights. Dozier tried to get ABC to change the formula and make Batman 
an hour-long series, but to no avail. Finally, by the late 1960s, with the 
Vietnam war airing on the nightly news and the Civil Rights movement in 
full swing, adult audiences were clamoring for more complex 
programming that directly confronted these issues, rather than using satire 
and allegory to soften their blow. By the late 1960s, many fantastical 
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sitcoms were being replaced by dramas or more socially relevant 
comedies. Batman was cancelled mid-way through the 1967-68 season.  In 
a climate of declining interest in Batman’s formula, The Green Hornet 
suffered because it shared the same producer and had been perceived by 
ABC as attracting a similar audience, even though all evidence suggests 
that it failed in comparison in all regards.  
 The decline of the fantastical sitcom and the rise of more socially 
relevant comedies went hand-in-hand with the networks privileging urban 
audiences over their rural counterparts. Many fantastical series carried 
high ratings in rural areas, but only mediocre ones in major metropolitan 
areas. Thus, CBS, the top-rated network at the time, decided to cancel the 
majority of its fantastical comedies in 1970, replacing the top-rated 
Beverly Hillbillies with series like The Mary Tyler Moore Show, a comedy 
about a single working woman. The Green Hornet, which was neither a 
comedy nor as fantastical as ABC had hoped, actually carried above-
average ratings in the top-30 urban markets, but was a ratings failure when 
the rest of the country was included. While there is no way of knowing if 
the outcome would have been any different, it is worth noting that ABC 
gave up on the series before the networks and their sponsors started 
valuing urban demographics above their rural counterparts. While all of 
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these factors undoubtedly played a hand in the series’ short run and quick 
cancellation, the conflicting approaches taken by Trendle and Dozier to 
the source material also prevented the producers from adjusting the 
formula to suit either network interests or those of the changing imagined 
audience. Competing memories of what had made the property profitable 
effectively rendered it non-competitive. The end result was not only 
cancellation of The Green Hornet series after only 26 episodes, but also, 
due to the contract Trendle signed, the death of the brand. 
 
DEATH OF A BRAND 
 As discussed earlier, The Green Hornet series and its related 
merchandise never produced a profit for either Dozier or Trendle. 
Certainly, both men (and their respective companies) earned some revenue 
from the project. Dozier received a small percentage of merchandising that 
was paid out prior to the calculation of net profits, while GHI was paid 
$750 per episode produced and Trendle an additional $500 per episode as 
a consultation fee, but neither saw a share of the net profits. This is largely 
due to the average cost per episode of the series, between $112,000 and 
$200,000, versus the total monies handed out by ABC-TV, $72,500, and 
the limited number of total episodes produced -- too few to make any 
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significant syndication arrangement. Moreover, GHI did not have any 
royalties built in to its contract for repeats, meaning that after the initial 
episode aired, its revenue earning ceased until the show was sold into 
syndication. As of the final episode produced, the negative cost of the 
series was $3,166,570.89, a figure that included a 15 percent overhead fee 
charged by TCFT.  
 TCFT and ABC-TV continued to profit off the series even in its 
failure because of the distribution and merchandising fees built in to their 
contract, which were guaranteed regardless of whether the show turned a 
profit or not. According to TCFT’s accounting records, as of September 
26, 1970 The Green Hornet series was still in the red, needing to recoup 
an additional $1,304, 349.31 before it would begin turning a profit, even 
though the series had actually generated $2,878,489.51 in gross revenue in 
the three years since it had first debuted. This revenue included earnings 
from licensing, merchandising, and off-network syndication sales. TCFT 
and ABC-TV claimed $419,155.26 of that revenue for themselves in 
distribution and merchandising costs, even though technically, the series 
was unprofitable.125 This failure to generate profit might have been 
sustainable had it not been for the five-year waiting period built in to the 
TCFT/GHI contract, which forbade Trendle from making another 
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television deal with the Green Hornet property until April 1972. This 
effectively closed off all other revenue streams as well, since without a 
nationally broadcast series, most other ancillary markets were unwilling to 
take a chance on the property. For example, as soon as the TV series was 
cancelled, Dell Publishing, which had been contracted to produce a Green 
Hornet comic book, cancelled its  
contract. Trendle did pursue the audiocassette market, but there was very 
little money to be made in recycling old episodes as novelties and 
nostalgia (for the licensors, not the distributors, who did decently).  
 Trendle did not take this stalemate sitting down. Between 1968-
1970 he made several attempts to convince Dozier to revive production 
interest in the series with another network, this time strictly following his 
1940s formula. Trendle even offered to canvass for a sponsor himself, 
with Dozier only needing to worry about the actual production.126 
Trendle’s proposition suggests the degree to which he was completely out 
of touch with how television was being produced in the late 1960s, 
regardless of whether his vision for the series might have been successful 
or not. By the late 1960s, sponsors were no longer investing directly in 
television production. 
 Exhausted from Trendle’s overbearing tactics, Dozier replied, “I 
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don’t wish to offend you any more than I already have on several 
occasions, but I honestly would not be interested in producing a GREEN 
HORNET television series along the lines of the radio show, no matter 
how much money there might be in it. You may find it hard to believe, but 
there are many things I will not do for money, and this is one of them.”127 
Trendle was unwilling to accept Dozier’s refusal to revive the program 
and, as of 1970, was still haranguing ABC-TV to let him out of his 
contract. Still claiming that if the television series were made along the 
lines of the radio show, it would have been profitable, Trendle offered to 
pay off the remaining $1.3 million loss through offering the network a 
percentage of whatever profits he would make from producing a new 
series. Trendle reasoned that this was the only way for ABC-TV to recoup 
its losses and that it did not make financial sense for them to sit on the 
property instead of allowing Trendle to revive interest in it. Once again, 
Trendle failed to understand the degree to which merchandising and 
distribution revenue earned from syndication were central to network 
profits. While GHI earned nothing from the series, ABC-TV continued to 
make money off of it, which they were unwilling to relinquish by having a 
competitive and updated product to contend with. The network’s desire to 
earn residual income off repeats and discounted merchandise outweighed 
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their interest in reactivating the brand.  
 
CONCLUSION 
 Independent licensors had prided themselves on their managerial 
roles, reigning in network, sponsor, and other cultural producer ideas that 
threatened the economic or moral values of their properties. By the end of 
the 1960s, the networks and film studios saw such independents as 
hindrances, since their functions were now being fulfilled in-house. 
Moreover, the cultural landscape had shifted since the 1930s from a 
pronounced anxiety about selling to children and conflicting attitudes 
toward consumption and civic duty, to a consumer-driven entertainment 
machine that unabashedly targeted the youth market without needing to 
invoke moral values or to teach civic participation.  The networks 
reasoned that the need for such a close monitoring of their work by 
independent licensors was no longer either necessary or welcome. While 
Trendle’s dated ideas about what had made the Green Hornet popular 
were not the only factors that contributed to the television series’ failure, 
they were identified as such by Dozier, who claimed that it was precisely 
this independent owner seeking to manage his property from outside the 
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studio and network structure that interfered with the profitable exploitation 
of the brand.  
 George Trendle died in March 1972, one month before The Green 
Hornet TV rights would have reverted back to him. While it is 
questionable whether Trendle might ever have succeeded in landing 
another television deal, it is clear that by the time of his death, branding, 
licensing, merchandising, and cross-promotion had all become integral to 
the networks and studios' cultural production logics. ABC-TV and TCFT 
each had their own licensing and merchandising divisions. Kinney's 1965 
purchase of NPP (and with it, both DC Comics and LCA) followed by 
Warner Bros., in 1969 would not only create one of the largest 
entertainment conglomerates of its era (and beyond), but also one whose 
business model was built around in-house brand management and 
extension. By the end of the 1970s, after adding Time, Inc. to its media 
empire, the re-christened Time-Warner would produce one of the most 
ambitious projects to date premised largely on mobilizing intellectual 
property within a diversified and integrated media corporation: Superman: 
The Motion Picture (1978). Though often overshadowed by Star Wars' 
success a year earlier, Superman better exemplifies early conglomerate 
efforts at brand management, taking the Superman property and not only 
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building a major motion picture franchise around it, but also tying 
promotional and merchandising efforts for the films back into Time-
Warner's book, magazine and comic book holdings. Though updated for 
the 1970s, the Superman movie largely recycled elements of the brand 
formula that had been in circulation since the 1940s, offering audiences 
both continuity and innovation.  The innovations, however, largely 
presupposed existing audience understandings of what the Superman 
brand was and what the icon stood for so that new elements could be 
directly compared with their memories of the film’s comic book, comic 
strip, cartoon, live-action television and film serial precursors. Indirectly, 
Time-Warner owed many of these ideas to work done over a century 
beforehand by independent licensors like Trendle. 
 Trendle, however, would most likely not have succeeded in re-
launching the Green Hornet brand even had he lived to reclaim the 
television rights. Trendle’s unwillingness to rework the Green Hornet 
formula in order to recast for emphasis on gadgetry and gimmickry 
coupled with his insistence on the hero’s civic virtuousness remained out 
of touch with television programming strategies, even as independent 
producers in the 1970s managed to reclaim some of their lost autonomy. 
In 1970, the FCC introduced the Financial Interest and Syndication (Fin-
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Syn) and Prime Time Access rules (PTAR), which were intended to break 
the networks’ control over program production and syndication and to 
stimulate competition amongst independent producers. Fin-Syn limited the 
number of programs a network could own and the number of times they 
could exhibit programs before the syndication rights reverted back to the 
producer. PTAR forced the top-50 markets to stop carrying network 
programming during the first hour of prime-time, opening up space for 
independent productions to sell programs directly to affiliates.  Though 
these conditions held promise for Trendle (had he lived long enough) to 
produce a Green Hornet TV series as he saw fit, independent of network 
control and ownership, there still would have been the question of what 
type of program to produce.  
 As the networks recast their prime-time line-ups to cater to urban 
audiences and responded to demands for more socially “relevant” 
programming, new series like All in the Family, Mary Tyler Moore, and 
M.A.S.H. appeared. Though produced by new independents like Norman 
Lear, MTM and Larry Gelbard, who exercised greater creative and 
financial control over their productions, these series featured morally 
complex and ambiguous characters that would not have fit Trendle’s 
model for creating heroes. Moreover, these series were almost exclusively 
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comedies, not action-adventure or crime shows. Action and crime 
programming also continued to be produced in the 1970s, but these shows 
were more expensive than the sitcoms and thus remained reliant on 
Hollywood studio and network financial support (the networks fought the 
Fin-Syn rules, delaying their full implementation until 1980).  
 Moreover, programs like The Six Million Dollar Man (Harve 
Bennett and MCA-Universal, 1974-1978), The Incredible Hulk (Kenneth 
Johnson and MCA-Universal, 1978-1982) and The Mod Squad (Bud 
Ruskin, 1968-1973) continued Batman’s legacy of emphasizing gimmicks 
and gizmos in their narrative formulas and extensively merchandised 
products ranging from lunch pails to action figures, posters and board 
games to novelizations and comic books. In all three instances above, the 
characters were the gimmicks. Again, this was antithetical to Trendle’s 
formula, which stressed that audiences wanted to purchase merchandisable 
props (costumes, weapons, etc) that were extensions of the hero’s inner 
virtuousness, not outer appearance.  Trendle continued to misunderstand 
the television market, just as licensing and merchandising were becoming 
central to its operations. Finally, though the producers of The Six Million 
Dollar Man and The Incredible Hulk might (arguably) have had greater 
creative control over the television production itself, licensing and 
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merchandising rights continued to be handled by larger corporate entities 
like the networks, studios and comic book publishers. As such, even had 
Trendle regained managerial authority over the Green Hornet formula, this 
would likely not have been accompanied by control over the branded 
inter-text of merchandise and other licenses that were central to the 
business model he had cultivated from the 1930s-1950s. Managing the 
formula was merely a precondition for extending the brand. By the late 
1960s, this model was no longer operational. The independent licensor had 
become obsolete while the brands they licensed and the strategies they 
championed would continue on without them, this time from inside 
diversified media conglomerates. 
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Chapter Seven: Conclusion 
In a July 12, 2006 interview appearing in the Comic Shop News, 
writer Brett Matthews describes the genesis of the new Lone Ranger 
comic book debuting September 2006 from Dynamite Entertainment. 
Matthews’ explanation of the how the Lone Ranger brand is being re-
interpreted for contemporary audiences reveals the extent to which 
recycling the long-established elements of the Lone Ranger formula, now 
encoded as culturally iconic memories, are integral to the industrial labor 
that goes into reactivating classic intellectual properties. Matthews states: 
I think it’s okay if things evolve. But you know what? – the 
characters you love and the stories you remember from 
back when you were a kid, they’re not going anywhere. 
Nothing can or ever will take them away. And so I thinks 
it’s okay – actually a really good thing, when more people 
get to discover something you find so special... if the core 
of the thing remains that same, on some level you’re all 
responding to the same thing, which is probably what made 
the Lone Ranger an icon in the first place. And why he 
should always remain one... That said, some re-
interpretations are just about getting back to basics or the 
roots of a character, set in a world that is applicable to the 
audience of today.1  
 
 Matthews’ comments hint at the marketability of nostalgia and the 
availability of technologies and media distribution systems that circulate 
older versions of brands alongside their modernized updates.  They also 
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reveal the extent to which formula management remains essential to 
extending brands well into the twenty-first century, as does the 
continuation of recycling practices -- both core components of 
independent licensor occupational functions. As the article succinctly 
summarizes Matthews’ plans for the Lone Ranger, “[They] include 
something old and something new – a lot of classic Lone Ranger, 
seasoned with elements of contemporary reinterpretation.”2  
 With the recent relaunch of the Superman film franchise and 
success of the Spiderman films, there can be no doubt that extending 
branded commercial intertexts across media and merchandising sites are 
central to contemporary conglomerate strategies. Brand formulas remain 
carefully managed, with particular attention paid to marketing both the 
universal – as opposed to strictly American or historically contingent – 
appeals of these properties and their iconic cultural status. The ubiquity of 
branded properties in almost every possible mediated form and 
merchandising ploy have allowed millions of consumers who may perhaps 
never have read a Superman comic book or seen an episode of the 1950s 
Lone Ranger television series to become familiar with these characters so 
that they seem to be merely free-floating popular culture signifiers rather 
than proprietary properties. Eileen Meehan’s explication of Tim Burton’s 
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Batman’s commercial intertext, in which merchandise and media spin-offs 
were not merely bi-products of the film, but essential to extending the 
audience’s experience of the Batman brand, remains relevant to 
contemporary branding strategies.3 While the two Spiderman films have 
grossed a combined $777,292,220, those profits do not include revenue 
generated from the Spiderman theme park ride, soundtracks, 
novelizations, animated cartoons, action figures, toys, ephemera and the 
Spiderman comic books, which continue to be both the source materials 
for the films and sites that incorporate and extend the movies’ narratives 
and plot innovations. The sites where iconic brands remain invisible or 
unauthorized remain equally important. Tellingly, there is no Superman or 
Spiderman-brand pornography, condoms, cigarettes or malt liquor on the 
market 
 Where this project has intervened in industrial histories of media 
conglomeration is in situating these inter-textual branding practices much 
earlier, tracing their roots back to the 1930s and the work performed by 
independent licensor’s like George Trendle. It is important to 
acknowledge the generative mechanisms that have led to contemporary 
media practices in order to understand these continuities, and to watch 
how these practices have been transformed to meet shifting industrial 
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conditions and cultural attitudes.4 As such, this project is in dialogue with 
scholarship on the “New Hollywood,” complementing the work of Tom 
Schatz, Richard Maltby, Eileen Meehan, Valerie Wee and many others by 
pointing to the ways current cross-promotional, trans-mediated, and 
intertextual strategies were negotiated nearly three-quarters of a century 
prior.5  As Jay Hoberman argued in his elaboration of “vulgar 
modernism,” all of these elements, though perhaps more intensely pursued 
in the current era, have precedents in earlier cultural and industrial 
practices; those historical connections must be excavated and analyzed if 
we truly hope to understand the contemporary media climate.6 This project 
is also in dialogue with works by Christopher Anderson and Michele 
Hilmes on early cross-media interactions.7 By focusing on the roles played 
by licensors to negotiate these relationships by positioning the brand as a 
shared commodity existing above any particular media text, I have argued 
for the importance of intermediaries in transforming media practices and 
the need for historical accounts that recognize these occupational 
communities that often have existed between producers and sponsors, 
networks and studios.   
 In this project, I have argued that Trendle’s licensing 
practices would prove influential on the development of this occupational 
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community. While he was not the only licensor operating in the 1930s – 
most newspaper syndicates licensed their comic strip properties and Walt 
Disney and John Dille were heavily invested in merchandising Mickey 
Mouse and Buck Rogers materials as well – Trendle was arguably the 
most invested in asserting both his ownership and managerial authority 
over the brand formulas used to showcase the Lone Ranger and Green 
Hornet. Future comparative research on Dille, Disney and Trendle would 
help flesh out how normative Trendle’s actions were in relation to other 
licensors.  Also, future research must consider the significance of 
Trendle’s position as an independent regional radio network owner in 
delineating his creative control over his brands in relation to Dille and 
Disney’s respective starting points as a print publisher and film producer 
with different audiences, conventions of authorship, and marketing 
strategies at play.    
Trendle’s conflation of authorship and ownership would be taken 
up in the early 1940s by cowboy stars like Gene Autry, Roy Rogers, and 
William Boyd, who both embodied their brand identities and acquired the 
rights to merchandise their own images. Similarly, cartoonists like Charles 
Schultz and Hank Ketchum asserted greater control over their comic strips 
in the early 1950s, demanding greater percentages of merchandise 
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royalties and stricter control over the creative exploitation of the Peanuts 
and Dennis the Menace brands. As Trendle was the least directly involved 
in the creative process, he foreground his role as moral arbiter, supervising 
the exploitation of his brands and ensuring that their moral integrity 
remained formulaicly consistent. While Trendle’s assertion that ownership 
and authorship were linked would help shape media industry discourse on 
trademark protection in the 1950s, the licensor’s insistence on his 
continued role as moral arbiter as central to this authorship function 
exceeded industry norms by the late 1950s and was seen as a hindrance to 
the full exploitation of media brands. In effect, while Trendle’s practices 
helped establish industry licensing and merchandising norms, the degree 
of creative and managerial authority he commanded contributed to his 
eventual downfall. 
 In following Trendle’s career and the development and attempted 
exploitation of the Lone Ranger and Green Hornet brand formulas, this 
project has provided a historically-situated analysis of how licensing and 
branding practices were popularized and gradually incorporated within 
larger trans-media conglomerates. I have argued in favor of investigating 
the work practices and cultural values of licensors in shaping intellectual 
properties into cultural icons, while also tracing how many of these work 
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practices were eventually co-opted by emerging media conglomerates 
even as the occupational habitus – the cultural values and work habits that 
defined the boundaries of licensor occupational identities – were 
increasingly marginalized. By the time Trendle finally managed to get the 
Green Hornet on television in the mid-1960s, many of the cross-
promotional, recycling and merchandising strategies he had championed 
for nearly thirty years quickly were becoming industry standards. Yet, 
Trendle’s own identity as an independent intermediary, who managed how 
the Green Hornet formula was being interpreted and guarded against 
deviations that might upset the public’s appreciation of the brand, were 
now considered anachronistic interferences with the smooth process of 
brand exploitation. Though the Lone Ranger and Green Hornet brand 
formulas promoted the innate goodness of corporate capitalist values, the 
era of independent entrepreneurialism that had helped shape these icons 
was over. As the networks and studios began operating their own in-house 
licensing and merchandising divisions that closely managed brand 
extensions and intellectual property infringements, and as concerns over 
the negative implications of transforming children into consumers 
subsided in the postwar era (partly in response to the work done by 
Trendle and others on foregrounding the civic virtues of their brands), 
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independent licensors like Trendle found their roles greatly reduced, either 
to merely collecting royalties by leasing out their property, or to becoming 
company men working within, rather than alongside, larger corporate 
entities.   
 It is clear, however, that by the time Trendle’s career was ending, 
conglomeration was still at a nascent phase, with only MCA-Universal up-
and-running and Kinney’s purchase of Warner Bros only hinting at the 
emergence of the Time-Warner empire. It would take these conglomerates 
until the 1980s to begin truly exploiting the cross-promotional possibilities 
of their brands. In other words, there is a historical gap in the transitional 
years between Trendle’s downfall and the full integration of brand 
exploitation strategies. While this project has demonstrated that licensing, 
merchandising, and other synergistic trans-mediated practices did not 
begin with conglomeration in the late 1960s, but were integral aspects of 
media and merchandise production from the 1930s onwards, a substantial 
amount of work still remains to be done analyzing and comparing how 
branding strategies, once absorbed into conglomerate business models, 
have shifted as the once independent cultural intermediaries that managed 
these properties became fully integrated members of the corporate 
machine.  A comparative study between Gene Autry’s efforts to brand and 
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license his own singing cowboy persona, William Boyd’s work on 
licensing Hopalong Cassidy, and Trendle’s contemporaneous strategies 
with the Lone Ranger would shed light on how generalizable licensing 
practices in the late 1940s were, especially amongst agents working to 
extend cowboy brands. Additionally, the Wrather Corporation’s 
exploitation of the Lone Ranger brand differed from TCM’s strategies 
only a few years earlier and the Licensing Corporation of America’s 
(LCA) emergence in the mid-1960s changed licensing strategies once 
again.  A comparative study of Wrather’s efforts with the Lone Ranger in 
the late 1950s and LCA’s work on Batman, Bond, and other licenses in the 
1960s with Trendle’s own struggles to exploit the Green Hornet brand 
would be an important means of distinguishing how licensing practices 
adapted to meet changing production environments and cultural attitudes. 
Tracing how licensing practices have shifted from LCA’s work in the 
1960s to current branding efforts by Marvel Comics and Classic Media, 
Inc., (CMI) would allow for considerations of how different industrial and 
cultural climates articulate longstanding brand formulas differently, while 
still continuing to reference previous iterations.  
 Contemporary branding strategies must contend with media 
technologies that allow past texts to be preserved while they circulate 
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alongside current brand articulations; they must also consider  the rise of 
fan communities who have far greater investments in and knowledge of 
the continuity and malleability of brand formulas. As a result, current 
branding efforts also pay very close attention to inter-textual continuity, 
with a greater eye toward marketing formula innovations and 
modernizations by directly comparing them with earlier renditions. 
Reviews of the current Superman Returns motion picture repeatedly have 
discussed its purposeful referencing of the 1978 blockbuster film through 
scenes that visually recreate moments from the original, while giving 
those iconic moments a modern twist. For example, the opening of the 
film recreates the destruction of the planet Krypton and the rocket ship 
with baby Superman traveling toward earth by overlaying the original 
dialogue spoken by Marlon Brando as Superman’s father Jor-El.  Tthe 
classic John Williams orchestral music plays on top of new CGI graphic 
effects that render the planet’s explosion and the ship’s trajectory in 
spectacular fashion.  Another example of this would be the 2005 Dukes of 
Hazard feature film that included the original 1978 TV pilot of the 
television show as a special feature on the recent DVD release. While such 
comparative recycling strategies are purposeful marketing ploys, they also 
provide opportunities for scholars to examine how successful cultural 
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brands are readjusted to meet changing assumptions about audience 
expectations and consumer habits.  
 In tracing a licensing lineage from Trendle to Wrather through 
LCA and CMI, it would be possible to investigate the subtle shifts 
amongst licensing agents’ attitudes toward their work, as their own 
intermediary and independent statuses gradually declined – to the point 
where LCA became just a division within Time-Warner’s media empire. 
Similarly, it would be important to analyze licensor’s shifting occupational 
roles in relation to changing definitions of youth markets and the attending 
concerns over exploiting young consumers as enacted in regulatory, 
corporate, and cultural arenas over the past half century.  
 This project has attempted to fulfill the demands made by scholars 
Paul DuGay and Sean Nixon, Liz McFall, and Keith Negus for in-depth 
and historically situated explorations of the particular motivations that 
undergird cultural intermediaries in its focus on the occupational habitus 
of the licensing profession prior to conglomeration.8 This historical 
intervention argues for the need to understand the motivations and cultural 
values that shaped licensor business practices, not merely the outcomes of 
such strategies. Roland Marchand has argued that adverting agents in the 
1920s saw themselves as apostles of modernity, ushering in a new era of 
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consumption and teaching the American public how to take advantage of 
the myriad consumer choices available to them.9 I argue that licensors saw 
themselves as moral arbiters who helped bring consumers to sponsors, but 
also guarded against consumer exploitation through misappropriation of 
their brands.  In so doing, I also have argued in favor of cultural economic 
approaches to analyzing media practices, which explore how cultural 
values inform production processes in conjunction with how production 
processes shape cultural products.  
 Moreover, I have demonstrated throughout this project how 
George Trendle helped construct the very category of cultural 
intermediary that I’ve assigned to him. This is an important contribution, 
because it suggests that occupational identities are neither stable nor 
natural, but always shaped through the experiences, actions, and values of 
the individuals working within them. In particular, Trendle occupied a 
complex position as both cultural creator and producer on the one hand 
and inter-textual manager and moral arbiter on the other. As such, the 
licensor occupied both an insider and outsider status that most cultural 
intermediaries cannot attain. In part, Trendle’s creative authority emerged 
out of his position as an independent radio station owner, which allowed 
him to initially operate unfettered by larger institutional and corporate 
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demands on his properties. Already having established creative and 
production control over the radio formula for the Lone Ranger, Trendle 
was then able to license the brand – and his services as manager and 
arbiter -- to other cultural manufacturers and producers, sponsors and 
networks while retaining his own creative authority over the production 
process. Once radio’s centrality for sponsors and networks dissipated by 
the mid-1950s, however, resulting in Trendle’s loss of direct production 
control over his brands, the licensor’s authority as cultural intermediary 
also diminished.  
Trendle’s career suggests that while we currently envision cultural 
intermediaries as existing on the interstices between producers and 
consumers, but not actively involved in the production process, 
historically, certain intermediaries functioned as both producers and 
mediators. Arguably, Trendle’s double status as both producer and 
licensor finds parallels in the contemporary comic book industry, which 
continues to use the creative aspects of comic book storytelling to generate 
new characters and formulas that can then be licensed out to toy and 
merchandise manufacturers and other media producers. Future work on 
the historical relationship between production and mediation amongst 
cultural intermediaries must explore how those aspects intersect and are 
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informed by changes to larger institutional structures and cultural values. 
 While I support the theories put forward by scholars like Paul 
DiMaggio, Paul Hirsch, Richard Petersen, Janet Staiger and Janet Wolff 
about the production of culture, I have diverged from their models by 
exploring precisely those “inexplicable” and “imaginary” assumptions that 
DiMaggio and Hirsch inevitably conclude inform the gate-keeping 
functions performed by cultural intermediaries in determining what 
innovations are permissible and what lines cannot be crossed for fear of 
alienating or upsetting consumers and regulators.10 The production of 
culture literature is valuable in outlining how tensions emerge between 
different creative and managerial personnel in shaping both the product 
and production conventions for brand formulas. Inevitably, however, 
scholars like DiMaggio and Hirsch conclude that these tensions are 
resolved rationally while the “etiology of conventions about what is and 
what is not permissible… remains one of the sociology of art’s 
outstanding mysteries.”11 I have argued in favor of a cultural economic 
approach to analyzing tensions between actors precisely because it does 
not see conflict resolution as rational, but rather as informed by struggles 
over conflicting and shifting cultural values and efforts to rationalize these 
values as economically viable. Moreover, I have articulated how cultural 
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producers write their own values onto those of the audiences they imagine; 
values shaped by their particular class and occupational taste cultures.  
 By exploring how Trendle positioned himself as a cultural 
intermediary who simultaneously managed cross-promotional relations 
between different cultural producers and helped bring consumers and 
sponsors together, I have articulated a complex relationship between the 
cultural and economic values that informed licensing practices. Believing 
that the economic viability of his properties emerged from their 
unchanging moral characterizations and generalizable formula 
adaptations, Trendle often privileged preserving the brand’s continuity 
over economic gains that might be derived from either associating the 
brand with “unsavory” elements or by altering the formula. This often 
produced tensions over how the brand was articulated, but these conflicts 
were rarely economically motivated in the final instance (though Trendle’s 
insistence in preserving the brand’s sanctity was often justified in 
economic terms). Trendle saw himself as a moral arbiter who ensured that 
consumers – and particularly child consumers – were protected against 
egregious exploitations of his brands by producers and manufacturers. As 
such, Trendle was unwilling to change his business model even as 
licensing practices moved in-house, because such a shift was antithetical 
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to his occupational identity.  
 Clearly, future work on how licensing and branding practices have 
developed under conglomeration must explore how the values and 
attitudes of licensing agents have shifted in relation to changing cultural 
production climates and new social attitudes toward consumption, civic 
duty, and nationalism. As branding has gradually become a global 
phenomenon, overt references to Americanism in the formulas used to 
construct cultural icons have declined in favor of strategies meant to 
extend brands into international and transnational markets. Any future 
research into contemporary branding would need to investigate the 
shifting definitions of nationalism and civic participation as articulated 
through brand formulas that are not specifically targeting American 
citizens. The height of the Lone Ranger’s popularity in the 1950s also 
corresponded with a moment in US history in which containment logics 
intersected with both political and economic practices. As CMI works to 
revive the brand in comic book and feature film forms over the next 
couple of years, it will be interesting to see if and how it adapts the Lone 
Ranger formula to appeal to expanding global markets that thrive on 
multiculturalism and malleable (though still closely monitored) trade 
borders.  
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 Throughout this project, I have argued in support of Michael 
Kackman’s prioritization of the brand as the ultimate trans-mediated 
commodity of exchange, above and beyond the individual texts that 
promote it.12 By repositioning the brand as the primary object bought and 
sold by cultural producers, I have argued for the need to reconceptualize 
brand authorship as a form of inter-textual management across multiple 
mediated articulations and for the licensor’s authorial role as tied to this 
managerial function. Historically, licensors like Trendle worked to 
disassociate the actual creative work performed by actors, cartoonists, 
directors, and scriptwriters on Lone Ranger or Green Hornet texts from 
authorship of the brand itself. Though this primarily served to reinforce 
licensor control over properties, it also had the cumulative effect of 
making brands like the Lone Ranger appear “authorless” and thus a part of 
the popular cultural landscape, rather than a tightly managed formula 
whose authorship firmly rests in the hands of the property’s owners.  
Trendle sought to construct non-media specific Lone Ranger fan 
communities through the Lone Ranger Safety Clubs, which elevated the 
hero above and situated him outside of any particular textual 
representations that depicted his adventures.  The licensor also tried to 
separate the Lone Ranger’s status as a cultural icon from the actual work 
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performed in developing and sustaining that myth. For decades, Lone 
Ranger writers and directors toiled anonymously on the property, while 
the actors who adorned the Lone Ranger mask had virtually no public 
personas outside of the character they portrayed. In public, Clayton Moore 
was the Lone Ranger, not an actor who counted the character as merely 
one of many performances in a long, distinguished career. Given Trendle’s 
preference for obscuring the creative work done on the brand -- but not the 
managerial work he performed in maintaining the inter-textual consistency 
of the formula and moral virtues of the character – it is perhaps worth 
imagining for a moment what might have happened had the licensor struck 
a successful feature film deal with David O. Selznick, who not only would 
have insisted on his own authorial stamp on the project, but contemplated 
casting Gary Cooper as the masked rider. Cooper and Selznick’s star 
personas might arguably have eclipsed the Lone Ranger’s, 
demythologizing the property in the process as well as constricting 
Trendle’s own authority over the Lone Ranger brand.  
 While privileging the brand over the star would continue to be a 
routine practice well into the late 1980s, there has been a shift in branding 
strategies dating back to Tim Burton’s 1989 direction of Batman toward 
marketing the synergy between brands and the “unique” artistic visions of 
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the creative communities that are re-interpreting them. It is not so much 
that Tim Burton assumed authorship of the Batman brand, but rather that 
his authorial take on the presumably authorless cultural icon was essential 
to the film’s marketing campaign. Similarly, Bryan Singer’s take on the 
Superman myth is as essential to the marketing campaign for Superman 
Returns as the character itself. Publicity for the upcoming Lone Ranger 
comic book has also stressed the importance of the writer and artists 
working on the book to the franchise’s revival. “Licensing a classic 
character isn’t always a formula for success, though, which is why 
Dynamite set out to find just the right creative team.”13 Foregrounding the 
“interpretive” skills of the authors working on extending established 
brands suggests a changing role for both licensors and their roles as brand 
managers in the contemporary media conglomerate culture.  
 It also opens these brand formulas up for creative innovations for 
which licensors like Trendle never would have stood. Trendle insisted that 
violence be downplayed and graphic or gruesome depictions be eliminated 
entirely. The cover of the forthcoming Lone Ranger comic book features a 
blood-soaked Texas Ranger’s badge that emphasizes the violence of the 
hero’s origins [see image #1]. Likewise, Singer’s inclusion of a potential 
illegitimate child born to Lois Lane following her brief tryst with 
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Superman has produced heated discussions amongst both fans and the 
creative community working on other facets of the Superman brand over 
whether this ought to be written into the character’s inter-textual 
continuity. DC Comics has stated that it approved the formula change 
because it saw the need to update the Superman brand and make it less 
wholesome and more in touch with contemporary cultural concerns.14 
Singer’s star power must not be discounted, however, in its ability to 
effect this change. Comic book writer Tony Siegel proposed having Clark 
Kent and Lois Lane have a child together several years ago while he was 
writing the Superman comic. DC refused his request. Future research must 
investigate this shifting relationship between authorship and cultural 
brands and analyze how independent licensors, in erasing the creative 
work performed on their properties, helped establish the criteria through 
which creative interpretation of brand formulas has now become a routine 
media conglomerate practice. 
 It is also important to recognize that the current wave of licensed 
trans-media brands have tended to be of the superhero variety (Spiderman, 
Superman, Batman, X-men, Daredevil, Fantastic Four, Aquaman), most if 
not all tracing their origins back to the comic book industry. Efforts to 
revive the Lone Ranger brand since the 1960s, including the 1981 motion 
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picture and the 2003 WB television movie, largely have failed. This raises 
questions about both the sustainability of certain brand formulas over 
others and the roles of media origin and public archiving in keeping 
certain brands in the public eye better than others. The Lone Ranger and 
Green Hornet brands emerged out of radio and their formulas were 
initially designed to meet the specific needs of that media industry at a 
particular historical moment. Both brands were constructed to attract 
sponsors, deliver and protect children audiences, and develop premiums. 
Comic book superhero formulas were conceived with different media 
cultural and economic concerns in mind. Comic books trace their origins 
back to the adventure and detective genres popularized by pulp novel 
publishers – Superman debuted in Action Comics #1 while Batman first 
appeared in Detective Comics #23. Both heroes were featured alongside 
several other short like-genre stories – and comic strip syndicates' seeking 
to find a secondary market to reprint newspaper strips. Neither pulp novel 
publishers nor comic strip syndicates saw children as their primary 
audience. In fact, pulp publishers often catered to the lurid tastes assumed 
to belong to the lower classes (though actual sales were usually dispersed 
across all income brackets). As purchased items that consumers willingly 
chose to bring into their homes, comic books were not initially subject to 
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the same regulatory concerns as radio, which was a “free” service that 
entered the private sphere without consumer control over its content. 
While the comic book industry would undergo significant changes in 
terms of its target audience and content regulation, it is arguable that these 
initial conditions structured brand formulas quite differently than those 
developed for radio. 
 A comparative study between comic book and radio brands would 
shed light on how each constructed its formulas and its audiences 
differently, and may provide answers as to why certain icons continue to 
be popular while others have had more difficulty in maintaining a 
persistent public presence. For instance, in the early 1980s the comic book 
industry worked with local retailers to promote a collector’s market that 
encouraged fans to familiarize themselves with and seek out older 
iterations of particular brands. Promoting acquisition and consumption of 
an archive of past Superman, Batman, and Spiderman stories not only 
brought new consumers to these characters, but fostered a strong fan 
community intricately aware of the narrative continuities and formulaic 
elements of each brand. Comparatively, as television eclipsed radio as the 
site for fictional dramatic programming, it became virtually impossible to 
hear older Lone Ranger and Green Hornet radio episodes. Though some 
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episodes did circulate in transcription form on various local radio stations 
and other episodes were eventually packaged as audio cassettes for cars in 
the early 1970s, fans were not encouraged (nor were they able) to seek out 
missing episodes hidden in attic boxes, nor was a public repository created 
like that of comic book shops that stock back issues.  
 While Lone Ranger merchandise became collectors’ items, the 
formulaic texts that promoted the brand’s values did not. Old Time Radio 
(OTR) clubs have existed since the 1970s and have gained new exposure 
over the internet, but the content options remain limited to a handful of 
episodes. OTR clubs often traffic in anecdotal histories that tend to 
reinforce the mythical qualities of a property like the Lone Ranger, but do 
little to familiarize new audiences with the formula or encourage new 
versions of classic texts. Similarly, while Lone Ranger television episodes 
have circulated in reruns on cable networks devoted to nostalgia TV, like 
TV Land and Nick-at-Nite, the emphasis often placed on the historically 
finite texts on such cable channels rather than on the continuous brand 
often work against comparisons of formula innovations. Quite simply, 
comic book publishers not only encouraged collecting older versions of 
their branded products, but they encouraged collecting older versions of 
on-going branded products that placed an emphasis on a comparative 
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mode of formula assessment, not merely a nostalgic reverence for past 
iterations. Any future study of branding and licensing would need to 
investigate how different media origins contributed to marketing strategies 
intended to activate nostalgic interest in past brand iterations. As I stated 
earlier, contemporary branding strategies rely on audience pre-knowledge 
of a brand’s formula in order to promote “updated” versions.  
 Thus, it is telling that Dynamite Entertainment’s promotion of the 
new Lone Ranger comic book goes out of its way to compare the character 
with Superman, Batman, and Spiderman. The Comic Shop News article 
restates the Lone Ranger’s origin as synonymous with Batman’s and 
Spiderman’s – all three came into existence because they witnessed the 
murder of loved ones by criminals that compelled their crime fighting 
ways. Dynamite cleverly conflates the Lone Ranger’s historical setting in 
the 1870s with the character being the first superhero. “This is the first 
superhero we’re talking about, the first man to put on a mask and right the 
wrongs of the age! The inspiration for all others...”15   Not only is this 
comparison in sharp contrast to Trendle’s vehement opposition to compare 
his properties with the phony superhero varieties circulating on 1960s 
television, but it conveniently effaces the fact that the Lone Ranger’s 
creation in 1933 was contemporaneous with the birth of other modern pulp 
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heroes like the Shadow, Zorro, and the Phantom. 
 Another Dynamite press release refers to the Lone Ranger as the 
original defender of “truth, justice, and the American way” – Superman’s 
famed byline since the 1950s Adventures of Superman TV series.16 On the 
one hand, this is likely a case of opportunistic marketing that is attempting 
to tie the comic book into buzz being generated about Superman Returns. 
On the other hand, this promotional strategy speaks to the relative absence 
of recent Lone Ranger stories – either new or reruns – that could be mined 
for cultural references. Finally, the reference to the Lone Ranger’s mission 
to fight for the American way is telling of how the current formula 
engages quite differently with contemporary cultural concerns than the 
brand with which it is being indirectly compared. Superman Returns has 
raised eyebrows amongst conservatives for its deliberate exclusion of the 
American way as amongst what Superman fights for. Arguably, this is less 
a political statement on the part of the film’s producers than a strategic 
attempt to appeal to global audiences; yet, the brand’s failure to promote 
Americanism overtly (indirectly, it continues to push for increased 
corporate capitalism and consumerism) has been deemed unpatriotic by 
some. The Lone Ranger brand appears to be positioned quite differently 
through marketing that compares the hero not with the current Superman 
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incarnation, but with his 1950s counterpart who emphatically stood for the 
American way in much the same way that the 1950s Lone Ranger 
advocated for American exceptionalism. Studies of contemporary 
licensing practices must take into account the growing complexity inter-
textual management strategies and their relation to recycling brand 
formulas as forms of cultural nostalgia. 
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